Booker v. Singletary
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 17469 · 35 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 983 · 90 F.3d 440
July 17, 1996 · Docket 18-14332
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
In a capital‑sentencing habeas‑corpus proceeding, the State must prove by clear‑and‑convincing evidence that the constitutional error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the sentencing decision.
After Brecht v. Abrahamson, the Supreme Court replaced Chapman’s harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard with the Kotteakos test for habeas review of death‑penalty cases, placing the burden on the State to show the error was harmless.
- Headnote 2
The Kotteakos test asks whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.
The Supreme Court in Kotteakos articulated a “substantial and injurious effect” standard, which Brecht adopted for determining harmless error in habeas review.
- Headnote 3
All mitigating evidence, whether statutory or non‑statutory, must be considered in capital sentencing; exclusion of substantial non‑statutory mitigating evidence triggers the Kotteakos harmless‑error analysis.
The Eleventh Circuit applied Hitchcock and Lockett, holding that the jury and trial judge gave no weight to mitigating evidence that was not statutorily enumerated, thereby violating the petitioner’s Eighth‑Amendment rights.
- Headnote 4
A movant seeking relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) must show extraordinary circumstances that justify relief and also satisfy the substantive burden applicable to the underlying claim.
Rule 60(b)(6) permits district courts to relieve a party from a final judgment for any reason justifying relief, but courts require more than a mere change in law; extraordinary circumstances and compliance with the underlying error standard are required.
- Headnote 5
Denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion; no abuse exists when the movant fails to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances.
The district court refused relief because the State did not meet the extraordinary‑circumstances threshold, and the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in that determination.
- Headnote 6
The Supreme Court in O’Neal v. McAninch held that grave doubt about the error’s effect means the error cannot be deemed harmless, shifting victory to the petitioner.
- Headnote 7
When the court cannot speculate how excluded substantial mitigating evidence would have influenced the sentencing body, the error is not harmless and the death sentence must be set aside.
The panel was unable to determine the effect of the disregarded mitigating evidence, concluded the error was not harmless, and affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas relief.
- Headnote 8
The Supreme Court in Brecht replaced Chapman’s harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard with the Kotteakos test, which asks whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect. When the State cannot meet this burden, the error requires reversal of the death sentence.
- Headnote 9
When a sentencing authority fails to give any weight to substantial non‑statutory mitigating evidence, the error is governed by Hitchcock/Lockett and triggers the Kotteakos harmless‑error analysis.
The trial judge and jury ignored mitigating evidence because it did not fit Florida’s statutory categories, violating Hitchcock v. Dugger’s requirement that all mitigating evidence be considered, regardless of statutory form.
- Headnote 10
The State argued that the change in law after Brecht created extraordinary circumstances to reinstate the death sentence, but the district court requires more than a mere legal change to grant relief.
- Headnote 11
A district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not an abuse of discretion when the movant fails to show the required extraordinary circumstances.
The State did not meet the extraordinary‑circumstances threshold; consequently, the appellate court affirmed that the district court acted within its discretion.
- Headnote 12
If the State cannot prove that the exclusion of substantial mitigating evidence had no substantial and injurious effect, the error is not harmless and the death sentence must be reversed.
The court could not speculate on the effect of the omitted mitigating evidence; therefore, it could not find the error harmless and affirmed the habeas relief that set aside the death sentence.
- Headnote 13
The Kotteakos test asks whether a constitutional error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”
In post‑Brecht habeas review the Court substituted the Kotteakos standard for Chapman’s harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt test.
- Headnote 14
On habeas review the State bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the sentencing decision.
The Court noted that Brecht made the burden easier for the State, but still required proof that the error was harmless; failure to meet that burden means reversal.
- Headnote 15
When sentencing authorities give no weight to substantial non‑statutory mitigating evidence, the error is evaluated under the Kotteakos harmless‑error analysis.
The trial judge and jury excluded mitigating evidence that did not fit a statutory definition, violating Hitchcock and Lockett’s mandate to consider all mitigating evidence.
- Headnote 16
The Court adopted the O’Neal standard, holding that grave doubt about the error’s effect bars a harmless‑error finding and requires reversal.
- Headnote 17
The statute provides an extraordinary remedy that is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
- Headnote 18
To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) a movant must show extraordinary circumstances—more than a mere change in the law—justifying the extraordinary remedy.
The Eleventh Circuit requires the movant to demonstrate that the circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to merit relief, as articulated in Ritter.
- Headnote 19
A district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not an abuse of discretion when the movant fails to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances.
The court found no abuse of discretion because the State did not meet the extraordinary‑circumstances requirement.
- Headnote 20
When seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief the movant must also satisfy the substantive harmless‑error burden applicable to the underlying claim.
The State argued that the Hitchcock error was harmless under Kotteakos; the court required both extraordinary circumstances and proof that the error was harmless, rejecting the State’s motion.
- Headnote 21
In habeas‑corpus review of a death‑sentence, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the constitutional error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the sentencing decision; otherwise the error is not harmless.
Brecht eliminated the Chapman harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard and applied the Kotteakos test, which asks whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.
- Headnote 22
The Eleventh Circuit follows O’Neal, holding that grave doubt about a substantial‑and‑injurious‑effect error means the error is not harmless and the petitioner prevails.
- Headnote 23
All mitigating evidence, whether statutory or non‑statutory, must be considered in a capital sentencing; exclusion of substantial non‑statutory mitigating evidence triggers the Kotteakos harmless‑error analysis.
The sentencing authority gave no weight to substantial non‑statutory mitigating evidence, violating Hitchcock and Lockett, and therefore the error must be evaluated under the substantial‑and‑injurious‑effect test.
- Headnote 24
The rule gives broad discretion to the district court; an abuse of discretion finding requires a clear error in refusing relief.
- Headnote 25
To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a movant must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances—more than a mere change in the law—and persuade the court that such circumstances justify the extraordinary remedy.
The Eleventh Circuit requires a showing beyond a simple legal change; the movant must satisfy the extraordinary‑circumstances requirement before the court considers discretionary relief.
- Headnote 26
A district court's denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not an abuse of discretion when the movant fails to demonstrate the required extraordinary circumstances.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to vacate the judgment because the State did not meet the extraordinary‑circumstances threshold.
- Headnote 27
In habeas‑corpus review, the Supreme Court’s Brecht decision requires applying the Kotteakos “substantial and injurious effect” test instead of Chapman’s harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard.
The Eleventh Circuit notes that Brecht replaced Chapman with the Kotteakos standard for determining whether a constitutional error affected a death‑sentence judgment.
- Headnote 28
When the court cannot speculate on the effect of excluded mitigating evidence, it treats the error as non‑harmless, following O’Neal and the “grave doubt” principle.
- Headnote 29
All mitigating evidence, whether statutory or non‑statutory, must be considered in capital sentencing; exclusion of substantial non‑statutory mitigating evidence triggers the Kotteakos harmless‑error analysis.
The trial judge and jury gave no weight to Booker’s psychiatric and background evidence because it was not listed in Florida statutes, violating Hitchcock and Lockett requirements.
- Headnote 30
The Eleventh Circuit cites Ritter that extraordinary circumstances are required beyond a mere change in law; the court’s discretion is reviewed only for abuse.
- Headnote 31
A denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not an abuse of discretion when the movant fails to show the requisite extraordinary circumstances.
The district court refused relief because the State did not meet the extraordinary‑circumstances threshold, and the appellate court affirmed the decision.
- Headnote 32
In a habeas‑corpus review of a death sentence, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the constitutional error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the sentencing decision.
Brecht replaced Chapman’s harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard with the Kotteakos test, requiring the State to show the error was harmless by clear and convincing evidence.
- Headnote 33
When a sentencing authority excludes substantial non‑statutory mitigating evidence, the error is not harmless unless the State shows the excluded evidence could not have substantially influenced the jury or judge’s sentencing decision.
The court found that significant non‑statutory mitigating factors were ignored and, because it could not speculate on their effect, the error could not be declared harmless.
- Headnote 34
O’Neal holds that ‘grave doubt’ about the error’s effect means the error is not harmless and the petitioner prevails.
- Headnote 35
A Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from a final judgment requires the movant to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances beyond a mere change in law and to satisfy the substantive harmless‑error burden; the district court’s discretion is reviewed for abuse only.
Rule 60(b)(6) permits discretionary relief for any reason justifying it, but extraordinary circumstances must be shown, and denial is not abuse of discretion when such circumstances are absent.
- Headnote 36
Under the Kotteakos standard, a constitutional error is harmless only if it did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.
The Eleventh Circuit applied the Kotteakos test, asking whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”
- Headnote 37
In a habeas‑corpus capital‑sentencing case, the State bears the burden of proving that the constitutional error was harmless by clear and convincing evidence.
The court noted that the State had failed to carry its burden of excusing the constitutional error, emphasizing the State’s obligation to demonstrate harmlessness.
- Headnote 38
The opinion explained that Rule 60(b)(6) provides discretionary authority to a district court to grant extraordinary relief from a final judgment.
- Headnote 39
To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a movant must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances—more than a mere change in the law—justifying the extraordinary remedy.
The court cited Ritter, requiring that a Rule 60(b)(6) movant show extraordinary circumstances and persuade the court that such circumstances warrant relief.
- Headnote 40
A district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not an abuse of discretion when the movant fails to show the required extraordinary circumstances.
The opinion held that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the State had not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances as required by Ritter.
- Headnote 41
When substantial non‑statutory mitigating evidence is excluded from capital sentencing, the error is not harmless if the court cannot speculate about its possible effect on the sentencing decision.
The court found it could not speculate as to the effect the excluded substantial mitigating evidence would have had, and therefore could not deem the error harmless.
- Headnote 42
Citing O’Neal, the opinion explained that grave doubt about the error’s effect means the error is not harmless and the petitioner must win.
- Headnote 43
In habeas‑corpus review, the harmless‑error inquiry uses the Kotteakos standard: the error must be shown to have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Kotteakos test following Brecht, replacing Chapman’s beyond‑reasonable‑doubt standard for capital‑sentencing cases.
- Headnote 44
When the court cannot determine that the error lacked a substantial and injurious effect, the petitioner prevails, as articulated in O’Neal and applied here.
- Headnote 45
All mitigating evidence, whether statutory or non‑statutory, must be considered in capital sentencing; exclusion of substantial non‑statutory mitigating evidence triggers the Kotteakos harmless‑error analysis.
The trial judge and jury gave no weight to mitigating evidence because it was not enumerated in Florida statute, violating Hitchcock v. Dugger and Lockett’s mandates.
- Headnote 46
The statute authorizes extraordinary relief, but the movant must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances before the court will exercise this discretion.
- Headnote 47
‘Extraordinary circumstances’ for Rule 60(b)(6) relief require more than a mere change in the law; the movant must persuade the court that the situation is sufficiently extraordinary.
The court cited Ritter, requiring a showing beyond a simple legal change to justify the extraordinary remedy.
- Headnote 48
A district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion; denial is not abusive absent a clear error.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court’s refusal to grant relief, because the State failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
- Headnote 49
When a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is raised in a capital‑sentencing case, the movant must also satisfy the underlying Kotteakos harmless‑error burden for the constitutional error at issue.
The State’s request to reinstate the death sentence required both extraordinary circumstances and proof that the Hitchcock error was harmless; lacking the latter, relief was denied.
- Headnote 50
The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief because the State failed to show extraordinary circumstances and could not meet the clear‑and‑convincing‑evidence burden to render the error harmless.
Thus, the death sentence remained vacated and the district court’s decision stood.
Opinion
I.
In the previous appeal in this case, we affirmed the district court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994), setting aside the death sentence that the petitioner received following his conviction for first degree murder in Florida state court. Booker v. Dugger, 922 F.2d 633 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 900, 112 S.Ct. 277, 116 L.Ed.2d 228 (1991). The writ issued because petitioner’s sentence had been imposed in violation of Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (applying Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)); petitioner’s senteneers — the jury, which made the sentencing recommendation, and the trial judge, who fashioned and imposed petitioner’s sentence — gave no weight to certain mitigating evidence that may have counselled the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment instead of death. According to the trial judge (in his instructions to the jury and, later, in imposing sentence) and the prosecutor (in his summation at the close of the penalty phase of petitioner’s trial), the evidence was entitled to no weight because it did not establish any of the mitigating circumstances prescribed by Florida statute. See Fla.Stat. ch. 921.141(6) (1995). Other mitigating evidence was not presented to the judge and the jury because petitioner’s counsel believed that it would have been disregarded as irrelevant.
The State objected to the issuance of the writ on the ground that, under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the Hitchcock error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the State argued that the aggravating circumstances in the case were such that none of the nonstatutory mitigating evidence the petitioner presented (or could have presented) would have affected the outcome of the ease; the jury still would have recommended and the trial court still would have imposed the death sentence. On review, we were “not able to speculate as to the effect this substantial [nonstatutory mitigating] evidence would have had on the sentencing body” and therefore we could not “find the error harmless, regardless of the ... aggravating circumstances that may have been found.” Booker, 922 F.2d at 636.
Following our affirmance of the district court’s decision, the State petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the State’s petition on October 7, 1991. Singletary v. Booker, 502 U.S. 900, 112 S.Ct. 277, 116 L.Ed.2d 228. The State, still in pursuit of the death penalty, moved the trial court to set the sentencing phase of petitioner’s case for trial. A trial date was set, but the proceedings were stayed indefinitely.
II.
On April 21, 1993, the Supreme Court decided Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). In Brecht, the Court held that Chapman’s standard of “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” was inapplicable to habeas corpus review. Id. at 622-23, 113 S.Ct. at 1713-14. In place of Chapman, the Court substituted the standard established by Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), for resolving the harmless error issue on the direct review of a criminal conviction. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. at 1714. The Kotteakos standard asks whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. at 1253. By substituting Kotteakos’ standard for Chapman’s, the Court in Brecht made it easier for a state to show that a constitutional violation did not prejudice an habeas petitioner’s case. See Duest v. Singletary, 997 F.2d 1336, 1337 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1133, 114 S.Ct. 1107, 127 L.Ed.2d 418, and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1141, 114 S.Ct. 1126, 127 L.Ed.2d 434 (1994).
With the less stringent Brecht standard in hand, the State moved the district court to vacate its judgment setting aside petitioner’s death sentence in accordance with Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes a district court, in the exercise of its discretion, to relieve a party from the operation of a final judgment for “any ... reason justifying relief.” The State argued that the district court should vacate its judgment and reinstate the petitioner’s death sentence because the Hitchcock error that permeated the sentencing phase of petitioner’s ease was harmless under the Kotteakos test.
The vacation of a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is an extraordinary remedy. See Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1400 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010, 107 S.Ct. 3242, 97 L.Ed.2d 747 (1987). The State submits that this extraordinary remedy is called for in this case because there has been a change in the law: a lessening of the State’s burden of demonstrating that a constitutional violation is excusable. “[Something more than a ‘mere’ change in the law is necessary[, however,] to provide the grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.” Ritter, 811 F.2d at 1401. In addition to citing a change in the law, a Rule 60(b)(6) movant “must persuade [the court] that the circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to warrant relief.” Id. Even then, whether to grant the requested relief is, as noted above, a matter for the district court’s sound discretion.
The district court denied the State relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because the State had not demonstrated the “extraordinary circumstances” required by Ritter. We find no abuse of discretion in this decision.
III.
Even if we were to revisit the district court’s grant of habeas relief under the correct standard — as we were required to do on remand from the Supreme Court in Duest v. Singletary — we would still hold that the State has failed to carry its burden of excusing the constitutional error. 1 In affirming the district court’s decision setting aside petitioner’s death sentence, we observed:
In petitioner’s case it is clear beyond cavil that significant nonstatutory mitigating factors were excluded from the jury’s consideration by the erroneous jury charge. Booker was the only defense witness at the sentencing phase of the trial, and he testified that he had been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons nine times beginning at age 13, that he had severe problems with alcohol and drugs and had experienced blackouts, and that he was honorably discharged from the Army. He said he could not remember the crime, but that if he did it he felt remorseful.... Although no psychiatric testimony was presented during sentencing, Booker did call one psychiatrist during the guilt phase of his trial; the testimony adduced showed that, although Booker was not insane, his records from Walter Reed Army Medical Center indicated that Booker suffered from an organic brain disorder as a result of drug use. The psychiatrist also testified that there were indications of paranoid schizophrenia. The police officer who took Booker’s confession testified that Booker seemed to have a split personality when he confessed. Booker assumed the identity of “Aniel”; he said that “Steve” committed the murder; he clenched his teeth so hard they cracked; and he laughed and cried uncontrollably. The officer stated that he did not think Booker was faking. There was also evidence that Booker was cooperative with the police, and that he may have made the anonymous phone call reporting the murder.
Booker, 922 F.2d at 635 (footnote omitted). After summarizing this evidence in the record, we observed that at the sentencing hearing subsequently held by the trial judge, other nonstatutory mitigating evidence was presented.
This evidence included the report of a court-appointed psychiatrist. This report concluded that Booker had above normal intelligence but was impulsive and had difficulty postponing gratification. It also noted that Booker had had little supervision as a child, that he began drinking and using drugs as a teenager, and that he had experienced hallucinations. The psychiatrist concluded that Booker was not under extreme emotional duress or the domination of another at the time of the crime. But due in part to intoxicants he had consumed, Booker was “most probably ... less able than the average individual to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”
Id. Due to the Hitchcock violation, however, neither the jury nor the sentencing judge considered whether any of this evidence counselled against the imposition of the death penalty. In addition, because Booker’s attorney believed that Florida law did not permit these sentencers to consider nonstat-utory mitigating circumstances, other available mitigating evidence was not presented. See id. at 636 n. 3. Because we were unable to speculate as to the effect the mitigating evidence would have had on the judge or jury, we could not find the error to be harmless. See id. at 636. We therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas relief.
When reevaluating the case in Duest v. Singletary under the Brecht standard, we posed the question as follows: “Did the constitutional error ‘substantially influence’ the verdict, or, at least, does a ‘grave doubt’ exist as to whether it did? If so, then the petitioner is entitled to habeas relief.” Duest, 997 F.2d at 1339 (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court instructed in O’Neal v. McAninch, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 992, 994, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995), which was decided eighteen months after the panel’s decision in Duest:
When a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” that error is not harmless. And, the petitioner must win.
When, in Booker, 922 F.2d at 636, we said that we were unable to speculate as to the effect the disregarded “substantial [mitigating] evidence would have had on the sentencing body,” we were in essence answering in the affirmative the second part of the question posed in Duest.
AFFIRMED.
. . In Duest, also a capital case from Florida, we reversed the district court's refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus setting aside the petitioner's death sentence. Duest v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 472 (11th Cir.1992). We did so because (1) the petitioner's juiy had based its recommendation of death upon consideration of a prior criminal conviction which was subsequently vacated — a constitutional error under Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) — and (2) the State had not shown that the error was harmless under the Chapman standard. Duest, 967 F.2d at 481-82. The Supreme Court, on certiorari, vacated our judgment and remanded the case “for further consideration in light of Brecht." Singletary v. Duest, 507 U.S. 1048, 1049, 113 S.Ct. 1940, 1941, 123 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993).