Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Hayes v. Union Pac. R. Co.

184 F.2d 337

October 20, 1950 · Docket 12509_1

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Headnotes

Generated summaries
  1. Headnote 1

    The appeal asked whether a district court could adjudicate a racial‑discrimination claim based on the railroad's implementation of a lawful agreement. The court held that Congress did not give federal courts authority to police the performance of such agreements.

  2. Headnote 2

    The opinion pointed to the statutory scheme that assigns adjustment of performance‑of‑agreement disputes to the NRAB, citing the statutory provision and the Slocum decision as authority.

  3. Headnote 3

    The court emphasized Supreme Court precedent (Steele and Tunstall) that limits judicial review to agreements that are void, voidable, contrary to public policy, or obtained unlawfully.

  4. Headnote 4

    The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ injunction claim for lack of jurisdiction; the appellate court affirmed, finding that without an unlawful agreement the federal courts cannot provide relief.

  5. Headnote 5

    The appeal concerned Hayes’ racial‑discrimination claim that the railroad’s implementation of a lawful agreement was discriminatory; the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

  6. Headnote 6

    The parties argued that the district court should hear the claim, but the statute designates an administrative board for such adjustment disputes.

  7. Headnote 7

    The court noted Supreme Court precedent limiting judicial intervention to agreements that are void, voidable, or procured unlawfully, citing Steele and Tunstall.

  8. Headnote 8

    The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, finding no jurisdictional basis for Hayes’s equitable relief claim.

  9. Headnote 9

    The court held that Congress did not grant the federal judiciary authority to police how parties carry out a valid agreement, and that such performance disputes must be heard in the Act’s designated administrative forum.

  10. Headnote 10

    The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§151‑153, creates an exclusive administrative forum for adjusting such disputes, and the courts may not act as a substitute tribunal.

  11. Headnote 11

    The opinion cites Supreme Court authority that limits judicial review to cases where the agreement itself is void, voidable, or contrary to public policy, or where the bargaining process was tainted by illegality.

  12. Headnote 12

    The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, finding that the claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB and therefore could not be heard in federal court.

  13. Headnote 13

    The court explained that Congress did not grant the courts jurisdiction to police performance of agreements entered into under the Act, and therefore such disputes are outside the judiciary’s authority.

  14. Headnote 14

    The opinion points to the statutory provision and to the Slocum decision, noting that appropriate administrative tribunals have been created to handle such performance‑of‑agreement matters.

  15. Headnote 15

    The court cites Supreme Court precedent (Steele and Tunstall) stating that jurisdiction is permissible solely in cases where the agreement is void, voidable, or obtained through unlawful means.

  16. Headnote 16

    The appellate court found the motion to dismiss correctly granted and affirmed the lower court’s disposition, as the claim concerned only the performance of a lawful agreement.

Opinion

GOODMAN, District Judge.

This appeal tenders the question whether the United States District Court has jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., of an employee’s complaint charging racial discrimination in the performance of a collective bargaining agreement. The appellant Hayes for himself and others similarly situated, all of whom are Negro members of appellee Dining Car Employees Union Local #372, sought an injunction and other equitable relief in the court below against acts of alleged discrimination by respondent Railroad against appellant and his associates in the making of seniority assignments and promotions. The respondents’ motion below to dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, was granted. It was not claimed below nor here that the collective bargaining agreement executed by respondent Union, as the bargaining representative of the employees, and respondent Railroad, in any manner by its terms, directly or indirectly, provided for any discrimination against appellants. Appellants claimed below only that the conduct of the respondents in performing the agreement was discriminatory. It was also contended on ap peal that the respondents entered into the collective bargaining agreement with an undisclosed intention (somewhat vaguely-described), of performing it in a discriminatory manner.

It is not necessary to state in detail the nature of the. affidavits and of the pleadings constituting the record which the trial court had before it. These matters are fully set forth in the opinion of Chief Judge Michael J. Roche, the trial judge. D.C., 88 F.Supp. 108108 .. We adopt his opinion. We add to it only to the extent of saying that it is clear to us that the Federal Courts are not charged by federal law with the duty or function-of policing the parties in the performance of collective bargaining agreements entered into pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. Congress did not, by the Railway Tabor Act, grant jurisdiction to the Federal Courts to afford relief for breaches of performance of collective bargaining agreements. Appropriate tribunals have been established for that purpose. 45 U.S.C.A. § 153; National Railroad Adjustment Board; Slocum v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577. It is only when collective bargaining agreements are unlawfully entered into or when the agreements themselves are unlawful in terms or effect, that federal courts ■may act. This is made quite clear by the Supreme Court in Steele v. L. & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 and Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187. The disposition of the cause made by the District Court is correct.

Affirmed.