Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Russell C. Lind v. John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare

434 F.2d 1313

January 28, 1971 · Docket 23883_1

Queued for AI processing — next in lineest. ~5 min

Headnotes

Generated summaries
  1. Headnote 1

    The court’s review is limited to the record; it does not re‑try the factual issues anew. If the record contains substantial evidence, the agency’s determination stands.

  2. Headnote 2

    The Secretary terminated Lind’s benefits on the ground that he could work. The court found the record sufficiently supported that finding, so the termination was upheld.

  3. Headnote 3

    Lind’s claim was dismissed by summary judgment because the court concluded the agency’s record already demonstrated his capacity for gainful activity; no further hearing was required.

  4. Headnote 4

    The statutes that define “substantial gainful activity” govern eligibility for disability‑insurance benefits and guide agency determinations of capability.

  5. Headnote 5

    Lind brought a civil action challenging the Secretary’s termination of benefits, invoking the statutory right to judicial review provided by § 405(g).

  6. Headnote 6

    The Department’s decision was upheld by the examiner after a de novo hearing, yet the court’s review remained confined to whether the record contained substantial evidence.

  7. Headnote 7

    The court examined the record and could not say that the agency’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, so the termination was upheld.

  8. Headnote 8

    The Secretary terminated Lind’s benefits on the finding that he could work; the court affirmed because the record supported that finding and Lind failed to prove a lack of such evidence.

  9. Headnote 9

    The opinion cites those statutory sections when discussing the meaning of the phrase that governs benefit termination decisions.

  10. Headnote 10

    Lind filed his action in the district court pursuant to the civil‑action provision that allows review of agency decisions to terminate benefits.

  11. Headnote 11

    Lind appealed from a summary judgment that upheld the agency’s decision; the court held that the judgment was proper because the record contained the requisite substantial evidence.

  12. Headnote 12

    The court examined the record and could not say the agency's decision lacked substantial evidence, applying the APA standard of review.

  13. Headnote 13

    The Secretary terminated Lind’s benefits after concluding he could work, and the court found the record satisfied the substantial‑evidence requirement.

  14. Headnote 14

    The statute sets the benchmark for determining eligibility for disability insurance and for agency determinations of capability.

  15. Headnote 15

    Lind filed a civil action challenging the Secretary’s decision, invoking the statutory right to review the agency’s termination.

  16. Headnote 16

    The court affirmed the agency’s decision without a new hearing because the record contained enough evidence that Lind could engage in substantial gainful activity.

  17. Headnote 17

    Doctors noted Lind’s remission of paranoia, lack of heart condition, and capacity to manage his own finances, supporting the agency’s conclusion that he could work in a restricted setting.

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

In 1964 the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare terminated Lind’s disability insurance benefits because the Department decided that Lind was capable of engaging in “substantial gainful activity.” 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423. This decision was affirmed by the agency upon reconsideration, by an examiner after a de novo hearing, and by the Department Appeals Council. Lind sought relief in the District Court and now appeals from a summary judgment upholding the Department’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

From the record before us, we cannot say that the challenged administrative decision was not supported by substantial evidence. 2

Affirmed.

. . In 1961, when he first received the disability benefits, Lind was diagnosed as a chronic schizophrenic with reactions of the paranoid type who also suffered from heart trouble in the form of angina pectoris. In 1964, however, there was no evidence of a heart condition and his paranoia was in remission. He had a passive-dependent type of approach to life.

. . One doctor noted that Lind was not mentally retarded and could manage his own funds. Although several physicians believed that Lind’s schizophrenia with a paranoiac reaction in partial remission was permanent, one distinguished psychiatrist expressed the opinion that Lind could work in a restricted environment where there was a minimum of social contact. She stated that “[i]f motivation could be achieved to some degree, Mr. Lind, because of his capacity to reason and plan and pursue such planning should have many years of productivity left to pursue.”