United States v. Sheila Smith and Byron Vandrea Phillips, A/K/A Vincent Andrian Phillips, A/K/A Byron A. Phillips
13 F.3d 860 · 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1395 · 1994 WL 22393
January 28, 1994 · Docket 92-7614
Opinion
Defendants-Appellants Sheila Smith and Byron Vandrea Phillips were convicted by a jury of three drug offenses in connection with the sale of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer. Smith and Phillips do not appeal their convictions, but both challenge their sentences. They assert that the trial court incorrectly applied the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines (the Guidelines)
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Testimony at trial produced the following facts: Smith and Phillips were arrested during a Houston (Texas) Police Department (HPD) undercover operation. Undercover police officers Donald DeBlane and Sharon Pouncy were driving by a house in Houston when they were flagged down by defendant Phillips. Phillips asked, “What do you need?” Officer DeBlane said he was looking for “six or seven rocks.” Phillips replied, “I got what you need.” At Phillips’ instruction, DeBlane turned his vehicle around, got out and went to the porch of the house, on which defendant Smith was waiting. Smith opened her hand, displayed a number of crack cocaine “rocks,” and advised DeBlane to pick out what he wanted to buy. At the time, two men, Lorenzo Gene Cheney and Troy Adams, were standing on the porch or just inside the open front door. They too displayed rocks of cocaine base to DeBlane. Phillips vouched for Smith’s cocaine, saying, “We have good rocks.” DeBlane selected rocks constituting approximately 2 grams from Smith’s hand and handed her a $100 bill, the serial number of which had been previously recorded.
After the sale was completed, DeBlane, who was wearing a concealed microphone, gave the “bust” signal, and the raid team officers waiting in a nearby van converged on the house. Smith, Phillips, Cheney, and Adams fled into the house and were arrested.
A jury convicted both Smith and Phillips on all three counts charged: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine; (2) possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine; and (3) distribution of crack cocaine. The trial court held a sentencing hearing for Smith and Phillips, during which the court took into account the total amount of cocaine base seized from the house, not just the 2 grams sold to the undercover officer.
Neither Smith nor Phillips testified at trial, and neither defendant put on any evidence. The following additional facts, which were considered by the trial judge in the sentencing process, do not come from trial testimony but from the defendants’ presentence investigation reports (PSRs) and from a letter written to the court by Phillips that whs made a part of the record of the sentencing hearing.
According to Smith’s PSR, the house where the offense occurred belonged to her mother. Smith said that Adams, Cheney, and Phillips lived at the house. Smith was aware that this house was being used as a “crack house.” Smith said she bought the rocks that she later sold to the undercover officer from a “source” located down the street from the house, and that she was introduced to her source by Lorenzo Cheney. Smith said that she decided to sell the crack cocaine because she needed money to pay her light bill. She had planned to give Phillips some of the crack cocaine in exchange for his luring buyers to the residence. Smith said that after Phillips flagged down the vehicle driven by the undercover officers, Phillips informed both - Smith and Cheney that an individual was interested in buying some rocks. According to Smith, the cocaine rocks found on the floor belonged to Cheney.
According to Phillips’ PSR, he claims his only involvement in the offense was telling the buyer where the crack cocaine could be bought. He considers himself to have a drug problem and wants treatment. In the letter written to the court, Phillips claims that “Troy Adams and I never had drugs. We were over there trying to earn a piece of crack to smoke. Ms. Smith and Lorenzo Cheney were the drug dealers.” Phillips stated that Smith and Cheney were competitors, and that the cocaine on the floor belonged to Cheney. Phillips does not say that he helped Cheney. Phillips never mentioned where he lived or who lived in the house where the offense occurred.
II
ANALYSIS
Smith raises two issues on appeal. She claims that the trial court erred by (1) basing her sentence on the larger amount of cocaine, and (2) denying her a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Phillips raises one issue, that the trial court erred in basing his sentence on the larger amount of cocaine.
A. Amount of Cocaine Considered in Smith’s Sentencing
Smith insists that she did not possess the crack cocaine found on the floor of the house, and that it should not have been considered in her sentencing. She points to the following facts drawn from trial testimony: (1) Four persons were arrested and police officers admitted that they did not know who threw the cocaine on the floor; (2) the cocaine on the floor differed in color and purity from the cocaine Smith sold to the officer; and (3) Cheney and Adams were also seen holding cocaine rocks on the porch of the house but were not carrying any cocaine when they were arrested minutes later.
The quantity issue was muddied in that, during the trial, both sides mistakenly assumed that the government had to prove the quantity of cocaine alleged in the indictment to obtain convictions. In reality, a trial court is not bound by a jury’s findings as to the quantity of drugs, and a jury finding as to quantity is unnecessary to conviction. The determination of the quantity of drugs is a sentencing issue necessary only to calculate a base offense level, and is a factual determination for the court to make.
At the sentencing hearing four months later, all parties had become aware that the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant is a sentencing issue rather than an element of the offense. At that hearing, however, the trial court did not make a finding as to whether Smith threw the 3.9 grams of cocaine on the floor. Instead, it held Smith accountable for the larger amount of cocaine under the theory of “relevant conduct” as set out in Guideline § lB1.3(a)(l)(B). That section states that when a defendant participates in “jointly undertaken criminal activity,”
Smith argued at sentencing that she was in competition with Cheney and Adams for drug customers, and she claims that she did not agree to participate in any joint enterprise with them. The trial court, however, made a finding that Smith was accountable for all the cocaine found in the house as a joint participant in the drug sales occurring there:
The Court’s justification for that [finding], for purposes of your appellate scrutiny, is essentially that I think it’s not persuasive to the Court that merely because she was in competition with others there at the same time, that that defies a conspiracy mentality in the sense that all of them were there and all of them were jointly participating in the sale of drugs. Whether one wanted the sale as opposed to another, does not belie, in this Court’s perception, some accountability on the part of this defendant for any of the drugs in the house, not just the drugs she brought to the residence.
Given the deferential standard of review we afford a sentencing court,
Regarding the foreseeability prong of the test, the trial court stated that Smith “knew full well that [her mother’s] residence was being used as a crack house.” Smith was present on the porch when Cheney and Adams displayed rocks of cocaine in their hands, and because she used Cheney’s source to buy her cocaine, she could have easily foreseen that Cheney might possess an additional 3.9 grams of cocaine.
Thus the trial court’s finding that Smith was accountable for all the cocaine found in the house is not clearly erroneous. Smith’s base offense level was thus properly based on 5.9 grams of cocaine. For these reasons, we affirm Smith’s sentence.
B. Denial of Reduction for Smith’s Acceptance of Responsibility
Smith argues that the district court erred when it denied her a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a) provides: “If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.” The commentary to that section provides:
In determining whether a defendant qualifies under subsection (a), appropriate considerations include ... truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). Note that a defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction in order to obtain a reduction under subsection (a). A defendant may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction under this subsection. However, a defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.13
That commentary requires Smith to admit, or at least not to deny falsely, all relevant conduct in order to receive the 2-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. True, Smith admitted her relationships with Cheney, Adams, and Phillips; admitted the fact that Cheney told her where to get the cocaine; and admitted that the house belonged to her mother. But even though Smith admitted the conduct comprising the offense of conviction, she steadfastly refused to admit any connection, even vicarious, with the additional cocaine found on the floor in the house. In light of our holding that Smith is accountable for the additional cocaine, the district court was not obliged to grant the two-point reduction. Although we may not have reached the same conclusion, the heightened deference we accord the sentencing court on review persuades us not to disturb the district court’s decision to deny the two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
C. Amount of Cocaine Considered in Phillips’ Sentencing
Phillips raises the same issue as did Smith regarding drug quantity. He argues that he did not possess the 3.9 grams of cocaine on the floor in the house and that he did not agree to participate in any joint criminal activity with Cheney and Adams. Phillips’ case for sentence vacatur and remand is stronger than Smith’s. The government did not produce any evidence to prove that Phillips agreed to a joint criminal enterprise. More importantly, there is no express finding by the district court that Phillips was acting in concert with anyone other than Smith. Phillips’ presentence report does not state that Phillips lived in the house; it does not identify the source of the cocaine; it does not indicate that Phillips agreed to participate in any way with Cheney or Adams, or that he helped either of them in any way. Phillips’ PSR merely states that police seized 7 grams of cocaine from the house, and therefore 7 grams would be considered in Phillips’ sentencing.
The factual contents of Smith’s PSR — on the basis of which the trial court found joint enterprise as to her — cannot be used against Phillips.
In this case, Phillips specifically objected to the trial court’s consideration of the greater amount of cocaine in his sentencing. The trial court made no specific findings that Phillips was involved in any jointly undertaken criminal activity, but merely adopted the findings of Phillips’ presentence report without commenting on them. This was not sufficient. When a defendant objects to particular findings in the presentence report, the sentencing court must resolve the specifically disputed issues of fact if it intends to use those facts as a basis for its sentence.
Even though we affirm Smith’s sentence, we are compelled to reverse Phillips’ sentence in light of the lack of necessary evidence and findings. Phillips was convicted of conspiracy with Smith, but this does not necessarily mean that — for sentencing purposes — he is accountable for the same quantity of drugs, under relevant conduct, as is Smith. A conviction for conspiracy does not automatically mean that every conspirator has foreseen the total quantity of drugs involved in the entire conspiracy.
Defendant R recruits Defendant S to distribute 500 grams of cocaine. Defendant S knows that Defendant R is the , prime figure in a conspiracy involved in importing much larger quantities of cocaine. As long as Defendant S’s agreement and conduct is limited to the distribution of the 500 grams, Defendant S is accountable only for that 500 gram amount (under subsection (a)(1)(A)), rather than the much larger quantity imported by Defendant R.25
This illustration demonstrates that the Sentencing Commission did not intend to hold persons who assist a drug dealer in one transaction responsible for all the drugs sold or possessed by that dealer.
D. Proximity of Offenses to a School
The drug transaction for which Phillips and Smith were convicted occurred within 1,000 feet of M.C. Williams Middle School, which brings into play a federal sentencing enhancement statute, 21 U.S.C. § 860(a).
III
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Smith’s sentence, but VACATE Phillips’ sentence and REMAND for findings and resen-tencing in accordance with this opinion.
. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1992).
. Troy Adams and Lorenzo Cheney were not prosecuted by the federal government and were not involved in the trial of defendants Smith and Phillips in the case now on appeal. Evidence at trial indicated that the State of Texas charged Cheney with a parole violation and Adams with a state drug paraphernalia violation.
. In the sentencing hearing the trial court referred to "all 7 grams” of cocaine found in the house, which included the 2 grams sold to the undercover officer, the 3.9 grams found on the floor near the $100 bill, and an additional 1 gram recovered from a side room of the house. The 1 gram was excluded from evidence at trial because there was no evidence to connect it to either defendant. However, the base offense level in the Guidelines is the same for 5.9 grams as it is for 6.9 grams, so it does not matter for this appeal whether the 1 gram was included for sentencing purposes. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(9) (providing that an offense involving "at least 5 grams but less than 20 grams of cocaine base” dictates a base offense level of 26). The parties' arguments deal mainly with the 3.9 grams found on the floor and whether that additional amount can be attributed to the defendants.
. Other factors, such as prior criminal history, can affect a defendant's range of potential sentences under the Guidelines, but to illustrate the difference in Smith’s case, the higher base offense level meant that she would serve 63 to 78 months in prison rather than 33 to 41 months. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A, Sentencing Table. Smith was actually sentenced to 66 months. Phillips had a prior criminal history, which put him in a category requiring a higher sentencing range. The trial court sentenced Phillips to 114 months. However, if Phillips had been held accountable only for 2 grams rather than 5.9 grams, his sentencing range would have been 63 to 78 months. Id.
.The court properly considered these facts even though they were not testified to at trial, because a sentencing court may properly consider any relevant information made available to it, without regard to admissibility under the Rules of Evidence, provided the information considered has sufficient "indicia of reliability.” United States v. Shacklett, 921 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir.1991); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). "Relevant conduct” attributed to a defendant under the sentencing guidelines, such as conduct of others committed during a joint criminal enterprise, does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, only by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Buckhalter, 986 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 203, 126 L.Ed.2d 160 (1993).
. United States v. Jacobo, 934 F.2d 411, 416-17 (2nd Cir.1991).
. "Jointly undertaken criminal activity” is defined as “a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy.” U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3(a)(1)(B).
. 992 F.2d 70 (5th Cir.1993).
. Evbuomwan, 992 F.2d at 74.
. A district court’s findings about the quantity of drugs on which a sentence should be'based are factual findings which we review for clear error. United States v. Palomo, 998 F.2d 253, 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 358, 126 L.Ed.2d 322 (1993); United States v. Mitchell, 964 F.2d 454, 457 (5th Cir.1992).
.See Evbuomwan, 992 F.2d at 74.
. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 1(a)).
. "[T]he determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 5). The sentencing court's factual determinations with regard to acceptance of responsibility, therefore, are entitled to even greater deference than that accorded the court under a clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Mourning, 914 F.2d 699, 705 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 610 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861, 110 S.Ct. 175, 107 L.Ed.2d 131 (1989).
. See United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir.1991).
. Id.
. Id.
. United States v. Blanco, 884 F.2d 1577, 1578 (3rd Cir.1989).
. Berzon, 941 F.2d at 20-21.
. United States v. Ponce, 917 F.2d 846, 848 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991); United States v. Rodriguez, 897 F.2d 1324, 1327 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 498 U.S. 857, 111 S.Ct. 158, 112 L.Ed.2d 124 (1990).
. United States v. Evbuomwan, 992 F.2d 70, 74 (5th Cir.1993).
. United States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301, 1309 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Nelson v. United States, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 355, 121 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); United States v. Puma, 937 F.2d 151, 159-60 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1165, 117 L.Ed.2d 412 (1992).
. See Ponce, 917 F.2d at 849; United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 445-46 (5th Cir.1990).
. Evbuomwan, 992 F.2d at 74.
. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment, (n. 2(c)(7)).
. See United States v. Maseratti, 1 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir.1993).
. The statute provides: “Any person who violates section 841(a)(1) ... by distributing, possessing with the intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance ... within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary, vocational or secondary school ... is ... subject to (1) twice the maximum punishment authorized by section 841(b) of this title.” 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). The provision also mandates a minimum sentence of one year.
. "In the interest of truth and fair sentencing a court should be able on a sentence remand to take new matter into account on behalf of either the government or the defendant.” United States v. Kinder, 980 F.2d 961, 963 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2376, 124 L.Ed.2d 280 (1993); United States v. Sanchez-Solis, 882 F.2d 693, 699 (2d Cir.1989).
. See United States v. Echevaria, 995 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir.1993) (enhancement upheld on facts nearly identical to this case); United States v. Wake, 948 F.2d 1422, 1432-33 (5th Cir.1991) (holding that Congress intended a "strict liability approach” to 21 U.S.C. 860), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2944, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992). Wake has been cited with approval by two other Circuits. See United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866, 869 (D.C.Cir.1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 961 F.2d 1089, 1092 (3d Cir.1992).