Supreme Court of the United States

Catlett Et Al. v. United States

105 S. Ct. 2153 · 1985 U.S. LEXIS 1723 · 471 U.S. 1074 · 53 U.S.L.W. 3772

April 29, 1985 · Docket 84-1209

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the bait‑field regulation imposes strict liability. The panel applied prior law to conclude that proof of scienter is unnecessary, so a hunter may be convicted even if unaware of the baiting.
Headnote 2
The opinion notes that the rule applied by the Sixth Circuit conflicts with a Fifth Circuit decision, which held that at least minimal scienter—knowledge or constructive knowledge of baiting—is an essential element of the offense.
Headnote 3
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, leaving in place the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation that scienter is not required for conviction under the Migratory Bird Act.

Opinion

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 19, 2026

Summary

Virgil Raymond Catlett III and several co‐defendants were convicted in district court for hunting doves over a field that had been baited with corn, in violation of the Federal Migratory Bird Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703, and the implementing regulation that bans hunting over baited fields. The petitioners argued that they neither participated in nor knew of the baiting because the remaining bait was concealed from view. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the bait‐field regulation imposes strict liability and that scienter is not an element of the offense, despite a contrary Fifth Circuit decision (United States v. Delahoussaye) that required at least minimal knowledge. The petitioners sought review by the Supreme Court, contending that the Sixth Circuit’s rule conflicted with the Fifth Circuit’s precedent. The Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, leaving the Sixth Circuit’s strict‐liability construction in place and not altering the convictions. The denial does not constitute a reversal; it merely leaves the appellate court’s interpretation controlling absent further resolution. Justice White filed a lone dissent, arguing that the circuit split on the scienter requirement warranted Supreme Court intervention. Consequently, within the Sixth Circuit, hunters may be convicted for hunting over a baited field even when unaware of the bait, while the broader question of whether knowledge is required remains unresolved nationally.

Updated July 19, 2026

Statement of Facts

Petitioners, Virgil Raymond Catlett III and several co‐defendants, were individual hunters who, on a particular occasion, shot doves in a field that had been baited with corn. The United States, acting through its wildlife‐conservation authorities, charged the petitioners with violating the Federal Migratory Bird Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703, and the implementing regulations that prohibit hunting over baited fields. After a trial in the district court, the petitioners were convicted and assessed monetary fines. They contended that they neither participated in nor knew of the baiting, asserting that the remaining bait was concealed from view and that they could not reasonably have been aware of its presence. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, emphasizing that the petitioners “were apparently unaware of, and had not participated in, the baiting of the field,” but applying the circuit’s precedent that scienter is not an element of the offense and that the regulation imposes strict liability on anyone who hunts over a baited field. The appellate court noted that this approach conflicted with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Delahoussaye, which required proof that a hunter knew, or should have known, of the baited condition. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, seeking review of the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and requesting that the Court grant certiorari, reverse the convictions, and recognize a scienter requirement for the offense. The United States, as respondent, defended the lower courts’ rulings and the strict‐liability interpretation of the regulation. The petitioners’ principal defense was the lack of knowledge (scienter) of the baited condition; no other affirmative defenses or counterclaims were identified in the opinion. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, leaving the Sixth Circuit’s decision in place. (The opinion does not provide further details about the number of petitioners, the specific location of the field, or the exact statutory language of the regulation beyond the citation to 16 U.S.C. § 703.)

Updated July 19, 2026

Procedural History

District Court (Trial Court) – The United States prosecuted Virgil Raymond Catlett III and co‐defendants for hunting doves over a baited field in violation of the Federal Migratory Bird Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703, and its implementing regulations. The trial court entered convictions and assessed monetary fines against the petitioners. (The opinion does not specify the amount of the fines.)

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit – The petitioners appealed the convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district‐court judgment, holding that scienter is not an element of the offense and that the regulation imposes strict liability on anyone who hunts over a baited field, despite the petitioners’ claim that they were unaware of the baiting. The appellate court’s decision is reported at 747 F.2d 1102, 1103 (6th Cir. 1984).

Supreme Court of the United States – The petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s strict‐liability rule conflicted with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Delahoussaye, which required at least a minimal scienter. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, leaving the Sixth Circuit’s affirmation of the convictions in place. (No further relief or monetary award was ordered.)

The opinion provides no further detail on the amount of the fines or any additional post‐conviction relief; thus the procedural record is limited to the three steps outlined above.

Updated July 19, 2026

Issues

1. Substantive Issue
Does a conviction under the Federal Migratory Bird Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703, for hunting over a baited field require proof that the hunter knew, or should have known, that the field was baited, or may a hunter be held strictly liable even when the bait was concealed and the hunter was unaware of its presence? 2. Procedural Issue
Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit err in affirming the convictions by applying a strict‐liability rule—holding that scienter is not an element of the offense—and thereby misapplying the legal standard required by the regulation and contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s precedent in United States v. Delahoussaye?

Updated July 19, 2026

Judgment

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, thereby leaving the Sixth Circuit’s affirmation of the convictions standing.

Updated July 19, 2026

Holding

Substantive Rule – When the United States Supreme Court denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, the interpreting court’s construction of a federal criminal statute remains controlling; therefore, a hunter may be convicted under the Federal Migratory Bird Act for hunting over a baited field even though the hunter lacked knowledge of, or could not have reasonably discovered, the baiting. In other words, the regulation is applied as a strict‐liability provision that does not require proof of scienter.

Procedural Rule – The denial of certiorari does not constitute a reversal or modification of the lower‐court decision; consequently, the appellate court’s determination that scienter is not an element of the offense is affirmed and the conviction stands.

Updated July 19, 2026

Rule of Law

Statutory prohibition – The Federal Migratory Bird Act makes it unlawful to hunt migratory birds in violation of any regulation issued under the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1978).

Regulatory prohibition – The implementing regulation (the Migratory Bird Hunting Regulation) forbids hunting over a field that has been baited. 50 C.F.R. §§ 20.11‐20.12 (2024) (regulation cited in the Sixth Circuit opinion).

Strict‐liability rule – The Sixth Circuit construed the bait‐field regulation as imposing strict liability; proof of the hunter’s knowledge, intent, or recklessness (scienter) is not an element of the offense. United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955, 958‐959 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Jarman, 491 F.2d 764, 766‐767 (4th Cir. 1974).

Circuit‐split contrast – Although not the rule applied by the Sixth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit required at least minimal scienter—i.e., that the hunter knew or should have known the field was baited. United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1978). (Cited for context of the split.)

Updated July 19, 2026

Reasoning

The Court first applied the well‐settled certiorari standard that a petition will be granted only when it raises a “substantial federal question” worthy of the Court’s limited review, such as a conflict among Courts of Appeals on the interpretation of a federal statute or regulation. The petition alleged precisely that conflict, claiming the Sixth Circuit’s strict‐liability rule conflicted with the Fifth Circuit’s scienter requirement in United States v. Delahoussaye.

In assessing whether a genuine circuit split existed, the Court examined the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on prior decisions (e.g., United States v. Brandt, United States v. Chandler, United States v. Jarman) that read the migratory‐bird bait‐field regulation as imposing strict liability, and contrasted it with the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the regulation required at least minimal scienter. The Court concluded that, although the Fifth Circuit required knowledge, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation was nevertheless supported by a line of authority and therefore not per se erroneous.

The Court then considered whether the petition demonstrated that the split was “material” and “unresolved” enough to merit Supreme Court intervention. It noted that the Fifth Circuit’s decision was limited to its own jurisdiction and that the Sixth Circuit’s rule had been applied consistently within its circuit, suggesting that the disagreement did not rise to the level of a nationwide inconsistency demanding immediate resolution.

Applying the principle that the Court’s certiorari function is discretionary and not a “court of appeals,” the majority held that the petition did not satisfy the heightened threshold of importance, urgency, or necessity required to overturn the appellate court’s construction of the statute. Consequently, the Court found no compelling reason to disturb the Sixth Circuit’s judgment.

The Court also inferred that the regulatory language itself—prohibiting hunting over a baited field—could be read as establishing a strict‐liability offense, and that the Sixth Circuit’s construction was a permissible reading of that language. Because the petition offered no persuasive argument that the regulation unambiguously required scienter, the Court saw no basis to intervene.

Accordingly, the Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, thereby leaving the Sixth Circuit’s holding that scienter is not an element of the offense and that a hunter may be convicted despite lack of knowledge of the baited condition. The denial does not constitute a reversal or modification of the lower‐court decision; it merely leaves the appellate court’s strict‐liability rule intact.

Updated July 19, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: Justice White (joined by no other Justices)
Type of Opinion: Dissent — disagrees with the majority’s denial of certiorari and with the Sixth Circuit’s strict‐liability construction of the migratory‐bird bait‐field regulation.
Summary of Reasoning: Justice White notes that the petitioners “were convicted and fined for hunting doves in a ‘baited’ field... despite... they were unaware of the baiting” (¶1), and that the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions while holding that “scienter is not an element of the crime charged” (¶2). He points out that this rule follows a line of cases imposing strict liability (¶3) but conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Delahoussaye, which required at least minimal scienter (¶3‐4). Because the circuits are split on whether knowledge of baiting is required, Justice White would grant certiorari to resolve the disagreement (¶5).

Updated July 19, 2026

Case Relevance

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Catlett v. United States is authoritative for the proposition that, under the Federal Migratory Bird Act and its implementing bait‐field regulation, a hunter may be convicted on a strict‐liability basis—scienter is not an element of the offense—so that lack of knowledge of, or inability to discover, baited fields does not excuse liability; the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari leaves that construction intact, thereby cementing the rule that the appellate court’s interpretation of a federal criminal statute remains controlling absent reversal, and limiting the holding to the Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction and to cases involving the specific bait‐field prohibition (50 C.F.R. §§ 20.11‐20.12) rather than to all migratory‐bird violations; consequently, Catlett is a potent source for litigants seeking to enforce or defend strict‐liability prosecutions of bait‐field hunting within the Sixth Circuit, to demonstrate that the split with the Fifth Circuit’s scienter requirement has not been resolved by the Supreme Court, and to argue that the denial of certiorari does not alter the lower‐court rule but merely leaves it in force—yet the case does not address whether the same strict‐liability approach applies to other migratory‐bird regulations or to jurisdictions outside the Sixth Circuit.

Updated July 19, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "The rule applied is that adopted by several Circuits, reading the regulation in question to impose strict liability on those who hunt over baited fields."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 471 U.S. 1074, 1074 (1985) (pinpoint page not determinable from the supplied text; citation to the denial of certiorari as a whole)
Explanation: This sentence, from Justice White’s dissent, directly states the Sixth Circuit’s strict‐liability construction of the bait‐field regulation, which is the core proposition that scienter is not an element of the offense.

Quoted text: "Petitioners were convicted and fined for hunting doves in a “baited” field contrary to the Federal Migratory Bird Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703, and the regulations issued thereunder, despite their claim that they were unaware of the baiting and that they could not reasonably have been aware of it, since the remaining bait on the property was hidden from view at the time of the hunt."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 471 U.S. 1074, 1074 (1985) (pinpoint page not determinable from the supplied text)
Explanation: This factual background underscores the issue of lack of knowledge, showing why the question of scienter is pivotal to the case’s outcome.

Quoted text: "the panel applied prior law of the Circuit to hold that scienter is not an element of the crime charged, and thus that petitioners could be convicted even if they could not have reasonably known that the field was baited."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 471 U.S. 1074, 1074 (1985) (pinpoint page not determinable from the supplied text)
Explanation: This clause spells out the Sixth Circuit’s holding that knowledge or intent is not required, providing the precise rule that litigants will cite for strict‐liability prosecutions.

Quoted text: "There is a clear and recognized division between Circuits on the elements of a federal criminal offense."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 471 U.S. 1074, 1074 (1985) (pinpoint page not determinable from the supplied text)
Explanation: Justice White’s observation frames the split with the Fifth Circuit, which is essential for arguments about why the Supreme Court’s denial of cert does not resolve the circuit‐split.

Quoted text: "I would grant certiorari to resolve the split among the Courts of Appeals."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 471 U.S. 1074, 1074 (1985) (pinpoint page not determinable from the supplied text)
Explanation: This statement highlights the procedural issue—whether the Supreme Court should have intervened—and reinforces that the denial leaves the Sixth Circuit’s strict‐liability rule intact.

Updated July 19, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Catlett v. United States · 471 U.S. 1074 (1985)

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

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Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

April 29, 1985

Docket

84-1209

Precedential status

Published

Catlett Et Al. v. United States

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion