Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Geracy, Inc. v. Hoover

133 F.2d 25 · 147 A.L.R. 185 · 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 2453 · 77 U.S. App. D.C. 55

December 14, 1942 · Docket 8041

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Opinion

MILLER, Associate Justice.

On March 13, 1940, appellee instituted a landlord and tenant proceeding in the Municipal Court, for the restitution of premises at 2801 Fourteenth Street, N. W., in the District of Columbia, and for arrears! of rent. On a date not revealed by the record appellant answered, admitting that it was in possession of the premises and denying any default in the payment of rent.

On April 10, 1940, appellant filed its complaint, in the present case, in the District Court, seeking damages in the amount of $2859.05 for negligent injury of chattels located in the same premises at 2801 Fourteenth Street, N. W.; which damages were alleged to have been caused by leakage of rain; which, in turn, was alleged to have resulted from negligent repairs made to the roof by appellee, the owner of the premises. This complaint was entitled “Complaint in Nature of Plea of Set Off or Plea for Recoupment.” [Italics supplied] In it appellant recited the facts of its tenancy of the premises at 2801 Fourteenth Street, N. W., in the District of Columbia; the ownership of the premises by appellee; that appellee had instituted landlord and tenant proceedings in the Municipal Court; that she was not entitled to recover either possession or the amount claimed for rent; it alleged that appellee was indebted to appellant in the sum of $2859.05 on account of damages; it stated “that it is willing that its claim be set off against the action of the defendant pending in the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia and that it is willing to recoup its said claim in the sum of $2,859.05 against the said action of the defendant. Wherefore, the plaintiff demands : (1) That it be allowed to set off or recoup the sum of $2,859.05 due and owing from the defendant to it, against the claim of the said defendant, and (2) that judgment be entered against the defendant in the sum of $2,859.05, and (3) that the cause in the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia pending therein and identified as Landlord and Tenant No. 855281 be caused to be certified to this Court and that said Municipal Court of the District of Columbia be directed to so certify said cause of action.”

Thereafter, but on a date not revealed by the record, appellant filed an affidavit of defense in the landlord and tenant proceeding. In this affidavit appellant denied default; alleged that appellee was indebted to it in the sum of $2859.05 by reason of damage to its chattels located in the same premises, caused by the alleged negligence of appellee. The affidavit then continued as follows : “Your affiant accordingly denies that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $525.00 or that the plaintiff is entitled to possession to the, said premises, but states on the contrary that the said plaintiff is indebted to the defendant in the sum of $2,859.05, and your affiant further states that there has been filed by the defendant in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, a Complaint in the nature of a plea of set off or plea for recoupment against this cause of action, in which Complaint this defendant requests that this cause of action be certified to the said District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia in order that the claim of this defendant may be set off against this action or that the said defendant may be allowed to recoup its claim presented in said Court in the sum of $2,859.05 against this cause of action.”

When the landlord and tenant case came on for hearing the Municipal Court denied appellant’s request that th'e proceedings be certified to the District Court. The case .was tried on May 28, 1940. At that time the undisputed testimony showed that appellant had not paid the rent claimed. Appellant then offered the testimony of several witnesses tending to prove that appellee had repaired the roof of the premises; that these repairs were negligently made; that as a result the roof leaked and. occasioned damage; and that an action to recover the damages had been instituted in the District Court. Appellee then offered testimony that no repairs had been made to the roof at the time alleged by appellant; and that repairs which had been made were not made negligently. In this trial appellant did not ask for a money judgment against appellee and that question was not submitted to the jury. However, under the instructions given, the jury could have returned a general verdict for appellant upon the evidence. Instead, it returned a verdict in favor of appellee for the rent and for possession. Judgment was entered accordingly.

Thereafter, but on a date not revealed by the record, appellee filed an amendment to her answer in the present case which reads as follows: “The defendant further alleges that since the filing of her original answer herein the landlord and tenant proceeding, namely, Case No. 855281, filed by this defendant against the plaintiff for possession of premises 2801 14th Street, Northwest, and for judgment for rent for the period from September 1, 1939, to March 1, 1940, has been tried before a jury in the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia; that defendant’s sole defense in said cause was based entirely upon the allegation that the plaintiff therein was indebted to the defendant in the sum of $2859.05, being the same amount and arising out of the same alleged facts as here involved; that at the trial of said cause the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and the alleged claim of plaintiff as here involved has already been decided adversely to the plaintiff herein and is therefore res judicata.” On June 2, 1941, counsel representing both parties stipulated that the district judge, sitting without a jury, might hear and determine the legal sufficiency of appellee’s defense of res judicata. The judge held that the purpose of the rule of res judicata is to give only one trial for each issue; that the Municipal Court had tried the issue of damages and that appellee was entitled to judgment.

We see no reason for disturbing the judgment. While we sympathize with appellant in the dilemma which seemed to confront it, nevertheless, it was within its power to elect in what manner it should vindicate its claim.1 Furthermore, it was its duty to elect. Appellant’s pleadings indicate that it tried to avail itself of the jurisdiction of both courts, at the same time, for the trial of the same issue. In fact, the complaint, which initiated the case in the District Court, is entitled a “Plea of Set Off or Plea for Recoupment.” [Italics supplied] The only sense in which it could be a plea was that it was by way of answer to the pleading of appellee theretofore filed in the Municipal Court. The law entitled appellant to but one trial of the issue.2 If it chose to reduce its claim to the dimensions of municipal court jurisdiction, and submit to the adjudication of that court, it was privileged to do so;3 but, if it did so, it forfeited the privilege of having the same issue adjudicated in the District Court.4

Appellant now contends that the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction to give judgment in the full amount of its claim; hence, that the adjudication cannot be said to have been one upon the same issues, between the same parties, in a court of competent jurisdiction. That the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction to give judgment in the amount of $2859.05 is not disputed. But that it had jurisdiction to try a defense, voluntarily submitted, to appellee’s claim for possession and for rent is beyond dispute. As appellant elected to plead its claim as a defense, the issue was within the jurisdiction of that court.5 What the situation might have been and what appellant’s rights might have been, if the issue had been determined in its favor by the Municipal Court, we need not decide. There is little authority to support a further recovery, even under such circumstances.6 But in the present case the Municipal Court decided that appellant had no cause of action, for any amount; thus adjudicating, adversely to appellant, the entire, fundamental and underlying issue of liability,7 the elements of which are the same regardless of the amount involved. As that precise issue was thus fully tried, and determined adversely to appellant, the determination became res judicata thereof;8 even though, if appellant had elected' to do so, it might have preserved its claim 9 and, possibly, have made a recovery upon it in the District Court.

Perhaps a modern system of administration of justice should operate in the medium of a court which has jurisdiction over all cases;10 with provision for automatic transfer,11 or for consolidation and transfer upon motion from one division to another; without the penalties which may now result from the existence of courts of concurrent jurisdiction, and from the selection of the wrong remedy or the wrong jurisdiction. But Congress has elected to preserve an older and more conventional system,- with a variety of functions and powers distributed to the several courts. Whatever we might wish to do, if we had the judicial powers of an oriental caliph, we are confined to the structure of judicial determination which Congress has provided and we are bound by the rule of res judicata.1212

Affirmed.

Brown v. First Nat. Bank of Newton, 8 Cir., 132 F. 450, 452, certiorari denied 196 U.S. 641, 25 S.Ct. 796, 49 L.Ed. 631; Silberstein v. Begun, 232 N.Y. 319, 323, 133 N.E. 904, 905.

Bank of Newton, 8 Cir., 132 F. 450, 452 , certiorari denied 196 U.S. 641 , 25 S.Ct. 796 , 49 L.Ed. 631 ; Silberstein v. Begun, 232 N.Y. 319, 323 , 133 N.E. 904, 905 .

Brown v. First Nat. Bank of Newton, 8 Cir., 132 F. 450, 455, certiorari denied 196 U.S. 641, 25 S.Ct. 796, 49 L.Ed. 631.

Bank of Newton, 8 Cir., 132 F. 450, 455 , certiorari denied 196 U.S. 641 , 25 S.Ct. 796 , 49 L.Ed. 631 .

Porter v. Rapine, Fed.Cas.No.11,288, 2 Cranch C.C. 47; Witt v. Hereth, D.C. Ind., 30 Fed.Cas. page 404, No. 17,921; Grammar v. Sweeney, Mo.App., 297 S.W. 706, 708. Note, 28 L.R.A. 221.

No.11,288, 2 Cranch C.C. 47 ; Witt v. Hereth, D.C. Ind., 30 Fed.Cas. page 404, No. 17,921; Grammar v. Sweeney, Mo.App., 297 S.W. 706 , 708.Note, 28 L.R.A. 221 .

Brown v. First Nat. Bank of Newton, 8 Cir., 132 F. 450, 453, 455, certiorari denied 196 U.S. 641, 25 S.Ct. 796, 49 L.Ed. 631.

Bank of Newton, 8 Cir., 132 F. 450, 453, 455 , certiorari denied 196 U.S. 641 , 25 S.Ct. 796 , 49 L.Ed. 631 .

D.C.Code (1940) § 16 — 1903. See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment,-56 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 28: “On the other hand, if the patient interposes a defense which is litigated and determined by the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to the matter litigated. If the patient resists the claim on the ground of the neg*28ligence of the physician, and it is found that he was not negligent and judgment is given for the physician, the patient cannot recover for the harm since the absence of negligence is conclusively established. If on such an issue judgment is given for the patient, he is not' precluded from bringing an action for malpractice; and in such action the negligence of the physician will be treated as conclusively established, although the physician may interpose any other defenses he may have. The patient is not splitting his cause of action by using the fact of the physician’s negligence as a defense in the first action and as a claim in the second action.” [Italics supplied]

See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment,- 56 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 28: “On the other hand, if the patient interposes a defense which is litigated and determined by the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to the matter litigated.If the patient resists the claim on the ground of the neg ligence of the physician, and it is found that he was not negligent and judgment is given for the physician, the patient cannot recover for the harm since the absence of negligence is conclusively established.If on such an issue judgment is given for the patient, he is not' precluded from bringing an action for malpractice; and in such action the negligence of the physician will be treated as conclusively established, although the physician may interpose any other defenses he may have.The patient is not splitting his cause of action by using the fact of the physician’s negligence as a defense in the first action and as a claim in the second action.”

Canton-Hughes Pump Co. v. Llera, 6 Cir., 205 F. 209, 211, 212, 213. But see Silberstein v. Begun, 232 N.Y. 319, 323, 133 N.E. 904, 905; 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 797.

But see Silberstein v. Begun, 232 N.Y. 319, 323 , 133 N.E. 904, 905 ; 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 797.

Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 23, 24: “Thus, if the issue in the first action was whether the defendant was negligent and judgment was given for the defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover in the second action for the alleged negligence of the defendant; if judgment was given for the plaintiff, the defendant is precluded from denying his negligence.”

Rev. 1, 23, 24: “Thus, if the issue in the first action was whether the defendant was negligent and judgment was given for the defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover in the second action for the alleged negligence of the defendant; if judgment was given for the plaintiff, the defendant is precluded from denying his negligence.”

Allamong v. Falkenhof, 39 Ohio App. 515, 177 N.E. 789, 791, 792.

Brown v. First Nat. Bank of Newton, 8 Cir., 132 F. 450, 452, certiorari denied 196 U.S. 641, 25 S.Ct. 796, 49 L.Ed. 631; 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 797. See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 2: “If an issue is actually litigated and determined, that issue cannot again be litigated between the parties even though it arises in • an action based upon a different claim.”

Bank of Newton, 8 Cir., 132 F. 450, 452 , certiorari denied 196 U.S. 641 , 25 S.Ct. 796 , 49 L.Ed. 631 ; 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 797.See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 2: “If an issue is actually litigated and determined, that issue cannot again be litigated between the parties even though it arises in • an action based upon a different claim.”

See Pound, Organization of Courts (1940) 273, 287, 289; Dodd, The Judiciary in a Model State Constitution, III Report of New York State Constitutional Convention Committee (1938) 1839.

Calif.Code Civ.Proc.

Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1941) § 396: “If an action or proceeding is commenced in or transferred to a court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof as determined by the complaint or petition, and it thereafter appears from the verified pleadings, or at the trial, or hearing, that the determination of the action or proceeding, or of a counterclaim, or of a cross-complaint, will necessarily involve the determination of Questions not within the jurisdiction of the court, in which the action or proceeding is pending, the court, .whenever such lack of jurisdiction appears, must suspend all further proceedings therein and transfer the action or proceeding * ■ * * to a court having jurisdiction thereof. * » *

“Right to remit excess. In any case where the lack of jurisdiction is due solely to an excess in the amount of the demand, the excess may be remitted and the action may continue in the court where it is pending.”

Of. D.O.Code (1940) § 11 — 809: “Set-off or counterclaim — Pleading—Retention of jurisdiction. * * * If the set-off or counterclaim be for more than the jurisdictional limit of said [small claims and conciliation] branch but within the jurisdictional limit of this [Municipal] court, the action shall nevertheless remain in said branch and he tried therein in its entirety.”

* » * “Right to remit excess.In any case where the lack of jurisdiction is due solely to an excess in the amount of the demand, the excess may be remitted and the action may continue in the court where it is pending.”Of.D.O.Code (1940) § 11 — 809: “Set-off or counterclaim — Pleading—Retention of jurisdiction.* * * If the set-off or counterclaim be for more than the jurisdictional limit of said [small claims and conciliation] branch but within the jurisdictional limit of this [Municipal] court, the action shall nevertheless remain in said branch and he tried therein in its entirety.”

Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judy*29ment, 56 Harv.L.Rev., 1, 3: “But matters actually litigated and determined in the prior action cannot be relitigated in the later action. As to such matters, we have said there is a collateral estoppel. The estoppel does not rise from representations made by one of the parties upon which the other party has relied, as in the case of the ordinary estoppel in pais. But a party who has once fought out a question in litigation with the other party is precluded from fighting it out again. The term ‘collateral’ estoppel is intended to emphasize the fact that the causes of action involved in the two proceedings are different, even though the issues or some of them are the same.”

Rev., 1, 3: “But matters actually litigated and determined in the prior action cannot be relitigated in the later action.As to such matters, we have said there is a collateral estoppel.The estoppel does not rise from representations made by one of the parties upon which the other party has relied, as in the case of the ordinary estoppel in pais.But a party who has once fought out a question in litigation with the other party is precluded from fighting it out again. The term ‘collateral’ estoppel is intended to emphasize the fact that the causes of action involved in the two proceedings are different, even though the issues or some of them are the same.”