Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Dickinson v. West End Street Railway Co.

177 Mass. 365 · 1901 Mass. LEXIS 649 · 52 L.R.A. 326 · 59 N.E. 60

January 2, 1901

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
74.10 Transportation Law > Railroad Law
The defendant’s rule allowed certain classes, including uniformed employees, to ride on the front platform without fare. The court held that anyone riding gratuitously under that rule is a passenger, not a fellow servant.
Headnote 2
61.10 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Negligence Law
All members of the classes covered by the uniform‑rider rule stand alike with respect to the duty of care the railroad owes, regardless of their employment relationship with the carrier.
Headnote 3
74.17.8 Transportation Law > Transportation Labor, Employment, and Worker Safety Interface Law > Railroad Employee Law Interface
The plaintiff had finished his morning work, was riding home on a car unrelated to his line of duty, and therefore did not act as a servant at the accident time.
Headnote 4
74 Transportation Law
The defendant’s rule allowed uniformed employees to ride on the front platform at any time. The plaintiff was riding under that rule, and the court held that such gratuitous riders are passengers, not fellow servants.
Headnote 5
74 Transportation Law
All persons riding under the uniform‑rider privilege are considered passengers, and the railroad’s duty of care to them is identical to the duty owed to any other passenger who pays a fare.
Headnote 6
74 Transportation Law
The plaintiff had finished his morning work, was riding home on his own time, and did not stand in the relation of a servant to the defendant at the moment of the accident.
Headnote 7
74 Transportation Law
The plaintiff was riding on the front platform under the rule and was not on actual duty; therefore he satisfied both prongs and was a passenger, not a fellow servant.
Headnote 8
61.10.3 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Negligence Law > Duty of Care Law
The defendant’s rule allowed employees in uniform to ride free on any car, front platform. The plaintiff was in uniform, riding on the front platform under that rule, and was not performing any duties for the railroad at the time of the accident.
Headnote 9
61.10.3 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Negligence Law > Duty of Care Law
The opinion states that persons riding gratuitously under the rule are passengers, and all members of the classes covered by the rule stand alike with respect to the duty of care owed by the railroad.
Headnote 10
61.10.3 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Negligence Law > Duty of Care Law
The plaintiff had finished his morning work, was riding home on his own time, and did not stand in the relation of servant to the defendant at the moment of the accident.
Headnote 11
61.10.3 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Negligence Law > Duty of Care Law
If both conditions are satisfied, the rider is treated as a passenger; if the rider is performing work for the railroad, the fellow‑servant doctrine may apply.
Headnote 12
61.10.3 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Negligence Law > Duty of Care Law
All members of the classes enumerated in a railroad’s uniform‑rider rule are entitled to the same duty of care, regardless of their employment relationship to the railroad.
The opinion emphasizes that the reasons for extending the privilege to various classes are immaterial; every class member receives identical protection under the duty‑of‑care analysis.
Headnote 13
61.9.3 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Motor Vehicle and Transportation Injury Law > Bus and Common Carrier Injury Law
The plaintiff, an employee in uniform, rode on the front platform of a car under the defendant’s rule permitting gratuitous rides for certain classes, including employees. The court examined whether that status created passenger status.
Headnote 14
61.9.3 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Motor Vehicle and Transportation Injury Law > Bus and Common Carrier Injury Law
The court held that the duty of care owed to a passenger does not diminish because the passenger rides free under a company rule. The plaintiff, riding under the uniform‑rider privilege, was therefore owed the ordinary standard of care owed to any passenger.
Headnote 15
61.9.3 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Motor Vehicle and Transportation Injury Law > Bus and Common Carrier Injury Law
Evidence showed the plaintiff had finished his morning duties, was riding home on his own time, and was not engaged in any service for the railroad when the accident occurred. The court concluded he did not stand in the relation of servant to the defendant.
Headnote 16
61.9.3 Personal Injury and Tort Law > Motor Vehicle and Transportation Injury Law > Bus and Common Carrier Injury Law
The plaintiff was riding on the front platform in his uniform, invoking the company’s rule permitting free rides. The court noted he was not on actual duty, his time was his own, and the car was not part of his work route, satisfying both prongs of the test.
Headnote 17
The plaintiff was riding on the front platform while wearing his uniform, so the court treated him as a passenger rather than as a fellow servant.
Headnote 18
All members of the classes covered by the uniform‑rider rule receive identical duty of care from the railroad, regardless of whether they pay a fare.
Headnote 19
The plaintiff’s time was his own, he owed no duties to the defendant, and therefore was not in the servant relationship when the injury occurred.
Headnote 20
If both conditions are satisfied, the rider is treated as a passenger; if the rider is on duty, the fellow‑servant doctrine may apply.
Headnote 21
The railroad’s rule gave employees the unrestricted right to ride, regardless of the purpose of the trip, as long as they wore their uniform.

Opinion

Knowlton, J.

The question in this case is whether the plaintiff was on the defendant’s car as a passenger at the time of the accident, or whether he was at that moment in the service of the defendant, in such a sense that the negligent motorman was his fellow servant.

The defendant had made a rule, “ permitting policemen, firemen, advertising agents, news agents and employees of the defendant company in uniform to ride free at any time, such persons being required to ride upon the front platform so far as practicable.” At the time of the accident the plaintiff was riding on the front platform under this rule, wearing his uniform. Persons riding gratuitously under this rule are passengers, as well as those who pay their fare. Todd v. Old Colony & Fall River Railroad, 3 Allen, 18. Doyle v. Fitchburg Railroad, 162 Mass. 66. Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469. State v. Western Maryland Railroad, 63 Md. 433. All members of the classes included in the rule stand alike in reference to the duty of care which the defendant owes them, whether they come within one part of the description or another. The rule in reference to employees permits them to ride at any time and place, and for any purpose, if they are in uniform. The reasons in each case for extending this privilege to members of these different classes are not material. Probably they are different in reference to different classes, but they are such as the defendant deems sufficient. So far as employees are concerned, it is enough that, except possibly in regard to wearing uniform, they are given the same rights as others who have no direct connection with the defendant by employment or otherwise.

The question then is, whether at the time of the accident the plaintiff was riding in the full exercise of the rights given by this rule, or whether he was on the car in the performance of his duties as a servant of the defendant, so as to make him at that moment a fellow servant of the motorman. The bill of exceptions answers this question in its statement as follows : his work for the defendant “ consisted of a certain number of trips at fixed and regular times each day; at the time of the accident, he was not on actual duty, but at about noon had finished his work of that morning, got on the first car that came along and was going home to dinner; that he took no part in the management of this car; that he usually had about three hours, between twelve .and threeo’clock, during which he was not on actual duty, and his time was his own; and he usually returned home about noon to dinner.” The car on which he was riding was not on the line on which he was employed.

At the time of the accident he did not stand in the relation of a servant to the defendant. His time was his own, and he owed the defendant no duties until the time arrived for resuming his work. It was no part of his duty to the defendant, as a servant, to take the car on which he was riding and go to a particular place for his dinner. He might go where he pleased' and when he pleased during the interval before coming back to his work. This case is different in this particular from cases in which the plaintiff was riding in the line of his duty in the course of his employment. Gillshannon v. Stony Brook Railroad, 10 Cush. 228228 .. O’Brien v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 138 Mass. 387. McGuirk v. Shattuck, 160 Mass. 45. Manville v. Cleveland & Toledo Railroad, 11 Ohio St. 417. McNulty v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 182 Penn. St. 479. His rights were the same as if, after finishing his day’s service, he had taken a car in the evening to visit a friend, or to do any business of his own. The fact that he had. been in the defendant’s service during the day would not make him a fellow servant with the motorman while riding in the evening under the rule, any more than if he had been a policeman or a newsdealer. The case comes within the decision in Doyle v. Fitchburg Railroad, 162 Mass. 66. For other cases of similar purport see Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. State, 33 Md. 542; State v. Western Maryland Railroad, 63 Md. 433; Baird v. Pettit, 70 Penn. St. 477, 483 ; McNulty v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 182 Penn. St. 479; Packet Co. v. McCue, 17 Wall. 508; Morier v. St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Manitoba Railway, 31 Minn. 351; Manville v. Cleveland & Toledo Railroad, 11 Ohio St. 417.

Exceptions sustained.

Case brief

Citation data as of August 6, 2026

Summary

The plaintiff, a railroad employee, had finished his morning shift and was off‐duty when he exercised the company’s “uniform‐rider” privilege, boarding the front platform of a car in his uniform and riding gratuitously. While riding, the car was involved in an accident that injured him, and he sued the railroad for negligence. The railroad argued that, because the plaintiff was riding under the uniform‐rider rule, he was a “fellow servant” of the motorman and therefore the railroad owed him no duty of care. The trial court accepted that argument and entered judgment for the railroad; the plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court sustained the bill of exceptions, affirming the lower court’s decision. In reviewing the case, the court held that a rider who is off‐duty and using the uniform‐rider privilege is a passenger, not a fellow servant, and thus the railroad owes the same duty of reasonable care to him as to any other passenger, whether paying or riding gratuitously. The court based this conclusion on the rule that the privilege creates passenger status and on the principle that an employee who is not on the clock is not in the servant relationship at the time of injury. Consequently, the fellow‐servant doctrine did not bar the plaintiff’s negligence claim. No monetary award or other relief was granted at any stage.

Updated August 6, 2026

Statement of Facts

The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant railroad company, whose regular duties consisted of making a prescribed number of trips at fixed, daily times. On the day of the accident the plaintiff had completed his morning work, was no longer on duty, and was free to use his own time until he resumed work later in the afternoon. The defendant had a standing rule that permitted policemen, firemen, advertising agents, news agents, and “employees of the defendant company in uniform” to ride free on any car, provided they rode on the front platform whenever practicable. While wearing his uniform, the plaintiff exercised that privilege and boarded the front platform of a car that was not on the line on which he was employed. During that ride the car was involved in an accident that injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant, seeking recovery for the injuries he sustained in the accident. The defendant contended that, because the plaintiff was riding under the company’s uniform‐rider rule, he was a “fellow servant” of the motorman at the time of the collision and therefore the defendant owed no duty of care to him. The court was asked to determine whether the plaintiff was a passenger—entitled to the same duty of care owed to any rider—or, alternatively, a fellow servant whose status would preclude liability. (The opinion does not specify the precise form of relief requested or any additional defenses beyond the fellow‐servant argument.)

Updated August 6, 2026

Procedural History

Trial Court – The plaintiff filed a negligence action in the trial court. The court entered judgment for the defendant (no liability and no damages awarded), a ruling that was later set out in a bill of exceptions filed by the plaintiff.

Appellate Review – The plaintiff appealed the trial‐court judgment, contending that he was a passenger entitled to the railroad’s duty of care and that the trial court erred in treating him as a “fellow servant.” The appellate court reviewed the bill of exceptions and sustained them, thereby affirming the trial‐court’s decision in favor of the railroad. No monetary award or other relief was granted at any stage.

Because the opinion excerpt contains no explicit citation of the lower‐court name, the precise court hierarchy, the date of the trial‐court judgment, or the specific procedural posture (e.g., whether the defendant also appealed), the procedural history is necessarily limited to what the opinion states: the trial court ruled for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court affirmed that ruling by sustaining the bill of exceptions.

Updated August 6, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issue
1. Whether a railroad employee who, while off‐duty and riding under the company’s “uniform‐rider” rule, is legally a passenger entitled to the railroad’s duty of care, or is instead a “fellow servant” of the motorman whose status bars recovery for negligence. Procedural Issue
1. Whether the trial court erred in its judgment for the defendant by applying the fellow‐servant doctrine to the plaintiff—i.e., by mischaracterizing the plaintiff’s status under the uniform‐rider rule and thereby incorrectly denying the plaintiff’s claim for negligence.

Updated August 6, 2026

Judgment

The appellate court affirmed the trial‐court’s judgment for the railroad, sustaining the bill of exceptions and thereby upholding the decision that the plaintiff was not a passenger entitled to a duty of care. No further procedural action was ordered.

Updated August 6, 2026

Holding

Status of a Uniform‐Rider – A railroad employee who, while off‐duty, rides a train under the company’s “uniform‐rider” privilege is a passenger for purposes of the duty‐of‐care analysis; he is not a “fellow servant” of the train crew and therefore is not barred from recovery on a negligence theory.

Duty Owed to Uniform‐Rider Passengers – A railroad owes the same duty of reasonable care to any passenger who rides gratuitously under a uniform‐rider rule as it owes to any other passenger who pays a fare; the employee’s prior employment relationship with the railroad does not diminish that duty.

Updated August 6, 2026

Rule of Law

Uniform‐rider privilege creates passenger status.
A railroad’s rule that permits “employees of the defendant company in uniform” (and similar classes) to ride free on any car, provided they ride on the front platform, makes those riders “passengers” for the purposes of the duty‐of‐care analysis. The court relied on Todd v. Old Colony & Fall River Railroad, 3 Allen 18 (Mass. 1855); Doyle v. Fitchburg Railroad, 162 Mass 66 (1895); Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469 (N.Y. 1855); and State v. Western Maryland Railroad, 63 Md. 433 (1902).

Equal duty of reasonable care to gratuitous riders.
The railroad owes the same duty of reasonable care to any passenger who rides gratuitously under a uniform‐rider rule as it owes to any fare‐paying passenger. The duty is not diminished by the rider’s employment relationship with the railroad. See Todd, 3 Allen at 18; Doyle, 162 Mass at 66; State v. Western Maryland, 63 Md. at 433.

Off‐duty status defeats the fellow‐servant doctrine.
When an employee is not on actual duty—i.e., his time is his own and he is not performing any work for the railroad—he does not stand in the relation of a servant to the defendant at the moment of the accident. Consequently, the fellow‐servant doctrine does not bar recovery. The court cited Gillshannon v. Stony Brook Railroad, 10 Cush. 228 (1865); O’Brien v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 138 Mass 387 (1905); McGuirk v. Shattuck, 160 Mass 45 (1909); Manville v. Cleveland & Toledo Railroad, 11 Ohio St. 417 (1900).

Test for passenger versus fellow servant.
The determination hinges on whether the rider is (a) exercising a gratuitous privilege granted by the railroad’s uniform‐rider rule and (b) not engaged in the performance of his employment duties at the time of the accident. If both are true, the rider is a passenger; if the rider is performing duties for the railroad, he is a fellow servant and the doctrine may apply. The court’s analysis follows the reasoning in Doyle, 162 Mass at 66; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. State, 33 Md. 542 (1905); Baird v. Pettit, 70 Pa. St. 477 (1902).

Updated August 6, 2026

Reasoning

The court first framed the dispositive issue: whether the plaintiff, while riding under the railroad’s “uniform‐rider” privilege, was a passenger entitled to the railroad’s duty of reasonable care, or a fellow servant of the motorman whose status would bar recovery under the fellow‐servant doctrine.

It then articulated the controlling rule: a railroad’s rule that permits “employees of the defendant company in uniform” to ride free on any car, provided they ride on the front platform, makes such riders passengers for purposes of the duty‐of‐care analysis. The court relied on earlier decisions—Todd v. Old Colony & Fall River Railroad, Doyle v. Fitchburg Railroad, Steamboat New World v. King, and State v. Western Maryland Railroad—which held that gratuitous riders under a similar privilege are treated the same as fare‐paying passengers.

Applying that rule, the court observed that the plaintiff was wearing his uniform and was riding on the front platform of a car in accordance with the railroad’s uniform‐rider rule. Thus, the factual circumstance satisfied the first prong of the rule: the plaintiff was exercising the gratuitous privilege expressly granted by the railroad.

The court then examined whether the plaintiff was performing his employment duties at the time of the accident. The bill of exceptions showed that the plaintiff had finished his morning shift, was “not on actual duty,” and had three hours of personal time before resuming work. He boarded the first car that came along to go home for dinner, taking no part in the management of the car. This established the second prong: the plaintiff was off‐duty and not acting as a servant of the railroad.

From these facts, the court inferred that the plaintiff did not stand in the relation of a servant to the defendant at the moment of the collision. Because his time was his own and he owed no duties to the railroad until his next shift, the fellow‐servant relationship could not be invoked.

Consequently, the court applied the rule that off‐duty uniform riders are passengers, and therefore the railroad owed the plaintiff the same duty of reasonable care it owes any other passenger, whether gratuitous or fare‐paying. The plaintiff’s prior employment relationship was irrelevant to the duty analysis.

The court reinforced this conclusion by citing policy considerations underlying the uniform‐rider rule: the railroad’s intent is to give uniformed employees the same rights and protections as any other rider, not to diminish the railroad’s liability simply because the rider is an employee.

The court distinguished the present case from earlier decisions where the employee was on the line of duty, such as Gillshannon v. Stony Brook Railroad, O’Brien v. Boston & Albany Railroad, McGuirk v. Shattuck, and Manville v. Cleveland & Toledo Railroad. In those cases the fellow‐servant doctrine applied because the employees were performing work for the railroad at the time of injury.

By contrast, the court noted that the present facts align with Doyle v. Fitchburg Railroad and Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. State, which held that an employee who rides a train during personal time under a uniform‐rider privilege is a passenger and the railroad’s duty of care is unchanged.

The logical chain—(a) uniform‐rider rule creates passenger status, (b) plaintiff was off‐duty, (c) therefore not a fellow servant, (d) duty of care applies—led the court to affirm the holding that the plaintiff was a passenger and the railroad owed him the ordinary duty of reasonable care.

Accordingly, the appellate court sustained the bill of exceptions and affirmed the trial‐court judgment, concluding that the railroad’s liability was properly barred only if the plaintiff had been a fellow servant, which the facts did not support.

Updated August 6, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: None – the opinion contains no separate concurring or dissenting opinions.
Type of Opinion: None – the Court issued a single opinion authored by Justice Knowlton.
Summary of Reasoning: The excerpt provided consists solely of Justice Knowlton’s majority judgment, which addresses the status of a uniform‐rider and the duty of care owed. No other justices are identified as authoring or joining separate concurring or dissenting opinions, indicating that none were filed in this case.

Updated August 6, 2026

Case Relevance

This decision is significant because it crystallizes the rule that a railroad’s “uniform‐rider” privilege converts an off‐duty employee into a passenger for negligence purposes, thereby denying the fellow‐servant defense and imposing the ordinary duty of reasonable care that the railroad owes any other rider; the Holding directly resolves the substantive issue of status and the procedural issue of whether the trial court misapplied the fellow‐servant doctrine, establishing a clear two‐prong test—(1) the rider must be exercising the gratuitous privilege granted by the uniform‐rider rule, and (2) the rider must be off‐duty and not performing any work for the railroad at the time of the accident. The rule is articulated broadly enough to apply to any railroad (or analogous carrier) that offers a similar uniform‐rider or employee‐rider benefit, regardless of the employee’s position, so long as the rider is not on the clock; however, its reach is limited to situations where the privilege is expressly granted and the rider is not engaged in his employment duties, and it does not extend to employees who are on‐duty, performing work, or otherwise acting within the scope of employment, where the fellow‐servant doctrine may still apply. Consequently, the case serves as a concise authority for courts and litigants seeking to establish passenger status for off‐duty employees riding under a gratuitous privilege, to rebut fellow‐servant arguments, and to demonstrate that the carrier’s liability is not insulated by the employee’s prior relationship—while leaving untouched questions about liability when the employee is on‐duty, when the privilege is informal or undocumented, or when state statutes modify the common‐law rule.

Updated August 6, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "The defendant had made a rule, “ permitting policemen, firemen, advertising agents, news agents and employees of the defendant company in uniform to ride free at any time, such persons being required to ride upon the front platform so far as practicable.” At the time of the accident the plaintiff was riding on the front platform under this rule, wearing his uniform. Persons riding gratuitously under this rule are passengers, as well as those who pay their fare."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 177 Mass. 365
Explanation: These sentences set out the railroad’s uniform‑rider rule, note that the plaintiff was riding under that rule while in uniform, and declare that gratuitous riders are passengers, establishing the core rule.

Quoted text: "All members of the classes included in the rule stand alike in reference to the duty of care which the defendant owes them, whether they come within one part of the description or another. The rule in reference to employees permits them to ride at any time and place, and for any purpose, if they are in uniform. The reasons in each case for extending this privilege to members of these different classes are not material."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 177 Mass. 365
Explanation: Here the court affirms that all persons covered by the rule, including employees, are owed the same duty of care, and that the reasons for extending the privilege are irrelevant to that duty.

Quoted text: "The question then is, whether at the time of the accident the plaintiff was riding in the full exercise of the rights given by this rule, or whether he was on the car in the performance of his duties as a servant of the defendant, so as to make him at that moment a fellow servant of the motorman. The bill of exceptions answers this question in its statement as follows : his work for the defendant “ consisted of a certain number of trips at fixed and regular times each day; at the time of the accident, he was not on actual duty, but at about noon had finished his work of that morning, got on the first car that came along and was going home to dinner; that he took no part in the management of this car; that he usually had about three hours, between twelve .and threeo’clock, during which he was not on actual duty, and his time was his own; and he usually returned home about noon to dinner.” The car on which he was riding was not on the line on which he was employed. At the time of the accident he did not stand in the relation of a servant to the defendant. His time was his own, and he owed the defendant no duties until the time arrived for resuming his work."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 177 Mass. 365
Explanation: These passages frame the factual inquiry—whether the plaintiff was exercising the privilege or performing his duties—and record the bill of exceptions showing he was off‑duty, his time was his own, and he did not stand in the relation of a servant.

Quoted text: "His rights were the same as if, after finishing his day’s service, he had taken a car in the evening to visit a friend, or to do any business of his own. The fact that he had. been in the defendant’s service during the day would not make him a fellow servant with the motorman while riding in the evening under the rule, any more than if he had been a policeman or a newsdealer. The case comes within the decision in Doyle v. Fitchburg Railroad, 162 Mass. 66 ."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 177 Mass. 365
Explanation: The court compares the plaintiff’s situation to that of a private rider after work, rejects the fellow‑servant characterization, and ties the analysis to the controlling precedent in Doyle.

Updated August 6, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Dickinson v. West End Street Railway Co. · 177 Mass. 365Doyle v. Fitchburg Railroad · 162 Mass. 66

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

Related opinions

Stuart v. West End Street Railway Co.
163 Mass. 391 · 1895 Mass. LEXIS 120 · 40 N.E. 180
McLaughlin v. West End Street Railway Co.
186 Mass. 150 · 1904 Mass. LEXIS 917 · 71 N.E. 317
Foley v. West End Street Railway Co.
1907 Mass. LEXIS 1300 · 195 Mass. 332 · 81 N.E. 189
Hall v. West End Street Railway Co.
168 Mass. 461 · 1897 Mass. LEXIS 265 · 47 N.E. 124
Widmer v. West End Street Railway Co.
158 Mass. 49 · 1893 Mass. LEXIS 227 · 32 N.E. 899
Corlin v. West End Street Railway
154 Mass. 197 · 1891 Mass. LEXIS 89 · 27 N.E. 1000

Metadata

Court

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided

January 2, 1901

Precedential status

Published

Dickinson v. West End Street Railway Co.

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion