Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Doris Chaney v. Tennessee Valley Authority

2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20428 · 2001 WL 1078400 · 264 F.3d 1325 · 7 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 610

September 14, 2001 · Docket 01-10268

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Headnotes

Generated summaries
  1. Headnote 1

    The statute provides that a prevailing‑wage dispute must be referred to the Secretary of Labor and that his determination is final, thereby excluding court adjudication of such wage‑determination claims.

  2. Headnote 2

    The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction, and on appellate review the court applied a de novo standard, finding the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction bars judicial adjudication of the wage dispute.

  3. Headnote 3

    Section 831b expressly states that the Secretary’s determination shall be final, meaning courts may not review the substance of the wage determination once the agency has issued its decision.

  4. Headnote 4

    The statute’s language expressly directs wage‑rate disputes to the Secretary and bars other forums from revisiting the decision.

  5. Headnote 5

    Because the statute grants the Secretary sole authority, district courts lack subject‑matter jurisdiction over wage‑determination actions arising under the TVA Act.

  6. Headnote 6

    The district court correctly dismissed the complaint because the wage‑determination issue fell within the Secretary’s exclusive jurisdiction.

  7. Headnote 7

    The appellate court reevaluated the district court’s interpretation of § 831b and its jurisdictional ruling afresh.

  8. Headnote 8

    The panel affirmed the lower court’s dismissal because the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Secretary was correctly applied.

  9. Headnote 9

    The statute expressly directs that wage‑rate disputes be decided by the Secretary of Labor, leaving no room for judicial determination of such issues.

  10. Headnote 10

    Because the statute gives the Secretary sole authority to determine wage rates and declares his decision final, no other forum, including federal courts, may hear such disputes.

  11. Headnote 11

    When a wage‑determination claim is governed by the exclusive‑jurisdiction provision, the proper remedy is for the Secretary to decide; the court must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

  12. Headnote 12

    On appeal, the appellate court examines the lower court’s jurisdictional analysis without deference, assessing the statutory interpretation anew.

  13. Headnote 13

    Because § 831b assigns wage‑rate disputes solely to the Secretary of Labor, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

  14. Headnote 14

    The statute governing TVA contracts provides that wage‑rate disputes are exclusively within the Secretary of Labor’s competence, removing authority from the courts.

  15. Headnote 15

    Because the statute expressly grants the Secretary sole authority, federal courts cannot adjudicate wage‑determination claims under the TVA Act.

  16. Headnote 16

    The district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ wage claim was proper because the dispute is statutorily assigned to the Secretary, not the courts.

  17. Headnote 17

    The appellate court examines the lower court’s jurisdictional determination without deference, applying its own interpretation of the statute.

  18. Headnote 18

    The statute’s language directs that a prevailing‑wage dispute be referred to the Secretary and that his determination is final, leaving no room for district‑court jurisdiction.

  19. Headnote 19

    The district court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs’ wage‑determination claim for lack of jurisdiction, and that dismissal was affirmed.

  20. Headnote 20

    The appellate court examined the lower court’s jurisdictional determination without deference, applying the standard of review for dismissal motions.

  21. Headnote 21

    The court found the statutory provision unambiguous, negating any need to interpret the clause beyond its plain terms.

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs are “temporary augmentation” employees of contractors who performed temporary construction work and temporary operation and maintenance for the Tennessee Valley Authority. Employees of TVA are, in accord with the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1994), paid the prevailing wage rates for work of a similar nature in the community. Plaintiffs allege that, though hired by contractors they perform work similar to or equivalent to that done by TVA employees, and therefore are entitled to be paid the same wages paid to trade and labor employees of TVA itself.

Plaintiffs allege a federal jurisdictional question. TVA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case.

We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and its interpretation and application of statutory provisions. See JBP Acquisitions, LP v. U.S., 224 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir.2000).

The issue before us is whether the district court correctly interpreted 16 U.S.C. § 831b. The statute states in relevant part: “In the event any dispute arises as to what are the prevailing rates of wages, the question shall be referred to the Secretary of Labor for determination, and his decision shall be final.” 16 U.S.C. § 831b. The statute is clear on its face. In this case there is a dispute. The dispute involves the prevailing rates of wages. The Secretary of Labor has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving the prevailing rates of wages.

AFFIRMED.