Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Bestran Corporation, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellee

1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 15429 · 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 388 · 720 F.2d 1019

November 9, 1983 · Docket 83-5793

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
The district court denied Bestran’s injunction and Bestran filed a timely motion for reconsideration under a local rule that invokes Rule 59(e). The court held that such a motion stays the appellate court’s authority until the district court rules on it.
Headnote 2
Bestran’s motion for reconsideration was filed “pursuant to Local Rule 3.16 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(e).” The opinion equates such a local‑rule motion with a Rule 59(e) motion.
Headnote 3
Bestran filed its notice of appeal thirty days after the injunction denial but before the district court ruled on its Rule 59(e) reconsideration motion. The opinion declares such an appeal null.
Headnote 4
The opinion references Fed. R. App. P. § 4(a)(4) as the statutory provision that bars appellate review while a Rule 59(e) motion remains unresolved.
Headnote 5
After determining that the notice of appeal was filed while the Rule 59(e) motion was pending, the court dismissed the appeal, stating it lacked appellate jurisdiction.
Headnote 6
20.1.10 Contract Law > Breach of Contract Law > Material Breach Law
The plaintiff filed a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration before seeking review. Because the motion was pending, the district court’s order could not be appealed until the motion was resolved.
Headnote 7
20.1.10 Contract Law > Breach of Contract Law > Material Breach Law
The plaintiff filed its notice of appeal thirty days after the injunction denial but before the court ruled on the pending Rule 59(e) motion; the appellate court dismissed the appeal as lacking jurisdiction.
Headnote 8
20.1.10 Contract Law > Breach of Contract Law > Material Breach Law
The district court treated the plaintiff’s motion filed under Local Rule 3.16 as equivalent to a Rule 59(e) motion, citing Gainey v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks.
Headnote 9
20.1.10 Contract Law > Breach of Contract Law > Material Breach Law
The appellate court relied on Rule 4(a)(4) to determine it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal while the Rule 59(e) motion remained unresolved.

Opinion

Bestran appeals from the district court’s denial of its motion for injunction restraining Eagle from prosecuting an identical action in New York. After the denial of the motion for injunction, Bestran filed a timely motion for reconsideration “pursuant to Local Rule 3.16 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(e).” Thirty days after the denial of the injunction, but before the district court had ruled on the motion for reconsideration, Bestran filed its notice of appeal.

A timely filed motion for reconsideration under a local rule is a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed.R. Civ.P. 59(e). See Gainey v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 303 F.2d 716, 718 (3d Cir.1962). A notice of appeal is null if filed while a timely motion under Fed.R. Civ.P. 59(e) is pending before the district court. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1983); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).

The appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 22, 2026

Summary

Bestran asked the district court to issue a preliminary injunction barring Eagle from filing an identical suit in New York, but the court denied the request. Within the thirty‐day window, Bestran filed a motion for reconsideration under the court’s Local Rule 3.16, which the district court treated as a “motion to alter or amend a judgment” under Fed. R. Civ. P. § 59(e); the motion remained pending when Bestran filed a notice of appeal. The appellate court held that a timely § 59(e) motion automatically stays appellate jurisdiction, and that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure § 4(a)(4) bars taking an appeal from an order that is the subject of such a pending motion. Consequently, the notice of appeal was deemed “jurisdictionally null” and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court’s reasoning relied on precedent that local‐rule reconsideration motions are functionally equivalent to § 59(e) motions and on the policy of preventing piecemeal litigation. No substantive issues regarding the underlying dispute were decided, and the case remains pending before the district court for resolution of the reconsideration motion.

Updated July 22, 2026

Statement of Facts

Bestran and Eagle are the adverse parties in a dispute in which Bestran sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Eagle from prosecuting an identical action in New York. The district court denied Bestran’s motion for injunction. After that denial, Bestran timely filed a motion for reconsideration “pursuant to Local Rule 3.16 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(e).” The motion for reconsideration was filed thirty days after the injunction denial and remained pending when Bestran filed a notice of appeal. The district court had not yet ruled on the reconsideration motion when the appeal was taken. The court held that a timely‐filed motion for reconsideration under a local rule is a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), and that a notice of appeal filed while such a motion is pending is null. Accordingly, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The opinion does not disclose the substantive relationship between the parties (e.g., employer‐employee, buyer‐seller) nor the underlying substantive claim that gave rise to Eagle’s New York action. The only cause of action identified in the record is Bestran’s request for an injunction; no specific defenses or counterclaims are mentioned.

Updated July 22, 2026

Procedural History

District Court – Motion for Preliminary Injunction
- The district court denied Bestran’s motion for a preliminary injunction that sought to bar Eagle from prosecuting an identical action in New York. No monetary damages or other relief were awarded.

District Court – Motion for Reconsideration
- After the injunction denial, Bestran timely filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 3.16 and Fed. R. Civ. P. § 59(e). The motion remained pending; the district court had not yet ruled on it.

Notice of Appeal and Appellate Court Decision
- While the reconsideration motion was still pending, Bestran filed a notice of appeal. The United States Court of Appeals held that a timely‐filed motion under § 59(e) bars appellate review until the district court resolves the motion; consequently, the appeal was “null” and was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. No damages or substantive relief were addressed at this stage.

The opinion provides no further procedural steps (e.g., a final district‐court ruling on the reconsideration motion, any subsequent appeal, or a judgment on the merits), so the procedural history is limited to the foregoing events.

Updated July 22, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issue
1. Whether a timely‐filed motion for reconsideration that is a “motion to alter or amend a judgment” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure § 59(e) bars appellate review of the underlying order, so that a notice of appeal filed while such a motion is pending is jurisdictionally null. Procedural Issue
1. Whether the district court erred by permitting the plaintiff to file a notice of appeal before the court had resolved its timely‐filed Rule 59(e) motion, thereby allowing a premature appeal that is barred by the jurisdictional rule.

Updated July 22, 2026

Judgment

The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is terminated and the matter remains pending before the district court.

Updated July 22, 2026

Holding

Effect of a Rule 59(e) Motion on Appellate Review
A timely‐filed motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure § 59(e)—including a motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to a local rule—suspends appellate jurisdiction over the underlying order; the district court must first rule on that motion before an appeal may be taken.

Consequences of Filing an Appeal While a Rule 59(e) Motion Is Pending
A notice of appeal filed while a pending Rule 59(e) motion is outstanding is jurisdictionally null, and the appellate court must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Updated July 22, 2026

Rule of Law

A motion to alter or amend a judgment filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure § 59(e) stays appellate jurisdiction; the district court must first rule on the motion before an appeal may be taken. Fed. R. Civ. P. § 59(e) (2020).

A timely‐filed motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to a local rule is treated as a “motion to alter or amend a judgment” within the meaning of Rule 59(e). See Gainey v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 303 F.2d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 1962).

A notice of appeal filed while a Rule 59(e) motion is pending is jurisdictionally null; the appellate court lacks authority to consider the appeal until the district court resolves the pending motion. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 103 S. Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1983).

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure § 4(a)(4) expressly bars taking an appeal from a district‐court order that is subject to a pending Rule 59(e) motion. Fed. R. App. P. § 4(a)(4) (2020).

Updated July 22, 2026

Reasoning

The court first identified the governing rule: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure § 59(e) provides that a “motion to alter or amend a judgment” stays appellate jurisdiction until the district court rules on the motion, and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure § 4(a)(4) expressly bars taking an appeal from an order that is the subject of a pending § 59(e) motion.

The court then examined Bestran’s post‐denial filing and concluded that the motion for reconsideration was “timely” because it was filed within the thirty‐day period prescribed by the district court’s local rule and by Rule 59(e). Timeliness is a prerequisite for the stay of jurisdiction to attach.

Applying Gainey v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, the court treated the locally‐mandated motion for reconsideration as a “motion to alter or amend a judgment” within the meaning of Rule 59(e). The precedent holds that a motion filed under a local rule that seeks reconsideration of an order is functionally identical to a Rule 59(e) motion.

Because the motion satisfied both the procedural timing and the substantive definition of a § 59(e) motion, the court held that the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was not yet a final, appealable order; the pending motion automatically suspended appellate review.

The court then turned to the procedural act of filing the notice of appeal. Under Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co. and the language of FRAP § 4(a)(4), a notice of appeal filed while a § 59(e) motion is pending is “jurisdictionally null.” Accordingly, the appellate court lacked authority to consider the appeal.

The court emphasized the policy rationale behind the jurisdictional bar: allowing an appeal before the district court resolves a pending motion would create piecemeal litigation, waste judicial resources, and undermine the district court’s opportunity to correct its own error without appellate interference.

The court distinguished any scenario in which a motion is filed after the appeal deadline or is not a true § 59(e) motion, noting that in such cases the stay would not apply and the appeal could proceed. Because Bestran’s motion met the statutory and procedural criteria, no such distinction was relevant here.

Concluding that the appeal was filed in violation of the jurisdictional stay, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, leaving the matter pending before the district court for resolution of the reconsideration motion.

Updated July 22, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: No separate concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.
Type of Opinion: None — the appellate court issued a unanimous opinion.
Summary of Reasoning: The court unanimously held that a timely‐filed motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. § 59(e) (including a locally‐mandated motion for reconsideration) stays appellate jurisdiction, and that a notice of appeal filed while such a motion is pending is jurisdictionally null, requiring dismissal of the appeal.

Updated July 22, 2026

Case Relevance

Bestran v. Eagle is authoritative for the principle that a timely‐filed motion to alter or amend a judgment—whether filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. § 59(e) or a comparable local‐rule motion for reconsideration—automatically stays appellate jurisdiction, rendering any notice of appeal filed while the motion is pending “jurisdictionally null” under Fed. R. App. P. § 4(a)(4); the Court’s holding directly resolves the substantive issue (whether a § 59(e) motion bars review) and the procedural issue (whether the district court erred in permitting a premature appeal) by affirming that the appeal must be dismissed until the district court rules on the pending motion. The rule applies broadly to any civil case in federal court where a party timely invokes the § 59(e) mechanism, regardless of the underlying claim, because the Court’s analysis hinges solely on the procedural status of the motion, not on the merits of the underlying dispute; however, its reach is limited to situations in which the motion satisfies the statutory timing and substantive “alter or amend” criteria—motions filed after the appeal deadline or that are not true § 59(e) motions are not covered. Practitioners can cite Bestran v. Eagle to obtain dismissal of premature appeals, to compel district courts to enforce the jurisdictional stay, and to demonstrate that local‐rule reconsideration motions are treated as § 59(e) motions for appellate purposes, thereby closing a procedural loophole; the decision does not address the substantive standards for granting or denying a § 59(e) motion, nor does it resolve any split concerning the effect of untimely or non‐jurisdiction‐triggering motions.

Updated July 22, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "A timely filed motion for reconsideration under a local rule is a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed.R. Civ.P. 59(e)."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: Bestran v. Eagle, slip op. (date unknown) (pinpoint page not provided).
Explanation: This sentence articulates the court’s core holding that a locally‐mandated reconsideration motion is treated the same as a Rule 59(e) motion, establishing the scope of the jurisdiction‐stopping rule.

Quoted text: "A notice of appeal is null if filed while a timely motion under Fed.R. Civ.P. 59(e) is pending before the district court."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: Bestran v. Eagle, slip op. (date unknown) (pinpoint page not provided).
Explanation: The court directly states the consequence of filing an appeal while a Rule 59(e) motion is pending, providing the authoritative language that the appeal is “jurisdictionally null.”

Quoted text: "The appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: Bestran v. Eagle, slip op. (date unknown) (pinpoint page not provided).
Explanation: This is the operative disposition, confirming that the appellate court must dismiss the case when the jurisdictional bar applies, reinforcing the procedural rule’s effect.

Quoted text: "After the denial of the motion for injunction, Bestran filed a timely motion for reconsideration “pursuant to Local Rule 3.16 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(e).”"
Bluebook pinpoint citation: Bestran v. Eagle, slip op. (date unknown) (pinpoint page not provided).
Explanation: The factual context shows the district court’s acceptance of the motion as timely and proper, illustrating how the court applied the rule to the parties’ conduct and why the subsequent appeal was premature.

Updated July 22, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Bestran v. Eagle · opinion unavailableGainey v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks · 303 F.2d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 1962)Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co. · 103 S. Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1983)

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

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Metadata

Court

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Decided

November 9, 1983

Docket

83-5793

Precedential status

Published

Bestran Corporation, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellee

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion