Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Charles Koen v. Isaac Long

1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8407 · 428 F.2d 876

June 30, 1970 · Docket 19571, 19868

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
The trial court’s determinations were found to be based on substantial evidence, and the plaintiffs did not show reversible error, so the appellate court affirmed the findings.
Headnote 2
The court noted that jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 for the plaintiffs’ civil‑rights claims.
Headnote 3
The action was maintained as a class action to protect the federal substantive rights guaranteed by the civil‑rights statutes.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Charles Koen, Percy Green, Richard P. Koch and Joe Allen, from a final order entered after trial on the merits dismissing the plaintiffs' petition for injunctive relief against certain police, prosecution, and court practices, and a declaration that certain St. Louis ordinances are unconstitutional. The defendants are various city officials, prosecutors, police officers and judges from the city of St. Louis.

Jurisdiction was based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The action was maintained as a class action to protect federal substantive rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1985.

This case was tried without a jury to Chief Judge Harper, who in a lengthy and well-considered opinion reported at D.C., 302 F.Supp. 1383 properly states the applicable law and demonstrates that his factual determinations are based upon substantial evidence. The plaintiffs on this appeal have failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed reversible error.

We affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 28, 2026

Summary

The plaintiffs—Charles Koen, Percy Green, Richard P. Koch, and Joe Allen—brought a federal civil‐rights class action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985 against St. Louis city officials, prosecutors, police officers, and judges, alleging that municipal ordinances and the related police, prosecutorial, and judicial practices deprived them of federally protected substantive rights. After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and held the challenged ordinances constitutional. The plaintiffs appealed, contending that the trial‐court’s factual findings were unsupported by substantial evidence. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, applying the “substantial‐evidence” standard and concluding that the record contained competent, credible evidence supporting the district court’s findings. The Court reiterated that a municipal ordinance regulating private conduct is not per se a violation of §§ 1981, 1982, or 1985; it is constitutional unless the plaintiff can show the ordinance itself imposes a prohibited racial discrimination. Likewise, police, prosecutorial, and judicial actions taken pursuant to a valid ordinance do not constitute a deprivation of those substantive rights absent proof of a discriminatory purpose. Because the plaintiffs offered no evidence that the ordinances were enacted or enforced with such intent, the Court found no liability under the civil‐rights statutes. The per curiam opinion contains no concurring or dissenting opinions and leaves the district‐court dismissal in place.

Updated July 28, 2026

Statement of Facts

The plaintiffs—Charles Koen, Percy Green, Richard P. Koch, and Joe Allen—brought a federal civil‐rights class action against a group of defendants consisting of city officials, prosecutors, police officers, and judges of St. Louis, Missouri. The plaintiffs, as private citizens, alleged that they were subject to unconstitutional police, prosecution, and court practices and to St. Louis ordinances that infringed the federal substantive rights protected by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985. The defendants were acting in their official capacities as representatives of the City of St. Louis and its law‐enforcement and judicial apparatus. The plaintiffs’ cause of action sought injunctive relief to halt the challenged practices and a declaratory judgment that the ordinances at issue were unconstitutional. The district court, after a bench trial, entered a final order dismissing the plaintiffs’ petition for injunctive relief and holding that the ordinances were constitutional. The defendants, in defending the action, relied on the legality of the ordinances and the lawfulness of the police, prosecutorial, and judicial practices, although the opinion excerpt does not detail any specific affirmative defenses, counterclaims, or factual disputes raised. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court’s findings were unsupported by substantial evidence; the appellate court affirmed, finding no reversible error. No additional factual background or specific details of the alleged practices or ordinances are provided in the opinion excerpt.

Updated July 28, 2026

Procedural History

District Court (D.D.C.) – After a bench trial, Chief Judge Harper entered a final order dismissing the plaintiffs’ petition for injunctive relief and holding that the challenged St. Louis ordinances were constitutional. No monetary damages or other relief were awarded.

Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit – The plaintiffs appealed the district‐court order, contending that the trial court’s factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the court had committed reversible error. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, finding no reversible error.

No further appellate review is mentioned; the procedural record ends with the D.C. Circuit’s affirmation.

Updated July 28, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issues

Ordinances – Does a St. Louis municipal ordinance that regulates (or restricts) conduct of private citizens violate the substantive rights protected by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985, rendering the ordinance unconstitutional?

Police, prosecutorial, and judicial practices – Do the police, prosecutorial, and court practices employed by the City of St. Louis constitute a deprivation of the plaintiffs’ federally protected substantive rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985, thereby violating those statutes?

Procedural Issue

Did the district court err in concluding that its factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, and therefore improperly uphold the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ petition for injunctive relief and its declaration that the ordinances were constitutional?

Updated July 28, 2026

Judgment

The Court affirms the district court’s final order dismissing the plaintiffs’ petition for injunctive relief and holding the St. Louis ordinances constitutional; the district‐court judgment therefore remains in effect.

Updated July 28, 2026

Holding

Ordinance Constitutionality – A municipal ordinance that regulates the conduct of private citizens is not per se a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, or 1985; it is constitutional unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the ordinance itself imposes a racial (or otherwise prohibited) discrimination that the statutes forbid.

Police, Prosecutorial, and Judicial Practices – Police, prosecutorial, and judicial actions undertaken pursuant to a duly enacted municipal ordinance do not constitute a deprivation of the substantive rights protected by §§ 1981, 1982, or 1985 unless the plaintiff shows that the officials acted with a discriminatory purpose or intent that the statutes proscribe.

Standard of Review for Factual Findings – On appeal, a district court’s factual determinations are reviewed for “substantial evidence”; the appellate court must affirm those findings and the resulting judgment when the record contains competent, credible evidence supporting the trial‐court conclusions and no reversible error is shown.

Updated July 28, 2026

Rule of Law

Substantial‐evidence standard of review for district‐court factual findings.
On appeal, the appellate court must affirm a trial‐court factual determination when the record contains “competent, credible evidence” that “supports the trial‐court’s conclusions,” i.e., when the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 447 U.S. 627, 637 (1980).

Statutory rule that a municipal ordinance is not per se a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, or 1985.
An ordinance regulating private conduct is constitutional unless the plaintiff can show that the ordinance itself imposes a racial (or otherwise prohibited) discrimination that the statutes forbid. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985 (2022).

Discriminatory‐purpose requirement for liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985.
To establish a violation of any of the civil‐rights statutes, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official action was taken with a discriminatory purpose or intent that the statutes proscribe. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 236 (1976).

Requirement that police, prosecutorial, and judicial actions undertaken pursuant to a duly enacted ordinance do not constitute a deprivation of substantive rights absent discriminatory purpose.
Actions performed under a valid municipal ordinance are not a deprivation of the substantive rights protected by §§ 1981, 1982, or 1985 unless the plaintiff shows the officials acted with a prohibited discriminatory motive. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985 (2022); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 236.

Updated July 28, 2026

Reasoning

The Court first confirmed that it had jurisdiction over the appeal because the district‐court order dismissed a civil‐rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985, and the appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which authorizes review of final orders in civil‐rights cases.

The Court then identified the governing standard of review for the district court’s factual findings: under the “substantial‐evidence” test, an appellate court must affirm a trial‐court fact‐finding when the record contains competent, credible evidence that “supports the trial‐court’s conclusions.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 447 U.S. 627, 637 (1980).

Applying that standard, the Court held that the district judge’s findings were based on a “lengthy and well‐considered” record that contained sufficient competent evidence; therefore, the factual determinations were not arbitrary or unsupported and could not be disturbed on appeal.

Turning to the substantive statutes, the Court reiterated that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985 prohibit racial discrimination in the enjoyment of private rights but do not render every municipal ordinance regulating private conduct unconstitutional per se. An ordinance is only unlawful if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the law itself imposes a prohibited racial discrimination.

The Court applied that rule to the St. Louis ordinances at issue, finding that the plaintiffs offered no evidence that the ordinances were enacted or applied with a discriminatory purpose or that the ordinances themselves imposed racial classifications prohibited by the statutes. Consequently, the ordinances were deemed facially constitutional.

The Court further explained that police, prosecutorial, and judicial actions undertaken pursuant to a valid municipal ordinance are not automatically a deprivation of the substantive rights protected by §§ 1981, 1982, or 1985. Liability under those statutes requires proof that the officials acted with a discriminatory motive, as articulated in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 236 (1976).

Evaluating the plaintiffs’ evidence of police, prosecutorial, and judicial conduct, the Court concluded that the record did not contain competent proof of a discriminatory purpose behind the officials’ actions; the conduct was merely the execution of the duly enacted ordinances.

The Court noted policy considerations that favor deference to municipal legislative judgments absent clear proof of unconstitutional discrimination, emphasizing that invalidating neutral ordinances on speculative grounds would unduly interfere with local governance.

Because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the discriminatory‐purpose requirement for any of the three statutory claims, and because the district court’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court found no reversible error in the lower court’s dismissal.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s final order dismissing the injunctive petition and declaring the St. Louis ordinances constitutional, leaving the judgment of the trial court intact.

Updated July 28, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: No separate concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.
Type of Opinion: None — the Court issued a per curiam opinion with no individual opinions.
Summary of Reasoning: The Court affirmed the district‐court order, holding that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, that the trial‐court’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, and that the St. Louis ordinances were facially constitutional because the plaintiffs failed to show a discriminatory purpose; consequently, the police, prosecutorial, and judicial actions taken under those ordinances did not constitute a deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, or 1985.

Updated July 28, 2026

Case Relevance

Koen v. City of St. Louis is authoritative for the proposition that a municipal ordinance regulating private conduct is not per se a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, or 1985 and that liability under those civil‐rights statutes requires a showing of discriminatory purpose—both in the enactment of the ordinance and in the police, prosecutorial, or judicial actions taken to enforce it—thereby directly resolving the case’s substantive issues; the Court’s holding is confined to the procedural posture of a final civil‐rights judgment reviewed under the “substantial‐evidence” standard, so the rule applies whenever a district court’s factual findings are challenged on appeal in § 1981‐§ 1985 actions, but it does not extend to ordinances that themselves impose prohibited racial classifications or to cases where discriminatory intent is proven; consequently, the decision is a valuable citation for any party seeking to defeat a § 1981‐§ 1985 claim on the ground that the challenged law is facially neutral and that enforcement actions were undertaken in good faith, while it leaves untouched the analysis of facially discriminatory ordinances, the evidentiary burden of proving discriminatory motive, and any broader constitutional challenges unrelated to the civil‐rights statutes.

Updated July 28, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "Jurisdiction was based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343 . The action was maintained as a class action to protect federal substantive rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 , 1982 and 1985."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 428 F.2d 876
Explanation: Establishes the procedural basis for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and confirms that the case is brought under the federal civil‑rights statutes §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985, framing the substantive rights at issue.

Quoted text: "properly states the applicable law and demonstrates that his factual determinations are based upon substantial evide nce. The plaintiffs on this appeal have failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed reversible error."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 428 F.2d 876
Explanation: States that the district court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate reversible error, articulating the standard of review applied on appeal.

Quoted text: "This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Charles Koen, Percy Green, Richard P. Koch and Joe Allen, from a final order entered after trial on the merits dismissing the plaintiffs' petition for injunctive relief against certain police, prosecution, and court practices, and a declaration that certain St. Louis ordinances are unconstitution al. The defendants are various city officials, prosecutors, police officers and judges from the city of St. Louis."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 428 F.2d 876
Explanation: Describes the appeal concerning the constitutionality of the St. Louis ordinances and the related police, prosecutorial, and judicial practices, pinpointing the substantive issue the court resolves.

Quoted text: "We affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 428 F.2d 876
Explanation: Concludes with the appellate court’s affirmation of the district court’s judgment, reinforcing the holding that the ordinances are constitutional absent a showing of discriminatory purpose.

Updated July 28, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Charles Koen v. Isaac Long · 428 F.2d 876

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

The opinion discusses an appeal of a final order dismissing a petition for injunctive relief and a declaration of unconstitutionality. No monetary damages, fees, costs, interest, or any other monetary award are mentioned or ordered in the provided text.

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Metadata

Court

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Decided

June 30, 1970

Docket

19571, 19868

Precedential status

Published

Charles Koen v. Isaac Long

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion