Shelton v. Van Kleeck

The Court explained that the bill of review is confined to errors of law evident without reference to evidence, rejecting any attempt to set aside a decree on alleged factual mistakes or newly discovered facts.

Specifications of error that are purely factual are not cognizable in a bill of review because factual disputes require reference to the evidence and are outside the jurisdiction of the proceeding.

The Court held that the defendants’ specifications were factual errors, which must be decided by reference to the evidence and therefore cannot be raised in a bill of review.

A demurrer to a bill of review admits only the facts properly pleaded; because factual questions are not open for review, the truth of any alleged fact cannot create a cognizable error.

The opinion noted that a demurrer admits only pleadings, and since questions of fact are excluded from a bill of review, a demurred fact does not establish an error.

A party served with a subpoena who neither pleads, answers, nor demurs is deemed to have confessed (pro confesso) and is bound by the decree as if specifically named in it.

The Court observed that the omission of the defendant’s name from the decree was immaterial because his failure to appear amounted to a confession, binding him to the judgment.

Affidavits or other evidence taken after the decree and not part of the original record cannot be considered on a bill of review to overturn that decree.

The Court ruled that affidavits introduced after confirmation of the sale were not part of the record and therefore could not be used to reverse the decree on a bill of review.

Evidence of newly discovered facts may be cited in a bill of review only to show that the matter was unknown at the time of the original proceeding; such evidence cannot become part of the record for deciding the review.

The Court allowed affidavits to be referenced solely to determine whether the alleged new matter was truly unknown when the original hearing could have raised it, but not as evidence to overturn the decree.

The court held that the bill’s jurisdiction is limited to questions of law evident from the record itself, excluding any reference to factual evidence.

Specifications of error that are purely factual are outside the jurisdiction of a bill of review.

The court found the defendants’ specifications were factual errors that required reliance on evidence, which a bill of review cannot address.

A demurrer admits only facts that are properly pleaded; because factual issues are not reviewable, the truth of any factual allegation cannot create a cognizable error in a bill of review.

Thus, factual assertions in the bill do not constitute a ground for relief, as the court may not re‑examine such facts.

A party served with a subpoena who neither pleads, answers, nor demurs is deemed to have confessed (pro confesso) and is bound by the decree as if specifically named.

The court treated the non‑participating defendant as having accepted the decree, making the judgment binding upon him.

Affidavits or other evidence taken after the decree and not part of the original record cannot be introduced on a bill of review to overturn that decree.

The court excluded post‑decree affidavits from the review, emphasizing that only the original record is admissible.

Post‑decree evidence may be annexed to a bill of review solely to show that a matter was truly new and unknown at the time of the original proceeding, but it does not become part of the record for review.

Such material may be referenced to establish novelty, but it cannot be used to decide the bill.

The court holds that the only questions open for examination on a bill of review are those legal mistakes apparent from the record itself; it cannot consider issues that require reviewing the underlying evidence.

Specifications of error that are purely factual are outside the jurisdiction of a bill of review.

The Court dismissed the bill because each specification alleged a factual mistake, which must be decided by reference to the evidence and therefore cannot be considered in a bill of review.

A demurrer admits only the facts pleaded; because questions of fact are not reviewable, the truth of factual allegations cannot create a cognizable error on a bill of review.

When a demurrer is filed, it admits the pleadings as they stand, and since factual issues are not subject to review, any factual dispute does not constitute an error of law for the bill.

Affidavits or other evidence taken after the decree and not part of the original record cannot be considered on a bill of review to overturn that decree.

The Court held that post‑decree affidavits, although read in a later motion, are not part of the record and therefore may not be used as evidence in a bill of review, though they may be referenced to show when a matter first became known.

A party who is served with a subpoena but neither pleads, answers, nor demurs is deemed to have confessed and is bound by the decree as if specifically named.

The Court applied the doctrine of pro confesso, holding that non‑participation after service of process results in a confession, binding the absent party to the judgment as though his name had appeared in the decree.