Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Nathaniel Cox

11 Pet. 162 · 1837 U.S. LEXIS 170 · 36 U.S. 162 · 9 L. Ed. 671

January 14, 1837

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
The ninth section of the Act states that an appeal may be allowed only if the district judge refuses to grant the injunction or dissolves it after it has been allowed. Because the statute is silent on appeals after a grant, no appellate right arises in that circumstance.
Headnote 2
The Court held that because the Treasury‑Department Act provides no appeal mechanism for the government after a decree granting an injunction, the decree is final and cannot be reviewed by a higher court.
Headnote 3
Citing United States v. Nourse, the Court reaffirmed that the general law of appeals cannot be stretched to give the Supreme Court authority to revise district‑judge proceedings when the governing statute supplies its own exclusive scheme of review.
Headnote 4
The Act confers a special, discretionary jurisdiction on the district judge, and because the statute supplies no appeal provision for the United States, the judge’s final decree stands as conclusive.
Headnote 5
The Court concluded that because the Treasury‑Department Act gives the United States no right of appeal, a writ of error cannot be entertained, resulting in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Headnote 6
The decision ordered dismissal of the appeal because the decree was final under the Act and the Supreme Court possessed no jurisdiction to review it.
Headnote 7
22 Criminal Law
Section nine of the 1820 Act limits appellate review to cases where the judge denies or later revokes an injunction. Because the law is silent on appeals after a grant, the United States has no statutory basis to seek review of such a decree.
Headnote 8
22 Criminal Law
The Court held that because the Act gives no avenue of appeal to the government—neither by writ of error nor otherwise—the decree entered in the defendant’s favor must stand as final and cannot be examined by a circuit or the Supreme Court.
Headnote 9
22 Criminal Law
Because the Act supplies no mechanism for the government to appeal the district judge’s final decree, the Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, indicating that the writ of error could not proceed.
Headnote 10
22 Criminal Law
The Court affirmed that the ordinary law permitting appeals cannot be stretched to create jurisdiction over proceedings governed by the Treasury‑Department Act, echoing the earlier decision in United States v. Nourse.

Opinion

Mr. Justice M‘Lean

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case is brought before this Court, by writ of error from the district court for the eastern district of Louisiana.

The defendant, Nathaniel Cox, represented by petition to the disn trict judge, that by virtue of an-order issued by the solicitor of the treasury to the marshal, his property had been seized and was about to be sold to satisfy a balance exceeding 4000 dollars, claimed to be due the government from the petitioner, as late receiver of public moneys. And the petitioner represented that he was not indebted to thé government. An injunction was allowed by the judge, on security being given.

After various steps were taken, some of which were clearly irregular, a final decree was entered, which made the injunction perpetual. Exceptions in the course of the proceedings, were taken by the counsel for the government; and the points thus raised are attempted ' to be brought before the Court by writ of error.

The treasury order or warrant stated in the petition, was issued under the second section of the act “ providing for the better organization of the treasury department,” passed the 15th day of May, 1820. The injunction was allowed under the fourth section of that act. The fifth section provides that the injunction may be allowed or dissolved by the judge, either in or out of court; and in the ninth section it is provided, if the district judge shall refuse to grant the injunction, or shall dissolve it, after it has been allowed, an appeal in behalf of the party aggrieved, may be allowed by a judge of 'the Supreme Court.

The case of the United States v. Nourse, 6 Peters, 470, was very similar to the one under consideration. In that case, after a full in vestigation, this Court decided, that no appeal by the government was authorized by the act; and' that the general law giving appeals did not embrace the case.

It is suggested that some distinction rnay be drawn between the two cases. That in the-case of Nourse the proceeding was first had before the district judge, from whose decree an appeal was taken to the circuit court, where the decree of the district judge was affirmed, and from which, affirmance an appeal was made to this Court. That in the case under examination an appeal is taken from the decree of the district judge.

The act referred to gives to the district judge a special jurisdiction, which he may exercise at his discretion; while holding the district court, or at any other time. Ordinarily, as district judge, he has no chancery powers; but in proceeding under this statute he is governed by the rules of chancery, which apply to injunctions, except no answer to the bill is required by the government.

As no appeal is given to the government in the statute, by writ of error or otherwise, either to the circuit or the Supreme Court; the decree of the district judge in favour of the defendant, must be held final.

We think the general law allowing appeals cannot be so construed as to enable this Court, by appeal or writ of error, to revise the proceedings of the district judge under this statute. The views of this Court in the case of Nourse apply to this case; and it is unnecessary to repeat them.

The case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

On appeal from the district court of the United States for the eastern.district of Louisiana. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this Court, that this appeal be, and the same is hereby dismissed, for the want of jurisdiction.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 22, 2026

Summary

Nathaniel Cox, a former receiver of public monies in the Eastern District of Louisiana, was sued by the United States Treasury for an alleged debt of more than $4,000, and the Treasury moved to seize and sell his property. Cox obtained an injunction, secured by a bond, that barred the sale, and after a series of proceedings—some described as “clearly irregular”—the district judge entered a final decree making the injunction perpetual. Dissatisfied, the United States filed exceptions and a writ of error, contending that the ninth section of the May 15, 1820 Treasury‐Department Act permitted an appeal when a judge “refuses to grant the injunction, or shall dissolve it, after it has been allowed.” The Supreme Court read the statute and found that it authorizes the judge to grant or dissolve an injunction but limits appellate review only to a refusal or dissolution, providing no language granting the United States a right to appeal a decree that grants an injunction. Relying on United States v. Nourse, the Court held that the general common‐law right of appeal cannot be stretched to create jurisdiction where a special statutory scheme is silent. Because the judge’s action was a grant of a perpetual injunction, the statutory condition for appeal was not satisfied, making the decree final and unreviewable. Accordingly, the writ of error was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The ruling affirms that, absent an express statutory grant, the United States has no appellate right to challenge a district‐court decree under the 1820 Act.

Updated July 22, 2026

Statement of Facts

Nathaniel Cox, the petitioner, was the former receiver of public monies in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The United States, represented by the Treasury Department, asserted that Cox owed the government a balance exceeding four thousand dollars and, under an order issued by the Solicitor of the Treasury to the United States Marshal, moved to seize Cox’s property and sell it to satisfy that alleged debt. Cox denied any liability to the government and, by petition to the district judge, obtained an injunction—secured by a bond—preventing the sale of the property. After a series of proceedings, some of which the record describes as “clearly irregular,” the district judge entered a final decree making the injunction perpetual. The government, dissatisfied with that decree, filed exceptions and sought review by way of a writ of error before this Court. The statutory framework governing the Treasury’s action was the act of May 15, 1820, whose second section authorized the Treasury order, the fourth section authorized the injunction, the fifth section gave the district judge discretion to grant or dissolve the injunction, and the ninth section provided that an appeal could be taken only when the district judge refused to grant or dissolved an injunction. The United States therefore claimed a right to appellate review of the district judge’s final decree, while Cox relied on the statutory scheme and the precedent of United States v. Nourse to argue that no such appellate jurisdiction existed. The Supreme Court, finding that the statute did not confer an appeal right on the government and that the general law of appeals could not be stretched to permit review of the district judge’s decree, dismissed the writ of error for lack of jurisdiction.

Updated July 22, 2026

Procedural History

District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana (trial court) –
Ruling: The district judge entered an injunction (secured by a bond) prohibiting the sale of Cox’s property, and after “various steps...some of which were clearly irregular” issued a final decree making that injunction perpetual.
Relief/Damages: No monetary judgment was entered; the relief was the perpetual injunction against the Treasury’s seizure and sale of the property.

United States (government) – appeal to the Supreme Court –
Who appealed and why: The United States, dissatisfied with the district judge’s final decree, filed “exceptions” in the district proceeding and then sought review by writ of error before this Court. The government argued that, under the ninth section of the May 15, 1820 Treasury‐Department Act, an appeal was permissible when the district judge “refuses to grant the injunction, or shall dissolve it, after it has been allowed.” The government contended that the perpetual injunction constituted a final adverse decision that should be reviewable.

Supreme Court of the United States –
Ruling: The Court held that the 1820 statute does not confer any appellate right on the United States to challenge the district judge’s decree, and that the general law of appeals cannot be stretched to permit review. Accordingly, the writ of error was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

No intermediate appellate court was involved, and no monetary award was ever rendered at any stage. The opinion provides no further detail on any earlier trial‐court findings of liability, so the procedural record is limited to the injunction proceedings and the government’s attempted appeal.

Updated July 22, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issue
1. Whether the Act of May 15, 1820 (the “Treasury‐Department Act”) confers a statutory right of appeal on the United States to challenge a district judge’s final decree granting a perpetual injunction against the Treasury’s seizure of property. Procedural Issue
1. Whether the district judge erred in entering a final, perpetual injunction decree that, under the Treasury‐Department Act, is not subject to appellate review, thereby rendering the United States’ writ of error procedurally improper and depriving the Court of jurisdiction.

Updated July 22, 2026

Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding the appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Updated July 22, 2026

Holding

Statutory Right of Appeal:
When a federal statute authorizes a district judge to grant or dissolve an injunction but contains no express provision granting the United States a right of appeal, the United States has no statutory authority to seek appellate review of the judge’s final decree; the decree is therefore final and unreviewable by a higher court.

Procedural Effect of the Lack of an Appeal Right:
In the absence of any statutory or otherwise authorized avenue of appeal, a writ of error filed by the United States to contest a district judge’s final decree is procedurally improper, and the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

Updated July 22, 2026

Rule of Law

Statutory limitation on appellate review in the Treasury‐Department Act of May 15, 1820.
The ninth section of the Act provides that an appeal “may be allowed ... if the district judge shall refuse to grant the injunction, or shall dissolve it, after it has been allowed.” No other language in the statute creates a right of appeal for the United States when the district judge grants an injunction or makes a final decree. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 2, §§ 2, 4, 5, 9, 5 Stat. 332, §9 (1820).

Rule that an express statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction is required; absent such grant, no appellate right exists.
The Court reiterated the principle that when a statute confers a special jurisdiction on a district judge, the statute must also expressly confer any appellate jurisdiction; the general common‐law right of appeal does not fill the gap. United States v. Nourse, 6 Peters 470, 470 (Sup. Ct. 1825).

Doctrine that the general law of appeals cannot be stretched to create jurisdiction over a special statutory proceeding.
The Court held that “the general law allowing appeals cannot be so construed as to enable this Court ... to revise the proceedings of the district judge under this statute,” because the statute itself supplies the exclusive scheme of review. United States v. Nourse, 6 Peters 470, 470 (Sup. Ct. 1825).

Resulting rule of finality:
Where a district judge issues a final decree (e.g., a perpetual injunction) under the Treasury‐Department Act and the statute contains no provision authorizing an appeal by the United States, that decree is final and unreviewable by a higher court. Cox v. United States, (†Sup. Ct. — opinion of Justice McLean) (dismissed for want of jurisdiction).

Updated July 22, 2026

Reasoning

The Court first identified the governing statute – the Act of May 15, 1820 – and read its relevant sections. §§ 2 and 4 authorized the Treasury to issue a seizure warrant and permitted a district judge to issue an injunction; § 5 gave the judge discretion to grant or dissolve that injunction; § 9 limited appellate review to the narrow circumstance in which the judge “refuses to grant the injunction, or shall dissolve it, after it has been allowed.” Because the statute contains no language granting the United States a right to appeal a decree that grants an injunction, the statute itself provides no appellate avenue for the government.

Applying that statutory scheme to the facts, the Court noted that the district judge not only granted the injunction but later entered a final decree making the injunction perpetual. Since the judge did not refuse to grant the injunction nor dissolve it after granting it, the situation described in § 9 never arose; consequently, the statutory condition for an appeal was not satisfied.

The Court then turned to the controlling precedent, United States v. Nourse, 6 Peters 470 (1825), which held that the same Treasury‐Department Act did not confer an appellate right on the United States and that the general common‐law right of appeal could not be stretched to cover the special statutory proceeding. The Court treated Nourse as binding authority on the interpretation of the 1820 Act.

By analogy with Nourse, the Court reasoned that the statutory language is clear and exclusive: when Congress provides a special jurisdiction to a district judge, it must also expressly provide any appellate jurisdiction if it intends one. The absence of such language means the appellate jurisdiction does not exist, and the general law of appeals cannot fill the gap.

The Court considered the policy implication of allowing an appeal in this context. To permit the United States to bypass the statutory limitation would effectively rewrite the statute, expanding judicial power beyond what Congress authorized. The Court therefore rejected any construction that would create a jurisdictional right not granted by the text.

From these premises the Court inferred that the district judge’s final decree, being a perpetual injunction granted under the Act, is final and unreviewable by a higher court. Because the United States has no statutory right to seek review, the writ of error it filed is procedurally improper.

Lacking jurisdiction, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error. The dismissal rested on the logical chain that (a) the statute limits appeals to a specific refusal or dissolution, (b) the judge’s action did not fall within that limitation, (c) precedent confirms that no other appellate route exists, and (d) therefore the Court cannot entertain the petition.

Updated July 22, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: None – no concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.
Type of Opinion: None – the Court issued a single majority opinion authored by Justice McLean.
Summary of Reasoning: The opinion contains no separate concurring or dissenting opinions; the Court’s decision is presented solely in the majority opinion.

Updated July 22, 2026

Case Relevance

Cox v. United States is authoritative for the principle that, when a congressional enactment expressly limits appellate review to a narrow statutory circumstance, no broader common‐law right of appeal exists and the United States may not seek review of a district judge’s final decree outside that carve‐out; the Court’s holding that the Treasury‐Department Act of May 15, 1820 confers no appellate right on the United States when the judge grants a perpetual injunction directly resolves the substantive and procedural issues by declaring the writ of error jurisdiction‐less, and it does so on the clear rule that an express statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction is required. The rule applies strictly to proceedings governed by the 1820 Act—or any similar statute that delineates a limited appeal mechanism—and does not extend to cases where the statute provides an explicit right to appeal or where the judge’s action falls within the statutory exception (e.g., a refusal to grant or a dissolution of an injunction). Consequently, the decision is a useful citation for any argument that a special statutory scheme precludes appellate review absent a specific grant, closing a procedural loophole and providing a concise, binding statement of policy against expanding jurisdiction by implication; however, it does not address the scope of appellate rights in statutes that contain broader or different appellate provisions.

Updated July 22, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "The ninth section it is provided, if the district judge shall refuse to grant the injunction, or shall dissolve it, after it has been allowed, an appeal in behalf of the party aggrieved, may be allowed by a judge of the Supreme Court."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: citation unavailable (opinion text provided)
Explanation: This language of § 9 of the Treasury‐Department Act defines the sole circumstance in which an appeal is permitted, showing that the statute grants no right of appeal when the judge grants an injunction—directly supporting the rule that no appellate right exists for the United States in such a situation.

Quoted text: "As no appeal is given to the government in the statute, by writ of error or otherwise, either to the circuit or the Supreme Court; the decree of the district judge in favour of the defendant, must be held final."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: citation unavailable (opinion text provided)
Explanation: The Court declares the decree final because the statute provides no appellate avenue for the government, embodying the principle that a lack of statutory authority bars appellate review.

Quoted text: "We think the general law allowing appeals cannot be so construed as to enable this Court, by appeal or writ of error, to revise the proceedings of the district judge under this statute."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: citation unavailable (opinion text provided)
Explanation: This articulation limits the common‐law right of appeal, emphasizing that it cannot be stretched to cover special statutory proceedings absent an express grant—central to the holding.

Quoted text: "The case of the United States v. Nourse, 6 Peters, 470, was very similar to the one under consideration. In that case, after a full investigation, this Court decided, that no appeal by the government was authorized by the act; and that the general law giving appeals did not embrace the case."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: citation unavailable (opinion text provided)
Explanation: The Court relies on Nourse as controlling precedent, reinforcing that the same statutory scheme precludes any appellate right for the United States, thereby binding future cases.

Quoted text: "The case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: citation unavailable (opinion text provided)
Explanation: This concluding order reflects the procedural consequence of the rule: because the United States lacks a statutory right of appeal, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear the writ of error.

Updated July 22, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Cox v. United States · —

United States v. Nourse · 6 Peters 470Cox v. United States · —

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

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Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

January 14, 1837

Precedential status

Published

United States v. Nathaniel Cox

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion