John T. GRAHAM, Appellant, v. F.B. LEOPOLD COMPANY, INC., Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

The appellant brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that his former employer had improperly discharged him because of his age. The district court granted the defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff employee appealed. We reverse.

I.

On December 31, 1983, the defendant, the F.B. Leopold Company, fired the plaintiff, John T. Graham. Graham, who had worked for Leopold for twenty-four years and who at the time of his dismissal was the superintendent of a plastics plant that Leopold operates in western Pennsylvania, was fifty-three years old. Leopold promoted James Green, who had previously served as a foreman in another Leopold plant, to the position formerly held by Graham. At the time of his promotion, Green was forty-one years old.

Approximately eighteen months before Graham’s dismissal, the Muller Company acquired Leopold. With an eye towards increasing the profitability of Leopold’s operations, Muller and Leopold officials met in the fall of 1983 to consider personnel cutbacks. One group these officials targeted for reduction was Leopold’s five-person supervisory cadre, which included Graham and Green. Although Graham had received generally favorable performance reviews during his tenure, he was the one supervisor elected for dismissal.

George Goyak, Leopold’s operations manager, delivered the termination letter to Graham on the last day of 1983. At that time, according to Graham, Goyak told him, “If I were you, I would get a lawyer and fight this.” Graham apparently took this advice to heart.

Alleging that Leopold had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982), when it fired him,1 Graham filed suit against Leopold in May 1984. The defendant employer moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in an opinion dated February 27, 1985. See Graham v. F.B. Leopold Co., 602 F.Supp. 1423 (W.D.Pa.1985).

II.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual ... because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982). Graham alleges that Leopold discharged him because of his age.

Analogizing the ADEA to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982), the district court employed in this ADEA suit the three-step procedure developed by the Supreme Court for assessment of Title VII claims. Both parties to this appeal argue that the district court’s invocation of Title VII doctrine was appropriate. We agree. See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913, 98 S.Ct. 2254, 56 L.Ed.2d 414 (1978).

Under the Supreme Court’s scheme, a Title VII plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.2 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 & n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 & n. 6, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1003 (3d Cir.1984). If the plaintiff succeeds in making out this prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the defendant employer “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. Should the employer articulate such a reason, the burden of production shifts back to the employee, who then must demonstrate either that the employer’s proffered reason is a pretext or that the employer’s decision was more likely motivated by some discriminatory reason.3 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825.44

Following this sequence, the district court found that Graham had established a prima facie case of age discrimination and that Leopold had demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to fire Graham. See Graham v. F.B. Leopold Co., 602 F.Supp. 1423, 1424-25 (W.D.Pa.1985). However, the court held that Graham then failed to introduce evidence that the employer’s reason was a pretext or evidence proving the defendant’s discriminatory intent. Consequently, it granted summary judgment for Leopold. See id. at 1425-26.

When addressing a summary judgment motion, the appropriate inquiry is

whether the admissible evidence, in the record in whatever form, from whatever source, considered in the light most favorable to the respondent to the motion, fails to establish a prima facie case or defense_ If _ there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the respondent’s favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment......

In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir.1983) (emphasis added), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1863, 85 L.Ed.2d 157 (1985). See also Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 224 (3d Cir.1984) (“ ‘[Sjummary judgment is never warranted except on a clear showing that no genuine issue of any material fact remains for trial....’”; quoting Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chemical Co., 524 F.2d 19, 24 (3d Cir.1975)). Accordingly, for Leopold to have prevailed on its motion, no material fact could have been at issue.

In opposing Leopold’s motion for summary judgment. Graham relied principally on what he alleged was a damaging admission by a Leopold official.5 Recounting in his deposition the conversation that he had with George Goyak — Leopold’s operations manager and the one who notified him of his dismissal — on the day he was fired, Graham stated, “He [Goyak] said, [‘JWell you’re dog meat. You are going, gone.[’] [A]nd then he said he would advise me to get a lawyer and fight this thing.” Joint Appendix at 50 (Deposition of John Graham). The deposition later featured the following colloquy:

Q. Has anybody ever told you specifically that they believed you were terminated because of your age?

A. The only time that anyone alluded to anything like that was — my being misused, was Goyak and that’s when he made the statement that he felt very strongly that I should take this to court and fight it.

A. As a matter of fact, yes. George Goyak did tell me that I was in the protected age group.

Q. And did you ask him what he meant by that?

A. Well I knew what he meant by that, that I was in an age bracket and that I just couldn’t be talked out on the street.

Joint Appendix at 62-63 (Deposition of John Graham).

The critical question for this appeal is whether this deposition testimony creates a genuine dispute about a material issue of fact — whether Goyak’s comments, as reported by Graham, would allow a jury to infer that Leopold has discharged Graham because of his age.6 The district court held that this testimony was not enough to defeat the summary judgment motion:

We cannot infer from the evidence or from the inferences reasonably drawn from plaintiff’s testimony regarding an isolated comment by Goyak that age was a factor in the decision to terminate the plaintiff. We do infer that Goyak, who was forced to chose [sic] which one management person among the five would be terminated, was somewhat angry and uncomfortable about plaintiff’s termination. We interpret Goyak’s statements to plaintiff to be a show of support for the plaintiff_ We take Go-yak’s comment about plaintiff being in a protected age group as a layman’s suggestion that Graham’s age might provide him with some extra legal protections not afforded to others, rather than as an intent to discriminate because of age. We, therefore, find plaintiff’s evidence insufficient as a matter of law to show either that defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext, or that defendant had a discriminatory intent in terminating the plaintiff.

Graham v. F.B. Leopold Co., 602 F.Supp. 1423, 1425-26 (W.D.Pa.1985) (footnotes omitted).

What the district court chooses to infer or chooses not to infer is simply not relevant to consideration of a summary judgment motion. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether, from the evidence available at the time of the motion’s disposition, a jury could reasonably have inferred that Leopold had illegally discriminated against Graham. The district court made no ruling that a jury could not draw such an inference, and in light of Graham’s deposition we believe that, as a matter of law, the record would not support a finding. We will reverse.