United States v. Paul Bradley

Appellant stands convicted of five counts of assault with a dangerous weapon. 22 D.C.Code § 502.1 On appeal, he claims error in the trial judge’s finding that he was competent to stand trial, and in the failure of the judge to order sua, sponte further inquiry into the question of whether the offense was the product of a mental disease or defect. The issues involved here are not new to this court, Green v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 408, 389 F.2d 949 (1967); Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 346 F.2d 812, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 124, 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965) ; United States v. Ashe, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 356, 427 F.2d 626 (1970). After careful consideration of the record before us, we find no error necessitating reversal.

Immediately before the beginning of the trial, the prosecutor informed the trial judge that the appellant had had an epileptic seizure the day before, and that he, the prosecutor, had recently learned that the appellant had had four prior mental examinations. When queried by the court on the matter, each of the two counsel representing appellant disclaimed any purpose to seek appellant’s commitment for observation on the issue of competency to stand trial, and expressed to the court their view, based on considerable contact with appellant, that he was competent to stand trial.2 They further represented that appellant himself asked that no reference be made to the prior commitment,3 from which it may be inferred that he did not wish to raise any insanity defense.

On the basis of these representations, the court suggested that the United States Attorney

“make some inquiry at St. Elizabeths as to (appellant’s) prior commitments. But should it become appropriate to get into that, we can handle that on some kind of bifurcated basis, and we can go ahead and try the case on the merits now.”

To this suggestion no objection was made. After the verdict, the court ordered appellant committed to St. Elizabeths for thirty days observation in order, in the court’s words, to

“determine in connection with the St. Elizabeths information as to whether this court should, at (counsel’s) urging, or sua sponte, interpose an insanity defense in this case.”

The court also felt that a current report on appellant’s “difficulties” 4 would “aid the sentencing process.”

The order committing appellant asked St. Elizabeths to report as to (1) whether appellant was suffering from mental disease or defect at the time of the offense, (2) if so, whether the offense was the product of the disease or defect, and (3) whether appellant was currently suffering from any mental disease or defect which would be likely to make him dangerous to himself or others. After examining appellant, the staff at St. Elizabeths reported to the court that (a) appellant was competent to stand trial, (b) at the time of the offense he was suffering from mental illness (Nonpsychotic Organic Brain Syndrome With Epilepsy (Alcoholic Factors)), (c) no opinion has been formed as the whether “the alleged offense was the product of an abnormal mental condition,” and (d) appellant was presently suffering from mental illness likely to make him dangerous to himself or others.

At a hearing convened by the court subsequent to the receipt of this report, the court asked defense counsel whether there was any objection to it. When counsel replied that there was not, and that, in the view of the defense, “ [Appellant is [not] the type to be incarcerated in St. Elizabeths,” the court said: “I do not think we need to have any order with respect to this St. Elizabeths matter.” Appellant was subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

The decision of the trial judge to proceed with a trial on the merits without ordering a commitment for competency observation was clearly not error per se. Whether to commit a defendant for such observation under 24 D.C.Code § 301(a) before trial is within the court’s discretion, even if the defense had moved for commitment.5 Certainly in the absence of any objection or motion from defense counsel, as was the case here, we cannot say that the court’s failure to commit was an abuse of discretion, particularly in the context of a simultaneous expression of willingness to try, through bifurcation, any insanity defense that might subsequently appeared appropriate.66

Appellant now contends, however, that the finding of competency implicit in the judge’s decision to try the case on the merits was subsequently rendered erroneous by the discrepancy between the report from St. Elizabeths and the order committing appellant for observation. His theory is that, even though the report certified him competent to stand trial, the fact that it appears mistakenly to have assumed — in volunteering an answer to a question which had not been asked — that he had not yet been tried rendered the report so “substantially suspect” as to require a judicial competency hearing under our decisions in Green and Whalem, supra.

The first fallacy in this argument is that, even assuming — which we do not — that the making of the report two months after the trial would render its finding of competency “substantially suspect,” in this case appellant was not committed for the purpose of determining his competence to stand trial, but to determine his mental state at the time of the offense, and currently. Defense counsel had explicitly represented to the trial judge that their client was competent, and had asked that the trial go forward without commitment for a mental examination. The finding of competence by the experts in the subsequent report was, thus, interesting but superfluous. Secondly, Green and Whalem, supra, contemplate only that, in respect of reports certifying competence which are “substantially suspect,” the judge shall convene a hearing at which objections to the report can be explored. Here, a hearing was convened with respect to the report, but appellant took no exception to it and was wholly uninterested in pursuing any issue with respect to it.

Appellant additionally claims error in the failure of the trial judge to investigate further, on his own motion, the issue of productivity. Such an investigation, presumably, would be with a view to the court’s raising sua sponte an insanity defense. Even more than the decision to order commitment for observation under 24 D.C.Code § 301(a) or to hold a judicial competency hearing notwithstanding a psychiatric report of competence, the decision of a trial judge to interpose an insanity defense on his own initiative and responsibility resides in his discretion. Whalem and Ashe, supra. Such a decision, especially when taken against the wishes of the accused himself, necessitates the utmost care in judgment, and requires consideration of many factors. The fact that appellant on appeal, after a verdict of guilty, now changes his mind and claims to want an insanity defense cannot, at least by reference to the precise circumstances of this record, render erroneous the failure of the trial judge to insist upon it sua sponte.

Against the background of appellant’s affirmative purpose not to object to the report or to raise an insanity issue, the trial judge was confronted with a report that disclaimed any opinion on productivity, and that diagnosed appellant’s illness as “Nonpsychotic Organic Brain Syndrome With Epilepsy (Alcoholic Factors)” — a diagnosis that does not suggest on its face the likelihood that the offense was the product of the illness. Moreover, the trial judge had a lengthy opportunity to observe appellant throughout the proceedings in court, and was thereby enabled to form some impressions relevant to the question of whether the insanity defense should be injected contrary to appellant’s wishes. In light of these considerations, we are not prepared to say that the court below abused its discretion in failing to pursue further the insanity issue. See Trest v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 350 F.2d 794 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1018, 86 S.Ct. 634, 15 L.Ed.2d 532 (1966).

The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed.