United States v. Maynard John Verdoorn, A/K/A John Maynard Verdoorn
433 F.2d 1370
November 30, 1970 · Docket 20271_1
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
The instruction is permissive, not mandatory; it allows inference but does not require the jury to find knowledge, leaving the prosecution’s burden intact.
- Headnote 2
The Court has consistently held that allowing the jury to draw an inference of knowledge from possession does not burden the defendant and therefore is constitutionally permissible.
- Headnote 3
The defendant appealed his conviction arguing that the trial‑court instruction shifted the burden of proof. The court held that the prosecution, not the defendant, bears the burden of proving knowledge, preserving the constitutional presumption of innocence.
- Headnote 4
The trial court instructed jurors they could infer knowledge from possession of the vehicle. The appellant claimed this shifted the burden, but the court relied on Harding and prior precedent, finding the instruction permissive, not mandatory, and therefore constitutionally valid.
- Headnote 5
The appellate court affirmed the conviction, emphasizing that the instruction allowed, but did not impose, an inference of knowledge and therefore did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant.
Opinion
The defendant was tried on January 23, 1970, and convicted by a jury for interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. He appeals that conviction. We affirm.
The evidence shows that on October 29, 1969, a 1967 White Trend van truck was stolen from Leased Trucks, Inc. in Sioux City, Iowa. On the same evening, the defendant was observed driving the truck by three witnesses in North Sioux City, South Dakota, a nearby border town. The truck was found abandoned in North Sioux City, South Dakota, some 24 hours later. It had been driven 600 miles between the time of the theft and its recovery.
The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. His sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that they could infer from possession of property recently stolen, when not satisfactorily explained, knowledge that the property was stolen. Defendant urges that this instruction shifts the burden of proof to the defendant thereby depriving him of his constitutional presumption of innocence.
Defendant acknowledges that this same attack has been rejected by this court and other courts of appeals, citing McIntosh v. United States, 341 F.2d 448, 456 (8 Cir. 1965); Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289, 1294 (8 Cir. 1969); United States v. Wenner, 417 F.2d 979, 982 (8 Cir. 1969) and cases cited therein; Orser v. United States, 362 F.2d 580, 582 (5 Cir. 1966); Ashley v. United States, 413 F.2d 249 (5 Cir. 1969), and United States v. Hood, 422 F.2d 737, 741 (7 Cir. 1970).
Defendant does not offer any new argument not previously considered. As we have repeated on prior occasions:
“Contrary to appellant’s contention, this burden was not shifted by the portion of the charge which only permitted, but did not require, the jury to infer from appellant’s possession of the automobile that he had transported it in interstate commerce.” Harding v. United States, 337 F.2d 254, 257 (8 Cir. 1964).
Judgment affirmed.