Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Sam Malia and Ingrid Malia v. Rca Corporation

794 F.2d 909

September 3, 1986 · Docket 85-5767

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge:

At issue on this appeal is whether section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982), preempts an employer’s state-law claims for breach of an oral contract of employment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional interference with contract and also preempts a derivative action by the employee’s wife for loss of consortium. The district court reasoned that the state-law claims were dependent upon a collective bargaining agreement and therefore held that the claims were preempted by federal law. Although the court went on to construe the complaint as alleging claims under § 301 of the LMRA, it granted summary judgment in favor of the employer because the complaint was not filed within the applicable six-month statute of limitations. Because we conclude that the district court misconstrued the nature of the employee’s state-law claims, we reverse.

This appeal arises out of a labor dispute in which the plaintiff, Sam Malia, sought to be reinstated to a job within a collective bargaining unit after Malia had been promoted to a supervisory position.1 Malia had worked as an hourly employee for the defendant, RCA Corporation, from 1966 until April 9,1984. In connection with his job as an hourly employee, Malia had been a member of a bargaining unit represented by Local 178 of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers. In early April of 1984 Malia, in his capacity as president of Local 178, attended a dinner at which RCA’s plant manager, Harlon May, offered to promote Malia to inventory coordinator, a managerial position outside the Local 178 bargaining unit. As an inducement to accepting the promotion, May promised Malia better pay, increased hours and overtime, advancement within the company, less stressful working conditions, and the option to return to the bargaining unit if Malia was not satisfied with the new position. See Malia’s Complaint at 1Í 6, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 4. Malia accepted RCA’s offer and began to perform his job as inventory coordinator on April 9, 1984. In less than three weeks Malia requested that he be returned to his former position as soon as such a position became available. On April 28, 1984, such a position became available, but RCA’s management did not accede to Malia’s request for reassignment. As a result, he has remained in the position of inventory coordinator.

Whether a state-law claim is preempted by federal law is a question of congressional intent. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 1190, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978). Section 301 of the LMRA provides a federal right of action for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).2 This statutory provision reflects a congressional intent to ensure that federal common law is applied to the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456, 77 S.Ct. 912, 917, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). While Congress did not state to what extent it intended § 301 to preempt state law, see Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), the Supreme Court has recently explained that

questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort.

Id. at 1911. Thus, in Allis-Chalmers the Court held “that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.” Id. at 1916 (citation omitted). The focus of inquiry in determining § 301 preemption, therefore, is on the nature of the state-law claims because state-law claims that are independent of collective bargaining agreements are not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 1912. A logical corollary to the rule preempting state-law claims that depend on collective bargaining agreements is the rule that employees who are members of a collective bargaining unit cannot negotiate individual contracts that are inconsistent with the collective bargaining unit cannot negotiate individual contracts that are inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-39, 64 S.Ct. 576, 580-81, 88 L.Ed. 762 (1944); Eitmann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 730 F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir.1984); see also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2006, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967). (“[National labor] policy ... extinguishes the individual employee’s power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees____ Thus only the union may contract the employee’s terms and conditions of employment.”) [4-7] In the case now under consideration the district court reasoned that Malia’s state-law claims depended upon an interpretation of a provision of the Local 178 collective bargaining agreement which the court believed governed Malia’s right to be reinstated to the bargaining unit. See Ma-lia v. RCA Corp., No. 85-0721, slip op. at 6-7 (M.D.Pa.Oct. 17, 1985). The provision of the Local 178 contract that the district court was referring to provides in relevant part,

When an employee has established seniority privileges in an occupational classification within the Bargaining Unit and is or has been thereafter transferred or promoted to another position which is not within the Bargaining Unit, in the event such employee is again restored to a position within the Bargaining Unit, such employee shall be deemed to have retained but not accumulated seniority privileges within the Bargaining Unit in accordance with Article 56, provided that the privilege of returning to the Bargaining Unit shall be extended to all employees so affected.

Supplementary Local Agreement between RCA and Local 178 at 1156.04, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 58 (emphasis supplied). A careful reading of this paragraph reveals that the district court was mistaken. Paragraph 56.04 of the Local 178 collective bargaining agreement does not govern the right to be reinstated. Rather it governs the issue of seniority if an employee is reinstated to the bargaining unit.3 In part the district court’s misinterpretation can be explained by Malia’s misleading reference to paragraph 56.04 in his Complaint. Malia's breach of contract claim alleges, “The Defendant by not reinstating the Plaintiff back into the Bargaining Unit at the Plaintiff’s request when a position was available has breached Paragraph 56.04 of the Supplemental Local Agreement between RCA Corporation and Local No. 178.” Malia’s Complaint at ¶ 16, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 6. To the extent that this claim relies on the Local 178 collective bargaining agreement, the claim is preempted. However, Malia’s Complaint also alleges facts that would support a claim for breach of an oral contract. See Malia’s Complaint at ¶¶ 5, 6, and 7, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 4. This oral contract is a completely separate agreement from the collective bargaining agreement. In addition this oral contract is not preempted by the rule prohibiting members of a collective bargaining unit from negotiating inconsistent individual contracts. Although Malia was a member of Local 178 when he negotiated the alleged oral contract, the oral contract relates to the job of inventory supervisor — a management position outside the Local 178 bargaining unit. Nothing in the LMRA prevents an individual — whether that individual is to be newly hired or promoted from a bargaining unit — from negotiating an employment contract for a management position.4 Nor does LMRA prevent an individual — whether an applicant for new employment or a current employee in a supervisory position — from negotiating for a job in a bargaining unit so long as that employment will be on the terms and conditions set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.

Thus, because we construe Malia’s Complaint as alleging a state-law breach of contract claim based on an oral employment contract we conclude that that claim and Malia’s state-law tort claims, which derive from the breach of the oral contract, are independent of and do not interfere with the Local 178 collective bargaining agreement. We, therefore, hold that the district court erred in concluding that Malia’s state-law claims were preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Given this conclusion, the district court’s decision concerning the statute of limitations is irrelevant. The six-month statute of limitations applicable to claims under § 301 of the LMRA does not govern state-law contract and tort claims. The summary judgment will, therefore, be reversed.

.

. Because this is an appeal from a summary judgment we accept the facts as pleaded in Ma-lia's complaint as true. See United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 981 (3d Cir.1984). Our discussion should not, therefore, be construed as bearing on the question of whether the oral contract alleged by Malia has been established as a factual matter.

See United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 981 (3d Cir.1984).Our discussion should not, therefore, be construed as bearing on the question of whether the oral contract alleged by Malia has been established as a factual matter..

. Subsection (a) of § 301 reads,

ta) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).

29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1982)..

. Focusing on the clause — "provided that the privilege of returning to the Bargaining Unit shall be extended to all employees so affected"— the dissent interprets section 56.04 of the collective bargaining agreement as “establishing a right to reinstatement for all employees who have left the bargaining unit.” Dissenting opinion at 914. The clause that the dissent relies upon, however, is more logically interpreted as a provision dealing with group transfer situations. For example, if RCA transferred a group of employees to another occupational classification outside the bargaining unit, section 56.04 would require that if one former unit member was restored to the unit and given her old seniority, the rest of the group would have the option of also returning to the bargaining unit with their old seniority. Thus the clause upon which the dissent relies does not provide a per se right of reinstatement, rather it provides a right for union employees to be treated equally. Equal treatment among union members is often an objective of collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, the dissent's interpretation of section 56.04 would give supervisors — employees who the LMRA expressly excludes from its statutory protection, see infra footnote 4 — the protection of a collective bargaining agreement.

Dissenting opinion at 914.The clause that the dissent relies upon, however, is more logically interpreted as a provision dealing with group transfer situations.For example, if RCA transferred a group of employees to another occupational classification outside the bargaining unit, section 56.04 would require that if one former unit member was restored to the unit and given her old seniority, the rest of the group would have the option of also returning to the bargaining unit with their old seniority.Thus the clause upon which the dissent relies does not provide a per se right of reinstatement, rather it provides a right for union employees to be treated equally.Equal treatment among union members is often an objective of collective bargaining agreements.Moreover, the dissent's interpretation of section 56.04 would give supervisors — employees who the LMRA expressly excludes from its statutory protection, see infra footnote 4 — the protection of a collective bargaining agreement..

. The LMRA expressly excludes a "supervisor" from its definition of an "employee.” See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). As § 301 is concerned with a contract between employers and organizations representing "employees,” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982), § 301 is not affected by a contract between an employer and a supervisor.

RCA cites Redmond v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 633 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam) for the proposition that former bargaining unit members cannot bring state-law claims based on an individual employment contract. Brief for RCA at 9. RCA, however, has misinterpreted the Redmond decision. Redmond involved a suit based on a collective bargaining agreement. See 734 F.2d at 635-36; Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (11th Cir.1985) (discussing the Redmond decision), cert denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986). It would be illogical to preempt an employment contract merely because the employee had formerly been a member of a collective bargaining unit. Only where the former unit member relies on the collective bargaining agreement — the situation in Redmond — would such a rule be consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Allis-Chalmers.

See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1982).As § 301 is concerned with a contract between employers and organizations representing "employees,” 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1982), § 301 is not affected by a contract between an employer and a supervisor.RCA cites Redmond v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 633 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam) for the proposition that former bargaining unit members cannot bring state-law claims based on an individual employment contract.Brief for RCA at 9.RCA, however, has misinterpreted the Redmond decision.Redmond involved a suit based on a collective bargaining agreement.See 734 F.2d at 635-36 ; Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (11th Cir.1985) (discussing the Redmond decision), cert denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 863 , 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986).It would be illogical to preempt an employment contract merely because the employee had formerly been a member of a collective bargaining unit. Only where the former unit member relies on the collective bargaining agreement — the situation in Redmond — would such a rule be consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Allis-Chalmers.