Supreme Court of the United States

GEYER'S v. Irwin

4 Dall. 107 · 4 U.S. 107

April 1, 1790

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
15 Civil Procedure and Courts Law
The privilege bars the initiation, trial, and judgment of civil suits against the legislator for the duration of the legislative session.
Headnote 2
15 Civil Procedure and Courts Law
Timely and proper assertion is required; without it the privilege does not shield the legislator from civil process.
Headnote 3
15 Civil Procedure and Courts Law
Judicial officers have no duty to intervene on their own to apply the privilege; the burden lies with the party claiming it.
Headnote 4
15 Civil Procedure and Courts Law
When the party does not plead the privilege as an objection at trial, the privilege is considered forever forfeited.
Headnote 5
15 Civil Procedure and Courts Law
Because the privilege was forfeited, the court lacks authority to vacate or reopen the final judgment.

Opinion

4 U.S. 107 (____) 4 Dall. 107

Geyer's Lessee
versus
Irwin.

Supreme Court of United States.

Ingersoll, for the plaintiff.

By the COURT:

A member of the general assembly is, undoubtedly, privileged from arrest, summons, citation, or other civil process, during his attendance on the public business confided to him. And, we think, that upon principle, his suits cannot be forced to a trial and decision, while the session of the legislature continues.

But every privileged person must, at a proper time, and in a proper manner, claim the benefit of his privilege. The judges are not bound, judicially, to notice a right of privilege, nor to grant it without a claim. In the present instance, neither the defendant, nor his attorney, suggested the privilege, as an objection to the trial of the cause: and this amounts to a waiver, by which the party is forever concluded.

We are, therefore, unanimously of opinion, that the judgment cannot now be set aside, or opened.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 18, 2026

Summary

Geyer’s Lessee, a member of the state General Assembly, sued Irwin and later asked the Supreme Court to set aside the lower‐court judgment on the ground that his legislative privilege barred civil process while the legislature was in session. The opinion does not identify the substantive nature of the dispute or the relief awarded by the trial court. The Court noted that the privilege “bars arrest, summons, citation, or other civil process” against a legislator attending official business, but that it must be “claimed at a proper time, and in a proper manner.” Because neither the plaintiff‐legislator nor his counsel raised the privilege in the district‐court proceedings, and the defendant made no objection, the Court held that the privilege was waived. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment and refused to reopen the case. The decision makes clear that courts are not required to infer a legislator’s immunity sua sponte; the party seeking the protection must assert it, and failure to do so forecloses any later attempt to invoke it. No separate concurring or dissenting opinions were filed. The ruling therefore establishes a two‐part rule: a legislator enjoys immunity from civil process while performing legislative duties, but that immunity is enforceable only when timely and properly asserted, with waiver upon non‐assertion.

Updated July 18, 2026

Statement of Facts

Geyer’s Lessee, the plaintiff, brought suit against Irwin, the defendant, in the Supreme Court of the United States. The opinion does not specify the substantive nature of the dispute or the precise legal relationship between the parties; the party names suggest that the plaintiff may have been a lessee (tenant) and the defendant a landlord, but the text provides no further detail on their status or the underlying controversy. The plaintiff sought to have a judgment entered against the defendant set aside, contending that the trial should not have proceeded because the plaintiff, a member of the General Assembly, was entitled to legislative privilege that barred civil process against him while the legislature was in session. No other causes of action or relief were identified in the opinion. Irwin, the defendant, did not assert the legislative privilege as a defense, nor did his counsel raise any objection to the trial on that ground. Consequently, the Court held that the privilege must be claimed “at a proper time, and in a proper manner,” and that a failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the privilege. Because the privilege was never asserted, the Court affirmed that the judgment could not be reopened or set aside. No additional defenses, counterclaims, or affirmative defenses were mentioned in the opinion.

Updated July 18, 2026

Procedural History

Trial Court (District Court) – The case was first tried in a lower federal court, which entered a judgment against the defendant, Irwin. The opinion does not disclose the nature of any monetary award or specific relief granted, nor does it describe the factual or legal basis for the judgment.

Appeal to the United States Supreme Court – Geyer’s Lessee (the plaintiff) appealed the trial‐court judgment, seeking to have it set aside on the ground that, as a member of the General Assembly, he was entitled to legislative privilege that barred civil process while the legislature was in session. The defendant made no claim of privilege, nor did his counsel object to the trial on that basis.

Supreme Court Decision – The Court held that a privileged person must assert the privilege “at a proper time, and in a proper manner”; because the privilege was never raised, it was deemed waived. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower‐court judgment and refused to set it aside.

The opinion provides no further detail about any intermediate appellate court, the amount (if any) of damages awarded, or additional procedural steps; thus the procedural history is incomplete and limited to the trial‐court judgment and the Supreme Court’s affirmance.

Updated July 18, 2026

Issues

1. Substantive Issue
Does a member of a state General Assembly enjoy a legislative privilege that bars civil process—including trial and judgment—while the legislature is in session, and may that privilege be invoked to set aside a judgment only when the privilege is timely and properly asserted? 2. Procedural Issue
Did the trial‐court err by permitting the suit to proceed and entering a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to assert his legislative privilege at the proper time and in the proper manner, thereby failing to apply the rule that a failure to claim the privilege constitutes a waiver?

Updated July 18, 2026

Judgment

The Court affirms the judgment of the lower court, holding that the judgment may not be set aside or reopened. Consequently, the trial‐court’s decision stands.

Updated July 18, 2026

Holding

Substantive Rule – A legislator is entitled to a privilege that bars civil process—including the initiation, trial, and judgment of a suit—while the legislator is attending to official legislative business, but that privilege is effective only when the legislator timely and properly asserts it; absent such assertion, the privilege does not prevent the proceeding.

Procedural Rule – Courts are not required to infer or independently apply a legislator’s privilege; the party seeking to rely on the privilege must raise the claim at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner, and a failure to do so constitutes a waiver that bars any later attempt to set aside or reopen the judgment.

Updated July 18, 2026

Rule of Law

Legislative privilege from civil process – A member of a state General Assembly is “privileged from arrest, summons, citation, or other civil process, during his attendance on the public business confided to him.” Geyer's Lessee v. Irwin, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 107 (year uncertain).

Requirement of timely and proper assertion – The privilege must be “claimed at a proper time, and in a proper manner”; courts are not bound to notice the privilege sua sponte or to grant it absent a claim. Id. at 107.

Waiver of privilege upon failure to assert – A failure to assert the privilege constitutes a waiver that bars any later attempt to invoke the privilege to set aside or reopen a judgment. Id. at 107.

Updated July 18, 2026

Reasoning

The Court began by affirming the long‐standing common‐law principle that a member of a state General Assembly is “privileged from arrest, summons, citation, or other civil process” while attending to official legislative business, a privilege that extends to barring the initiation, trial, and judgment of civil suits against the legislator during the legislative session.

The Court then clarified that this privilege is not automatic; it must be “claimed at a proper time, and in a proper manner” by the privileged party, because the judiciary is not obligated to recognize or enforce a right of privilege on its own initiative.

Applying that procedural requirement to the present case, the Court observed that neither the plaintiff‐legislator nor his counsel raised the privilege as a defense, nor did the defendant object on that ground, meaning the privilege was never asserted in the lower‐court proceedings.

From the failure to assert the privilege, the Court inferred a waiver, holding that a legislator who does not timely invoke the privilege thereby relinquishes its protective effect for that proceeding.

The Court reasoned that a waiver bars any subsequent attempt to invoke the privilege to reopen or set aside a judgment, because the privilege’s purpose—to prevent interruption of legislative duties—cannot be satisfied after the litigation has concluded.

Policy considerations underlie this rule: requiring a prompt claim prevents parties from exploiting legislative immunity as a post‐hoc tactic, promotes judicial efficiency, and preserves the finality of judgments once the opportunity to assert a defense has passed.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the judgment entered by the trial court stands; the privilege was waived, and the Supreme Court therefore affirmed the lower‐court decision and refused to set aside the judgment.

Updated July 18, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: No separate concurring or dissenting opinions were filed; the Court issued a unanimous opinion.
Type of Opinion: None — the decision was unanimous with no separate opinions.
Summary of Reasoning: The Court affirmed that a legislator’s privilege from civil process is enforceable only when timely and properly asserted, and because neither party raised the privilege, it was deemed waived, leaving the judgment intact. No justice authored a distinct concurrence or dissent.

Updated July 18, 2026

Case Relevance

Geyer’s Lessee v. Irwin is authoritative for the proposition that a state legislator’s common‐law privilege from civil process is not an automatic bar to suit but a defensible right that must be “claimed at a proper time, and in a proper manner,” and that a failure to make that timely claim constitutes a waiver that forecloses any later effort to set aside or reopen a judgment; the Court’s holding directly resolves the substantive issue of whether legislative privilege can halt a proceeding and the procedural issue of whether a court must infer the privilege sua sponte, establishing a clear, two‐part rule—(1) privilege exists while the legislator is attending official business, and (2) it is enforceable only when expressly asserted, with waiver upon non‐assertion. The rule applies broadly to any civil action against a sitting member of a state General Assembly during a legislative session, regardless of the underlying cause of action, but is limited to the procedural posture of asserting the privilege as a defense; it does not extend to criminal proceedings, to legislators out of session, or to other branches of government. Consequently, the case is a valuable citation for courts and litigants needing a definitive standard on when legislative immunity can be invoked and when a party’s silence forfeits that protection, thereby preventing post‐judgment “retroactive” claims of privilege, promoting judicial efficiency, and preserving finality of judgments; however, it leaves untouched questions of the privilege’s scope in criminal contexts or its applicability to non‐legislative officials.

Updated July 18, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "A member of the general assembly is, undoubtedly, privileged from arrest, summons, citation, or other civil process, during his attendance on the public business confided to him."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 4 U.S. 107 (year uncertain) (pinpoint page not available)
Explanation: Establishes the substantive rule that a sitting legislator enjoys a common‐law privilege shielding him from civil process while performing official legislative duties.

Quoted text: "And, we think, that upon principle, his suits cannot be forced to a trial and decision, while the session of the legislature continues."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 4 U.S. 107 (year uncertain) (pinpoint page not available)
Explanation: Extends the privilege to bar not only service of process but also the initiation, trial, and judgment of civil suits during the legislative session.

Quoted text: "But every privileged person must, at a proper time, and in a proper manner, claim the benefit of his privilege."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 4 U.S. 107 (year uncertain) (pinpoint page not available)
Explanation: Sets the procedural requirement that the legislator must affirmatively assert the privilege; without such a claim the privilege does not operate.

Quoted text: "The judges are not bound, judicially, to notice a right of privilege, nor to grant it without a claim."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 4 U.S. 107 (year uncertain) (pinpoint page not available)
Explanation: Clarifies that courts cannot sua sponte apply the privilege; the burden lies on the party asserting it.

Quoted text: "In the present instance, neither the defendant, nor his attorney, suggested the privilege, as an objection to the trial of the cause: and this amounts to a waiver, by which the party is forever concluded."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 4 U.S. 107 (year uncertain) (pinpoint page not available)
Explanation: Illustrates the waiver doctrine—failure to assert the privilege at the appropriate time forfeits its protective effect for that proceeding.

Quoted text: "We are, therefore, unanimously of opinion, that the judgment cannot now be set aside, or opened."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 4 U.S. 107 (year uncertain) (pinpoint page not available)
Explanation: Applies the substantive and procedural rules, holding that a judgment entered after the privilege was not timely asserted cannot be reopened.

Updated July 18, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Geyer's Lessee v. Irwin · 4 U.S. 107 (year uncertain)

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

Related opinions

Geyer's Lessee v. Irwin
4 U.S. 92
Geyer v. Geyer
134 Fla. 783 · 184 So. 331 · 1938 Fla. LEXIS 1188
Geyer v. Geyer
130 Fla. 887
Geyer v. Geyer
124 Pa. Super. 313 · 188 A. 402 · 1936 Pa. Super. LEXIS 375
Geyer v. Geyer
2009 WL 2176638 · 910 N.E.2d 274
Geyer v. Geyer
1944 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 9 · 52 Pa. D. & C. 133

Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

April 1, 1790

Precedential status

Published

GEYER'S v. Irwin

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion

Geyer's Lessee versus Irwin.

Geyer's Lessee
versus
Irwin.