Brooks v. Railroad Co.
102 U.S. 107 · 1880 U.S. LEXIS 2003 · 26 L. Ed. 91
November 18, 1880
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
The Court applied the rule from Public Schools v. Walker, citing earlier authority that a rehearing petition may not be filed after the term in which the judgment was rendered.
- Headnote 2
The opinion explains that at the end of a term the parties are discharged from further attendance and the Court can do no more than correct clerical errors, underscoring the limitation on post‑term rehearing.
- Headnote 3
The Court denied the petition on the ground that it was untimely, noting that such denial does not constitute a reversible error.
- Headnote 4
The Court reiterates the rule first stated in Public Schools v. Walker, emphasizing that any petition filed after that term is procedurally barred.
- Headnote 5
The Court entered a “Motion denied” order, noting that once the term ends the parties are discharged and the Court lacks authority to hear the case again.
- Headnote 6
The opinion explains that beyond the term, the Court’s function is limited to fixing record mistakes, not revisiting substantive issues.
- Headnote 7
The Court reiterated the rule first set out in Public Schools v. Walker and affirmed by Hudson & Smith, holding that the term of judgment is the exclusive window for rehearing petitions.
- Headnote 8
Because the petition was filed after the February Term, the Court held it untimely and entered a denial, emphasizing that the parties are discharged from further attendance after the term expires.
- Headnote 9
The opinion states that once the term ends, the Court may do no more than rectify any clerical mistakes, reaffirming the narrow post‑term remedial power.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
A petition for rehearing after judgment, under the rule promulgated in Public Schools v. Walker (9 Wall. 603), cannot be filed except at the term in which the judgment was rendered; In Hudson & Smith v. Guestier. (7 Cranch, 1), a motion was made at the February Term, 1812, for a rehearing in a case decided two years before; but the court said “ the case could not be reheard after the term In which it was decided.” At thé end of the term, the parties. are discharged from further attendance on all causes decided, and.we have no power to brihg them back. . After that, we can do no more than correct any clerical errors that may be found in the record of what we have done.
In Brown v. Aspden (14 How. 25), where the practice in respect to orders for rearguments was first formally announced, the rule in this particular was not extended, for Mr. Chief Justice Taney was careful to say that the order for reargument might be made after judgment, provided it was entered at the saíne term; and the same limitation is maintained in United States v. Knight’s Administrator, 1 Black, 488. Down to that time such an order could be made only on the application of some member of the court who concurred in the judgment, and this continued until Public Schools v. Walker (supra), when leave was given counsel to submit a petition to the same effect. In all other respects the rule is now substantially the same as it was before this relaxation.
Motion denied.