Howard J. St. Jules v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections
1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8355 · 462 F.2d 1365
July 18, 1972 · Docket 72-1826
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
The Fifth Circuit has characterized the exhaustion requirement as grounded in comity rather than jurisdiction. Accordingly, a federal court is not compelled to refuse jurisdiction merely because the state proceeding remains pending.
- Headnote 2
The court cited Dixon, Odsen, Bartone, and Fay, noting that when state procedural obstacles preclude an effective remedy, federal courts may proceed despite the pending state case.
- Headnote 3
The court observed that over seventeen months had elapsed since the petitioner filed his second state habeas application, highlighting the length of delay as sufficient to trigger the exception to the exhaustion requirement.
- Headnote 4
The district court erred by striking the petition solely on the basis that the state proceeding was pending, without first assessing if the prolonged delay rendered the state remedy ineffective.
- Headnote 5
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded with instructions to assess the delay’s justification before proceeding to a merits hearing.
- Headnote 6
The court notes that exhaustion is grounded in federal‑state comity and therefore may be set aside when strict application would defeat the purpose of federal review.
- Headnote 7
When a state habeas proceeding remains pending for a lengthy period without disposition, the federal court may deem exhaustion met and entertain the § 2243 petition.
- Headnote 8
The court requires an assessment of the reasonableness of the delay; an unjustified, inordinate delay can render the state remedy unavailable and satisfy exhaustion.
- Headnote 9
If the delay is found unjustified, the district court must proceed to a merits hearing on the § 2243 petition after remand.
The appellate court vacated and remanded, directing the district court to assess the justification of the state‑court delay and, if it is unreasonable, to hear the federal habeas claim on its merits.
- Headnote 10
The Fifth Circuit held that the exhaustion doctrine reflects mutual comity rather than a strict jurisdictional prerequisite, so a federal court need not refuse jurisdiction merely because the state habeas action has not yet been resolved.
- Headnote 11
Because exhaustion pertains to the availability of a state remedy, not the petitioner’s conduct, courts may treat excessive delay as rendering the state process ineffective, citing Dixon and Odsen.
- Headnote 12
The court instructed the district court to determine the justification of the delay before deciding that exhaustion bars federal review, following the standard articulated in Dozie and Jones v. Crouse.
- Headnote 13
The court relied on Bartone and Fay, which permit federal relief where state procedural snarls preclude an effective remedy, emphasizing that patience has limits in the federal‑state comity relationship.
- Headnote 14
The Fifth Circuit treats exhaustion as a matter of judicial comity; therefore, strict application cannot foreclose federal jurisdiction when state remedies have been presented but not resolved.
- Headnote 15
If a state habeas proceeding remains pending for a prolonged period—e.g., over seventeen months—without disposition, the federal court may treat the state remedy as unavailable and proceed to merits.
- Headnote 16
The court instructed the district court to first assess the justifiability of the state‑court delay and, if unjustified, to proceed to a merits hearing rather than dismiss for non‑exhaustion.
- Headnote 17
The Court noted that over seventeen months had elapsed since the filing of the second Art. 11.07 application, indicating an unjustified delay that satisfies exhaustion for federal review.
- Headnote 18
Because the doctrine is rooted in federal‑state comity, courts may decline to treat a pending state proceeding as a jurisdiction‑killing obstacle when strict application would defeat the purpose of federal review.
- Headnote 19
If procedural snarls or prolonged inactivity make the state habeas avenue incapable of providing relief, a federal court may treat the exhaustion requirement as met and proceed to the merits.
- Headnote 20
Unjustified, unreasonable delays that render the state remedy ineffective satisfy exhaustion; the court must first assess the reasonableness of the delay before concluding lack of jurisdiction.
- Headnote 21
The proper remedy is to vacate the dismissal and remand for a determination of whether the pending state proceeding is so delayed as to make exhaustion satisfied.
- Headnote 22
The courts may dispense with waiting for state action—referred to as “waiting for Godot”—and address the federal claim where prolonged delay defeats the purpose of exhaustion.
- Headnote 23
The doctrine focuses on the existence of a remedial pathway. Even if the state proceeding remains pending, the petitioner has exhausted because the remedy itself is at issue, not his personal exhaustion.
Opinion
This is an application for the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Howard J. St. Jules, presently held by the State of Texas by authority of a judgment of conviction for the offense of burglary. Punishment was enhanced to life imprisonment. On direct appeal the conviction was affirmed. St. Jules v. State, 438 S. W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). Twice appellant has directed applications for the writ of habeas corpus to the state sentencing court under the provisions of Art. 11.07 of the Vernon’s Ann. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. His first excursion was rejected by the sentencing court on June 5, 1969, for its failure to allege sufficient sworn facts which, if believed, would entitle him to relief. Appellant here alleges that he filed a second application under Art. 11.07 on April 17, 1970. This time appellant alleges the allegations of the complaint were sworn to and, if believed, entitled him to relief. When no response was forthcoming from the sentencing court, appellant filed this petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court.
The district court denied appellant relief based on a supposed failure to exhaust available state remedies. Since the Art. 11.07 proceeding was undis-posed of, the district court’s action was technically correct. Nevertheless, we vacate and remand to enable the district court to take jurisdiction of this case and insure that appellant’s claims receive some forum.
The requirement of exhaustion of state remedies is a doctrine embodied in the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The doctrine, however, is one of comity. Imhoff v. Jones, 453 F.2d 894 (5th Cir., 1972). Comity does not require that the federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction in the face of allegations that the state courts have been presented with the merits of a claim for habeas corpus relief and have, for one reason or another, refused or been unable to act upon the claim. Dixon v. Florida, 388 F.2d 424 (5th Cir., 1968); Odsen v. Moore, 445 F.2d 806 (1st Cir., 1971). In the verified pleadings before the district court and the briefs before this court, appellant has demonstrated that he in fact filed a second application for habeas corpus relief under Art. 11.07 in April of 1970, and that no disposition of that application has as yet been received. In Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 21, 11 L.Ed.2d 11 (1963), the Court said:
“Where state procedural snarls or obstacles preclude an effective state remedy against unconstitutional convictions, federal courts have no other choice but to grant relief in the' collateral proceeding. Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837.” 375 U.S. at 54, 84 S.Ct. at 22.
The Court’s citation to Fay v. Noia is instructive. It is when inordinate delay in state collateral proceedings make relief through state avenues unavailable that the federal courts may dispense with “waiting for Godot” 1 and entertain the collateral proceedings.
In Dixon, supra, we noted: “The concept of federal-state comity involves mutuality of responsibilities, and an unacted upon responsibility can relieve one comity partner from continuous deference moreover, the wait for action . must not be so exhausting as to frustrate its purpose. Patience is a virtue in the accommodation process of our federalism, but it is not inexhaustible.” 388 F.2d at 426. The First Circuit in Odsen, supra, noted: “We remind ourselves that exhaustion refers to remedies, not to petitioners.” That admonition is well taken in this case for, if the facts are as appellant alleges, over seventeen months have elapsed since the filing of his second 11.07 application.
In similar eases we have remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether the delays were justi fiable. This is the course we here adopt. If on remand the district court determines that the delay was not justifiable, it shall proceed to a hearing on the merits of the habeas corpus petition. Compare Dixon v. Florida, supra; Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637 (7th Cir., 1970); Jones v. Crouse, 360 F.2d 157 (10th Cir., 1966).
Vacated and remanded.
. . Samuel Beckett, “Waiting for Godot,” in Seven Plays of The Modern Theater.