Alton G. HARWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee
1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 20773 · 5 Soc. Serv. Rev. 317 · 735 F.2d 1292
July 6, 1984 · Docket 83-8543
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
Harwell appealed the denial of SSDI benefits. The court noted that while treating‑physician testimony is presumptively weighted, the ALJ properly considered contrary evidence from consulting doctors and rejected the treating physician’s conclusions.
- Headnote 2
The appellate court affirmed the ALJ’s denial of benefits, holding that the Secretary’s finding was supported by substantial evidence and that the court’s role was limited to reviewing that standard rather than re‑weighing the evidence.
- Headnote 3
The record showed the claimant used only occasional pain medication, described limited discomfort, and his demeanor and daily activities suggested the absence of constant, severe pain, allowing the ALJ to deny benefits without objective pain studies.
- Headnote 4
Harwell’s prior grocery employment involved skilled tasks, and the vocational expert testified those skills were transferable to sedentary jobs. The consulting doctors’ reports supported the ALJ’s RFC finding that the claimant could perform sedentary work.
- Headnote 5
The ALJ must ordinarily defer to the treating doctor’s opinion, but when evidence contradicts it, the judge may rely more on other medical opinions.
- Headnote 6
Contrary evidence such as other physician reports, functional findings, or medication usage can justify the ALJ’s reliance on alternative medical opinions over the treating doctor’s view.
- Headnote 7
The district court affirmed the ALJ’s denial because the record contained substantial evidence of no disability, and the appellate court upheld that deference to the agency’s weighing of evidence.
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The court adopted the Watkins definition, emphasizing that the evidence need not be conclusive but must be sufficient to justify the agency’s decision.
- Headnote 9
The record showed occasional discomfort, minimal pain‑killer use, and the claimant’s demeanor, leading the ALJ to conclude the pain was not constant and severe enough to preclude work.
- Headnote 10
Consulting physicians’ reports and the vocational expert’s analysis of the claimant’s grocery‑store experience provided substantial evidence supporting the sedentary‑work RFC determination.
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The court noted that while the default is to give treating physicians great deference, an ALJ may override that weight when other credible evidence contradicts the treating doctor’s opinion.
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The opinion cited Oldham v. Schweiker, emphasizing that the agency may disregard a treating doctor’s view if other evidence shows the claimant’s condition does not align with that view.
- Headnote 13
Applying Bloodsworth v. Heckler, the court affirmed the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits because the record contained substantial evidence supporting that conclusion.
- Headnote 14
The court relied on Watkins v. Schweiker to define the level of proof required for an agency’s factual determination to be upheld on review.
- Headnote 15
The opinion explained that the claimant’s occasional discomfort, lack of strong pain‑killer use, and daily activity descriptions were sufficient to reject the claim of constant, severe pain without objective proof.
- Headnote 16
The court held that the consulting physicians’ reports and the vocational expert’s opinion that the claimant’s grocery‑store experience was transferable provided substantial evidence for a sedentary RFC finding.
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The ALJ must respect the treating doctor’s opinion, but may discount it when other competent medical evidence undermines the treating physician’s findings.
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The agency’s discretion to favor other medical opinions is proper if the evidence shows the treating doctor’s view is unsupported or unreliable.
- Headnote 19
When an administrative decision rests on evidence that a reasonable mind could accept, the court cannot overturn it absent clear error.
- Headnote 20
The totality of the evidence, including the claimant’s description of daily activities and pain‑killer usage, suffices to determine whether constant, severe pain exists.
- Headnote 21
The consulting physicians’ reports and the vocational expert’s testimony that the claimant’s grocery‑store experience involved transferable skills provide substantial evidence for a sedentary RFC finding.
- Headnote 22
The Fifth Circuit held that, absent proof to the contrary, the testimony of the physician who treats the claimant carries substantial weight in Social Security disability determinations.
- Headnote 23
In Harwell, the court explained that the ALJ’s discretion to favor other medical opinions is proper when the treating doctor’s conclusions are contradicted by credible evidence in the record.
- Headnote 24
The Fifth Circuit applied the substantial‑evidence standard, citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, and concluded that the ALJ’s denial of benefits was backed by substantial evidence.
- Headnote 25
The court referenced Watkins v. Schweiker for the definition of substantial evidence, emphasizing that the standard does not require absolute certainty.
- Headnote 26
Harwell’s record showed the claimant’s occasional discomfort, lack of strong pain medication, and daily activity description, which the ALJ considered in finding the pain was not constant and severe.
- Headnote 27
The court held that consulting physicians’ reports and the vocational expert’s testimony that the claimant’s grocery‑store experience involved transferable skills provided substantial evidence for a sedentary RFC determination.
- Headnote 28
The Harwell court reiterated Fruge, stating that treating physicians are accorded substantial weight absent good cause to the contrary, and emphasized that the weight may shift only when the record undermines the physician’s opinion.
- Headnote 29
Harwell cited Oldham, explaining that the agency may overturn a treating doctor’s view when other medical evidence demonstrates the treating physician’s findings are unsupported or unreliable.
- Headnote 30
The court applied Bloodsworth and Watkins, noting that substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable mind could accept, and that courts cannot overturn an ALJ’s factual findings absent clear error.
- Headnote 31
Harwell held that the ALJ properly considered the claimant’s pain‑killer use, daily activities, and demeanor, and therefore did not need objective medical evidence to reject the claimant’s claim of constant severe pain.
- Headnote 32
The court found the consulting physicians’ reports and the vocational expert’s testimony provided substantial evidence that Harwell’s grocery experience involved skill transferable to sedentary positions, supporting the ALJ’s RFC finding.
- Headnote 33
The claimant argued the ALJ gave more weight to consulting physicians. The opinion notes that treating physicians normally receive substantial weight (Fruge) yet the agency may reject that opinion if contrary evidence exists (Oldham).
- Headnote 34
The district court affirmed the ALJ’s denial, stating the record contained substantial evidence. The opinion cites Bloodsworth and Watkins defining substantial evidence and the standard of review.
- Headnote 35
The claimant claimed the ALJ demanded objective proof of pain. The opinion explains the ALJ considered pain‑killer use, daily activities, and the claimant’s demeanor, concluding no need for objective evidence.
- Headnote 36
Harwell argued the ALJ erred in deeming him capable of sedentary work. The opinion relies on consulting physicians’ reports and the vocational expert’s testimony that grocery experience provided transferable skills, providing substantial evidence for the RFC finding.
Opinion
In this appeal we review the denial of disability insurance benefits to a 59 year-old who suffers from back and heart problems. The magistrate recommended that the district court reverse the Secretary, but the court concluded that the determination was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed. We affirm.
Claimant asserts that the Administrative Law Judge improperly gave greater weight to the reports of the consulting physicians than to those by the treating doctors. “Unless there is good cause shown to the contrary, the testimony of the treating physician must be accorded substantial weight.” Fruge v. Harris, 631 F.2d 1244, 1246 (5th Cir.1980). At the same time, the AU may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B). Furthermore, even if the evidence preponderates against the Secretary’s decision, we must affirm if substantial evidence supports the disability determination. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.1983). After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s finding of no disability. See Watkins v. Schweiker, 667 F.2d 954, 958 n. 1 (11th Cir.1982).
In his report the AU stated
while the claimant may experience some discomfort on occasion, the essentially benign objective medical record, lack of regular use of potent pain medicatinn [sic], description of daily activities as well as claimant’s demeanor and testimony at the hearing mitigate [sic] against claimant’s allegation of constant, severe pain.
2 Rec. at 13. Claimant asserts that the AU erroneously required objective medical evidence to substantiate his testimony about pain and improperly engaged in “sit and squirm” jurisprudence. However, the record shows that the AU properly considered a variety of factors, including the claimant’s use of pain-killers and his daily activities, in making the finding about pain.
Harwell also argued that the AU erred in concluding that claimant was capable of sedentary work, had previously been employed in skilled or semi-skilled jobs and had transferable skills. The reports of the consulting doctors provide substantial evidence for the AU’s RFC finding. Furthermore, the vocational expert who testified at the second hearing before the AU concluded that Harwell’s prior employment in the grocery business constituted work requiring some skill and that the claimant’s skills were transferable to other positions in the grocery business. 2 Rec. at 102. This testimony provides substantial evidence for the AU’s findings on these issues.
AFFIRMED.