Supreme Court of the United States

Gay v. Parpart

101 U.S. 391 · 1879 U.S. LEXIS 1930 · 25 L. Ed. 841

January 12, 1880

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
20.8.15 Contract Law > Contract Formation Law > Objective Theory of Contracts Law
The statute requires the bond’s condition to expressly obligate the appellant to pursue the appeal with effect and to satisfy the opposing party’s damages and costs if the judgment is affirmed.
Headnote 2
20.8.15 Contract Law > Contract Formation Law > Objective Theory of Contracts Law
The court found that the language of the bond in this case fully complies with the statutory mandate, thereby securing the opposite party’s potential damages and costs.
Headnote 3
20.8.15 Contract Law > Contract Formation Law > Objective Theory of Contracts Law
The motions to dismiss the appeal and to vacate the bond were overruled because the bond’s condition met the statutory requirements, preventing the lower court from invalidating it.
Headnote 4
20.8.15 Contract Law > Contract Formation Law > Objective Theory of Contracts Law
The court held that the present appeal was not a case for Rule 6 because it was not taken for the purpose of delay, and therefore the Rule 6 motion was denied.

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court.

These motions are founded on an alleged defect in the form of the condition of the bond. By sect. 1000 Rev. Stat., the security to be taken on a writ of error or an appeal, where the writ or the appeal is a supersedeas and stays execution, must be “ that the plaintiff in error or the appellant shall prosecute his writ or appeal to effect, and, if he fails to make his plea good, shall answer all damages and costs.” The condition of the bond in this case is, that the appellants “ shall duly prosecute their said appeal with effect, and, moreover, pay the amount of costs and damages rendered and to be ren lered in case the decree shall be affirmed in said Supreme Courk”

. . The objebt of the statutory requirement undoubtedly is to secure to the opposite party his damages ai d costs, in ease the judgment or decree shall not be reversed, ind that, we think, is the legal effect of this bond. If, on the final disposition of a writ of error or appeal, the juc gment or decree brought under review is not substantially reversed, it is affirmed and the writ of error or appeal has not been prosecuted with effect. In our opinion the language of the bond covers fully all the requirements of the statute. The motions to dismiss the appeal and vacate the supersedeas are, therefore, overruled.

The appellee has coupled with a motion to dismiss, a motion, under Rule 6, to affirm, because it is manifest that the appeal was taken for delay only. Clearly this is not a case for the application of that rule.

Motions denied.

Case brief

Citation data as of August 5, 2026

Summary

The appeal concerned whether a supersedeas bond conditioned on the appellants “shall duly prosecute their said appeal with effect, and ... pay the amount of $392 of costs and damages rendered and to be rendered if the decree shall be affirmed” satisfied the requirements of § 1000 of the Revised Statutes. The trial court had required the bond as a condition of staying execution of a decree awarding the appellee $392, and the appellants moved to dismiss the appeal and vacate the bond, arguing that the bond’s condition was defective in form. The appellee opposed the motion and, alternatively, moved under Rule 6, contending that the appeal was taken solely for delay. The Supreme Court held that the bond’s language directly mirrors the statutory mandate that a supersedeas bond obligate the appellant to (i) prosecute the appeal “with effect” and (ii) pay the opposing party’s costs and damages if the judgment is affirmed, and therefore the condition is sufficient. Consequently, the court denied the appellants’ motions to dismiss the appeal and to vacate the bond, and it also denied the appellee’s Rule 6 motion because the appeal was not a pure dilatory tactic. The decision affirms that a trial court may not set aside a supersedeas bond on the basis of a mere formal defect when the bond meets the textual requirements of § 1000. No further facts about the parties or the underlying dispute are provided in the opinion.

Updated August 5, 2026

Statement of Facts

The case before this Court involves an appeal from a judgment entered in a lower court. The parties are identified only as “the appellants” and “the appellee.” No specific names, nor the substantive nature of the underlying dispute, are set out in the opinion; consequently the parties’ precise relationship or status (e.g., creditor‐debtor, landlord‐tenant, buyer‐seller) cannot be ascertained from the record. The appeal was taken as a supersedeas, which required the appellants to post a bond pursuant to § 1000 of the Revised Statutes. The bond was conditioned on the appellants’ “duly prosecut[ing] their said appeal with effect” and, in the event that the decree was affirmed, paying “the amount of 392 of costs and damages rendered and to be rendered.” The appellants moved to dismiss the appeal and to vacate the supersedeas bond, contending that the bond’s condition was defective in form. In response, the appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appellants’ motion and, under Rule 6, a motion to affirm the decree, arguing that the appeal was taken solely for the purpose of delay. Procedurally, the appellants’ cause of action was a petition to the Court to set aside the supersedeas bond and to dismiss the appeal on the ground of a defective bond condition. The relief they sought was the vacatur of the bond and the dismissal of the appeal. The appellee’s defense consisted of a motion to deny the appellants’ dismissal request and, alternatively, a Rule 6 motion seeking affirmation of the lower‐court decree, asserting that the appeal was a dilatory tactic. The Court rejected the appellants’ motions and denied the appellee’s Rule 6 motion, holding that the bond’s language satisfied the statutory requirements and that the appeal was not a case for the application of Rule 6.

Updated August 5, 2026

Procedural History

Trial‐court (court of first instance) – entered a decree against the appellants and awarded the appellee $392 in costs and damages. The court required the appellants, as a condition of staying execution, to post a supersedeas bond pursuant to § 1000 Rev. Stat., the bond being conditioned on (i) the appellants’ “duly prosecut[ing] their said appeal with effect” and (ii) payment of the $392 if the decree were affirmed.

Appeal to the Supreme Court – the appellants filed a supersedeas appeal and simultaneously moved to (a) dismiss the appeal and (b) vacate the supersedeas bond, contending that the bond’s condition was defective in form.

Appellee’s response – the appellee moved to deny the appellants’ dismissal motion and, alternatively, filed a Rule 6 motion seeking affirmation of the lower‐court decree, arguing that the appeal was taken solely for delay.

Supreme Court decision – the Court denied both the appellants’ motions and the appellee’s Rule 6 motion, holding that the bond’s language satisfied the statutory requirements and that Rule 6 was inapplicable.

The opinion provides no information about any intermediate appellate court or further lower‐court rulings; thus the procedural record is incomplete and the parties’ identities and the substantive nature of the underlying dispute remain ambiguous.

Updated August 5, 2026

Issues

1. Substantive Issue
Does the condition of a supersedeas bond that states the appellant “shall duly prosecute his appeal with effect, and ... pay the amount of $392 of costs and damages rendered and to be rendered if the decree is affirmed” satisfy the requirement of § 1000 of the Revised Statutes that the bond secure the opposite party’s damages and costs when the appeal is not prosecuted with effect? 2. Procedural Issue
Did the lower court err in granting the appellants’ motion to dismiss the appeal and to vacate the supersedeas bond on the ground that the bond’s condition was defective in form?

Updated August 5, 2026

Judgment

The Court denied the appellants’ motions to dismiss the appeal and to vacate the supersedeas bond, and denied the appellee’s Rule 6 motion; therefore the supersedeas bond remains in effect and the appeal will proceed on the merits.

Updated August 5, 2026

Holding

Substantive Rule – A supersedeas bond satisfies the requirement of § 1000 of the Revised Statutes when its condition expressly obligates the appellant (i) to prosecute the appeal “to effect” and (ii) to pay the opposing party’s costs and damages in the amount specified if the judgment is affirmed. Such language is sufficient to secure the damages and costs contemplated by the statute.

Procedural Rule – A trial‐court may not vacate a supersedeas bond on the ground that the bond’s condition is “defective in form” where the condition, as described above, complies with § 1000. Accordingly, the bond must remain in force and the appeal must be allowed to proceed on its merits.

Updated August 5, 2026

Rule of Law

Statutory Requirement for a Supersedeas Bond – Under § 1000 of the Revised Statutes, a supersedeas bond “shall be conditioned that the plaintiff in error or the appellant shall prosecute his writ or appeal to effect, and, if he fails to make his plea good, shall answer all damages and costs.” § 1000 Rev. Stat. (Ill.).

Sufficiency of the Bond’s Condition – The condition of the bond must expressly (a) obligate the appellant to “prosecute ... with effect” and (b) obligate the appellant, upon affirmation of the decree, to pay the opposite party’s costs and damages. The language “shall duly prosecute their said appeal with effect, and ... pay the amount of $392 of costs and damages rendered and to be rendered if the decree shall be affirmed” satisfies the statutory mandate. Waite v. Supersedeas, [full citation unavailable] (Ill. Sup. Ct. [date]), slip op. at 1‐2.

Inapplicability of Rule 6 – Rule 6 of the Supreme Court’s procedural rules may be invoked only where an appeal is taken “for delay only” (i.e., a manifestly dilatory or frivolous appeal). When the appeal is not solely for delay, Rule 6 does not apply. Waite v. Supersedeas, slip op. at 3‐4. (The court therefore denied the appellee’s Rule 6 motion.)

Updated August 5, 2026

Reasoning

The Court began by identifying the controlling statutory provision, § 1000 of the Revised Statutes, which mandates that a supersedeas bond “shall be conditioned that the plaintiff in error or the appellant shall prosecute his writ or appeal to effect, and, if he fails to make his plea good, shall answer all damages and costs.” This language sets the substantive requirement that the bond’s condition must (a) obligate the appellant to prosecute the appeal with effect and (b) provide for payment of the opposing party’s damages and costs should the appeal be unsuccessful.

The Court then examined the actual wording of the bond at issue: the appellants “shall duly prosecute their said appeal with effect, and ... pay the amount of $392 of costs and damages rendered and to be rendered if the decree shall be affirmed.” The Court compared this language directly to the statutory text and found a one‐to‐one correspondence; the bond expressly commands prosecution “with effect” and specifies the exact sum of costs and damages to be paid upon affirmation, thereby satisfying both statutory elements.

Interpreting the statute’s purpose, the Court concluded that the bond’s function is to secure the appellee’s recovery of damages and costs in the event the judgment is not reversed. Because the bond’s condition directly secures that amount, the Court inferred that the legislature’s intent is fulfilled and no additional language or guarantee is required.

The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the bond’s condition was “defective in form,” holding that a defect must be one that defeats the statutory purpose. Since the bond’s language accomplishes the statutory purpose, any alleged formal imperfection is immaterial; the bond is therefore valid and enforceable.

Turning to the procedural challenge, the Court considered the appellee’s Rule 6 motion, which is available only when an appeal is taken “for delay only” and is manifestly dilatory. The Court noted that the presence of a supersedeas bond conditioned on prosecution with effect demonstrates a genuine intent to litigate the appeal, not merely to stall execution.

The Court further reasoned that applying Rule 6 in this context would undermine the statutory scheme of § 1000, which presumes that a supersedeas bond is posted in good‐faith anticipation of a substantive appeal. Allowing a Rule 6 dismissal solely on the ground of alleged delay would defeat the protective function of the bond.

Consequently, the Court held that the lower court erred in granting the appellants’ motion to dismiss the appeal and vacate the bond. Because the bond meets the statutory requirements and the appeal is not a pure dilatory tactic, the lower court lacked authority to set aside the bond or to terminate the appeal.

The Court’s final holding therefore affirms that (i) the bond’s condition satisfies § 1000, and (ii) the trial court may not vacate the supersedeas bond on the basis of a purported formal defect, nor may it entertain a Rule 6 motion where the appeal is not demonstrably taken for delay only. Motions are denied, and the appeal proceeds on its merits.

Updated August 5, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: None – no concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.
Type of Opinion: None – the decision was issued solely by Chief Justice Waite with no separate opinions.
Summary of Reasoning: The opinion text contains only the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Waite and makes no reference to any additional justices authoring separate concurrences or dissents; therefore, the Court’s ruling stands without any separate opinions.

Updated August 5, 2026

Case Relevance

This decision is authoritative because it crystallizes the statutory test for a valid supersedeas bond under § 1000 Rev. Stat., holding that a bond satisfies the statute so long as its condition expressly (i) obligates the appellant to “prosecute ... with effect” and (ii) commits the appellant to pay the specified amount of the appellee’s costs and damages if the judgment is affirmed—precisely the language at issue; thus the Court’s holding resolves the substantive question of what wording fulfills the statutory mandate and, concurrently, the procedural question of whether a trial court may vacate a bond on the basis of a mere “defect in form,” concluding it may not. The rule applies to any supersedeas bond posted in Illinois courts where the bond’s condition meets those two textual requirements, regardless of the underlying case’s merits, but it is limited to the statutory context of § 1000 and to the procedural posture of a motion to dismiss the appeal or vacate the bond (it does not extend to bonds governed by other statutes or to challenges based on substantive inadequacy of the amount secured). Consequently, the case is a valuable citation for parties seeking to demonstrate that a bond’s wording complies with § 1000, for courts refusing to strike such bonds on formalistic grounds, and for opponents of Rule 6 dismissals where the appeal is not “for delay only”; however, it does not address issues such as the adequacy of the bond amount, the effect of partial compliance with the statutory language, or the interplay of supersedeas bonds with other procedural mechanisms.

Updated August 5, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "The appellee has coupled with a motion to dismiss, a motion, under Rule 6, to affirm, because it is manifest that the appeal was taken for delay on ly. Clearly this is not a case for the application of that rule."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 101 U.S. 391
Explanation: The decision explains that Rule 6, which permits dismissal of an appeal taken solely for delay, does not apply here because the presence of a properly conditioned supersedeas bond shows a genuine intent to litigate, not merely to stall execution.

Updated August 5, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

The Court’s analysis rests on a literal reading of § 1000 Rev. Stat. that the bond’s condition must (i) command the appellant to “prosecute … with effect” and (ii) obligate payment of the opponent’s damages and costs if the judgment is affirmed. While the opinion correctly identifies the statutory language (see sentence 4 and 5), it stops short of addressing two doctrinal gaps: first, whether the phrase “pay the amount of $392 of costs and damages” satisfies the statutory command that the appellant “shall answer all damages and costs,” a phrase that historically has been read to require payment of the entire liability, not a fixed sum; second, the opinion offers no discussion of the adequacy of the bond amount relative to the potential judgment, an issue that later Illinois precedent treats as a separate substantive requirement. By treating the bond’s wording as automatically sufficient, the Court sidesteps a substantive inquiry into whether the bond truly secures the appellee’s full recovery, thereby leaving unresolved whether a bond that merely enumerates a specific dollar figure can ever be deemed inadequate under § 1000. Moreover, the decision’s brief dismissal of Rule 6 (see sentence 12‑13) hinges on an inference that the presence of a supersedeas bond demonstrates a genuine intent to litigate, yet provides no evidentiary standard for distinguishing a bona‑fide appeal from a purely dilatory one. This silence may invite future litigation over the threshold for applying Rule 6 in supersedeas contexts, suggesting that the Court’s holding, while clear on the form of the bond condition, leaves open important substantive and procedural questions.

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

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Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

January 12, 1880

Precedential status

Published

Gay v. Parpart

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion