Garnett Lynn Goforth, R. Lynn Goforth and wife, Susan D. Goforth v. State of Tennessee
February 22, 2007 · Docket E2006-00926-COA-R3-CV
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
T.C.A. §§ 9‑8‑307(c) and (a)(1)(C) impose the traditional tort burden on plaintiffs, as explained by the Supreme Court in Hames v. State.
- Headnote 2
A claim against the State for a dangerous condition on state‑controlled real property requires the plaintiff to prove that the State created or maintained the condition, the condition was unreasonably dangerous, the risk was foreseeable, and the State had actual notice in time to remedy it.
The Tennessee dangerous‑condition statute sets forth these elements, and the Supreme Court in Hames clarified the plaintiff’s burden under § 9‑8‑307.
- Headnote 3
In a dangerous‑condition claim the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing all statutory elements by a preponderance of the evidence; the State’s liability is measured by the traditional, reasonably prudent person standard.
Tennessee Code Ann. § 9‑8‑307(c) specifies the burden and the applicable tort standard.
- Headnote 4
On appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission, factual findings are reviewed for pre‑ponderance of the evidence with a presumption of correctness; the appellate court may reverse only if the evidence preponderates against those findings.
The court follows Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), giving deference to the Commission’s fact determinations unless undermined by the evidence.
- Headnote 5
Legal conclusions of the Tennessee Claims Commission are reviewed de novo on appeal, without any presumption of correctness.
While factual findings receive deference, questions of law are examined anew by the appellate court.
- Headnote 6
A public university is not liable for negligence when it allows practice on a wet, muddy field that is customary to the sport, unless the plaintiff shows the condition created an unreasonable risk of harm and the university had actual notice of that risk.
The Commissioner concluded the field was not unreasonably dangerous because football fields routinely become muddy; the plaintiff failed to prove the university had notice of an unreasonable danger.
- Headnote 7
A coach satisfies the duty of care by teaching tackling techniques that conform to the sport’s accepted standards; liability does not arise merely from injury sustained using those techniques.
The Commission found the university’s coaches taught proper tackling, and the evidence did not show any departure from accepted practice.
- Headnote 8
The dangerous‑condition statute requires the State to be liable only when it created or maintained a hazardous condition on its property and had notice sufficient to permit remediation, applying traditional tort concepts of duty and the reasonable‑person standard.
- Headnote 9
Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9‑8‑307(c), the State is liable only if the plaintiff shows by a more‑likely‑than‑not proof that the condition was unreasonable, foreseeable, and known to the State, using ordinary negligence principles.
- Headnote 10
The Commissioner concluded the field was not unreasonably dangerous because “football fields get muddy,” and the evidence did not preponderate against that finding; thus the university’s duty was not breached.
- Headnote 11
The evidence showed coaches instructed players to keep heads up and eyes open, consistent with accepted technique, and the Commission found no negligence in the coaching of tackling.
- Headnote 12
The Tennessee dangerous‑condition statute sets forth the elements a claimant must establish to hold the State liable for a dangerous condition on state‑controlled real property.
- Headnote 13
Statutory language and Tennessee precedent require the plaintiff to meet its burden and apply ordinary negligence standards when suing the State for a dangerous condition.
- Headnote 14
On appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission, factual findings are reviewed for pre‑ponderance of the evidence with a presumption of correctness; the appellate court may overturn only if the evidence preponderates against those findings.
The Court of Appeals applies Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) to evaluate the Commission’s fact‑finding, granting deference unless the record overwhelms the finding.
- Headnote 15
Legal conclusions of the Tennessee Claims Commission are reviewed de novo on appeal, without any presumption of correctness.
While factual findings receive deference, the appellate court examines the Commission’s legal rulings anew under Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).
- Headnote 16
Evidence showed the coaches taught proper tackling, and the Court affirmed there was no negligence in the technique taught.
- Headnote 17
The written agreement covered only the fall scholarship year; no enforceable promise of increase was proven, so no breach occurred.
- Headnote 18
A claim against the State for a dangerous condition on state‑controlled real property requires the plaintiff to prove that the State created or maintained the condition, that the condition was unreasonably dangerous, that the risk was foreseeable, and that the State had actual notice of the danger.
Tennessee Code Ann. § 9‑8‑307(a)(1)(C) sets forth these four elements, and the court emphasizes that liability is based on traditional tort concepts and the reasonable‑person standard.
- Headnote 19
In a dangerous‑condition action, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the statutory elements by a preponderance of the evidence.
The court notes that the plaintiff must meet the burden of proof, and the State’s liability is measured by traditional tort concepts.
- Headnote 20
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviews a Tennessee Claims Commission fact finding for pre‑ponderance of the evidence with a presumption of correctness and may reverse only if the evidence preponderates against that finding.
Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo without deference, while factual determinations receive the presumptive correctness standard.
- Headnote 21
A public university is not negligent for allowing practice on a wet or muddy field when the condition is customary to the sport and not shown to be unreasonably dangerous; the plaintiff must prove actual notice of an unreasonable risk.
The commissioner found the field was not unreasonably dangerous, and the court affirmed that the evidence did not preponderate against that finding.
- Headnote 22
A coach fulfills his duty of care when he teaches tackling techniques that conform to the sport’s accepted standards; liability arises only if the coach teaches a technique that is objectively improper.
The commission found proper tackling techniques were taught, and the appellate court held the evidence did not preponderate against that finding.
- Headnote 23
State liability for dangerous‑condition claims is measured by the traditional tort concepts of duty and the reasonably prudent person’s standard of care.
The statute expressly provides that the State’s liability is predicated upon these traditional tort principles.
- Headnote 24
The Commission relied on Tennessee’s dangerous‑condition statute, which limits liability to situations where the State’s conduct created an unsafe condition and the State knew or should have known of the risk in time to act.
- Headnote 25
The opinion reiterated that the statutory burden rests on the plaintiff and that liability is grounded in ordinary negligence principles, not a special standard for the State.
- Headnote 26
The court explained that its review of the Commission’s fact‑finding is deferential, while questions of law receive no such deference.
- Headnote 27
The Commissioner found the field was merely muddy, a normal condition for football, and the evidence did not preponderate against that finding; the plaintiff admitted playing in mud was expected.
- Headnote 28
The Commission concluded the university’s coaches taught proper tackling, and the evidence did not preponderate against that finding.
- Headnote 29
Testimony showed the scholarship covered only the 2000‑2001 fall term and was paid in full; no written commitment to increase was proven.
- Headnote 30
The Commission found the university’s agreement promised no premium increase, the premiums rose $150 per month, and awarded $3,600 in damages for the breach.
- Headnote 31
The university’s answer denied negligence and argued the student‑athlete assumed the risks inherent in football, also invoking comparative fault.
- Headnote 3261.14.14 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Premises Liability Law > Recreational Premises Liability Law
The Tennessee dangerous‑condition statute imposes liability only when the State’s conduct satisfies the four statutory elements, and liability is measured by traditional tort concepts of duty and the reasonable‑person standard.
- Headnote 3361.14.14 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Premises Liability Law > Recreational Premises Liability Law
The Commissioner found the field was not unreasonably dangerous because “football fields get muddy,” and the evidence did not preponderate against that finding.
- Headnote 34
The evidence showed coaches taught proper tackling—keeping the head and eyes up—and the court held no negligence in the technique taught.
- Headnote 35
The written agreement covered only the fall semester scholarship, and coaches testified that only the head coach could determine any increase; no breach was found.
- Headnote 36
A claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9‑8‑307(a)(1)(C) requires the plaintiff to prove that the State created or maintained the condition, that the condition was unreasonably dangerous, that the risk was foreseeable, and that the State had actual notice of the danger.
The statute authorizes a tort claim against the State for dangerous conditions on state‑controlled real property, setting forth the four elements the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence.
- Headnote 37
In a dangerous‑condition action the plaintiff bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and liability is measured by the traditional duty‑and‑reasonable‑person standard.
The dangerous‑condition statute places the entire evidentiary burden on the plaintiff, and the State’s liability is evaluated under ordinary tort principles of duty and the reasonable‑person standard of care.
- Headnote 38
On appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission, factual findings are reviewed for pre‑ponderance of the evidence with a presumption of correctness; the appellate court may reverse only if the evidence preponderates against those findings. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
The Court of Appeals applies the standard set forth in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), giving deference to the Commission’s fact‑finding while examining legal issues without deference.
- Headnote 39
A public university is not liable for injuries sustained on a wet or muddy football field when such conditions are customary to the sport and the plaintiff fails to show the condition was unreasonably dangerous or that the university had actual notice of the risk.
The Commissioner found the field’s mud was typical for football and the evidence did not preponderate that the condition created an unreasonable risk of harm or that the university knew of the danger.
- Headnote 40
A coach satisfies his duty of care by teaching tackling techniques that conform to the sport’s accepted standards; liability arises only when a coach teaches a technique that is objectively improper or contrary to accepted practice.
The evidence showed that the coaches instructed players to keep their heads up and eyes open, which is the accepted method, and no evidence proved an improper technique was taught.
- Headnote 41
An athletic‑scholarship agreement is breached only when there is a clear, enforceable promise to increase the award and the institution fails to honor that promise; a mere failure to raise the scholarship amount absent such a promise does not constitute breach.
The Commission found no written contract obligating the university to increase the scholarship; the amount for the 2000‑2001 year was paid, and no definite promise to raise it was proven.
- Headnote 42
Tennessee courts require the plaintiff to establish the statutory elements, applying ordinary tort principles, as explained in Hames v. State.
- Headnote 43
The Court of Appeals follows Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), giving deference to the Commission’s fact‑finding but reviewing legal issues without deference.
- Headnote 44
The Commissioner concluded the field was not unreasonably dangerous because “football fields get muddy,” and the appellate court affirmed that finding.
- Headnote 45
The Commissioner found the coaches taught proper tackling techniques, and the evidence did not show any deviation from accepted methods.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Submitted on Briefs, January 9, 2007
GARNETT LYNN GOFORTH, R. LYNN GOFORTH and wife, SUSAN D. GOFORTH v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Direct Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission, Eastern Grand Division No. 20101497 Hon. Vance W. Cheek, Jr., Judge
No. E2006-00926-COA-R3-CV - FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2007
Plaintiffs, parents and son brought suit against the University for injuries to the son sustained while practicing football, charging the coaches were negligent in allowing practice to continue under dangerous conditions. The Commissioner ruled in favor of the University, except as to the dispute over insurance, and awarded plaintiffs $3,600.00 under the contract of insurance with the University.
Tenn. R. App. P.3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Claims Commission Affirmed.
HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D. SUSANO , JR., J., and D. MICHAEL SWINEY , J., joined.
Thomas C. Jessee, Johnson City, Tennessee, for appellants.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Heather C. Ross, Nashville, Tennessee, for appellee.
OPINION
Plaintiffs, Garrett Lynn Goforth, and his parents, R. Lynn Goforth and Susan D. Goforth, sued East Tennessee State University in the Claims Commission and alleged that the son was a scholarship athlete participating in the school football program in 2000, and that while practicing football on April 8, 2000, he was severely injured , sustaining permanent injuries to his neck and back.
The Complaint alleges that the son’s coaches were negligent in their training and direction of the team, and were negligent in allowing practice to continue in severe weather, which contributed to the son’s injury. Also that the defendant had failed to comply with the requirements of the insurance which it agreed to provide to the son as a member of the football program, in that defendant had failed to process claims, and had failed to maintain sufficient coverage to keep plaintiffs’ insurance rates from increasing in the event of an injury.
Defendant Answered, denying any negligence, and asserted that the son assumed the risk of playing football, and that all medical payments had been made for which the University was properly responsible, and that comparative fault would apply.
At the hearing before the Commissioner, numerous witnesses testified for the plaintiffs and defendant.
Following Trial, the Commissioner found in favor of the defendant on all claims except the claim that defendant was negligent in failing to promptly pay the medical bills, and caused plaintiffs’ insurance premiums to increase, and thus awarded $3,600.00 for the increased premiums to the plaintiffs, and dismissed the remaining claims.
The Commissioner found that the son was recruited to play football at the University and received a partial scholarship. He said the son received a packet of materials from the University which included the Possibility of Serious Injury Notice, and a letter to the parents of student-athletes regarding athletics, accidents, and medical insurance. He found that the son was red-shirted his freshman year, which left him four years of eligibility. Under the terms of the Injury Notice, the family’s insurance was to be primary, and the University’s insurance was secondary. He also said that the son met with coach Hamilton, and Hamilton told him that any potential increase in his scholarship would depend on his play in spring practice. Further, that the son, although undersized, decided to play defense and use his red-shirt year to get more time in the weight room and more training, and that he played linebacker as one of his positions during spring practice.
The Commissioner found that on April 8, 2000, the University football program held a scrimmage practice game, and called Southern Conference officials to referee the game. The Commissioner said that the officials came from the Southeast, and that there was a steady, cold, early spring rain that day, which caused the field to be in bad condition, especially as it related to mud. The Commissioner found that Hamilton testified it was as muddy a field as he had ever seen. He said the coaches and players testified that it was normal to play in wet, muddy conditions, as well as extreme cold, wind, fog, heat and snow. The Commissioner stated he watched the videotape of the scrimmage, and could see the condition of the field, could see the mud on the players’ jerseys and helmets, and further observed that it was “just one big messy day” and that the injury occurred when the son was in an “off tackle fullback veer” and that the son did what he was supposed to do, which was fill the hole in the offensive line, and as he made the tackle, his feet slipped out from under him and his helmet contacted the fullback in the thigh. As a result, the son was seriously injured.
-2- The Commissioner found that the University was slow in paying its share of the bills, which caused problems for the plaintiffs, but the University continued to pay his scholarship, as it was obligated to do.
The Commissioner noted that plaintiffs relied on Tenn. Code Ann. §9-8-307 (a)(1)(C), which refers to dangerous conditions on state controlled real property. The Commissioner ruled that in viewing the tape, he could not conclude that the condition of the field was unreasonably dangerous, because “football fields get muddy”. As to the charge that the coaching staff was negligent in allowing the practice to go on, he held that the University had a duty to exercise care of their student-athletes and keep them free from harm, but the University did not breach that duty in this case, and that the coaches had taught proper tackling techniques. Finally, he found the parties had a written agreement that the plaintiffs’ insurance premiums would not increase, but they had increased by $150.00 per month, and as a result, the Commissioner awarded $3,600.00 in damages for the breach of that agreement by the University.
These issues are raised on appeal:
1. Whether the Commissioner erred in failing to find that a preponderance of the evidence established that the coaching staff was negligent in allowing practice to continue in the conditions which existed on the date in question?
2. Whether the Commissioner erred in failing to find that a preponderance of the evidence established that the coaching staff was negligent in its teaching of tackling techniques, which led to Goforth’s injuries?
3. Whether the Commissioner erred in failing to award Goforth damages for breach of his athletic scholarship because the preponderance of the evidence is in favor of finding a breach?
On appeal, we review the Commissioner’s fact finding with a presumption of correctness, unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). However, questions of law are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness.
Tenn. Code Ann. §9-8-307 (a)(1)(C) permits a claim against the State for negligently creating or maintaining a dangerous condition on State property. Id. at (E). Plaintiffs rely on the foregoing statutory provisions and assert the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings.
As the Commissioner noted, the plaintiffs were required to show that the field was in an unreasonably dangerous condition, or that the players were “negligently controlled” by the coaches in being made to practice in such conditions. Plaintiffs argued the proof showed that the conditions on the field were unreasonably dangerous. The proof was that the field was wet and muddy, but all witnesses except the plaintiff testified that games had been played and practice had
-3- been held under worse conditions, and the video demonstrated that the field was wet, and appeared muddy in spots, but it could not reasonably be concluded from the video that the field was in an unreasonably dangerous condition.
As the Supreme Court stated in Hames v. State, 808 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Tenn. 1991):
The Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the State negligently created or maintained a dangerous condition on the [property] and further that foreseeability of the risks and notice had been given to proper State officials at a time sufficiently prior to the injury to enable appropriate remedial measures. T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C). The statute itself provides that the State's liability is to be predicated upon "traditional tort concepts of duty and the reasonably prudent person's standard of care." T.C.A. § 9-8-307(c).
In this case, the proof does not preponderate against the Commissioner’s finding that the coaching staff was not negligent in allowing practice to be held on the day in question, and that the condition of the football field was not unreasonably dangerous. Plaintiff admitted that it was not unusual to play in mud or rain, and that he expected to do so, and the son’s father recognized this as well, although stating he thought the conditions on that date were extraordinary. All of the other witnesses who were there on that day, however, testified that there was nothing unusual about the weather or field conditions, and the video portrayed the conditions that existed. The son also admitted that he did not complain of the allegedly “dangerous” conditions to anyone, and the evidence does not preponderate against the Commissioner’s findings.
Next, plaintiffs argue that the coaching staff was negligent in its teaching of proper tackling techniques, and base their argument solely on the son’s testimony that Coach Collins admitted to him at the hospital that he had the linebackers hitting “too low”. Further the plaintiffs pointed out, the State did not call Coach Collins to testify, but neither did plaintiffs, and argue that no witness disputed this testimony, but Coach Hamilton, Coach Taylor, and “Doc” Robertson all testified that proper tackling technique required the player to keep his head and eyes up. The son admitted that he was taught this, as it was in his playbook, and that no one on the coaching staff ever told him otherwise. When questioned about Coach Collins’ alleged statement, Coach Taylor replied that there was no such thing as being too low on the football field, but that they always taught the players to keep their heads up and eyes open. His testimony was corroborated by Hamilton, Robertson, and the son, as well as the exhibits. Accordingly, the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that proper tackling techniques had been taught to the son.
Finally, plaintiffs argue the State should be held liable for breach of the son’s scholarship contract, asserting that Coach Mynatt had advised Mr. Goforth that his son would receive more money on his scholarship after his injury. Contrary to the assertion in plaintiffs’ brief, Coach Mynatt was not called to testify. Coaches Hamilton and Taylor testified, however, that only the head coach (Hamilton) could determine whether an athlete would receive a scholarship or an increase in the same. Hamilton denied that any such increase was given, and the written agreement shows that
-4- the son’s scholarship was for the fall only, for the 2000-2001 academic year (as it was the previous year). There is no dispute that that amount was paid, and the Commissioner found, plaintiffs failed to show that a written contract was breached by the State, and this issue is also without merit.
We affirm the Judgment as entered by the Commissioner and remand, with the cost of the appeal assessed to the plaintiffs.
______________________________ HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS, P.J.
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