Hampton v. Rouse
1874 U.S. LEXIS 1269 · 22 L. Ed. 755 · 22 Wall. 263 · 89 U.S. 263
February 18, 1875 · Docket 144
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
The court noted that the Act expressly states that title remains unchanged before the authorized assignment, and that the title stays with the bankrupt until the assignee is appointed and the conveyance is made, preventing automatic divestiture.
- Headnote 2
The opinion observed that, without any further act, the decree does not discharge debts or strip the debtor of ownership, because the statute contains no language authorizing such divestiture.
- Headnote 3
Citing Barnet v. Hunter, the court held that a third‑person’s act for the benefit of the owner is valid when ratified, and therefore such an offer can be considered a tender of redemption.
- Headnote 4
The court relied on Tracy v. Irwin, explaining that the commissioners’ waiver makes a relative’s payment sufficient even without a formal offer, fulfilling statutory tender obligations.
- Headnote 5
The opinion found the instruction contrary to the Fourteenth Section, stating that such an instruction improperly directs the jury and must be disregarded.
- Headnote 6
The court emphasized that the evidence of the April 10 offer, made before the assignee’s appointment, should have been submitted to the jury unimpeded, and the improper instruction demanded reversal.
- Headnote 7
The court contrasted the former Act’s third‑section provision, which deemed property divested ipso facto, with the present statute that preserves title until the assignee receives the deed.
- Headnote 8
The Court explains that the Fourteenth Section of the Bankruptcy Act preserves the debtor’s title and redemption right until the statutory conditions of appointment, qualification, and execution of an assignment are satisfied.
- Headnote 9
The statutory language cited by the Court makes clear that title does not shift until the assignment is made, but the court retains equitable power to prevent unauthorized disposition.
- Headnote 10
The Court finds the instruction given to the jury inconsistent with the Fourteenth Section and therefore a reversible error that overrides the factual issues presented.
- Headnote 11
The record showed a redeemer’s offer made before an assignee was qualified; the Court held that the jury should have considered this evidence without the restrictive instruction.
- Headnote 12
Citing Barnet v. Hunter, the Court holds that a third‑person’s act for the benefit of the owner becomes effective when the owner ratifies it, allowing the offer to be considered a tender of redemption.
- Headnote 13
Relying on Tracy v. Irwin, the Court notes that a commissioner’s announcement waiving owner‑only tender makes a relative’s or agent’s payment sufficient to satisfy the tax lien.
- Headnote 14
The Court contrasts the old Act’s automatic divestiture provision with the new statutory scheme that retains title until an assignee is appointed and a conveyance executed.
- Headnote 15
The Court examined the language of the Fourteenth Section, which expressly provides that title remains unchanged before any assignment or conveyance, and held that no divestiture occurs until the statutory steps are completed.
- Headnote 16
The opinion states that, without an assignee’s appointment and conveyance, the decree alone lacks the effect of discharging debts or stripping the bankrupt of title or redemption rights.
- Headnote 17
Relying on Barnet v. Hunter, the Court treated the agent’s April 10, 1869 offer as a valid tender, presuming ratification by the bankrupt owner.
- Headnote 18
The Court applied Tracy v. Irwin, noting that a commissioner’s announcement waiving owner‑only tender makes a relative’s or agent’s payment sufficient.
- Headnote 19
The Court found the instruction to be erroneous and a reversible error, as the statute requires an assignee’s appointment before title is transferred.
- Headnote 20
The opinion held that the offer of redemption should have been presented to the jury, untrammeled by instructions that the debtor had lost his ownership and redemption rights.
- Headnote 21
The Court contrasted the former Act’s automatic divestiture with the current Act’s requirement that title remain with the debtor until an assignee is appointed and the conveyance executed.
- Headnote 22
The Court held that under the Fourteenth Section of the Bankruptcy Act, a decree alone has no effect on the debtor’s ownership or on his statutory right to redeem the property.
- Headnote 23
The Court pointed to the language of the Fourteenth Section, which preserves the debtor’s estate until the assignee is appointed, qualified, and the conveyance is made, at which point title passes to the assignee.
- Headnote 24
The Court found that such an instruction improperly directed the verdict, contradicting the Fourteenth Section which does not support divestiture prior to an assignment.
- Headnote 25
The record showed a proper offer made before an assignee was appointed; the Court held that such evidence should have been presented to the jury without the restrictive instruction.
- Headnote 26
Citing Barnet v. Hunter, the Court treated the agent’s offer as a valid tender on the debtor’s behalf when ratified.
- Headnote 27
The Court applied the rule from Tracy v. Irwin, holding that the commissioner’s waiver makes a third‑person’s tender sufficient.
- Headnote 28
The Court contrasted the former Act’s automatic divestiture provision with the new statutory scheme that retains title with the debtor until an assignee is appointed and the conveyance executed.
- Headnote 29
The Court examined the Fourteenth Section of the Bankruptcy Act, concluding that the statutory language preserves the debtor's ownership and redemption rights pending formal assignment, and rejected the view that the decree alone effects divestiture.
- Headnote 30
The opinion held that such an instruction improperly directed the jury’s verdict, because the statutory scheme does not support divestiture before an assignee is appointed.
- Headnote 31
Citing Barnet v. Hunter, the Court recognized that a third‑person’s act for the benefit of the owner is valid when the owner ratifies it, allowing such an offer to be considered a tender of redemption.
- Headnote 32
The Court applied the rule from Tracy v. Irwin, noting that the commissioners’ announcement operates as a waiver, making a relative’s or agent’s payment sufficient.
- Headnote 33
The opinion contrasted the old statutory rule—automatic loss of property at decree—with the present statute, which preserves title until an assignee is appointed and the deed executed.
- Headnote 34
The Court found that the offer made on April 10, 1869, predates the assignee’s appointment and should have been left to the jury’s consideration, unhindered by improper instructions.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
It appears by the record that the otter to redeem was made by the agent of the owner on the 10th of April, 1869, less than two years from the sale. This was within proper time, as allowed by law.
It is clear that a decree in bankruptcy, without more, will not, under the Bankrupt Act, which in the first part of its eleventh section provides for the decree, have the effect to discharge the debts of the petitioner nor to divest him of the title to either his real or personal estate. And argument is hardly necessary to show that none of the proceedings contemplated in- any part of the eleventh section, or those directed in the twelfth, have that effect, as neither of the sections contains any language whatever to import or indicate that anything of the kind was intended by the framers of the act.
Conclusive support to this view, if any be needed, is derived from the fourteenth section of the act. Prior to the assignment and conveyance authorized and directed by that section, the title, whatever it be, of the estate belonging to the debtor, both real and personal, remains unchanged, except'that the court, in certain cases, may in the meantime restrain the debtor or any other person, by injunction, from making any transfer or disposition of any part of the same, not excepted from the operation of the act.
Sufficient appears in the sections of the act referred to, when considered in connection with the admissions and other evidence exhibited in the record, to show beyond doubt that the instruction of the court under discussion is erroneous, and that the error was of a character to supersede every question of fact submitted to the jury. •
Plenary evidence was given that the offer to redeem, as exhibited in the transcript, was made on the 10th of April, 1869, and the assignee of the estate of the bankrupt was not appointed and qualified as such until the 19th of April in the same year, and the testimony reported shows that the bankrupt was in the possession of the premises and that he ever after continued in the possession of the same to the present time.
Whether or not the evidence introduced to prove that an offer to redeem the premises was made at the time was sufficient to avail the defendant as equivalent to a tender, it is not necessary at the present time to decide, but the court is of the opinion that it was of such a character, in view of a recent decision of this court, that it ought to have been submitted to the jury, untrammelled by a prior instruction, which in substance and effect amounted to a direction to the jury that their verdict must be for the plaintiff.
Such an offer to redeem it was held, in the case of Barnet v. Hunter, * might be made by the owner or by an agent or by any person willing to act for the’party interested, upon the ground that an act done by a third person for the benefit of another is valid if ratified either expressly or by implication, and that such ratification will be presumed in furtherance of justice. Since that time it has also been decided, in the case of Tracy v. Irwin, † that if the tax commissioners announce that they will not receive the payment of the taxes in such cases unless tendered by the owner, that a formal offer by another to pay is unnecessary, that it is enough if a relative of the owner went to the office of the commissioners to see after the payment of the tax, even though he made no formal offer to pay, because such an announcement is in effect a waiver of a tender by the commissioners, they having declined to receive payment unless the tender is made by the owner in person.
Apply that rule to the case and it is clear that the evidence introduced by the defendants tending to show an offer to redeem the premises should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions. Instructions of the kind, however, would have been useless after the jury had been told that the defendant ceased to be the owner of the land, and that he lost his right to redeem the same when he was adjudged a bankrupt, it appearing that the decree was entered before the offer to redeem was made, as assumed by both parties.
Enough appears in the language of the fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act to demonstrate the proposition that the instruction of the Circuit Court in that regard was incorrect, nor is the question affected in the least by the fact that the same section provides that such assignment or conveyance shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings, as the instrument of assignment cannot operate either retrospectively or prospectively before it is executed. Until an assignee is appointed and qualified and the conveyance or assignment is made to him, the title to the property, whatever it be, remains in the bankrupt, which is the plain meaning of the fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act. * Different regulations in that respect were enacted in the former Bankrupt A.ct, as the third section of that act provided that “all the property and rights of property, of every name and nature, of the bankrupt, not excepted from the operation of the act, . . . shall, by mere operation of law ipso facto, from the time of such decree, be deemed to be divested out of such bankrupt, without any other act, assignment, or other conveyance whatsoever.” † Unlike the old act, the existing act makes it the duty of the court, or, where there is no opposing interest, of the register, by an instrument under his hand, to assign and convey to the assignee all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt, and the rule is that such a conveyance or assignment divests the bankrupt of the whole of his property, except what is exempted from the operation of the Bankrupt Act, and vests the title to the same in the assignee, but the record in this case shows that no assignee had been appointed when the alleged offer to redeem was made, which affords a demonstration that the charge of the court that he had ceased to be the owner of the land and thereby lost his right to redeem was improper, being equivalent to a direction to the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff. *
Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to issue
A new venire.
9 Wallace, 338.
18 Wallace, 550.
Sutherland v. Davis, 42 Indiana, 28.
5 Stat. at Large, 443 ; Ex parte Newhall, 2 Story, 362; Oakey v. Bennett, 11 Howard, 44.
Wright v. Johnson, 4 National Bankrupt Register, 627; Same Case, 8 Blatchford, 150; Bump on Bankruptcy (7th ed.), 22.