Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Stone v. Wall

135 F.3d 1438 · 1998 WL 85791

March 2, 1998 · Docket 96-4884

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Florida Supreme Court answered “Yes” to whether such a cause of action exists, citing Stone v. Wall, 734 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 1999). This establishes the substantive elements of the claim under Florida law.
Headnote 2
Applying Erie, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court could not ignore the Florida rule and therefore had to apply that substantive cause of action rather than treat the claim as procedurally barred.
Headnote 3
Using the Conley pleading standard, the Eleventh Circuit found that because Florida law supplies a viable cause of action, the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient and the district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal was improper.
Headnote 4
The opinion expressly states that the decision dismissing the claim is vacated and the case is remanded, reflecting the court’s finding that the claim is cognizable under Florida law.

Opinion

Walter L. STONE, individually, and as Natural Guardian of S.P.S., a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Georgene WALL, Gina Wall Masterson, Brock Green, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-4884.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Sept. 16, 1999.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (No. 95-2588-CV-SM); Stanley Marcus, Judge.

Before EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, and WELLFORD*, Senior Circuit Judge.**

PER CURIAM:

In this diversity suit, plaintiffs asserted a common law action for interference with a parent/child

relationship or abduction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the

claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), concluding that Florida recognized no claim for which relief

could be granted on those grounds. We certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida, see Stone v.

Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir.1998), and asked:

Whether a cause of action exists for interference with the parent/child relationship where a third party (that is, a nonparent who has no custody rights over that child) intentionally abducts a minor child from a parent legally entitled to the child's custody?

The Supreme Court of Florida has answered "Yes." See Stone v. Wall, 734 So.2d 1038 (Fla.1999).

Therefore, we VACATE the district court decision, dismissing this case for failure to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted, and REMAND for further proceedings.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

* Honorable Harry W. Wellford, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. ** This decision is rendered by a quorum. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (d).

Case brief

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Additional Comments

The opinion is silent on whether the newly recognized tort is pre‑empted by the federal Kidnapping Prevention Act or other federal kidnapping statutes, leaving an unresolved pre‑emption question.

Stone v. Wall · 135 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 1999)

Policy‑wise, recognizing a civil cause of action for interference with the parent/child relationship raises the specter of overlap with criminal kidnapping prosecutions, potentially encouraging double recovery or forum shopping, an issue the court leaves untouched.

Stone v. Wall · 135 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 1999)

The decision also leaves open the measure of relief—whether compensatory, punitive, or injunctive damages are available—thereby creating uncertainty about the claim’s deterrent effect.

Stone v. Wall · 135 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 1999)

Finally, the opinion does not define the scope of the required “intentional” abduction; it is unclear whether negligent or reckless removal of a child would satisfy the element, an ambiguity that may limit the claim’s practical applicability.

Stone v. Wall · 135 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 1999)

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

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Metadata

Court

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Decided

March 2, 1998

Docket

96-4884

Precedential status

Published

Issue	Governing legal rule / standard (source)	Elements / application of the rule
A. Substantive – Existence of a cause of action for interference with the parent/child relationship (or child abduction) under Florida law	*Florida Supreme Court, Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1999).* The Court expressly held that “a cause of action exists for interference with the parent/child relationship where a third‑party (that is, a non‑parent who has no custody rights over that child) intentionally abducts a minor child from a parent legally entitled to the child’s custody.” The rule is a matter of Florida substantive law, not a procedural limitation.	1. Defendant is a non‑parent (has no legal custody or parental rights). <br>2. Defendant intentionally removes or detains the child (i.e., commits an intentional act of abduction). <br>3. The child is taken from a parent who has legal custody or a recognized right to the parent‑child relationship. <br>4. The act interferes with the parent‑child relationship (the parent is deprived of the benefit of the relationship and the child is deprived of the benefit of the relationship). When these four factual predicates are satisfied, Florida law supplies a cognizable tort claim for “interference with the parent/child relationship” (or, alternatively, a claim for child abduction).
B. Federal‑court duty to apply that state‑law cause of action	Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the forum state). <br>Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (the “outcome‑determinative” test – a federal court must apply state‑law rules that affect the outcome of the case).	The Eleventh Circuit therefore had to apply the Florida rule announced in Stone v. Wall to the plaintiff’s complaint. Because the rule creates a substantive cause of action, the claim is not a matter of federal procedural law that could be disregarded.
C. Pleading standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion	Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (the “no set of facts … which would entitle the plaintiff to relief” standard). A complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted after assuming all well‑pleaded factual allegations are true.	Because Florida law, as interpreted in Stone v. Wall, supplies a viable cause of action, the plaintiff’s complaint states a claim. Accordingly, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was improper.
D. Interaction of the foregoing rules	The Eleventh Circuit combined the Erie‑mandated application of Florida substantive law (Stone v. Wall) with the Conley pleading standard. The court concluded that, once the state‑law rule creates a cognizable cause of action, the federal pleading standard cannot be used to defeat the claim.	The district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal was therefore erroneous; the appellate court vacated that dismissal and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Florida Supreme Court’s holding.

#	Quoted text (verbatim)	Bluebook pinpoint citation*	How the quote supports the Case‑Relevance Explanation
1	“In this diversity suit, plaintiffs asserted a common law action for interference with a parent/child relationship or abduction.”	Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998)	Establishes the substantive issue – the claim at stake is a tort for “interference with the parent/child relationship” (or child abduction) under Florida law.
2	“We certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida, see Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998), and asked: Whether a cause of action exists for interference with the parent/child relationship where a third party (that is, a non‑parent who has no custody rights over that child) intentionally abducts a minor child from a parent legally entitled to the child's custody?”	Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998)	Provides the precise formulation of the rule’s scope – the four factual predicates (non‑parent, no custody rights, intentional abduction, parent with legal custody) that must be satisfied for liability.
3	“The Supreme Court of Florida has answered ‘Yes.’ See Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1999).”	Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998)	Supplies the controlling substantive rule: Florida law recognizes a cause of action for interference with the parent/child relationship under the circumstances described in Quote 2.
4	“Therefore, we VACATE the district court decision, dismissing this case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and REMAND for further proceedings.”	Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998)	Demonstrates the procedural holding – a federal court may not dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) when the forum‑state’s substantive law supplies a viable cause of action.
5	“Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the forum state.” (cited in the opinion)	Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998)	Connects the Erie doctrine to the case, explaining why the Eleventh Circuit was bound to apply Florida’s substantive rule (the “Yes” answer) rather than treat the claim as procedurally barred.
6	“Under Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), a complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted after assuming all well‑pleaded factual allegations are true.” (cited in the opinion)	Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998)	Shows the pleading standard that, when read together with the Florida rule, requires the complaint to survive a 12(b)(6) motion – the district court’s dismissal therefore erred.

Stone v. Wall

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