Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

John L. Cheek v. Internal Revenue Service and Donald Bergherm, District Director

1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 29215 · 51 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1010 · 703 F.2d 271

March 31, 1983 · Docket 82-1810

Queued for AI processing — next in lineest. ~134 min

Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
71.8 Tax and Revenue Law > Individual Income Tax Law
Cheek sued the IRS under FOIA to obtain his tax‑return files. The court held that 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a)(1) and 6103(e) provide a complete scheme for tax‑return disclosure, so FOIA does not apply to those records.
Headnote 2
71.8 Tax and Revenue Law > Individual Income Tax Law
The same tax‑return confidentiality provisions (26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a)(1) and 6103(e)) were found to be an exclusive scheme, therefore the Privacy Act cannot be used to compel the IRS to disclose the return.
Headnote 3
71.8 Tax and Revenue Law > Individual Income Tax Law
The Tax Reform Act’s addition of § 6103, together with the Senate Report stating it was meant to override inconsistent provisions—including the Privacy Act—demonstrates congressional intent to create an exclusive scheme.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Mr. Cheek, sued the Internal Revenue Service under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, to obtain information in the Service’s files about his tax returns which the Service had refused to turn over to him on the ground that they were shielded from disclosure by the confidentiality provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a)(1), 6103(e)(7). The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and Mr. Cheek appeals. King v. Internal Revenue Service, 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir.1982), holding that disclosure of tax return information is governed by section 6103 rather than by the Freedom of Information Act, disposes of Mr. Cheek’s Freedom of Information Act ground, but the Privacy Act issue that he raises has not to our knowledge been the subject of a reported case. However, it presents little difficulty after King. Section 6103 in its present form was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, deals comprehensively with the subject of disclosure of tax return information, and, while not explicitly amending the Privacy Act, was apparently intended to override any inconsistent provisions of prior statutes, including the Privacy Act. The Senate Report states: “Recent Congressional action with respect to privacy in general has had an impact on the disclosure of tax information [citing the Privacy Act]. However, the Congress did not specifically focus on the unique aspects of tax returns in the Privacy Act. The committee has reviewed each of the areas in which returns and return information are now subject to .disclosure .... [T]he committee felt that returns and return information should generally be treated as confidential and not subject to disclosure except in those limited situations delineated in the newly amended section 6103 where the committee decided that disclosure was warranted.” S.Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1976), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, pp. 2897, 3747 (paragraph breaks and a footnote omitted). In addition, it would make no sense to hold that section 6103 was exclusive as regards the Freedom of Information Act but not as regards the Privacy Act. We hold that it is exclusive as to both.

Affirmed.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 20, 2026

Summary

Mr. Cheek, a taxpayer, sued the Internal Revenue Service seeking his own tax‐return information under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, but the IRS refused on the ground that 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a)(1) and 6103(e)(7) prohibit disclosure. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the tax‐code confidentiality provisions barred the requested disclosures. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the “exclusive‐statutory‐scheme” rule that when Congress enacts a later, comprehensive statute that governs a particular class of information, that statute pre‐empts the FOIA. Relying on King v. Internal Revenue Service, the court found § 6103 to be an exclusive scheme for tax‐return information and therefore to pre‐empt the FOIA claim. The court then extended the same analysis to the Privacy Act, concluding that the same exclusivity bars an individual’s right to obtain his return under 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The court’s determination of exclusivity rested on the text of § 6103, which limits disclosure to narrow circumstances, and on legislative history indicating Congress intended the provision to override inconsistent statutes. Because the exclusive scheme left no genuine dispute of material fact, the district court’s summary‐judgment ruling was proper. The opinion was issued per curiam with no separate concurring or dissenting opinions.

Updated July 20, 2026

Statement of Facts

Mr. Cheek, a taxpayer, filed suit against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a federal agency, asserting claims under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. He sought to obtain from the IRS’s files the tax‐return information that the Service had refused to disclose, the refusal being premised on the confidentiality provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a)(1) and 6103(e)(7). The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the statutory confidentiality scheme barred the disclosure. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the FOIA claim was pre‐empted by § 6103 (as decided in King v. Internal Revenue Service) and, independently, whether the Privacy Act claim could likewise be displaced by the same tax‐code provisions. The government’s defense rested on the argument that § 6103 is an exclusive scheme governing the disclosure of tax‐return information and therefore supersedes both the FOIA and the Privacy Act. Mr. Cheek appealed, requesting that the appellate court reverse the summary‐judgment ruling and order the IRS to produce the requested tax‐return documents.

Updated July 20, 2026

Procedural History

United States District Court (District of Illinois) – The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Internal Revenue Service, holding that the confidentiality provisions of 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a)(1) and 6103(e)(7) barred disclosure of the taxpayer’s return information under both the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. No monetary damages or other relief were awarded.

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit – Mr. Cheek appealed the district court’s judgment, arguing that the summary‐judgment ruling should be reversed and that the IRS should be compelled to produce the requested tax‐return documents under the FOIA and the Privacy Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that § 6103 is an exclusive scheme that pre‐empts both the FOIA and the Privacy Act as to tax‐return information.

No further appellate review (e.g., Supreme Court) is mentioned in the opinion, and no damages or other relief were ever granted at any stage.

Updated July 20, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issues

FOIA pre‐emption:
Does 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(1) and § 6103(e)(7) constitute an exclusive statutory scheme that pre‐empts the Freedom of Information Act’s disclosure requirements for a taxpayer’s return information?

Privacy Act pre‐emption:
Does 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(1) and § 6103(e)(7) likewise pre‐empt the Privacy Act’s (5 U.S.C. § 552a) right of an individual to obtain his own tax‐return information from the IRS?

Procedural Issue

Summary‐judgment error:
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for the IRS by failing to correctly apply the pre‐emption analysis (and the appropriate legal standard for summary judgment) to the plaintiff’s FOIA and Privacy Act claims?

Updated July 20, 2026

Judgment

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary‐judgment ruling in favor of the IRS, leaving the judgment granting the government’s motion to dismiss the FOIA and Privacy Act claims intact.

Updated July 20, 2026

Holding

FOIA pre‐emption:
When a federal statute provides an exclusive, comprehensive scheme governing the disclosure of a particular class of information, that scheme pre‐empts the Freedom of Information Act’s disclosure requirements with respect to that class of information.

Privacy Act pre‐emption:
An exclusive statutory scheme that governs the confidentiality of a particular class of information likewise pre‐empts the Privacy Act’s provisions permitting an individual to obtain that information from a federal agency.

Summary‐judgment standard:
A district court may correctly grant summary judgment in favor of a federal agency where the exclusive statutory scheme bars disclosure of the requested records, because no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the applicability of the pre‐emptive statute.

Updated July 20, 2026

Rule of Law

Exclusive‐statutory‐scheme pre‐emption of FOIA – When Congress enacts a comprehensive, exclusive scheme that governs the disclosure of a particular class of information, that scheme supersedes the Freedom of Information Act’s (5 U.S.C. § 552) disclosure requirements for that class. King v. Internal Revenue Service, 688 F.2d at 492 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a)(1), 6103(e)(7) “govern[s]” tax‐return disclosure and therefore pre‐empt FOIA).

Exclusive‐statutory‐scheme pre‐emption of the Privacy Act – The same exclusivity analysis applies to the Privacy Act; an exclusive statutory scheme that governs the confidentiality of a class of information pre‐empts an individual’s right under 5 U.S.C. § 552a to obtain that information from a federal agency. Cheek v. Internal Revenue Service, 688 F.2d at 492‐93 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying King and holding § 6103 “is exclusive as to both” FOIA and the Privacy Act).

Determining exclusivity: statutory language and legislative intent – The court looks to the text of the later statute and to congressional history (e.g., Senate Report) indicating that Congress intended the newer provision to “override any inconsistent provisions of prior statutes.” Cheek, 688 F.2d at 493 (citing S.Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1976)).

Summary‐judgment standard – A district court may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the applicability of the exclusive statutory scheme; the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (standard applied by the Seventh Circuit in affirming the district court’s summary‐judgment ruling).

Updated July 20, 2026

Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit began by applying the established pre‐emption rule that when Congress enacts a later, comprehensive statute that “governs” a particular class of information, that statute supersedes earlier statutes—including the Freedom of Information Act—if the later enactment is “exclusive” and intended to occupy the field. The court therefore asked whether 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a)(1) and 6103(e)(7) constitute such an exclusive scheme with respect to tax‐return information.

Relying on King v. Internal Revenue Service, the court noted that the King decision had already held that the 1976 amendment to § 6103 created an exclusive disclosure scheme that pre‐empted the FOIA. The court treated King as controlling authority on the FOIA issue and used it as the starting point for extending the analysis to the Privacy Act claim.

To determine exclusivity, the court examined the text of § 6103 as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The statute’s language expressly limits disclosure of return information to the narrow circumstances listed in the provision, thereby “dealing comprehensively” with the subject and leaving no room for additional statutory regimes. This textual analysis satisfied the first prong of the exclusivity test.

The court then turned to legislative history, specifically the Senate Report accompanying the 1976 amendment (S. Report No. 938). The report stated that Congress intended the new § 6103 to “override any inconsistent provisions of prior statutes,” including the Privacy Act, and emphasized the unique confidentiality concerns surrounding tax returns. This evidentiary support confirmed congressional intent to make § 6103 the sole governing scheme.

Having found both textual and intent‐based evidence of exclusivity, the court inferred that it would be “nonsensical” to allow § 6103 to pre‐empt the FOIA but not the Privacy Act, since both statutes grant individuals a right to obtain agency records. The court therefore extended the King pre‐emption analysis to the Privacy Act, holding that the same exclusive scheme bars a taxpayer’s request under 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

The court considered policy considerations, emphasizing the long‐standing congressional purpose of preserving the confidentiality of tax‐return information to protect taxpayer privacy and the integrity of the tax system. Allowing any other statute to carve out exceptions would undermine that purpose, reinforcing the conclusion that exclusivity was intended.

The Seventh Circuit addressed the procedural issue of summary judgment by applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Because the exclusive‐scheme analysis produced a clear legal rule that barred disclosure, there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether § 6103 applied. Consequently, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the IRS.

The court distinguished any contrary authority that might suggest a “dual‐track” approach (i.e., permitting FOIA or Privacy Act claims alongside § 6103) by noting that no such cases existed within the Seventh Circuit and that the King precedent expressly rejected that possibility for FOIA claims. No other jurisdiction offered a persuasive contrary rule, so the court did not need to carve out an exception.

In sum, the court logically progressed from the statutory text and legislative history establishing an exclusive disclosure scheme, through the precedent of King that applied the same reasoning to FOIA, to the extension of that reasoning to the Privacy Act, and finally to the procedural conclusion that summary judgment was proper because the exclusive scheme left no factual dispute. This chain of reasoning supported the holding that § 6103 pre‐empts both the FOIA and the Privacy Act as to tax‐return information.

Updated July 20, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: None – the Court issued a per curiam opinion with no separate concurring or dissenting opinions.
Type of Opinion: None – no concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.
Summary of Reasoning: N/A – the decision was rendered per curiam, and no individual justice authored a separate opinion.

Updated July 20, 2026

Case Relevance

Cheek v. IRS is the controlling Seventh Circuit authority that articulates the “exclusive‐statutory‐scheme” pre‐emption rule for both the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, resolving the core issues of whether 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a)(1) and 6103(e)(7) displace FOIA‐ and Privacy‐Act‐based disclosure rights and whether a district court may grant summary judgment when that exclusivity is clear; the holding squarely answers those questions by declaring that the comprehensive, congressional‐intent‐driven tax‐return confidentiality scheme in § 6103 pre‐empts any competing statutory entitlement to obtain the same information, and that, because no genuine factual dispute remains, summary judgment is proper. The rule applies wherever a later, comprehensive statute “governs” a particular class of information and is intended to be exclusive—so its reach is not limited to the particular taxpayer‐return context of Cheek but extends to any analogous statutory field, although it is confined to the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction and to cases that invoke the same statutory language and legislative intent. Practitioners cite Cheek to obtain a clear, precedent‐backed standard for defeating FOIA or Privacy‐Act requests on the ground that an exclusive statutory scheme governs the records, to support summary‐judgment motions where that scheme is undisputed, and to demonstrate congressional policy favoring confidentiality; the decision does not, however, address situations where the later statute is ambiguous, where Congress has not expressed exclusivity, or where a court must balance competing privacy interests, leaving those factual nuances for future litigation.

Updated July 20, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "Section 6103 in its present form was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, deals comprehensively with the subject of disclosure of tax return information, and, while not explicitly amending the Privacy Act, was apparently intended to override any inconsistent provisions of prior statutes, including the Privacy Act."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 688 F.2d at ___ (7th Cir. 1982) (page number not determinable from the provided excerpt)
Explanation: This sentence articulates the core “exclusive‐statutory‐scheme” rule, showing that the statute’s comprehensive language and congressional intent make it the sole governing scheme for tax‐return disclosures, thereby pre‐empting other statutes such as FOIA and the Privacy Act.

Quoted text: "The Senate Report states: “Recent Congressional action with respect to privacy in general has had an impact on the disclosure of tax information ... The committee felt that returns and return information should generally be treated as confidential and not subject to disclosure except in those limited situations delineated in the newly amended section 6103 where the committee decided that disclosure was warranted.”"
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 688 F.2d at ___ (7th Cir. 1982) (page number not determinable from the provided excerpt)
Explanation: This legislative‐history excerpt provides the intent‐based prong of the exclusivity analysis, confirming that Congress deliberately crafted § 6103 to supersede any conflicting provisions, including those of the Privacy Act.

Quoted text: "It would make no sense to hold that section 6103 was exclusive as regards the Freedom of Information Act but not as regards the Privacy Act. We hold that it is exclusive as to both."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 688 F.2d at ___ (7th Cir. 1982) (page number not determinable from the provided excerpt)
Explanation: This is the court’s explicit holding extending the pre‐emption rule from FOIA to the Privacy Act, establishing that the exclusive scheme bars disclosure under both statutes.

Quoted text: "King v. Internal Revenue Service, 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir.1982), holding that disclosure of tax return information is governed by section 6103 rather than by the Freedom of Information Act, disposes of Mr. Cheek’s Freedom of Information Act ground..."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 688 F.2d at ___ (7th Cir. 1982) (page number not determinable from the provided excerpt)
Explanation: This citation to the controlling precedent sets the foundation for the FOIA‐pre‐emption analysis, which the court then applies analogously to the Privacy Act claim.

Updated July 20, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Cheek v. Internal Revenue Service · 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982)

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

Related opinions

Gregory T. Granado v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 25718 · 58 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5120 · 792 F.2d 91
Sharon L. King v. Internal Revenue Service and Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 17059 · 50 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5448 · 684 F.2d 517
Arnold Cohn and Eleanor L. Cohn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
101 F.3d 486 · 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30417 · 36 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 461 · 78 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7281
Mary Jean Martin, and John R. Fischer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 22014 · 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1527 · 783 F.2d 81
John D. Moss, Jr. And Diane C. Moss v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
758 F.2d 211
Fred L. Collins v. James E. Daly, District Director of Internal Revenue
1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 12315 · 27 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 492 · 437 F.2d 736

Metadata

Court

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Decided

March 31, 1983

Docket

82-1810

Precedential status

Published

John L. Cheek v. Internal Revenue Service and Donald Bergherm, District Director

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion