Supreme Court of the United States

United States Ex Rel. Claussen v. Day

1929 U.S. LEXIS 362 · 279 U.S. 398 · 49 S. Ct. 354 · 73 L. Ed. 758

May 13, 1929 · Docket 416

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
The Court explained that the Immigration Act’s provisions apply to every non‑citizen, irrespective of how the person arrived in the country.
Headnote 2
The statute’s reach is not limited by the alien’s admission status; the law applies to all persons described as aliens.
Headnote 3
The Court held that the term requires an actual landing after having been abroad; mere presence on an American vessel does not satisfy the definition.
Headnote 4
When the petitioner landed at Boston in March 1918 after visiting foreign ports, the Court treated that landing as an entry that started the statutory five‑year period.
Headnote 5
The Court explained that a vessel outside U.S. territory, even if American‑owned, is not part of the United States for entry purposes.
Headnote 6
Section 19 provides that an alien sentenced within five years after his entry is subject to mandatory deportation; thus the clock starts at the moment of physical arrival from abroad.

Opinion

Mr. Justice Butler

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner is an alien held upon a warrant issued by the Assistant Secretary of Labor for deportation under § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, U. S. C., Tit. 8, § 155. On his petition, the district court for the southern district of New York issued a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent made return and after a hearing the writ was dismissed. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Section 19 contains the following: “At any time within five years after entry . . . any alien who is hereafter sen tenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the' entry of the alien to the United States, . . . shall, upon warrant of the Secretary of Labor, be taken into custody and deported.”

The facts are not in controversy. Petitioner is a native and subject of Denmark. He came to this country as a member of the crew of a British ship and landed at Norfolk January 22, 1912. He shipped the next day on an American schooner and subsequently served as a seaman on other American ships. October 19, 1917, he shipped from New York on the Elisha Atkins for a voyage to South America and return by way of Cuba; he landed at Boston, March 26, 1918. That was his last voyage from foreign ports to the United States. He was subsequently employed in American coastwise trade and resided for a time on land as representative of a seamen’s labor union. In June, 1919, he petitioned for naturalization and declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States. June 17, 1921, in the Cumberland county court in the State of Maine, he pleaded guilty to a charge qf manslaughter, the killing of James Walker at Portland on May 21, 1921, and was sentenced to imprisonment for more than one year. Subsequently a warrant of the Department of Labor was served upon him and after a hearing he was ordered to be deported to Denmark upon the termination of his imprisonment.

The question for decision is whether petitioner was sentenced within five years after his entry into the United States.

The provision extends to all aliens, that is, every person not a native-born or naturalized citizen. § 1; U. S. C., Tit. 8, § 173. It is immaterial whether h¿ was entitled' to admission or whether he lawfully entered. The cause for which his deportation was ordered arose after entry. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78, 91. Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291. His declared purpose to naturalize does not serve him here as he had not become a citizen. If his landing at Boston in 1918 was an entry he is rightly held.

Section, 1 provides that “ United States ” as used in the Act shall be construed to mean the United States and any waters, territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction thereof except the Isthmian Canal Zone. An entry into the United States is not effected by embarking on an American vessel in a foreign port. Such a vessel outside the United States whether on the high seas or in foreign waters is not a place included within the United States as defined by the Act. See Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100, 122. Scharrenberg v. Dollar S. S. Co., 245 U. S. 122, 127. The word " entry” by its own force implies a coming from outside. The context shows that in order that there be an entry within the meaning of the Act there must be an arrival from some foreign port or place. There is no such entry where one goes tó sea on board an American vessel from a port of the United States and returns to the same or another port of this country without having been in any foreign port or place. See §§ 19, 32, 33, 35.

And it is clear that petitioner departed from the United States on the Elisha Atkins and that, when he landed at Boston on his return from South American and Cuban ports, he made an entry into the United States within the meaning of the Act.

T > , ~ , Judgment affirmed.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 18, 2026

Summary

The petitioner, a Danish subject who first came to the United States in 1912 and later worked as a seaman, left the country on the American vessel Elisha Atkins in October 1917 and returned to Boston on 26 March 1918. After remaining in the United States, he was convicted of manslaughter on 17 June 1921 and, under § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, the government issued a deportation warrant because the conviction occurred within five years of his “entry.” The petitioner challenged the order by filing a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his 1918 arrival did not constitute a new entry for purposes of the statute. The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the Boston landing was an entry; the Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that “entry” under § 19 means a physical arrival in the United States from a foreign port, and each such arrival restarts the five‐year period. Because the petitioner’s 1918 arrival satisfied that definition, the five‐year clock began then, making his 1921 conviction fall within the statutory window and justifying deportation. No concurring or dissenting opinions were filed. Accordingly, the Court upheld the lower courts’ dismissal of the habeas‐corpus petition and the order to deport the petitioner.

Updated July 18, 2026

Statement of Facts

The petitioner is a native and subject of Denmark who entered the United States as a member of the crew of a British vessel, landing at Norfolk on 22 January 1912. He thereafter worked as a seaman on American ships, including a voyage on the Elisha Atkins that departed New York on 19 October 1917, called at South‐American ports and Cuba, and returned to Boston on 26 March 1918—his last arrival from a foreign port. After that date he remained in the United States, working in the coastwise trade and serving as a representative of a seamen’s labor union, and in June 1919 he filed a petition for naturalization. On 17 June 1921, in the Cumberland County Court of Maine, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the killing of James Walker and was sentenced to imprisonment for more than one year. Pursuant to a warrant issued by the Assistant Secretary of Labor under § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, the government ordered his deportation to Denmark upon the termination of his sentence. The petitioner challenged that order by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking release from custody and denial of the deportation. The government (respondent) defended the order by invoking § 19, contending that the petitioner’s arrival in Boston on 26 March 1918 constituted an “entry” into the United States within five years of which the statute’s five‐year limitation is measured, and that the statute applies to any alien regardless of the manner of admission. The district court dismissed the petition; the decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. (The opinion does not specify any additional defenses or counterclaims raised by the government beyond its statutory interpretation.)

Updated July 18, 2026

Procedural History

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York – The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from custody and denial of the deportation order. The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner’s 26 March 1918 landing in Boston constituted a statutory “entry” within five years of which the five‐year limitation of § 19 is measured. No monetary relief was awarded.

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit – The petitioner appealed the district court’s dismissal, contending that the government’s construction of “entry” was erroneous and that the deportation order therefore exceeded the statutory period. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal. No damages or other relief were granted.

Supreme Court of the United States – The petitioner petitioned for a writ of certiorari, again challenging the government’s interpretation of “entry” under § 19. The Supreme Court granted review, affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, and held that the petitioner’s return to Boston in 1918 was an entry within the meaning of the Act. No monetary award or other relief was issued.

The opinion provides a complete procedural record; no additional motions, countersuits, or damages awards are mentioned.

Updated July 18, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issue
1. Whether the petitioner’s landing at Boston on 26 March 1918 constitutes an “entry” into the United States for purposes of § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, so that his manslaughter conviction on 17 June 1921 occurred within five years of that entry and therefore triggers mandatory deportation. Procedural Issue
1. Whether the district court (and, by affirmation, the Court of Appeals) erred in construing “entry” to include the petitioner’s 1918 return from a foreign voyage, and consequently erred in dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus that sought relief from the deportation order.

Updated July 18, 2026

Judgment

The Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and upholding the order of deportation.

Updated July 18, 2026

Holding

Interpretation of “entry” under § 19, Immigration Act of 1917 – For purposes of the five‐year limitation in § 19, an alien’s “entry” into the United States is satisfied only when the alien physically arrives in the United States from a foreign port or place; a return to a U.S. port after a voyage abroad therefore constitutes a new entry, and the statutory five‐year period begins on the date of that arrival.

Effect on habeas‐corpus relief – When the statutory term “entry” is correctly construed to include the alien’s post‐voyage arrival, a district court’s dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the affirmance of that dismissal by the appellate courts are proper; the petition for relief from deportation must be denied.

Updated July 18, 2026

Rule of Law

Statutory definition of “alien.”
An “alien” is any person who is not a native‐born or naturalized citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 173 (1917). The Immigration Act of 1917 therefore applies to every non‐citizen regardless of his admission status. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 91 (1914); Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291 (1914).

Statutory definition of “entry” for purposes of § 19.
“Entry” means a physical arrival in the United States from a foreign port or place; a return to a U.S. port after a voyage abroad constitutes a new entry. 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1917) (the text of § 19). The Court relied on the ordinary meaning of the term and on precedent interpreting “entry” in the context of immigration statutes: Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923); Scharrenberg v. Dollar S.S. Co., 245 U.S. 122, 127 (1918).

Five‐year limitation measured from the date of entry.
Under § 19, the five‐year period during which an alien’s conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude triggers mandatory deportation begins on the date of the qualifying “entry” into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1917). Consequently, an alien who re‐enters the United States after a foreign voyage starts a new five‐year clock.

Applicability of the deportation provision regardless of lawful admission.
The statute’s deportation trigger applies even if the alien’s prior admission was unlawful or if the alien was not “entitled to admission.” The Court held that the provision “extends to all aliens... It is immaterial whether he was entitled to admission or whether he lawfully entered.” 8 U.S.C. § 1 (definition of “United States”) and § 155 (1917).

Updated July 18, 2026

Reasoning

The Court began by stating the operative provision of the Immigration Act of 1917, § 19, which mandates deportation of any alien who, within five years after his entry into the United States, is sentenced to a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1917) supplies the five‐year limitation and the trigger for removal. The rule therefore requires (a) identification of the alien’s “entry” date and (b) a determination whether the criminal conviction occurred within five years of that date.

The Court defined “alien” by reference to 8 U.S.C. § 173, holding that the term encompasses every person who is not a native‐born or naturalized citizen. Citing Lapina v. Williams and Lewis v. Frick, the Court emphasized that the statute’s reach is categorical and does not depend on the alien’s citizenship aspirations or prior naturalization petitions; thus the petitioner, a Danish subject, falls squarely within the statutory class.

Turning to the meaning of “entry,” the Court read the term in its ordinary sense—“a coming from outside”—and required a physical arrival in the United States from a foreign port or place. The Court relied on the definition in 8 U.S.C. § 155 and on precedent such as Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon and Scharrenberg v. Dollar S.S. Co., which held that entry is not effected by merely embarking on an American vessel abroad because the vessel remains outside U.S. jurisdiction.

The Court further explained that a voyage on an American ship that departs from a U.S. port, sails to foreign ports, and returns to another U.S. port does not constitute a continuous entry; rather, each arrival from a foreign destination constitutes a new, separate entry. This distinction is grounded in the statutory text and the cited cases, which reject the notion that “entry” can be satisfied by boarding a U.S. vessel overseas.

Applying that definition to the petitioner’s facts, the Court noted that he left the United States on the Elisha Atkins on 19 October 1917, visited South‐American ports and Cuba, and then landed at Boston on 26 March 1918. Because the Boston landing was a physical arrival from foreign ports, it satisfied the statutory concept of “entry” and therefore reset the five‐year clock prescribed by § 19.

With the entry date fixed as 26 March 1918, the Court calculated that the petitioner’s conviction for manslaughter on 17 June 1921 occurred less than three years later—well within the five‐year period. Consequently, the statutory condition that the crime be committed “within five years after the entry of the alien” was met.

Since both statutory elements—(i) the petitioner’s status as an alien and (ii) the occurrence of a qualifying conviction within five years of a valid entry—were satisfied, the Court concluded that the deportation warrant issued under § 19 was proper. Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of the habeas‐corpus petition and the appellate court’s affirmation were affirmed as correct applications of the law.

The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the petitioner’s 1918 return to Boston constituted an entry for purposes of the Immigration Act, that the five‐year limitation began on that date, and that the subsequent manslaughter conviction triggered mandatory deportation. No relief was warranted.

Updated July 18, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: None – no separate concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.
Type of Opinion: None – the Court’s decision consists solely of the majority opinion authored by Justice Butler.
Summary of Reasoning: The opinion text provided contains only Justice Butler’s majority opinion and makes no reference to any additional opinions filed by other justices; therefore, no concurring or dissenting opinions exist in this case.

Updated July 18, 2026

Case Relevance

This decision is authoritative for the proposition that, under § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, an alien’s “entry” is satisfied only by a physical arrival in the United States from a foreign port, so that each post‐voyage landing restarts the statutory five‐year clock for mandatory deportation—precisely the rule the Court applied to resolve the substantive issue of whether the petitioner’s 26 March 1918 landing constituted an entry and the procedural issue of whether the district court correctly dismissed the habeas‐corpus petition; the holding therefore establishes a clear, text‐based test—physical arrival from abroad—that applies whenever the five‐year limitation of § 19 is invoked, regardless of the alien’s prior admission status, and is not limited to the particular facts of a seaman’s return from South‐American ports but extends to any alien who departs and later re‐enters the United States. Consequently, the case is a valuable source for courts confronting the scope of “entry” in immigration removal statutes, offering a definitive rule that can be cited to close arguments that a return voyage does not create a new entry, to resolve jurisdictional splits over the measurement of the five‐year period, and to support the dismissal of relief petitions predicated on an erroneous entry analysis; however, it does not address other statutory triggers for removal, the meaning of “entry” in statutes that define it differently, or procedural issues unrelated to the five‐year limitation, leaving those questions for separate authority.

Updated July 18, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "The provision extends to all aliens, that is, every person not a native‐born or naturalized citizen. § 1; U. S. C., Tit. 8, § 173. It is immaterial whether he was entitled to admission or whether he lawfully entered."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: citation unavailable (pinpoint page not provided)
Explanation: Establishes that § 19 applies to any non‐citizen regardless of admission status, supporting the holding that the petitioner’s alien status triggers the deportation provision.

Quoted text: "An entry into the United States is not effected by embarking on an American vessel in a foreign port."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: citation unavailable (pinpoint page not provided)
Explanation: Sets the basic rule that merely boarding a U.S. ship abroad does not constitute “entry,” forming the foundation for the Court’s analysis of the petitioner’s movements.

Quoted text: "The word ‘entry’ by its own force implies a coming from outside. The context shows that in order that there be an entry within the meaning of the Act there must be an arrival from some foreign port or place."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: citation unavailable (pinpoint page not provided)
Explanation: Provides the Court’s textual interpretation of “entry” as a physical arrival from abroad, the core element of the rule applied to the five‐year limitation.

Quoted text: "There is no such entry where one goes to sea on board an American vessel from a port of the United States and returns to the same or another port of this country without having been in any foreign port or place."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: citation unavailable (pinpoint page not provided)
Explanation: Clarifies the limitation of the entry concept, rejecting the notion that a continuous voyage without a foreign stop counts as a new entry; this distinction is pivotal to the Court’s decision.

Quoted text: "Petitioner departed from the United States on the Elisha Atkins and that, when he landed at Boston on his return from South American and Cuban ports, he made an entry into the United States within the meaning of the Act."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: citation unavailable (pinpoint page not provided)
Explanation: Applies the defined rule to the facts, holding that the March 26 1918 landing is a valid “entry,” thereby starting the five‐year clock and justifying the deportation order.

Updated July 18, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Butler v. United States · unreported

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

Related opinions

United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day
278 U.S. 592 · 49 S. Ct. 33
United States ex rel. Claussen v. Curran
273 U.S. 688 · 47 S. Ct. 459
United States ex rel. Claussen v. Curran
16 F.2d 15 · 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 3732
United States Ex Rel. Kassin v. Mulligan
1935 U.S. LEXIS 325 · 295 U.S. 396 · 55 S. Ct. 781 · 79 L. Ed. 1501
United States ex rel. Chance v. Tolson
1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13767 · 312 F. Supp. 1384
Day v. Welles
31 Conn. 344

Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

May 13, 1929

Docket

416

Precedential status

Published

United States Ex Rel. Claussen v. Day

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion