Railroad Land Company v. Courtright
1874 U.S. LEXIS 1371 · 21 Wall. 310 · 22 L. Ed. 582 · 88 U.S. 310
February 18, 1875 · Docket 159
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
Congress intended the advance sections to provide aid for preliminary work before construction began, and imposed no condition on the state for the disposition of those specific sections.
- Headnote 2
Congress allowed the railroad to choose any sections inside the twenty‑mile corridor, whether at the eastern end, western end, or the middle of the line.
- Headnote 3
The Iowa grant of July 14, 1856 was written in present‑transfer language, so title vested immediately in the railroad company, independent of any future performance.
- Headnote 4
The grant reserved a right of resumption limited to sections not yet sold, indicating that the grantor's power was a condition subsequent rather than a condition precedent to title.
- Headnote 5
The Court held that title passed to the plaintiff under the original conveyance and that the lower court’s decree granting quiet title was proper.
- Headnote 6
The Act of May 15, 1856 uses express language to permit sale of one‑hundred‑twenty sections in advance of construction, limiting the mileage condition to later sales. This interpretation reflects Congress’s intent to aid preliminary work without imposing pre‑construction restrictions on the advance sections.
- Headnote 7
The statute does not limit the railroad to sections adjoining any particular terminus; the sections may be taken from the eastern end, western end, or any central portion as long as they remain inside the twenty‑mile corridor.
- Headnote 8
Both the federal grant and the Iowa state grant of July 14, 1856 were made “in prcesenii,” giving the railroad immediate title to the designated sections, with any future state reservations operating as conditions subsequent, not as precedent conditions.
- Headnote 9
The Iowa grant reserves the right to resume lands not yet disposed of, indicating a condition subsequent. Accordingly, the railroad’s failure to finish the road does not invalidate the title it already received for the advance sections.
- Headnote 10
The Court examined whether the congressional grant permitted the railroad to sell land before construction began. It concluded that the express language of the Act created an exception for a fixed number of advance sections, removing the usual construction condition for those sections.
- Headnote 11
Defendants argued that the twenty‑mile road‑completion requirement applied to all land. The Court held that the statutory language limited that condition to the sections sold after the advance sections, preserving the advance‑section exemption.
- Headnote 12
The Court addressed whether the advance sections had to be taken only from lands next to the eastern end of the line. It found the statute merely required the sections to fall within the prescribed corridor, allowing selection anywhere inside it.
- Headnote 13
The dispute turned on whether the Iowa grant gave the railroad a future interest conditional on building the line. The Court held that the language ‘in prcesenii’ created an immediate fee‑simple estate, transferring title at the grant’s issuance.
- Headnote 14
Defendants claimed that the state’s reservation of the right to resume the land was a precedent condition that barred title passage. The Court read the reservation as a condition subsequent, so the railroad’s title remained valid despite incomplete construction.
- Headnote 15
The Act of May 15, 1856 said the United States ‘authorized a sale of one hundred and twenty sections in advance of the construction of any part of the road.’ The Court held that this language permits the advance sections to be conveyed prior to construction.
- Headnote 16
Only the sale of the remaining sections was subject to the condition that twenty miles of railroad be completed, as the statute expressly limited that condition to land sold after construction.
- Headnote 17
The Iowa grant of July 14, 1856 was a grant in prcesenii, which, according to the Court, passed title to the railroad immediately and was not dependent on any precedent condition.
- Headnote 18
The Court explained that the state’s reservation to resume lands ‘as to such lands as at the time of the resumption had not been previously disposed of’ creates a condition subsequent, preserving the railroad’s title even if the road is not completed.
- Headnote 19
The statute placed no limit on whether the sections were taken from the eastern terminus, western terminus, or any central portion, provided they fell within the twenty‑mile‑wide corridor.
- Headnote 20
The May 15, 1856 act authorized the sale of one‑hundred‑and‑twenty advance sections before construction, while the requirement that twenty continuous miles be completed applied only to the remaining sections.
- Headnote 21
Congress allowed the advance sections to be taken from any land within the twenty‑mile corridor, whether at the eastern end, western end, or any central portion of the line.
- Headnote 22
The Iowa act of July 14, 1856 granted land in prcesenii, and the reservation of the right to resume the land shows the grant was a present transfer, with later conditions deemed subsequent rather than precedent.
Opinion
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
The question for determination is, whether the plaintiff took a good title to the lands in controversy under the conveyance from the first company, the Iowa Central Air-Line Railroad Company, or whether that title is vested in the last company, the Iowa Railroad Land Company.
It is contended by the defendants, first, that under the act of Congress of May 15th, 1856, no lands could be sold by the, State until twenty continuous miles of the road were constructed; second, that if one hundred and twenty sections could be sold in advance' of such construction, they could only be taken from lands adjoining the line of the road from its commencement on the east; and third, that the grant by the State to the first company was upon conditions precedent, which not having been complied with, the title did not pass. Neither of these positions can, in our judgment, be maintained. The act of Congress by its express language authorized a sale of.one hundred and twenty sections in advance of the construction of any part of the road. It was only as to the sale of the remaining sections that the provision requiring a previous completion of twenty miles applied. It is true it was the sole object of the grant to aid in the construction of the railroad, and for that purpose the sale of the land was only allowed, as the road was completed in divisions, except as to one hundred and twenty sections.
The evident intention of Congress in making this exception was to furnish aid for such preliminary work as would be required before the construction of any part of the road. No conditions, therefore, of any kind were imposed upon the State in the disposition of this quantity, Congress relying upon the good faith of the State to see that its proceeds were applied for the purposes contemplated by the act.
Nor was there any restriction upon the State as to the place where the one hundred and twenty sections should be selected along the line of the road, except that they should be included within a continuous length of twenty miles on each side. They might be selected from lands adjoining the eastern end of the road or the western end, or along the central portion.
The act of Congress of May 15th, 1856, was a grant to the State in prcesenii; it passed a title to the odd sections designated, to be afterwards located. When the line of the road was fixed, and the location of the odd sections thus became certain, the title of the State acquired precision, and at once attached to the land. And the act of the State of July 14th, 1856, was also a grant in prcesenii to the first railroad company. That company took the title and interests of the State upon the terms, conditions, and restrictions expressed in the act of Congress. The further conditions as to the completion of the road imposed by.the State were conditions subsequent and not conditions precedent, as contended by the defendants. The terms, in which the right is reserved by the act of the State to resume the lands granted, imply what the previous language of the act declares, that a present transfer was made, and not one dependent upon conditions to be previously performed. The right is by them restricted to such lands as at the time of the resumption had not been previously disposed of. The resumption, therefore, of the grant by the failure of the first company to complete the road did not impair the title to the lands, which the act of Congress authorized to be sold in advance of such completion, and which were sold by that company.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff took a good, title to* the premises in controversy by his conveyance from that company. The judgment of the court below is, therefore,
Affirmed.