Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Reade v. Ewing, Federal Security Adm'r

1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2647 · 205 F.2d 630

June 23, 1953 · Docket 22454_1

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Headnotes

Generated summaries
  1. Headnote 1

    The court held that a consumer who alleges the order harms him meets the standing requirement of 21 U.S.C.A. § 371(f)(1), which authorizes such persons to seek review of the Administrator’s order.

  2. Headnote 2

    The court found that substantial evidence supported the Administrator’s findings, so the order could not be vacated under the substantial‑evidence standard of review.

  3. Headnote 3

    The Administrator’s letter addressing the petitioner’s new evidence was considered part of the record, and the court relied on it in determining that the order was supported by substantial evidence.

  4. Headnote 4

    The petitioner sought a stay and reopening under 21 U.S.C.A. § 371(f)(2), but because the Administrator’s letter stated the evidence would not change the order, the court refused to reopen the proceeding.

  5. Headnote 5

    The court noted that, for jurisdiction, it is enough that the petitioner's claims are made in good faith and are substantial, thereby meeting the statutory threshold.

  6. Headnote 6

    Petitioner, a dealer in fish oils, claimed he was adversely affected as both a producer and consumer of oleomargarine; the court held that such an allegation meets the jurisdictional requirement for standing under the statute.

  7. Headnote 7

    The court found that the Administrator’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, so the order permitting synthetic vitamin A in oleomargarine was upheld.

  8. Headnote 8

    The administrator sent a letter indicating the new evidence would not change the decision; the court considered that letter and the evidence as part of the record and declined to reopen the proceeding.

  9. Headnote 9

    The statute authorizes the court to require the administrator to take new evidence before a reopened hearing when those conditions are met.

  10. Headnote 10

    The court noted that as long as the jurisdictional allegations are bona fide and non‑frivolous, the petition meets the statutory pleading requirement.

  11. Headnote 11

    The opinion cites Associated Industries v. Ickes and related cases to explain that allowing adversely affected persons to sue vindicates the United States’ interest.

  12. Headnote 12

    Petitioner, a dealer in fish oils, claimed the Administrator’s order harmed him as a producer and consumer. The court held that such an adverse‑effect allegation creates the statutory standing required to bring a petition for review.

  13. Headnote 13

    The Administrator’s findings that the labeling order would promote honest dealing were supported by substantial evidence, so the court affirmed the order and denied the petition for setting it aside.

  14. Headnote 14

    The Administrator sent a letter stating that the petitioner’s new evidence would not alter the decision; the court treated that letter as part of the record and declined to reopen the hearing.

  15. Headnote 15

    Petitioner sought a stay and a reopening of the hearing, invoking the statutory provision that empowers the court to permit new evidence when it meets the materiality and prior‑omission standards.

  16. Headnote 16

    The court emphasized that the petitioner’s jurisdictional claims were sufficient because they were asserted in good faith and were not frivolous, meeting the statutory pleading requirement.

  17. Headnote 17

    Petitioner, a dealer in fish oils, claimed the Administrator’s order harmed him both as a producer and as a consumer, and the court held that such adverse‑effect allegations meet the standing requirement of 21 U.S.C.A. § 371(f)(1).

  18. Headnote 18

    The opinion cites earlier cases to explain that permitting a described class of citizens to sue for statutory violations effectively makes them private attorneys general, satisfying the case‑or‑controversy requirement.

  19. Headnote 19

    The court found substantial evidence in the record for the Administrator’s conclusion that the labeling order would promote honest dealing, and therefore affirmed the order on the merits.

  20. Headnote 20

    The Administrator’s letter, which was placed on the record and explained why the new evidence would not change the decision, was considered by the court as part of the record in assessing the order.

  21. Headnote 21

    The statute authorizes the court to order new evidence to be taken before the Administrator and considered in a reopened proceeding when the petitioner meets the materiality and reasonable‑omission requirements.

  22. Headnote 22

    The court noted that for jurisdiction, the petitioner’s claims need only be honest and have substance; frivolous or insincere claims do not confer jurisdiction.

  23. Headnote 23

    The petitioner claimed he was “adversely affected” both as a producer of vitamin‑A ingredient and as a consumer of oleomargarine, and the court held that such allegation meets the statutory standing requirement.

  24. Headnote 24

    The court reiterated that for jurisdiction the petitioner’s claims need to be bona‑fide and serious; frivolous or insincere allegations do not confer jurisdiction.

  25. Headnote 25

    The court found that substantial evidence supported the Administrator’s conclusions, so the order was not overturned.

  26. Headnote 26

    The opinion emphasized that the reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency once substantial evidence is found in the record.

  27. Headnote 27

    The Administrator’s letter addressing the petitioner’s new evidence was considered part of the record, and the court evaluated the order as if that evidence and the agency’s ruling on it were in the record.

  28. Headnote 28

    The petitioner sought a stay and reopening under § 371(f)(2); the court found the Administrator had already declined to consider the new evidence and therefore refused to reopen the hearing.

  29. Headnote 29

    The court cited precedent that authorizing a class of “adversely affected” individuals to sue effectively makes them private attorneys‑general for the United States.

  30. Headnote 30

    Petitioner, a dealer in fish oils and a consumer of oleomargarine, claimed the labeling order harmed him; the court held that such adverse‑effect allegations meet the standing requirement of the statute.

  31. Headnote 31

    The court explained that authorizing a class to sue to restrain an officer’s action is equivalent to granting private‑Attorney‑General authority, citing Associated Industries and FCC cases.

  32. Headnote 32

    The court noted that the adequacy of jurisdictional allegations is measured by their good‑faith and substantial nature, rejecting any claim that they are merely speculative.

  33. Headnote 33

    The court found the Administrator’s order supported by substantial evidence and therefore affirmed the order without re‑evaluating the agency’s judgment.

  34. Headnote 34

    The statute authorizes the court to reopen a hearing and admit new evidence under the specified conditions.

  35. Headnote 35

    The Administrator’s letter indicating the new evidence would not change the decision was treated as part of the record, and the court considered it in its review.

  36. Headnote 36

    After reviewing the Administrator’s letter, the court found no basis to disturb the order and dismissed the petition.

Opinion

FRANK, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner, a dealer in fish oils which are a natural source of vitamin A, seeks judicial review 1 and the setting aside of an order 2 of the Federal Security Administrator 3 (promulgated after hearings), allowing the optional vitamin content of oleomargarine to be supplied by synthetic as well as natural sources without indicating the source on the label, but containing merely the designation, “Vitamin A added.” Petitioner challenges the validity of the respondent’s order, asserting that it is not supported by sufficient evidence to show that it “will promote honestly and fair dealing in the interest of consumers” of oleomargarine; he contends that he is “adversely affected” in his capacity as a producer of an ingredient used in oleomargarine fortified by vitamin A, and also as a consumer of such oleomargarine.

A motion by respondent to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction 4 was denied by this court without prejudice to its renewal at the argument of the petition, and respondent has now renewed its motion.

1. 1. We need not consider whether, in the light of our previous decisions, 5 the allegations of petitioner’s interest as a producer suffice to meet the jurisdictional requirements. For the allegations of interest as consumer 6 do meet them: (a) The allegation that the ordet violates the statute discloses a “case of actual controversy.” (b) The asserted consumer interest constitutes him a person, “adversely" affected.” As we have elsewhere said, if Congress authorized the Attorney 'General' to bring suit to restrain a federal officer from exceeding his statutory authority, such a suit would be a “case or controversy” satisfying the constitutional provision; it would therefore satisfy the first statutory provision before us here. As we have also said elsewhere, Congress, by authorizing certain persons within a described class — here those “adversely affected” — to bring actions to restrain such officers from transcending their statutory authority, validly creates a class of “private Attorney Generals” to vindicate the right of the United States against its wrongdoing officer. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 2 Cir., 134 F.2d 694, 704; Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 642, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L.Ed. 869, 1037; Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc., v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U.S. 4, 62 S.Ct. 875, 86 L.Ed. 1229. 7 With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, as distinguished from the merits, it suffices that the jurisdictional allegations are in good faith and substantial, i. e., not frivolous. 7a .

2. 2. On the merits, however, petitioner must lose, since there was substantial evidence to support the Administrator’s-findings and conclusions, and therefore we cannot set the order aside.

Petitioner asks that, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.A. § 371(f)(2), 8 we stay the operation of the order and require the Administrator to reopen the hearing for the introduction by the petitioner of new evidence. The Administrator has already-written petitioner a letter (which is of record) discussing that proposed. evidence, and indicating that the Administrator would not change his decision on account of that evidence. We have considered the case as if the record contained that evidence and also a formal ruling thereon by the Administrator along the lines of his letter. On that basis, wc see no grounds for disturbing the order.

Petition dismissed on the merits.

. . Authorized by § 701(f) (1) of the Federal Food, Drug & Oosmotic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C.A. § 371(f) (1), which reads as follows:

“In a case of actual controversy as to the validity of any order under subsection (e), any person who will be adversely affected by such order if placed in effect may at any time prior to the ninetieth day after such order is issued file a petition with the United States court of appeal for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of business, for a judicial review of such order. The summons and petition may be served at any place in the United States. The Administrator, promptly upon service of the summons and petition, shall certify and file in the court the transcript of the proceedings and the record on which the Administrator based his order.”

. . Under 21 U.S.C.A. § 341.

. . His functions are now administered by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953, 67 Stat. 18, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 133 z-15 note, 623.

. . See note 1 supra.

. . American Lecithin Co. v. McNutt, 2 Cir., 155 F.2d 784; United States Cane Sugar Refiners’ Association v. McNutt, 2 Cir., 138 F.2d 116.

. “8.. “8. In addition, your petitioner and the members of his family are consumers and prospective consumers of oleomargarine and the inclusion of any harmful ingredient therein which will make or which may make the oleomargarine unwholesome and detrimental to the health of a human being, will adversely affect and harm petitioner and the members of his family.”

. Cf.. Cf. Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 495-496, 22 N.W. 641, 645: “It is further claimed that the statute is invalid because it authorizes an action to be brought by any citizen of the county, without a shbwing that he is especially damaged by the nuisance. * * * There can be no doubt that it is within the power of the legislature to designate the person or a class of persons who may maintain actions to restrain and abate public nuisances, and when that is done the action is for all purposes an action instituted in behalf of the public, the same as though brought by the attorney general or public prosecutor.”

In Barrows v. Farnum’s Stage Lines, Inc., 254 Mass. 240, 243, 150 N.E. 206, 206, the court said: “The state has power to confer jurisdiction upon its courts to consider suits at the instance of those who have very remote and even no personal interest in the subject-matter. It may invoke or permit the aid in law enr forcement of one or of a group of private citizens, whose only purpose is the promotion of observance of law. There is no constitutional objection to this exercise of legislative power. * * * A stated number of citizens or a single individual may be clothed by the Legislature with authority to invoke the aid of courts in the suppression of violations of law.”

See also, Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225, 26 S.Ct. 31, 50 L.Ed. 157; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 note, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443.

. . The Fair v. Koehler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25-26, 33 S.Ct. 410, 57 L.Ed. 716.

. . 21 U.S.C.A. § 371(f) (2) reads as follows:

“If the petitioner applies to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shows to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Administrator, the court may order such additional evidence (and evidence in rebuttal thereof) to be taken before the Administrator, and to be adduced upon the hearing, in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper. The Administrator may modify his findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, ¿nd he shall file such modified or new findings, and his recommendation, if any, for the . modification or setting aside of his original order, with the return of such additional evidence.”