New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission v. Ward

Alleging that under date of December 3, 1948, the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 3rd Division, Docket C. L. 4023, Award No. 4204, had made an award1 in favor of appellee, defendant below and that because thereof a controversy existed between it and defendant, appellant brought this suit for a declaratory judgment.

Claiming: that the award was a money award and, therefore, under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § *655151 et seq., as amended, was not final and binding upon plaintiff; that the defendant, Mrs. Ward, had demanded of plaintiff that the award be put into effect; that the plaintiff had in reply asked her certain questions in respect of her claim which she •had not answered; and, pointing out that defendant was contending that the award was binding upon plaintiff while plaintiff was contending that it was not, the complaint charged that an actual controversy exists requiring the court to interpret the award and to determine whether or not it is binding upon plaintiff.

The prayer of the petition was that a judgment be rendered:

“1. Decreeing that the refusal on the part of Public Belt to reinstate Mrs. Ward to her former position was not in violation of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, and was justified and warranted and constituted no breach of any obligation by Public Belt to Mrs. Ward.

2. Further decreeing that no wages whatever, or any other amount, are due by Public Belt to Mrs. Ward.

3. Further decreeing that Mrs. Ward has no right to reinstatement in the employment of Public Belt with or without any seniority or any other rights.

4. Further decreeing that the said Mrs. Ward has no rights, claims or demands against Public Belt growing out of or in any way connected with her prior employment by Public Belt.

5. Further decreeing that the award by the National Railroad Adjustment Board is not final and binding on Public Belt.

6. Further rendering such other judgment, decrees and orders as may be proper and equitable in the premises.

7. Further decreeing that Public Belt be awarded such costs as may be incurred in this proceeding.”

Defendant appeared by motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,2 and the motion coming on to be heard, it was sustained and the cause was dismissed.

Appellant is here insisting that, in declining to take jurisdiction and dismissing the suit, the court erred.

We do not think so. While in its brief and in oral argument, appellant makes considerable point of its effort to obtain from appellee a statement of the amount claimed by her to be due, no question of the amount due under the award was submitted to the court for decision.

On the contrary, the only controversy really put up to the court was whether plaintiff was bound by, and must obey, the award. In short, the only question presented here for decision is, May a court after an award has been rendered by the Board against a defendant carrier, entertain a suit for declaratory judgment as to the correctness and binding effect of the award?

We think it quite plain that the court below correctly answered the question in the negative. The statute under which the award was made 3 makes specific provision for hearings and awards, and subsec. 1 (m) 4 provides that, except as to a money award, they shall be final and binding, and that in case of a dispute involving an interpretation of the award, the division of the Board shall interpret the award. Sub-sec. 1 (p) 5 does provide for a suit on the award, by the petitioner, or any person for whose benefit such order was made, but the law contains no provision for a suit by a carrier to interpret or construe the award or set it aside.

It is plain, we think, that plaintiff’s suit presented no justiciable controversy requiring or admitting of a declaratory judgment. To the extent that the suit sought an interpretation of the award, the statute has prevented this being done by making exclusive provision for its • interpretation by the Board. To the extent that it sought to set the award aside, the statute has prevented this by its provision that the award is final and binding.

Finally, if, contrary to the -whole tenor of the suit, it could be considered as one on a money award, this would not help appellant, because the suit was not broiught, as provided in the statute, by the petitioner or by any person for whose benefit the order was made. That no case for declaratory judgment is presented has already been precisely determined against the contention of appellant in Boswell’s case.6 It has been recently again determined in principle by the Supreme Court in the case of Marion Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 584. It is true that in that case the suit was brought in the state court and before the Board had acted, instead of, as here, in the federal court and after it had acted, but the language and scope of the decision is conclusive authority for the view that we take, that the complaint does not present a justiciable declaratory judgment controversy. ' The opinion of the dissenting judge, on page 8, makes this plain:

“Throughout this opinion I have assumed that the Court means only to impose a requirement of primary recourse to the Board. But that inevitably means many litigants would be deprived of access to the courts. The extent of judicial review of awards other than money awards is doubtful, and it is highly questionable whether even a money award can be reviewed in the courts if only the carrier wishes review. Most important, the statute provides no relief for a petitioning party — be he union, individual or carrier — against an erroneous order of the Board.”

The district judge was right in refusing to exercise the invoked jurisdiction. His judgment is

Affirmed.