United States v. Boyd
231 F. App'x 314
May 7, 2007 · Docket 06-41135
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
Boyd argued the letters were copies, but the district court correctly found they were the originals received by the victims and admitted them as such.
- Headnote 2
The handling of Boyd’s father’s estate was found to be irrelevant to whether Boyd mailed threatening letters, so the district court properly excluded that evidence.
- Headnote 3
The Fifth Circuit applied this standard, citing United States v. Robles‑Pantoja, to conclude Boyd’s conviction was supported by the evidence.
- Headnote 4
The indictment charged Boyd with mailing letters that threatened victims’ reputations and demanded money, and the court found sufficient evidence of each statutory element.
- Headnote 5
Boyd’s claim that his prosecution violated the First Amendment was rejected because the government’s case targeted his extortion scheme, not the expressive content of the letters.
- Headnote 6
The district court found Boyd’s extortion attempts were partially motivated by Judge Nall’s status as a judge, satisfying the enhancement criteria.
- Headnote 7
The Fifth Circuit examined whether the sentence imposed on Boyd was reasonable in light of the governing guidelines and case law.
- Headnote 8
Boyd argued the letters were copies, but the district court found they were the originals received by the victims and admitted them as such.
- Headnote 9
The handling of Boyd’s father’s estate was held irrelevant to whether he mailed threatening letters, so the district court limited cross‑examination and excluded that evidence.
- Headnote 10
Applying the Robles‑Pantoja standard, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Boyd’s conviction under § 876(d).
- Headnote 11
The statute’s elements were set out in the opinion and proved by testimony that Boyd authored, mailed, and threatened victims with fliers unless they paid him money.
- Headnote 12
Boyd claimed the prosecution violated his free‑speech rights, but the court held he was prosecuted for extortion, not for the expressive content of the letters.
- Headnote 13
The court found Boyd’s extortion was partly motivated by Judge Nall’s status as a judge and therefore affirmed the enhancement imposed under the guideline.
- Headnote 14
The appellate court examined the district court’s sentence enhancement for reasonableness, citing Mares as the controlling standard of review.
- Headnote 15
Boyd argued the letters were copies; the district court determined they were the originals received by the victims, so admission as originals was proper.
- Headnote 16
Boyd sought to introduce evidence about his father's estate; the court held that the estate issue bore no relevance to whether Boyd mailed threatening letters and therefore properly excluded it and limited cross‑examination.
- Headnote 17
Boyd claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under §876(d); the court applied the rational‑trier test from Robles‑Pantoja and found the evidence met the statutory elements.
- Headnote 18
Agents testified Boyd authored and mailed the letters, which threatened victims with fliers calling them “liars and thieves” unless they paid; the statutory elements of mailing, reputational threat, and extortion intent were satisfied.
- Headnote 19
Boyd argued that his prosecution violated free‑speech rights; the court held he was prosecuted for the extortion attempt, not for expressive conduct, and the First Amendment does not shield extortionate threats.
- Headnote 20
Boyd claimed his motive was personal grievance over his father’s estate; the court found his letters repeatedly referenced Judge Nall’s status, satisfying the motivation requirement and justifying the enhancement.
- Headnote 21
Boyd challenged the enhanced sentence; the Fifth Circuit applied the reasonableness standard from United States v. Mares and affirmed the sentencing court’s decision.
- Headnote 22
The district court determined that the letters admitted as evidence were the originals received by the victims, so the admission complied with Fed.R.Evid. 1002.
- Headnote 23
The court excluded evidence concerning Boyd’s father’s estate and restricted cross‑examination because the estate issue bore no relevance to whether Boyd mailed the threatening letters.
- Headnote 24
The statute’s elements were satisfied: agents testified Boyd authored and mailed the letters, the letters threatened victims with reputational harm, and they demanded money, establishing extortion.
- Headnote 25
Applying this standard, the appellate court concluded that the evidence presented could support a finding of guilt on all required elements of § 876(d).
- Headnote 26
Boyd’s argument that his prosecution violated free‑speech rights was rejected because the government’s case targeted his extortionate threats, not protected expression.
- Headnote 27
The court found Boyd’s extortion attempts were partly motivated by Judge Nall’s status as a judge, justifying the application of the enhancement.
- Headnote 28
Boyd argued the letters were copies, but the court found they were the originals received by the victims, so the district court’s admission was proper.
- Headnote 29
The district court excluded evidence about Boyd’s father’s estate because it bore no relation to whether Boyd mailed the threatening letters; the exclusion did not violate his right to a fair trial.
- Headnote 30
Applying United States v. Robles‑Pantoja’s test, the Fifth Circuit held that the evidence presented against Boyd satisfied the statutory elements of 18 U.S.C. § 876(d).
- Headnote 31
The statute’s language (sentences 18‑22) and the evidence that Boyd authored, signed, and mailed letters threatening to label victims “liars and thieves” unless paid (sentences 26‑27) satisfy all three elements.
- Headnote 32
Boyd’s claim that his prosecution violated the First Amendment was rejected because the government charged him with extortion, not with protected expressive conduct.
- Headnote 33
The court found Boyd’s extortion attempts were partly motivated by Judge Nall’s status as a judge, satisfying the guideline’s motive requirement even though Boyd also harbored a personal grievance over his father’s estate.
- Headnote 34
The Fifth Circuit examined Boyd’s enhanced sentence for reasonableness, applying the Mares standard to ensure the enhancement was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
- Headnote 35
The district court found the letters admitted at trial were the originals received by the victims, so Boyd’s argument that they were copies and should be excluded fails.
- Headnote 36
The handling of Boyd’s father’s estate was unrelated to whether Boyd mailed threatening letters, so the court’s exclusion of that evidence and restriction on cross‑examining government witnesses was proper.
- Headnote 37
The court applied this sufficiency standard and concluded that the evidence presented could support a conviction for Boyd under 18 U.S.C. § 876(d).
- Headnote 38
Federal agents testified that Boyd authored and mailed the letters, which threatened to publish defamatory flyers unless the victims paid money, satisfying all statutory elements.
- Headnote 39
Boyd was prosecuted not for distributing flyers but for using the threats to attempt extortion; therefore the First Amendment does not shield his conduct.
- Headnote 40
The court found Boyd’s extortion attempts were partially motivated by Judge Nall’s status as a judge, satisfying the guideline’s motive requirement and justifying the enhancement.
- Headnote 41
The district court’s sentencing decision was examined under this reasonableness standard and was upheld.
Opinion
Arthur Marcus Boyd (“Boyd”) appeals his conviction and sentence for mailing threatening communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(d). We affirm for the following reasons:
1. 1. Boyd contends that the letters at issue were copies, and thus were erroneously admitted at trial. According to the government and the victims, the letters were the originals received by the victims. Boyd himself had apparently copied the letters before mailing them. Because the district court properly determined that the letters admitted into evidence were the originals, Boyd’s argument fails.
2. 2. Boyd also argues that the district court erred in limiting cross-examination of the government’s witnesses and excluding evidence concerning the estate of Boyd’s father. Because the handling of Boyd’s father’s estate was irrelevant as to whether Boyd had mailed threatening letters, this argument also fails. See Fed. R.Evid. 401.
3. 3. Boyd contends that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction by determining “whether, viewing the evidence presented and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact properly could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Robles-Pantoja, 887 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation omitted).
Boyd was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 876(d), which provides that:
Whoever, with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, knowing so deposits or causes to be delivered ... any communication, with or without a name or designating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other person and containing any threat to injure the ... reputation of the addressee or of another ...
has violated the law. In this case, first, federal agents testified that Boyd admitted to them that the writing in the letters was his and that he mailed the letters, and the letters contained his printed signature; and second, the letter writer threatened to spread fliers throughout the town saying that the victims were, for example, “liars and thieves” unless the victims gave him money, and the letters contained examples of such fliers. Thus, Boyd’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. Boyd argues that his prosecution violates the First Amendment. However, Boyd is not being prosecuted for displaying the signs or distributing the fliers, but for attempting to extort money from others. The First Amendment does not protect extortion.
4. 4. Finally, Boyd challenges the district court’s enhancement of his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(a). That provision provides for a three level enhancement if the victim was a government officer or employer and the offense was motivated by that status.
Boyd argues that his crime was motivated not by Judge Nall’s status as a judge, but because Boyd believed that Judge Nall mishandled his father’s estate. The district court found that Boyd’s extortion attempts were in part motivated by Nall’s status as a judge, and thus enhanced Boyd’s sentence.
We review the district court’s sentence for reasonableness. United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir.2005). Boyd addressed several of his letters to “Judge Rim Nall.” Many of the fliers that Boyd sent to the victims referred mainly to Nall, including phrases like “Crooked Judge Rim Nall Bribes;” “Watch As Christian Judge Transforms Himself Into A Snake Before Your Very Eyes;” and “[o]ne of these crooks is Rim Nall and he’s sitting as a judge sending people the [sic] prison for stealing less than he has. Sherman should know.” He also included pictures of a truck pulling a flatbed trailer with a large sign labeled “Crooked Judge Rim Nall Bribes.” Although Boyd was undoubtedly motivated in part by what he saw as Nall’s wrongful handling of his father’s estate, because of Boyd’s constant reiteration of the fact that Nall was a judge, and his attempts to extort money from Nall based on the fact that Nall was a judge, it is reasonable to infer that Boyd was also motivated by Nall’s status as a judge in the community. Therefore, the district court did not err by enhancing Nall’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.