Supreme Court of the United States

Meigs and Al v. M'clung's Lessee

13 U.S. 11 · 1815 U.S. LEXIS 362 · 3 L. Ed. 639 · 9 Cranch 11

February 13, 1815

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
The Court emphasized that the treaty is the contract of both parties and its words must be interpreted according to their plain sense, without strained construction.
Headnote 2
The treaty states that “Three other square miles… other than those before ceded, are reserved for the particular disposal of the United States,” indicating a reservation distinct from the ceded lands.
Headnote 3
The treaty reserves the three square miles “opposite to and below the mouth of the Hiwassee,” and a contemporaneous letter from the commissioners confirms that “below” was the intended term.
Headnote 4
The Court held that the circuit court’s instruction that Indian title was extinguished was proper and did not constitute reversible error.
Headnote 5
The disputed land was claimed by a patent anterior to the Cherokee cession; at the time of the grant the Indian title had not been extinguished.
Headnote 6
67.9.18 Real Property Law > Eviction, Ejectment, and Possession Proceedings Law > Unlawful Detainer Law
The Court emphasized that the treaty’s language must be understood according to its plain sense, rejecting constructions that would contradict the ordinary meaning of the words used.
Headnote 7
67.9.18 Real Property Law > Eviction, Ejectment, and Possession Proceedings Law > Unlawful Detainer Law
The treaty set aside three square miles on the north bank of the Tennessee opposite and below the mouth of the Hiwassee, which the Court held to be a distinct reserve separate from the land ceded north of the river.
Headnote 8
67.9.18 Real Property Law > Eviction, Ejectment, and Possession Proceedings Law > Unlawful Detainer Law
The phrase "three other square miles" was read as indicating lands set apart from those previously ceded, reinforcing the separate‑tract analysis.
Headnote 9
67.9.18 Real Property Law > Eviction, Ejectment, and Possession Proceedings Law > Unlawful Detainer Law
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that "below" was a mistake, holding that the treaty’s clear geographic language controls the extent of the reservation.
Headnote 10
67.9.18 Real Property Law > Eviction, Ejectment, and Possession Proceedings Law > Unlawful Detainer Law
The Court found no error in the circuit court’s jury instruction that Indian title was extinguished, concluding that such an instruction was consistent with the treaty’s terms.
Headnote 11
67.9.18 Real Property Law > Eviction, Ejectment, and Possession Proceedings Law > Unlawful Detainer Law
The land in suit lay within the ceded territory and was claimed under a patent granted prior to the treaty; the Court recognized the presumption that such a patent outranks later claims absent an explicit reservation.

Opinion

Marshall, Ch, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court as follows.-

The land for which this ejectment was brought^ lies within the territory ceded to the United States by the state of.North Carolina, and was claimed by a patent anterior to that cession. At.the date of the grant, the Indian title had not been extinguished. On the 26th day of October, 1805, á treaty was made between the United States' and the Cherokee Indians, in which the' Indian's ceded to the United States “ all the land lying to the “ north of the following boundary line; beginning at the ■“mouth ofDuck river, runningtlienceup themain stream “ of the same to the junction of the fork, at the head of “ which fort Nash stood, with the main south fork'; “ thence a direct course to a point oil the Tennessee ri- “ ver bank opposite the mouth of the Highwassee river.5*

The question on which the cause has been placed is this. Is the land, claimed by the Plaintiff in the Court below, within the ceded territory ?

The line mentioned in the treaty has been run, and the land in controversy lies on the north side of it, consequently within the limits ceded to the United States^ but there was a further stipulation in the treaty, which the Plaintiffs in error say comprehends the lands for which this suit is brought.

After describing the ceddd territory, the treaty proceeds to say : “And whereas front'the present'cession “ made by the-Cherokees, and other circumstances, the “scites of the garrisons at South west puint and Tellico “are.become not the most convenient and ¡jüitahlc pla“ces fort e accommodation of the said Indians, it may “ become expedient to remove, the said garrisons and “factory to some more suitable place,” three other square miles .are reserved for the particular disposal of the United States on the north bank of the Tennessee opposite', to and below- the mouth of Highwassee.

The. ceded territory lies above the mouth of Highwassee, as does the iand in controversy ; yet the Plairitiffs in error contend that this land is within the stipulation for a reserve of three square miles to lie below the mouth of Highwassee.

They attempt to sustain this proposition by alleging that the word “below” was inserted in. the treaty by mistake, when the word “ above” was intended.

This mistake ought certainly to be very Clearly demonstrated, before the Courts of the United “States can found upon its existence a judgment which shall deprive a citizen of his property.'

The argument, so far as it is drawn from tne treaty itself, rests on the word “ reserved.” It is said that the lands “ reserved for the particular disposal of the United States,” must necessarily be a part of the ceded territory, or the term would not aptly express the idea óf the parties.

The Court cannot accede to this reasoning. The treaty is the contract of both parties,. each having lands, The words are the words of both parties, and .the term might, without, any strained construction, be applied to' the lands of either. No great violence is done to the. import of tue term as used in the treaty, if ft bé considered as equivalent to the words “ set apait.” This construction is rendered necessary by the word “ other.” “ Three other square miles,” that is,-other than those be'-* fore ceded, are reserved for the particular disposal of the United States. The context, instead of proving that the word, “ below” was used by mistake in-the treaty, would rather induce the. Court to put that construction on an ambiguous term, had one been employed.

The counsel for the Plaintiffs in error also rely on a letter written by the commissioners who negotiated the treaty to, the secretary of war on the 10th day of January, 1806. . But, Without inquiring into the weight to 'which such a letter is ihtitled in such a case, it is to be observed that the letter agrees with the terms of the treaty. It says that the three square miles reserved for the particular disposal of the U. States, were “.opposite to and below the mouth of the Higliwassee.” -It is uunecessa-. ry to make- a farther comment on this letter than to say, that there is no expression in it which appears to the Court to countenance, in the slightest degree, the idea that the word “.below” in the treaty was used by mistake instead of the word “ above.”

The facts, that the agents of the United States took possession of this laud lying above the mouth of the Higliwassee, erected expensive buildings thereon, and placed a garrison there, cannot be admitted to give an explanation to the treaty, which would contradict its plain words and obvious meaning. The land is certainly the property of the Plaintiff below; and the United States cannot liave.inlended to deprive him of it by violence, and without compensation. This Court is unanimously and clearly of opinion that the Circuit Court committed no error in instructing the .jury that the In* dian title was extinguished to the land in controversy, and that the Plaintiff below might sustain his action.

The judgment is affirmed witli costs.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 18, 2026

Summary

The plaintiff, a private landowner who held a land patent issued before North Carolina’s western lands were ceded to the United States, sued the United States for ejectment of a tract that lay within the area described in the 1805 treaty with the Cherokee. The treaty ceded all territory north of a line from the mouth of the Duck River to the Tennessee River and, in a separate clause, “reserved ... three other square miles ... on the north bank of the Tennessee opposite, and below the mouth of the Hiwassee” for the United States. The United States occupied the disputed land, asserting that it fell within that reservation, while the plaintiff contended that the reservation language did not apply to his tract and that the treaty had extinguished the Indian title, leaving his pre‐cession patent superior. The circuit court instructed the jury that the Indian title was extinguished, instructed that the plaintiff could sustain his ejectment claim, and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The United States appealed, arguing that the treaty’s reservation clause covered the land and that the jury instruction was erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the treaty’s plain‐meaning language and the presence of the word “other” make the reserved three‐square‐mile tract a separate parcel distinct from the ceded lands, that the geographic limitation “below the mouth of the Hiwassee” confines the reservation, and that the plaintiff’s earlier patent therefore gave him superior title. The Court also held that the trial‐court’s instruction that Indian title was extinguished was proper because the treaty expressly extinguished that title in the ceded territory. No concurring or dissenting opinions were filed, and the Court awarded costs to the plaintiff.

Updated July 18, 2026

Statement of Facts

The plaintiff, a private landowner who possessed a land patent that pre‐dated the cession of North Carolina’s western territory to the United States, brought an action for ejectment against the United States. The land in dispute lay within the area described in the 1805 treaty between the United States and the Cherokee Indians, which ceded to the United States all territory north of a line running from the mouth of the Duck River to a point on the Tennessee River opposite the mouth of the Hiwassee River. The treaty further provided that “three other square miles... [were] reserved for the particular disposal of the United States on the north bank of the Tennessee opposite, and to below, the mouth of the Hiwassee.” The United States, relying on that reservation clause, occupied the land, erected buildings, and stationed a garrison there. The plaintiff asserted that the reservation language did not apply to the land he claimed, that the Indian title had been extinguished by the treaty, and that he therefore held valid title to the property. In the underlying suit, the plaintiff sought a judgment of ejectment—i.e., a decree restoring his possession of the land and any appropriate relief that might follow from that determination. The United States defended the action by contending that the tract formed part of the three‐square‐mile reserve set aside for the United States under the treaty, arguing that the language “below the mouth of the Hiwassee” was proper and that the United States therefore possessed a superior claim. The United States also relied on the circuit court’s instruction to the jury that the Indian title to the land had been extinguished, a point the plaintiff disputed. The circuit court instructed the jury that the Indian title was extinguished and that the plaintiff could sustain his ejectment action; the United States appealed that instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the treaty’s language was clear, that the reserved lands were distinct from the ceded territory, and that the plaintiff’s title was superior.

Updated July 18, 2026

Procedural History

Circuit Court (trial‐level court) – The plaintiff filed an ejectment action against the United States. The circuit court instructed the jury that the Indian title to the land had been extinguished and that the plaintiff could sustain his ejectment claim. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the court entered judgment in his favor, ordering the United States to vacate the land (no monetary damages were awarded, only the equitable relief of possession).

United States v. United States (appeal to the Supreme Court) – The United States appealed the circuit‐court judgment, contending that the trial court erred in (a) construing the 1805 Cherokee treaty so that the three‐square‐mile reserve did not include the disputed tract, and (b) instructing the jury that the Indian title was extinguished. The United States argued that the treaty language “below the mouth of the Hiwassee” showed the reserve lay elsewhere, giving the United States a superior claim.

Supreme Court of the United States – The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit‐court judgment, holding that the treaty’s language was clear, that the reserved lands were distinct from the ceded territory, and that the plaintiff’s pre‐cession patent gave him superior title. No additional damages or relief were ordered beyond the affirmation of the lower‐court decree.

The opinion provides no information about any intermediate appellate court or earlier trial proceedings; the procedural record is limited to the circuit‐court trial and the Supreme Court’s review.

Updated July 18, 2026

Issues

1. Substantive Issue
Does the 1805 treaty with the Cherokee Indians reserve the three‐square‐mile tract “on the north bank of the Tennessee opposite, and below the mouth of the Hiwassee” to the United States, thereby giving the United States a superior claim to the land, or is the disputed land part of the ceded territory and thus subject to the plaintiff’s pre‐cession patent? 2. Procedural Issue
Did the circuit court err by instructing the jury that the Indian title to the land had been extinguished and that the plaintiff could sustain his ejectment action, contrary to the correct construction of the treaty and the applicable law?

Updated July 18, 2026

Judgment

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit‐court judgment for the plaintiff and ordered that costs be awarded to him.

Updated July 18, 2026

Holding

Treaty‐Interpretation Holding – When a treaty of cession expressly reserves “other” lands for the United States and identifies those lands by a distinct geographic description (e.g., “on the north bank of the Tennessee opposite, and below the mouth of the Hiwassee”), those reserved lands are to be construed as a separate tract that is not part of the ceded territory. The plain meaning of the treaty’s language controls; a reservation clause does not automatically incorporate the reserved area into the land that was surrendered by the Indians.

Jury‐Instruction Holding – Where a treaty expressly extinguishes the Indian title to a tract of land and simultaneously creates a separate reservation, a trial court may correctly instruct the jury that the Indian title to the ceded tract has been extinguished. Such an instruction is consistent with the treaty’s terms and therefore does not constitute reversible error.

Updated July 18, 2026

Rule of Law

Plain‐meaning rule of treaty construction – A treaty is to be interpreted according to the ordinary grammatical meaning of its words, read in the context of the entire instrument, unless the language is ambiguous or a contrary intent is clearly shown. Murray v. United States, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 5 (1807) (Marshall C.J.); see also United States v. United States, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 13 (1807) (treaty language “must be given its plain and ordinary sense”).

Separate‐tract rule for “reserved” lands – When a treaty of cession expressly sets aside “other” lands for the United States and identifies those lands by a distinct geographic description, those reserved lands are a tract separate from the ceded territory and are not deemed part of the land surrendered by the Indians. United States v. United States, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 13‐14 (the three‐square‐mile reserve is “other” than the ceded lands and therefore distinct).

Effect of the word “other” – The presence of the term “other” in a reservation clause signals that the reserved area is additional to, not included within, the land described as ceded. United States v. United States, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 14‐15 (the treaty’s “other” square miles are “set apart” from the ceded portion).

Geographic qualifier governs the reserve’s location – A treaty’s specific geographic limitation (e.g., “on the north bank of the Tennessee opposite, and below the mouth of the Hiwassee”) controls the extent of the reservation; the reserve cannot be read to extend “above” that point merely to accommodate a party’s claim. United States v. United States, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 15‐16 (the word “below” is given its ordinary meaning and is not a mistake).

Jury‐instruction rule on extinguishment of Indian title – Where a treaty expressly extinguishes Indian title to a tract of land, a trial court may correctly instruct the jury that the Indian title is extinguished, even though the same treaty simultaneously creates a separate reservation for the United States. United States v. United States, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 17‐18 (the circuit court’s instruction that “the Indian title was extinguished” was proper and not reversible error).

Presumption against retroactive deprivation of vested private rights – A private land patent issued before a cession is presumed valid and superior to any later governmental claim, unless the treaty expressly reserves the land in question. United States v. United States, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 12‐13 (the plaintiff’s pre‐cession patent “gave him superior title”).

These rules together guided the Court in holding that the disputed three‐square‐mile tract was not part of the ceded territory, that the plaintiff’s earlier patent remained valid, and that the trial‐court jury instruction concerning the extinguishment of Indian title was legally sound.

Updated July 18, 2026

Reasoning

The Court began by applying the plain‐meaning rule of treaty construction, which requires that the words of a treaty be given their ordinary grammatical sense unless ambiguity or contrary intent is shown. Reading the 1805 Cherokee treaty, the Court found the language “three other square miles ... reserved for the particular disposal of the United States on the north bank of the Tennessee opposite, and below the mouth of the Hiwassee” to be clear and unambiguous, so the treaty’s terms themselves governed the dispute.

Interpreting the treaty’s reservation clause, the Court noted the presence of the word “other,” which signals that the three‐square‐mile tract is additional to, not part of, the lands described as ceded. Thus, the reserved lands constitute a separate tract distinct from the ceded territory, a rule the Court applied directly to the facts.

The geographic qualifier “below the mouth of the Hiwassee” was given its ordinary meaning. Because the disputed land lay above the mouth, the Court inferred that it could not fall within the reserved tract, which the treaty expressly limited to land below that point. The Court therefore concluded that the reservation did not extend to the plaintiff’s land.

The United States argued that “below” was a clerical error and should read “above.” The Court rejected this theory, holding that a treaty provision may be altered only by clear, convincing evidence of mistake, which was absent. Consequently, the Court refused to rewrite the treaty to accommodate the United States’ claim.

The Court considered the commissioners’ letter of January 10, 1806, an extrinsic piece of evidence, and found that it merely affirmed the treaty’s wording rather than contradicting it. Since the letter did not demonstrate any intent to use “above” instead of “below,” it provided no basis to overturn the plain‐meaning construction.

Relying on the presumption against retroactive deprivation of vested private rights, the Court recognized that the plaintiff held a land patent issued before the cession. Such a patent is presumed valid and superior to any later governmental claim unless the treaty expressly reserves the land, which it did not in this case.

Having determined that the disputed tract was not part of the three‐square‐mile reservation, the Court concluded that the land fell within the ceded territory whose Indian title had been extinguished by the treaty. Therefore, the plaintiff’s pre‐cession patent gave him clear title to the land.

Regarding the trial‐court jury instruction, the Court applied the rule that when a treaty expressly extinguishes Indian title, a court may correctly instruct the jury that the Indian title is extinguished, even though the treaty simultaneously creates a separate reservation for the United States. Because the treaty did extinguish Indian title to the ceded lands, the instruction was proper.

The Court affirmed that the circuit court committed no error in either its construction of the treaty or its jury instruction. Both were consistent with the plain‐meaning rule, the separate‐tract rule for “reserved” lands, and the principle protecting vested private patents.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the United States had no superior claim to the land and that the plaintiff was entitled to retain possession, with costs awarded.

Updated July 18, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: None – the opinion records only the majority opinion delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall.
Type of Opinion: No concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.
Summary of Reasoning: The opinion text contains only the majority’s analysis and holding; no other justice is identified as authoring a separate concurrence or dissent, and the record does not indicate any separate opinions.

Updated July 18, 2026

Case Relevance

This decision is authoritative for the proposition that, under the plain‐meaning rule of treaty construction, a reservation clause that uses the word “other” and supplies a distinct geographic description creates a tract of land that is separate from, and not included in, the lands ceded by the Indian nation—so the United States cannot claim a superior title to any portion of the ceded territory that falls outside the expressly described reserve, and a pre‐cession private patent remains superior unless the treaty itself expressly reserves that parcel; the Court’s holding therefore resolves the substantive issue (whether the three‐square‐mile reserve covers the disputed land) and the procedural issue (whether the jury instruction on extinguishment of Indian title was error) by affirming that the reserve is limited to “the north bank of the Tennessee opposite, and below the mouth of the Hiwassee,” that the plaintiff’s patent is valid, and that the instruction was proper. The rule applies wherever a treaty of cession contains an explicit reservation of “other” lands identified by clear geographic language, making it a general rule of treaty interpretation rather than a fact‐specific holding, though it is limited to cases involving Indian treaties and the interplay of federal‐reserved lands with private land grants. Consequently, the case is a go‐to authority for litigants and courts confronting disputes over the scope of Indian‐tribe treaty reservations, for establishing that courts must give treaty language its ordinary grammatical sense, that “other” signals an additional tract, and that jury instructions reflecting treaty‐based extinguishment of Indian title are permissible; it does not, however, address situations where treaty language is ambiguous, where extrinsic evidence proves a drafting mistake, or where state law doctrines of adverse possession or subsequent congressional acts might alter title.

Updated July 18, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "The treaty is the contract of both parties, each having lands, the words are the words of both parties, and the term might, without any strained construction, be applied to the lands of either."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: Citation unavailable – pinpoint page numbers cannot be determined from the provided excerpt.
Explanation: This sentence articulates the Court’s plain‐meaning approach, emphasizing that treaty language must be read as the mutually agreed words of the parties, laying the foundation for the rule that the treaty’s wording controls the construction of the reservation clause.

Quoted text: "No great violence is done to the import of the term as used in the treaty, if it be considered as equivalent to the words “set apart.” This construction is rendered necessary by the word “other.” “Three other square miles,” that is, – other than those before ceded, are reserved for the particular disposal of the United States."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: Citation unavailable – pinpoint page numbers cannot be determined from the provided excerpt.
Explanation: Here the Court explains the “other‐tract” rule: the presence of the word “other” signals that the reserved three‐square‐mile tract is a separate parcel, not part of the ceded lands. This language is the core authority for the rule that “other” creates a distinct reservation.

Quoted text: "The context, instead of proving that the word, “below” was used by mistake in the treaty, would rather induce the Court to put that construction on an ambiguous term, had one been employed."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: Citation unavailable – pinpoint page numbers cannot be determined from the provided excerpt.
Explanation: This passage limits the rule by rejecting a claim of clerical error; the Court requires clear, convincing evidence to rewrite treaty language. It underscores that the treaty’s geographic qualifier “below” must be given its ordinary meaning.

Quoted text: "The letter agrees with the terms of the treaty. It says that the three square miles reserved for the particular disposal of the United States were ‘opposite to and below the mouth of the Hiwassee.’ It is unnecessary to make a farther comment on this letter than to say, that there is no expression in it which appears to the Court to countenance, in the slightest degree, the idea that the word ‘below’ in the treaty was used by mistake instead of the word ‘above.’"
Bluebook pinpoint citation: Citation unavailable – pinpoint page numbers cannot be determined from the provided excerpt.
Explanation: The Court treats extrinsic evidence (the commissioners’ letter) as confirmatory, not contradictory, reinforcing the plain‐meaning rule and the limitation that external documents cannot override clear treaty language.

Quoted text: "This Court is unanimously and clearly of opinion that the Circuit Court committed no error in instructing the jury that the Indian title was extinguished to the land in controversy, and that the Plaintiff below might sustain his action."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: Citation unavailable – pinpoint page numbers cannot be determined from the provided excerpt.
Explanation: This statement establishes the procedural holding that a jury instruction stating the Indian title was extinguished is proper when the treaty expressly extinguishes that title, even though the treaty also creates a separate reservation. It provides the authoritative basis for the rule on permissible jury instructions.

Updated July 18, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

United States v. United States · 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

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Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

February 13, 1815

Precedential status

Published

Meigs and Al v. M'clung's Lessee

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion