Knox County v. Harshman
10 S. Ct. 8 · 132 U.S. 14 · 1889 U.S. LEXIS 1835 · 33 L. Ed. 249
October 28, 1889 · Docket 1212
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
The Court reaffirmed the settled rule that the filing of an appeal does not automatically stay the effect of an injunction or judgment, even when the appeal challenges the decree that dismissed a bill of complaint.
- Headnote 2
Citing Spraul v. Louisiana, the Court explained that the statutory supersedeas provision stays the process for execution of a judgment only upon posting the required bond, not merely by appealing the judgment.
- Headnote 3
The Court held that the decree dismissing the county’s auxiliary bill could not supersede the operative process on the original judgment, because such a bill is not an original action and therefore cannot stay execution.
- Headnote 4
The Court noted that the County’s appeal sought to supersede a judgment and a peremptory mandamus, but the settled rule is that an appeal from such a decree does not disturb the judgment’s operative effect.
- Headnote 5
Citing Spraul v. Louisiana, the Court explained that the supersedeas provision stays process for execution of the judgment only upon bond posting, and observed that no bond had been given here, so the judgment remained enforceable.
- Headnote 6
The Court held that the county’s bill to restrain collection was an auxiliary proceeding, and such a decree cannot supersede the process on the judgment at law, so the judgment could be executed despite the bill’s dismissal.
- Headnote 7
The Court explained that a dissolved injunction requires a fresh exercise of judicial power, and the mere prosecution of an appeal cannot serve as an injunction where none has been granted.
Opinion
after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant’s counsel contends that the appeal taken and perfected from the decree dismissing his client’s bill of complaint operated, or should be made to operate, to supersede the judgment, in collection of which the peremptory writ of mandamus was awarded. That judgment was recovered on the 28th day of Maroh, 1881, and no proceedings in error have ever been taken, and no bond given to supersede its operation. An alternative writ of mandamus was sued out, the cause shown by the county court and its judges against granting the peremptory writ was disposed of by this court on writ of error, and the peremptory writ was directed to be issued. The county of Knox then filed its bill in equity to restrain the collection of the judgment as commanded, No preliminary injunction was granted, and upon final hearing the bill was dismissed, and a decree passed against the county for costs,
The'general rule is well settled that an appeal from a decree granting, refusing, • or dissolving an injunction, does not disturb its operative effect. Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 161; Slaughter-House Cases, 10 Wall. 273, 297; Leonard v. Ozark Land Co., 115 U. S. 465, 468.
When an injunction has been dissolved, it cannot be revived except by a new exercise of judicial power; and fio'appeal by ’ the dissatisfied party can of itself revive it. A' fortiori, the mere prosecution of an appeal cannot operate as an injunction where none has been granted.
As stated by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in Spraul v. Louisiana, 123 U. S. 516, 518, “The supersedeas provided for in § 1007 of the Revised Statutes stays process for the execution of the judgment or decree brought under revi iw by the writ of error or appeal to which it belongs.”
The supersedure of process on the decree dismissing the bill' could not supersede process on the judgment at law, and this is so, notwithstanding a bill to impeach a judgment is regarded as an auxiliary or dependent and no' as an original bill.
The record presents no ground for the interference sought, and
The motion n ,ust be overruled.