Charles Russell Rhines v. Douglas Weber, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10348 · 2005 WL 1322628 · 409 F.3d 982
June 6, 2005 · Docket 02-2990
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
Rhines, a South Dakota inmate, filed a mixed habeas petition with unexhausted claims. The district court stayed all claims pending state exhaustion. On appeal, the court considered the procedure in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rhines v. Weber.
- Headnote 2
The Supreme Court instructed the district court to determine, consistent with its opinion, whether the stay constituted an abuse of discretion. The lead opinion recited that stay and abeyance is appropriate only when good cause exists for failing to exhaust claims first in state court.
- Headnote 3
The lead opinion applied the Supreme Court’s guidance that a district court must assess whether each unexhausted claim is potentially meritorious before granting a stay. Here, the district court had not analyzed each unexhausted claim for potential merit.
- Headnote 4
The district court gave Rhines sixty days to commence state proceedings and sixty days to return to federal court after exhaustion. The court discussed the Supreme Court’s statement that district courts should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back.
- Headnote 5
The lead opinion noted that the district court had not considered whether Rhines engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay. The Supreme Court’s guidance was that such conduct negates the appropriateness of a stay.
- Headnote 6
The Supreme Court remanded the case and instructed the court of appeals to determine whether the district court’s grant of the stay constituted an abuse of discretion consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion.
- Headnote 7
The district court had granted the stay before the Supreme Court’s Rhines guidance issued and had not analyzed good cause, potential merit, abusive tactics, intentional delay, or reasonableness of the time limits. The appellate court therefore vacated the stay and remanded for further consideration.
- Headnote 8
Because the district court granted the stay without the benefit of controlling Supreme Court guidance, the court of appeals vacated the district court’s stay order and remanded the case for consideration in light of Rhines v. Weber.
- Headnote 9
Rhines, a state inmate, filed a mixed federal habeas petition. The district court stayed all claims so he could pursue state remedies without letting federal claims become time-barred. The Supreme Court later held stay and abeyance is within district court authority but should be available only in limited circumstances.
- Headnote 10
The Eighth Circuit remanded Rhines after the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court explained that stay and abeyance is appropriate only when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.
- Headnote 11
The Eighth Circuit applied Supreme Court guidance requiring district courts to examine the merits of unexhausted claims before staying a mixed petition. The court emphasized that even good cause for nonexhaustion does not justify a stay if the unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.
- Headnote 12
The district court had stayed Rhines’s claims and given him sixty days to begin state proceedings and sixty days to return after exhaustion. The Eighth Circuit noted that stay and abeyance is not indefinite and that district courts should set reasonable time limits for the petitioner’s trip to state court and back.
- Headnote 13
The Eighth Circuit compared the district court’s sixty-day time limits with Supreme Court guidance. The Supreme Court, in Rhines, quoted a Second Circuit opinion stating that an appropriate interval is normally thirty days, supporting a narrower benchmark for reasonable time limits.
- Headnote 14
The Eighth Circuit listed the Supreme Court’s guidance for mixed habeas petitions. One part of that guidance is that a petitioner who engages in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay should not receive the equitable relief of stay and abeyance at all.
- Headnote 15
Because the district court had granted the stay before the Supreme Court’s Rhines guidance, it had not analyzed good cause, potential merit, abusive tactics, or time limits. The Eighth Circuit held it should not review the stay for abuse of discretion until the district court considered those issues first.
- Headnote 16
The Eighth Circuit found the district court had granted the stay without analyzing good cause, potential merit, abusive litigation tactics, or reasonable time limits under Rhines. The court therefore vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.
Opinion
South Dakota inmate Charles Russell Rhines petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus. The district court deter mined that the “mixed” petition included eight unexhausted claims and that non-futile state court remedies may be available. To avoid federal claims becoming time-barred while Rhines exhausted his state court remedies, the court stayed all claims pending exhaustion provided Rhines commenced state court exhaustion proceedings within sixty days and returned to federal court within sixty days of completing exhaustion. Respondent appealed, and we reversed, concluding that our decision in Akins v. Kenney, 341 F.3d 681 (8th Cir.2003), “precludes the district court from staying Rhines’s exhausted claims while he seeks state post-conviction relief on other claims that may be unexhausted.” Rhines v. Weber, 346 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir.2003). The Supreme Court granted Rhines’s petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuits. The Court has vacated our judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its opinion in Rhines v. Weber, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005). For the following reasons, we remand to the district court.
In Rhines, the Court held that the stay and abeyance procedure adopted by the district court was within the court’s authority but should be available “only in limited circumstances.” 125 S.Ct. at 1535. The Court remanded, instructing us “to determine, consistent with this opinion, whether the District Court’s grant of a stay in this case constituted an abuse discretion.” Id. at 1535-36. The Court’s opinion provided the following guidance:
[ S]tay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court. Moreover, even if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unex-hausted claims are plainly meritless.
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Even where stay and abeyance is appropriate .... [a] mixed petition should not be stayed indefinitely.... Thus, district courts should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back.... And if a petitioner engages in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay, the district court should not grant him a stay at all.
In this case, the district court granted a stay without the benefit of this controlling Supreme Court guidance. Thus, the court did not (i) analyze each unexhausted claim to determine whether Rhines had good cause for failing to exhaust the claim and whether it is potentially meritorious, and (ii) consider whether Rhines has engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” In addition, the district court gave Rhines sixty days to commence state court proceedings and sixty days to return to federal court after completing exhaustion, whereas the Supreme Court in discussing this issue quoted from a Second Circuit opinion noting that an appropriate interval is “normally 30 days.” 125 S.Ct. at 1535, quoting Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 381 (2d Cir.2001).
In these circumstances, we conclude that we should not review the. stay order for abuse of discretion until the district court has considered these issues in the first instance. Accordingly, the district court’s order of July 3, 2002, is vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rhines v. Weber, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005).