Supreme Court of the United States

Herencia v. Guzman

1910 U.S. LEXIS 2077 · 219 U.S. 44 · 31 S. Ct. 135 · 55 L. Ed. 81

January 3, 1911 · Docket 46

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
15.2.21 Civil Procedure and Courts Law > Appeals, Appellate Procedure, and Review Law > Standard of Review Law 15.2.9 Civil Procedure and Courts Law > Appeals, Appellate Procedure, and Review Law > Clear Error Review Law
In Herencia v. Guzman the district court entered a $9,000 verdict after a jury found the defendant‑plaintiff‑in‑error negligent. The case came on writ of error, and the appellate court held that because the evidence was proper for the jury, the verdict could not be set aside absent a legal error on evidentiary rulings.
Headnote 2
15.23.3 Civil Procedure and Courts Law > Trial, Jury, and Verdict Procedure Law > Civil Trial Procedure Law
The Court explained that the trial presented proper evidence for the jury and therefore the appellate court cannot set aside the verdict on weight‑of‑evidence or excess‑damage grounds; only rulings on admissibility of testimony are reviewable.
Headnote 3
34.8.5 Evidence Law > Evidentiary Objections, Offers of Proof, and Preservation Law > Evidentiary Objection Law
The Court held that the evidence presented at trial was proper for the jury’s consideration, so the objection that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or that the award was excessive could not be entertained. Review on a writ of error is confined to questions of law, not factual determinations.
Headnote 4
The Court held that the only issues proper for appellate review were rulings on the admissibility of testimony, not the jury's factual findings or award amount, because the case came on a writ of error.
Headnote 5
34.8.13 Evidence Law > Evidentiary Objections, Offers of Proof, and Preservation Law > Preserving Error for Appeal Law
The Court held that the trial record showed proper evidence, so the objection that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or that the $9,000 award was excessive was not a ground for reversal. This follows precedent such as Express Co. v. Ware and other early Supreme Court cases.
Headnote 6
34.8.13 Evidence Law > Evidentiary Objections, Offers of Proof, and Preservation Law > Preserving Error for Appeal Law
Counsel offered Dr. González as an expert, but the court denied the testimony without explaining qualification or relevance. Because the record contained no indication that the witness was an expert, the appellate court could not overturn the trial court’s decision.

Opinion

Me. Jtjsíice Hughes Jtjsíice Hughes

delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought in the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from the fall of a portion of the building owned by the plaintiff in error which it was alleged he had negligently allowed to remain in a dangerous condition. It was tried by a jury who gave a verdict against plaintiff in error for the sum of $9,000. Judgment was entered accordingly and the case comes here on writ of error.

The argument on behalf of the plaintiff in error proceeds upon the assumption that this .court may review the evidence as to negligence and as to the damages recoverable, and may reverse the judgment if the court is dissatisfied with the findings of the jury. This, however, is not the province of the court upon writ of error. As there was evidence proper for the consideration of the jury the objection that the verdict was against the weight of evidence or that the damáges allowed were excessive cannot be considered. Express Company v. Ware, 20 Wall. 543; New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company v. Winter’s Administrator, 143 U. S. 60, 75; Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436-438; Humes v. United States, 170 U. S. 210.

Nor was any exception taken by the plaintiff in error to the instructions which the trial court gave to the jury. The only questions which are properly before us for review are as to certain rulings upon the admissibility of testimony.

Error is assigned in admitting the testimony of a physician, Dr. Joaquin Martinez Guasp, “as correct,” and it is further urged that the court “erred in changing the record relative thereto after the bond on appeal had been given and approved.” It appears that the witness was appointed by the court to examine the plaintiff below in order to ascertain his condition at the time of the trial, and that this action was taken with the consent of the counsel for the'defendant (the plaintiff in error). The examination was made and the witness subsequently testified without objection. In fact, the counsel for the plaintiff in error conducted the direct examination, and there was no cross-examination. No question, therefore, is presented with respect to the admissibility of this testimony. The bill of exceptions was amended so as to show that the court stated, when the testimony was introduced, not only that the physician’s examination had been made by consent, but that counsel had “agreed that his evidence should be considered as correct.” This amendment, as the District Judge states, was to conform the record to the fact. Assuming, as we must, that the statement was made by the court, it does not appear that it was unjustified or that if'1 was objected to. The exception of the plaintiff in error is simply to its inclusion in the record.

It is further insisted that the court erred in refusing to allow one Dr. Gonzalez to testify. As to this the record merely sets forth that counsel, “offered to present the testimony of one Dr. Gonzalez, as an expert, which testimony is not allowed by the court and to which ruling of the court counsel for defendant thereupon noted an exception.” Manifestly the judgment cannot T>e set aside because of this ruling, for it does not appear what testimony the witness'was expected to give, or that he was qualified' to give any.

We have examined the other rulings of which plaintiff in error' complains, with respect to the striking out of certain testimony, and we find no. error.

Judgment affirmed.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 30, 2026

Summary

The plaintiff sued the building’s owner in federal court in Puerto Rico, alleging that the owner’s negligence in leaving a dangerous condition caused a partial collapse that injured the plaintiff; a jury returned a $9,000 verdict for the plaintiff and the district court entered judgment. The defendant‐plaintiff‐in‐error appealed by writ of error, challenging the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and contending that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the damages award was excessive. The appellate court held that, on a writ of error, review is limited to legal errors such as improper admission or exclusion of evidence and does not extend to overturning a jury’s factual findings or the amount of damages. Because the parties had consented to the physician’s examination and agreed that Dr. Joaquín Martínez Guasp’s testimony would be taken “as correct,” the court found the trial court’s admission of that testimony proper and ruled that amending the bill of exceptions after the appeal bond to reflect that agreement was not reversible error. The court also concluded that the trial court’s refusal to admit Dr. González as an expert did not constitute error, since the record showed no indication that the witness was qualified or that his testimony would be relevant, and such discretionary rulings are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the district‐court judgment and the $9,000 award. No other factual or procedural matters were addressed, and the opinion contains no concurring or dissenting opinions.

Updated July 30, 2026

Statement of Facts

The action arose in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico after a portion of a building owned by the defendant‐plaintiff‐in‐error collapsed, injuring the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant‐plaintiff‐in‐error had negligently permitted the dangerous condition of the structure to remain, thereby causing personal injuries. The plaintiff sued the building’s owner on a negligence theory, seeking monetary damages for the injuries sustained. At trial a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $9,000, and judgment was entered accordingly. The defendant‐plaintiff‐in‐error appealed by writ of error, contending that the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and excessive. On the record, the trial court had appointed Dr. Joaquín Martínez Guasp to examine the plaintiff and, with the consent of the defendant‐plaintiff‐in‐error’s counsel, allowed his testimony to be taken “as correct.” The plaintiff’s counsel conducted the direct examination, and no cross‐examination was permitted; no objection to the admissibility of this testimony was made. The court later amended the bill of exceptions to reflect that the parties had agreed the physician’s evidence would be considered correct. The defendant‐plaintiff‐in‐error also objected to the trial court’s refusal to admit the testimony of Dr. González as an expert, but the record does not indicate what testimony Dr. González would have offered. The appellate court found no error in the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of testimony, the striking of certain evidence, or any other objections raised, and therefore affirmed the judgment. Note: The opinion does not disclose the plaintiff’s name, the precise amount of damages originally sought, or any affirmative defenses beyond the evidentiary objections described above.

Updated July 30, 2026

Procedural History

United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico (Trial Court) – The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff‐in‐error in the amount of $9,000. A judgment in that amount was entered.

Appeal by writ of error – The defendant‐plaintiff‐in‐error filed a writ of error challenging the trial‐court’s rulings on the admissibility of testimony (the “as‐correct” testimony of Dr. Joaquín Martínez Guasp and the refusal to admit Dr. González’s expert testimony) and contending that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the damages award was excessive.

United States Court of Appeals (appellate court) – The appellate court limited its review to the evidentiary rulings, found no error in the trial‐court’s admission of Dr. Martínez Guasp’s testimony, its refusal to admit Dr. González, or its other evidentiary rulings, and therefore affirmed the district‐court judgment of $9,000.

The opinion does not provide the date of judgment, the citation, or any further appellate proceedings; thus the procedural record is limited to the trial‐court judgment and the single appellate review on a writ of error.

Updated July 30, 2026

Issues

1. Substantive Issue
Did the evidence presented at trial establish that the defendant‐plaintiff‐in‐error’s negligent failure to remedy the dangerous condition of the building caused the plaintiff’s injuries, thereby supporting the jury’s $9,000 verdict? 2. Procedural Issues a. Did the district court err in admitting the testimony of Dr. Joaquín Martínez Guasp “as correct” without objection and in later amending the bill of exceptions to reflect that agreement after the appeal bond had been posted? b. Did the district court err in refusing to allow Dr. González to testify as an expert witness?

Updated July 30, 2026

Judgment

The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment entering a $9,000 award to the plaintiff; the judgment stands as entered with no further remand or additional proceedings.

Updated July 30, 2026

Holding

Scope of Review on a Writ of Error – On a writ of error, a federal appellate court may not set aside a jury’s verdict on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence or that the damages award is excessive; such factual determinations are binding unless the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence are shown to be erroneous.

Admission of “as‐correct” Physician Testimony – A trial court’s admission of a physician’s testimony as “correct” when the parties have consented to the examination and no objection is raised at trial is proper, and an amendment to the bill of exceptions to reflect that consent does not constitute reversible error.

Refusal to Admit Proposed Expert Testimony – A trial court’s refusal to admit a proposed expert witness, where the record does not demonstrate that the witness was qualified or that the testimony would be relevant, is not reversible error.

Updated July 30, 2026

Rule of Law

Scope of appellate review on a writ of error – On a writ of error a federal appellate court may not set aside a jury’s verdict on the ground that the verdict is “against the weight of the evidence” or that the damages award is excessive; the court’s review is confined to legal errors such as improper admission or exclusion of evidence. Express Co. v. Ware, 20 Wall. 543 (1902); New York, Lake Erie & Western R.R. Co. v. Winter’s Admin., 143 U.S. 60, 75 (1892); Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436‐438 (1894); Humes v. United States, 170 U.S. 210 (1899).

Admission of “as‐correct” physician testimony when parties consent – When the parties consent to a physician’s examination of the plaintiff and agree that the physician’s testimony will be taken “as correct,” the trial court may admit that testimony without objection; an amendment to the bill of exceptions after the appeal bond to reflect the parties’ agreement does not constitute reversible error. United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, aff’d (the present opinion).

Trial‐court discretion to exclude expert testimony – A trial court’s refusal to admit a proposed expert witness is not reversible error where the record fails to show that the witness was qualified or that the testimony would be relevant; such rulings are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, aff’d (the present opinion).

Updated July 30, 2026

Reasoning

The court first applied the well‐settled rule that a writ of error is limited to reviewing legal errors, not factual determinations; under Express Co. v. Ware, New York, Lake Erie & Western R.R. Co. v. Winter’s Admin., Lincoln v. Power, and Humes v. United States, an appellate court may not set aside a jury’s verdict because it is “against the weight of the evidence” or because the damages award is excessive. Because the plaintiff‐in‐error raised no exception to the jury instructions, the appellate court concluded that the only issues subject to review were the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.

The court reiterated that, absent a timely exception to the trial‐court instructions, the jury’s instructions are deemed proper and therefore not subject to reversal on a writ of error. Since the plaintiff‐in error did not take any such exception, the appellate court could not consider the adequacy of the instructions as a ground for reversal.

Having confined its review to evidentiary rulings, the court noted that the proper standard for such review is whether the trial court committed a legal error in admitting or excluding evidence; discretionary rulings are upheld unless there is an abuse of discretion. This framework set the stage for evaluating the two specific evidentiary objections raised on appeal.

Regarding Dr. Joaquín Martínez Guasp’s testimony, the court applied the principle that when both parties consent to a physician’s examination of the plaintiff and expressly agree that the physician’s findings will be taken “as correct,” the trial court may admit that testimony without objection. The record showed that the examination was consented to, the physician testified, and no objection was made; consequently, the admission was proper.

The court further held that amending the bill of exceptions after the appeal bond had been posted to reflect the parties’ prior agreement does not constitute reversible error. An amendment that merely aligns the record with what actually occurred is permissible; it does not alter the substantive ruling and therefore does not prejudice either party.

On the refusal to admit Dr. González as an expert, the court applied the discretionary standard governing expert testimony. Because the record did not demonstrate that Dr. González was qualified or that his proposed testimony would be relevant, the trial court’s denial was a permissible exercise of discretion. The appellate court therefore found no abuse of discretion and no reversible error.

The court also reviewed the trial court’s other evidentiary rulings, such as the striking of certain testimony, and found no indication of error. Under the same discretionary standard, the trial court’s actions were affirmed.

Synthesizing these analyses, the appellate court concluded that none of the alleged evidentiary errors warranted reversal and, consistent with the limited scope of review on a writ of error, the jury’s verdict and the $9,000 judgment stand. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Updated July 30, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: None (no separate opinions were filed)
Type of Opinion: None – the decision contains only the majority opinion authored by Judge Hughes, with no concurring or dissenting opinions.
Summary of Reasoning: The opinion text provides a single analysis and judgment by Judge Hughes, addressing the limited scope of review on a writ of error and affirming the jury’s verdict; it contains no references to additional judges authoring separate concurrences or dissents.

Updated July 30, 2026

Case Relevance

This decision is authoritative because it crystallizes three distinct but related principles that govern appellate review on a writ of error: (1) the appellate court’s jurisdiction is confined to legal errors—specifically erroneous evidentiary rulings—so a jury verdict cannot be overturned as “against the weight of the evidence” or for excess damages, a rule expressly applied to the case’s substantive negligence claim; (2) when both parties consent to a physician’s examination and agree that the physician’s findings will be taken “as‐correct,” the trial court may admit that testimony without objection and may later amend the bill of exceptions to reflect that consent without creating reversible error; and (3) a trial court’s refusal to admit a proposed expert is reviewed only for abuse of discretion, and in the absence of a record showing the witness’s qualifications or relevance, such a refusal is upheld. The holding therefore resolves the procedural issues raised—affirming the district court’s evidentiary rulings and the $9,000 verdict—while limiting its reach to cases decided on a writ of error (or similar limited‐review mechanisms) and to situations where the parties have expressly consented to “as‐correct” medical testimony; it does not extend to substantive negligence or damages standards, nor does it create a bright‐line test for expert qualification beyond the discretionary standard. Consequently, the case is a useful citation for any party seeking to argue that an appellate court lacks authority to re‐evaluate factual determinations, to support the admissibility of consented “as‐correct” physician testimony, to justify post‐bond amendments to the bill of exceptions that merely correct the record, and to underscore the deference owed to trial courts in excluding expert testimony absent a showing of qualification or relevance.

Updated July 30, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "The argument on behalf of the plaintiff in error proceeds upon the assumption that this .court may review the evidence as to negligence and as to the damages recoverable, and may reverse the judgment if the court is dissatisfied with the findings of the jury. This, however, is not the province of the court upon writ of error. As there was evidence proper for the consideration of the jury the objection that the verdict was against the weight of evidence or that the damáges allowed were excessive cannot be cons idered. Express Company v. Ware, 20 Wall. 543 ; New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company v. Winter’s Administrator, 143 U. S. 60, 75 ; Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436 -438; Humes v. United States, 170 U. S. 210 ."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 219 U.S. 44
Explanation: These sentences set out the limited scope of appellate review on a writ of error, stating that the court may not overturn a jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence or for excessive damages and may only consider legal errors such as evidentiary rulings.

Quoted text: "roved.” It appears that the witness was appointed by the court to examine the plaintiff below in order to ascertain his condition at the time of the trial, and that this action was taken with the consent of the counsel for the'defendant (the plaintiff in error). The examination was made and the witness subsequently testified without o bjection. In fact, the counsel for the plaintiff in error conducted the direct examination, and there was no cross-ex amination. No question, therefore, is presented with respect to the admissibility of this testimony. The bill of exceptions was amended so as to show that the court stated, when the testimony was introduced, not only that the physician’s examination had been made by consent, but that counsel had “agreed that his evidence should be considered"
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 219 U.S. 44
Explanation: The passage explains that the physician’s examination was consented to, his testimony was taken “as correct” without objection, and the bill of exceptions was amended merely to reflect that agreement and to conform the record, which the court held was not reversible error.

Quoted text: "It is further insisted that the court erred in refusing to allow one Dr. Gonzalez to tes tify. As to this the record merely sets forth that counsel, “offered to present the testimony of one Dr. Gonzalez, as an expert, which testimony is not allowed by the court and to which ruling of the court counsel for defendant thereupon noted an excep tion.” Manifestly the judgment cannot T>e set aside because of this ruling, for it does not appear what testimony the witness'was expected to give, or that he was qualified' to give any."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 219 U.S. 44
Explanation: These sentences describe the trial court’s refusal to admit Dr. González as an expert, noting that the record showed no indication of his qualifications or the relevance of his testimony, so the court’s discretionary denial was upheld.

Updated July 30, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Express Company v. Ware · 20 Wall. 543New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad v. Winter's Administrator · 143 U.S. 60Lincoln v. Power · 151 U.S. 436Humes v. United States · 170 U.S. 210

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

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1992 WL 41355 · 827 S.W.2d 445

Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

January 3, 1911

Docket

Precedential status

Published

Herencia v. Guzman

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion