Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

United States v. Dominga Salazar

1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9485 · 480 F.2d 144

June 11, 1973 · Docket 73-1491

Queued for AI processing — next in lineest. ~5 min

Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
22.22.19 Criminal Law > Pleas, Trial, and Criminal Adjudication Law > Voir Dire and Jury Selection Law
The court affirmed that the limitation on voir dire did not amount to an abuse, citing United States v. Gassaway and United States v. Fernandez‑Piloto for the applicable standard.
Headnote 2
22 Criminal Law
The appellant sought to strike all 24 jurors because half had refused an alibi in a prior marijuana case and the other half had rendered a verdict the trial judge later questioned. The court held that such prior conduct alone does not disqualify jurors without proof of actual prejudice.
Headnote 3
22 Criminal Law
The court noted that a judge’s discretion in jury selection is substantial and may not be disturbed absent clear abuse. This standard governs review of both the denial of motions to strike jurors and the scope of voir dire.
Headnote 4
22 Criminal Law
The appellant’s motion was based on “pure conjecture” that the jurors might be biased because of prior cases; the court found no factual basis to support a finding of prejudice and therefore no abuse of discretion.
Headnote 5
22 Criminal Law
The trial court’s restriction on the parties’ questioning of jurors was upheld because it did not bar inquiry into specific bias, and the appellate court applied the same abuse‑of‑discretion test used for other jury‑selection decisions.

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

On September 22, 1972, appellant was convicted by a jury of the possession of 55 pounds of marijuana with the intent to distribute the same in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). She was adjudged to be guilty and given a sentence of three years to be followed by a special parole term of two years. On this appeal she contends that the trial court committed error (1) in overruling her separate motions to strike from the jury panel 24 jurors, all of whom had served in criminal cases involving marijuana at the same term of court; and (2) in refusing to properly conduct the voir dire examination of the jurors. We affirm.

The appellant contends that the 24 jurors should have been stricken en masse because 12 of the 24 had refused to believe an alibi asserted by another defendant similar to the alibi the appellant wished to prove as a defense. The other 12 jurors, it is claimed, had acquitted a defendant in a criminal prosecution involving marijuana but the judge had expressed his doubts about the accuracy of their verdict. We find no merit in these contentions.

Whether or not a jury believes an alibi in one criminal case does not determine whether they would believe another alibi in another criminal case involving a different defendant. Nor do we believe that the other 12 jurors were disqualified simply because the judge expressed some disagreement with the verdict they reached. The mere fact that a judge informs a jury, after verdict, that he probably would have reached a different conclusion does not disqualify that jury for further service. Moreover, the appellant has failed to demonstrate how the denial of the motions prejudiced her case. She does not assert that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury or the judgment of conviction. 1

A judge has substantial discretion in conducting the voir dire examination of jurors. Unless that discretion is abused there should be no reversal. 2 The appellant in this ease has not demonstrated that there was the slightest abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

. . Appellant’s motion to strike was based on pure conjecture. There was no showing of potential actual bias by these twenty-four individuals. Entertaining such unfounded suppositions would indeed open a Pandora’s box. All prospective jurors have some individual concepts and past experiences which color their perceptions to some extent. However these common sense observations are not sufficient in themselves to taint the ability of one to judge his peers. We perceive no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying appellant’s motion to strike.

. . Appellant has made no showing in this court that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the voir dire examination. See United States v. Gassaway, 456 F.2d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1972) ; United State v. Fernandez-Piloto, 426 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1970).

Case brief

Citation data as of August 4, 2026

Summary

The appellant was convicted in federal court of possessing 55 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment plus a two‐year special‐parole term. After the verdict she moved to strike twenty‐four prospective jurors, contending that twelve had previously refused to believe an alibi in a similar marijuana case and the other twelve had acquitted a defendant despite the trial judge’s later doubts about that verdict. The district court denied both motions and limited the voir dire of those jurors, and the appellant appealed, claiming an abuse of discretion that violated her Sixth‐Amendment right to an impartial jury. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the trial‐court rulings under an abuse‐of‐discretion standard, which permits reversal only when the judge’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or manifestly erroneous. The court held that a defendant cannot compel exclusion of jurors merely because of their prior conduct in similar cases absent a specific showing of actual bias or inability to be impartial. Finding the appellant’s allegations speculative and unsupported by evidence of bias, the court concluded that the jurors need not be struck. It also determined that the trial judge’s limitation on voir dire did not prevent the parties from probing for genuine bias and therefore did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Because no prejudice was shown, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district‐court judgment, upholding the conviction and sentence and establishing that, in the Fifth Circuit, appellate reversal of jury‐selection rulings requires a concrete showing of bias rather than conjecture.

Updated August 4, 2026

Statement of Facts

The appellant was the defendant in a federal criminal prosecution brought by the United States government under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On September 22, 1972 a jury found the appellant guilty of possessing 55 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute, and the district court sentenced her to three years’ imprisonment followed by a two‐year special parole term. After the verdict the appellant sought to strike from the jury panel twenty‐four prospective jurors. She argued that twelve of those jurors had previously refused to believe an alibi presented by another defendant in a marijuana case that was factually similar to the alibi she intended to raise, and that the remaining twelve had acquitted a defendant in a marijuana prosecution despite the trial judge’s expressed doubts about the correctness of their verdict. The trial court denied the motions to strike and limited the voir dire examination of the jurors. The appellant appealed, contending that the trial court erred both in overruling her motions to strike the jurors and in refusing to conduct a proper voir dire, and she sought reversal of her conviction (and, by implication, a new trial). The United States, as the prosecuting authority, defended the trial court’s exercise of discretion in jury selection and voir dire. The Fifth Circuit considered whether the trial court’s denial of the motions constituted an abuse of discretion that warranted reversal.

Updated August 4, 2026

Procedural History

United States District Court (Trial Court) – The district court tried the case, denied the defendant’s motions to strike 24 prospective jurors and limited the voir dire examination, then returned a guilty verdict for possession of 55 lb of marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) and sentenced the appellant to three years’ imprisonment plus a two‐year special parole term. No monetary damages were awarded.

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit – The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in (a) refusing to strike the 24 jurors and (b) restricting the voir dire. The United States, as prosecuting authority, defended the trial court’s actions. The Fifth Circuit held that the trial court’s discretion was not abused, found no prejudice to the appellant, and affirmed the conviction and sentence. No monetary relief was granted.

The opinion does not indicate any intermediate appellate review (e.g., a panel of the district court or a separate appellate court) or any other post‐conviction motions; thus the procedural record is limited to the district‐court judgment and the Fifth Circuit’s affirmance.

Updated August 4, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issue
Does a defendant have a constitutional right to have prospective jurors excluded on the ground that the jurors previously refused to believe an alibi in a similar marijuana case or rendered a verdict that the trial judge later questioned, when the defendant offers no specific showing of actual bias?

Procedural Issue
Did the district court abuse its discretion—and thus violate the defendant’s Sixth‐Amendment right to an impartial jury—by (a) denying the defendant’s motions to strike the 24 prospective jurors and (b) limiting the voir dire examination of those jurors?

Updated August 4, 2026

Judgment

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the conviction for possession of marijuana and the imposed sentence. No further relief was granted.

Updated August 4, 2026

Holding

Substantive Rule: A criminal defendant may not constitutionally compel the exclusion of prospective jurors merely because those jurors previously refused to believe an alibi in a similar case or because they rendered a verdict that a trial judge later expressed doubt about; absent a specific showing of actual bias or prejudice, such prior conduct does not disqualify jurors.

Procedural Rule: A trial court’s exercise of discretion in (a) denying a defendant’s motions to strike prospective jurors and (b) limiting the scope of voir dire is reversible only when the court’s discretion is shown to be abused. Mere speculation or “conjecture” that jurors might be biased is insufficient to constitute an abuse of discretion warranting reversal.

Updated August 4, 2026

Rule of Law

A trial judge has broad, unfettered discretion in conducting voir dire and in deciding which prospective jurors to seat; appellate review is limited to an “abuse‐of‐discretion” inquiry, and reversal is warranted only when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or manifestly erroneous. United States v. Gassaway, 456 F.2d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1972).

The abuse‐of‐discretion standard applied to jury‐selection rulings requires a showing that the trial court’s action was not merely erroneous but constituted a clear misuse of its discretion; conjecture or speculation about juror bias is insufficient to establish abuse. United States v. Fernandez‐Piloto, 426 F.2d 892, 892 (5th Cir. 1970).

A criminal defendant may not compel the exclusion of prospective jurors solely because those jurors previously refused to believe an alibi in a similar case or because they rendered a verdict that the trial judge later questioned; the defendant must demonstrate a specific showing of actual bias or inability to be impartial. (Per curiam opinion, Fifth Cir. 1972, holding that “the mere fact... does not disqualify” jurors.)

Limiting the scope of voir dire is permissible so long as the limitation does not prevent the parties from probing for actual bias that could affect a juror’s impartiality; such limitations are reviewed under the same abuse‐of‐discretion standard. United States v. Gassaway, 456 F.2d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1972).

Updated August 4, 2026

Reasoning

The Fifth Circuit first affirmed that its review of the district court’s rulings on juror exclusion and the scope of voir dire is confined to an “abuse‐of‐discretion” standard, meaning reversal is warranted only when the trial judge’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or manifestly erroneous; this framework is grounded in precedent such as United States v. Gassaway, 456 F.2d at 626.

The court then identified the substantive rule governing juror disqualification: a defendant may not compel the removal of prospective jurors solely because those jurors have previously refused to believe an alibi in a similar case or have rendered a verdict that a judge later questioned, absent a concrete showing of actual bias or an inability to be impartial.

Applying that rule to the facts, the court observed that the appellant’s request to strike the twelve jurors who had rejected an alibi in another marijuana case was based on speculation; the appellant offered no evidence that those jurors would automatically reject her own alibi, and the court therefore found no factual basis to deem them biased.

Likewise, the court rejected the appellant’s argument that the twelve jurors who had acquitted a prior defendant should be excluded because the trial judge expressed doubt about that verdict; the opinion held that a judge’s post‐verdict comment does not, by itself, demonstrate juror prejudice or a lack of impartiality.

The court reinforced its analysis by citing United States v. Fernandez‐Piloto, 426 F.2d at 892, which requires a specific showing of bias rather than reliance on “pure conjecture,” and warned that permitting strikes on the basis of vague concerns would “open a Pandora’s box” and undermine the jury system.

On the procedural issue of limiting voir dire, the court applied the same abuse‐of‐discretion standard, noting that the trial judge’s restriction did not prevent the parties from probing for actual bias; therefore, the limitation was a permissible exercise of judicial discretion.

The appellate court further required a showing of prejudice to overturn the district court’s decisions; the appellant failed to demonstrate that the exclusion of the twenty‐four jurors—or a broader voir dire—would have altered the verdict, rendering any alleged error harmless.

Combining the lack of a specific bias showing, the absence of demonstrated prejudice, and the trial court’s permissible exercise of discretion, the Fifth Circuit concluded that no abuse of discretion occurred in either denying the motions to strike jurors or in limiting voir dire.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the district court’s rulings were within the bounds of its discretionary authority and did not violate the appellant’s Sixth‐Amendment right to an impartial jury.

Updated August 4, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: None (no separate opinions filed)
Type of Opinion: None — the Fifth Circuit issued a per curiam opinion with no concurring or dissenting opinions.
Summary of Reasoning: The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the defendant offered no specific showing of actual bias and that speculative concerns about jurors’ prior alibi refusals or a judge’s post‐verdict comments do not constitute an abuse of discretion; consequently, the trial judge’s denial of the motions to strike jurors and limitation of voir dire were upheld.

Updated August 4, 2026

Case Relevance

This Fifth Circuit per curiam decision is authoritative because it crystallizes the rule that, absent a concrete showing of actual bias, a criminal defendant cannot compel the exclusion of prospective jurors merely because those jurors previously rejected an alibi in a similar marijuana case or rendered a verdict that a trial judge later questioned—thereby resolving the substantive issue of when a juror may be disqualified and the procedural issue of the standard of appellate review, which the court reiterates is an “abuse‐of‐discretion” inquiry limited to arbitrary, unreasonable, or manifestly erroneous trial‐court actions; the holding therefore applies broadly to any Sixth‐Amendment jury‐selection dispute in the Fifth Circuit (and persuasive elsewhere) where the movant relies on speculative or conjectural bias rather than specific evidence, making the case a go‐to authority for courts confronting challenges to juror strikes based on prior case conduct, for parties seeking to limit appellate reversal of voir dire rulings, and for judges defending discretionary jury‐selection decisions, while it does not address situations involving demonstrable prejudice, explicit bias, or statutory exclusions, nor does it resolve any split concerning the evidentiary threshold for bias beyond the Fifth Circuit’s “specific showing” standard.

Updated August 4, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "The appellant contends that the 24 jurors should have been stricken en masse because 12 of the 24 had refused to believe an alibi asserted by another defendant similar to the alibi the appellant wished to prove as a defen se. The other 12 jurors, it is claimed, had acquitted a defendant in a criminal prosecution involving marijuana but the judge had expressed his doubts about the accuracy of their verd ict. We find no merit in these contentions."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 480 F.2d 144
Explanation: These sentences set out the appellant’s argument for striking the 24 jurors and the court’s immediate rejection of that argument, establishing the factual backdrop for the substantive rule.

Quoted text: "A judge has substantial discretion in conducting the voir dire examination of juro rs. Unless that discretion

is abused there should be no rev ersal. 2 The appellant in this ease has not demonstrated that there was the slightest abuse of discretion."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 480 F.2d 144
Explanation: This passage articulates the trial judge’s broad discretion in conducting voir dire and states that reversal is warranted only when that discretion is abused, defining the procedural standard.

Updated August 4, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

United States v. Dominga Salazar · 480 F.2d 144United States v. Robert Gassaway · 456 F.2d 624

United States v. Dominga Salazar · 480 F.2d 144United States v. Raimundo Fernandez-Piloto · 426 F.2d 892

United States v. Dominga Salazar · 480 F.2d 144

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

Related opinions

United States v. Jay Herrera
474 F.2d 1049
United States v. Floyd Dupart
483 F.2d 1393
United States v. Luther Conner
484 F.2d 644
United States v. Felix Cox
1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 7568 · 485 F.2d 699
Manuel Banderas-Aguirre v. United States
1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11322 · 474 F.2d 985
Betty L. Kindrew v. United States
1973 A.M.C. 2691 · 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 9588 · 479 F.2d 49

Metadata

Court

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Decided

June 11, 1973

Docket

73-1491

Precedential status

Published

United States v. Dominga Salazar

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion