Willie E. Daniel, Jr. v. United States
107 U.S. App. D.C. 110 · 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5500 · 274 F.2d 768
January 28, 1960 · Docket 15352-15354_1
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
The Court reiterated that a defendant cannot be found to have waived counsel at sentencing unless the waiver satisfies the traditional three‑part standard of voluntariness, knowledge, and intelligence.
- Headnote 2
Because the presumption of regularity is rebuttable, the trial judge must expressly determine, after evaluating the evidence, whether the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
- Headnote 3
The judge’s waiver analysis is incomplete without a consideration of the defendant’s personal characteristics that affect the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver.
- Headnote 4
Although a judgment is ordinarily presumed accurate, a defendant’s claim that no waiver question was asked requires the court to look beyond that presumption.
- Headnote 5
Courts must resolve any doubt in favor of the defendant, treating the waiver of a fundamental right as the exception rather than the rule.
- Headnote 6
If the court determines that the defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive counsel, a new sentencing hearing must be conducted with counsel present.
The opinion states that when a waiver is absent, the sentencing proceeding is invalid and the defendant must be brought back for re‑sentencing with assistance of counsel.
- Headnote 7
The court emphasized that an express finding on waiver is mandatory; without it, the sentencing judgment is reversible and must be sent back for further proceedings.
- Headnote 8
The court held that a mere notation in the judgment that the defendant declined counsel does not prove a knowing and intelligent waiver; an explicit finding on the record is required.
- Headnote 9
The opinion emphasizes that the court must evaluate the defendant’s testimony, credibility, and surrounding circumstances rather than rely on presumptions.
- Headnote 10
These factors are listed as essential to determine whether the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently at sentencing.
- Headnote 11
The court noted that, despite the judgment’s presumption of regularity, the lack of transcript and the defendant’s denial required further factual findings.
- Headnote 12
The opinion cites the presumption against waiver and holds that the government must overcome it with sufficient proof of a valid waiver.
- Headnote 13
The court instructed that without such a finding, the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new sentencing hearing with counsel.
- Headnote 14
The opinion directs that the defendant be brought before the court accompanied by counsel for a new sentencing proceeding.
Opinion
These cases arise under Section 2255 of Title 28 U.S.C. (1958). Appellant seeks to vacate sentences of imprisonment imposed on him by the District Court for convictions under three indictments. The sentence in one of these cases, following a trial, is not yet being served. Belief in that case is not available under Section 2255. See Heflin v. United States, 1959, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407. Furthermore, considering the petition and the record in the light most favorable to petitioner, no basis appears for granting relief in habeas corpus or by motion comparable to coram nobis. See Moon v. United States, 1959, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 272 F.2d 530. The principal allegation of the petition relative to this case is that appellant did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. The District Court held a hearing on this subject and found adversely to petitioner. We perceive no error in its determination.
The sentences in the other two eases are nowr being served on a concurrent basis and resulted from pleas of guilty. 1 The appellant alleges that both pleas were the result of coercion and the giving of promises and that in one of the cases, No. 848-54, he did not effectively waive counsel. The District Court, after an extensive hearing on the allegations made by the appellant-petitioner, decided adversely to him on all points. We find no error affecting substantial rights, with this exception:
When appellant was sentenced on Case No. 848-54, his counsel was not present. The formal judgment recites this, and further states: “The Court advised the defendant of his right to counsel and asked him whether he desired to have counsel present at the time of sentence, and the defendant replied that he did not.” At the hearing under Section 2255, Daniel denied that this had happened. The judge stated that he had no actual recollection of the facts, but that he was certain that Daniel was informed of his right to have counsel present. 2 We do not regard this as an adequate treatment of the matter. The judge should have made an express finding as to whether or not Daniel knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. In reaching his decision, the judge should weigh the credibility of the defendant’s testimony; his age and education at the time of the alleged waiver; the presumption of reliability attaching to the recital in the judgment; and the presumption against waiver of constitutional rights. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 1938, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; Farnsworth v. United States, 1956, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 232 F.2d 59, 62 A.L.R.2d 423; Gadsden v. United States, 1955, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 223 F.2d 627; McKinney v. United States, 1953, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 222, 208 F.2d 844. If substantial doubt exists in the judge’s mind, after further consideration of the matter, he should set aside the sentence, though not the conviction. Daniel should then be brought before the court, “accompanied by counsel, for the imposition of a new sentence, to be rendered after counsel [as well as the prisoner] has been given an opportunity to make all proper representations to the court.” McKinney v. United States, supra, 93 U.S.App.D.C. at page 225, 208 F.2d at page 847.
If the judge concludes, after further consideration, that the right to counsel at sentence was intelligently and knowingly waived, he may enter findings and an order to that effect. That order may then be brought before us by a new appeal, if counsel concludes that one is warranted.
The District Court’s order, denying relief under Section 2255, will accordingly be affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in respect of the sentence imposed in Case No. 848-54 (our No. 15,-354).
So ordered.
. . The sentence in District Court Case No. 848-54 was for a term of imprisonment for a period of from five to fifteen years. Later, Daniel was sentenced in District Court Case No. 846-54, with counsel present, to a term of three to ten years, the sentence to run concurrently to that in No. 848-54.
. . The court’s formal finding was:
“6. “6. Inasmuch as the court reporter’s notes pertaining to the sentencing proceedings in Criminal Case No. 848-54 cannot be located, after an extremely thorough search, there is no transcript available to this Court with regard to the referred-to proceedings. However, a note appears on the judgment in that case to the effect that the defendant was asked by the Court if he desired to have counsel present, whereupon the defendant replied that he did not. The judgment, which is the only record which we have in this case pertaining to the subject question, must be given its presumption of due regularity. This Court finds as a fact that the defendant was informed of his right to have counsel present at his sentencing; and this Court finds as a fact that this Court has never failed to ask a defendant if he has anything to say by way of mitigation before being sentenced and therefore this Court must conclude, in the absence of a transcript, that it did inquire of the defendant in that respect in this case.” (Emphasis in original.)