Briscoe v. Rudolph
1911 U.S. LEXIS 1755 · 221 U.S. 547 · 31 S. Ct. 679 · 55 L. Ed. 848
May 29, 1911 · Docket 141
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
The 1899 Act authorized a one‑half share of damages to be levied on properties within a designated area as a lien, collected in five equal installments. The Court cites precedents that such proportional assessments are a permissible exercise of congressional power over D.C.
- Headnote 2
The Court holds that the act does not on its face require an assessment in excess of benefits and that the record contains no evidence of excessiveness. The issue is therefore a factual determination, not a constitutional defect.
- Headnote 3
The statute provides for a second jury when a party is dissatisfied. The Court finds that the lower court’s refusal to summon such a jury, without a request, does not invalidate the judgment, merely rendering the error subject to correction on review.
- Headnote 4
The bill lacked the required assignment of errors. The Court cites the statutory and procedural mandates and notes that the practice of treating a brief’s statements as sufficient is erroneous.
- Headnote 5
The 1899 act directed that one‑half of the damages be assessed against lands in the improvement district, declared a lien, and collected in five equal installments with interest. The assessment operates as a special improvement tax.
- Headnote 6
The February 10, 1899 act authorized one‑half of the damages for the extension of Rhode Island Avenue to be assessed against lands in a specially designated district, proportionate to the benefit each lot received. The Court held that imposing such a lien is a valid exercise of Congress’s plenary power over the District and does not violate the Takings Clause so long as the statute does not on its face require assessments that exceed the actual benefits.
- Headnote 7
The Court examined the objection that the act required assessments in excess of the special benefits actually received. It found no indication on the face of the statute that the one‑half assessment was excessive, and the record contained no evidence that the $1,000 assessment exceeded the benefit to the appellant. Citing English v. Arizona, the Court held that excessiveness is a factual determination.
- Headnote 8
Section 263 of the Revised Statutes authorizes a second jury of twelve when a party is dissatisfied with the first jury’s verdict. The appellant never moved for a new jury, and the trial court did not order one. The Court said that this failure, while error, does not void the judgment confirming the first jury’s assessment; the judgment remains enforceable unless corrected on error review.
- Headnote 9
The bill contained no “assignment of errors” as required by §§ 997 and 1011 of the Revised Statutes and Rule 35, which is a mandatory prerequisite for an appeal from the District of Columbia’s Supreme Court. Because the statutory requirement was not satisfied, the Court dismissed the bill without prejudice, holding that the defect was jurisdictional and could not be cured by a notice of plain error.
- Headnote 10
The February 10, 1899 act extending Rhode Island Avenue created a special improvement district and required that one‑half of the damages be assessed against lands in the district proportionally to the benefit each received. The Court held the statute’s facial language imposes no excessive assessments and is therefore a valid exercise of congressional power.
- Headnote 11
The Court observed that the act does not on its face require assessments beyond the benefits actually received and that the record contained no evidence of excess. Accordingly, the issue of excessiveness is a factual determination, following English v. Arizona.
- Headnote 12
Section 263 provides that a dissatisfied owner may have a second twelve‑person jury summoned. The Court held that the failure to summon such a jury, without a request from the party, is merely error‑correctable and does not invalidate the judgment confirming the first jury’s assessment.
- Headnote 13
The bill lacked an assignment of errors required by the Revised Statutes and Rule 35. Citing the statutes and Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, the Court held that such omission deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction, warranting dismissal of the appeal.
- Headnote 14
The Court dismissed the bill without prejudice because the required assignment of errors was absent, permitting the appellant to continue the action in the case where the assessment was originally made.
- Headnote 15
The Court upheld the February 10, 1899 act authorizing one‑half of damages to be assessed on lot owners in proportion to the benefit of the Rhode Island Avenue extension, finding Congress’s plenary power over D.C. permits such special districts and assessments when the statute itself is not facially excessive.
- Headnote 16
The Court found no record evidence that the $1,000 assessment exceeded the benefit conferred and held that excessiveness is a factual determination, citing English v. Arizona for the principle that such questions are not constitutional but fact‑based.
- Headnote 17
The Court explained that § 263 provides a procedural right to a second jury only upon a party’s request; the absence of such a request means the trial court’s omission does not invalidate the judgment, merely making it subject to error review.
- Headnote 18
The bill was dismissed because the appellant’s brief contained no proper assignment of errors, contrary to the statutory and rule requirements previously identified in Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph.
- Headnote 19
The Court affirmed the dismissal of the bill without prejudice, allowing the appellant to continue the cancellation proceeding in the original case where the assessment was made.
- Headnote 20
The Court held that the February 10, 1899 act authorizing a half‑damage assessment for owners in the Rhode Island Avenue improvement district was a valid exercise of congressional power, relying on precedents that permit special taxing districts when assessments reflect proportional benefits.
- Headnote 21
The opinion found no record evidence that the $1,000 assessment exceeded the benefit conferred, and therefore the takings claim failed as a matter of fact.
- Headnote 22
The statute requires the marshal to convene a new twelve‑person jury when a dissatisfied owner requests a rehearing of the assessment verdict.
- Headnote 23
The Court explained that the court retained jurisdiction and that the omission to summon a second jury did not invalidate the judgment, only rendered it subject to error correction.
- Headnote 24
The brief contained no proper assignment of errors, and the Court therefore affirmed the lower court’s dismissal on that procedural ground.
- Headnote 25
The lower court’s order dismissed the bill without prejudice, allowing the claimant to pursue the original assessment case once the procedural deficiency was corrected.
- Headnote 26
The Court held that the February 10, 1899 act creating a special assessment district for the Rhode Island Avenue extension was a permissible exercise of congressional power, citing prior cases upholding similar special taxing districts.
- Headnote 27
The Court found no evidence that the $1,000 assessment surpassed the benefit to the appellant’s lot and therefore treated excessiveness as a factual determination, referencing English v. Arizona.
- Headnote 28
Section 263 provides a procedural right to a second jury upon request. The Court held that the failure to order such a jury, without a request, does not invalidate the judgment, only permits correction on an error‑review proceeding.
- Headnote 29
The bill lacked the required assignment of errors, and the Court dismissed it, citing the statutory and procedural mandates and prior decision in Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a bill filed by a lot-owner whose property was subjected to a special assessment for' benefits resulting from the .extension of Rhode Island Avenue in the City of Washington. The object of the bill is to vacate the assessment and enjoin the sale about to be made by the Commissioners of the District.
The case was heard upon the bill, answer and an agreed statement of facts, and was dismissed without prejudice, to proceed in the case in which the assessment had been made for cancellation, if so advised.
The proceeding under which the special assessment, in question was instituted in March, 1899, was in pursuance of authority conferred , by an act of Congress of February 10, 1899, entitled "An act to extend Rhode Island Avenue.” '30 Stat. 834, c. 150. That act provided that one-half of the amount awarded as damages should be assessed against the lands within an area described, as benefits, considering the benefits received by each lot within the area. Such assessments were declared a lien on the lots, severally assessed and were to be collected as special improvement taxes in five equal instalments, with interest at four per cent until paid. The lot owners were not formally notified, but notice was given by publication to all property owners as required by the statute.. Following, the act, a jury of seven was appointed,, who viewed the property and assessed damages and benefits; the lot owned by this appellant being assessed for benefits in the sum of one thousand dollars. A rule was then made requiring all persons whose lots had been so assessed to appear and show cause why the verdict of the jury of seven should not be confirmed. ' The appellant appeared and filed a number of objections, which may be shortly stated as follows:
a. That the act of Congress is unconstitutional, as not providing for notice, and as an arbitrary assessment of one-half of the damage upon lots in a designated aréa.
b. That the assessment against the appellant was ex-' cessive, unjust, and an unequal apportionment of benefits.
c. c. Want of notice and opportunity to appear and be heard by the court or the said jury of seven and want of notice as to any of the proceedings until cited to show cause why the verdict of the jury should not be confirmed.
These objections were overruled and the verdict and assessment confirmed. This final judgment was on June 27, 1900. Like objections by other lot-owners assessed for benefits were filed and overruled at the same time.
From this action of the Supreme Court of the District an appeal was prayed but never prosecuted. More than two years thereafter the Commissioners advertised the lot and proceeded to sell the same to enforce payment of the whole amount of the assessment. Thereupon this bill was filed. '
There is no assignment of errors as required by ■§§ 997 and 1011, Rev. Stat., and by Rule 35 of this -court. These statutes and the rule apply to appeals from the courts of the District of Columbia, as we.pointed out in the case of Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 217 U. S. 547. An assignment in the brief of. appellant seems to have been regarded by many members of the District bar. as sufficient. That erroneous practice has been followed here, and three errors have been assigned, though in substance there are but two. One is that the act of February 10, 1899, for the extension of Rhode Island avenue, is unconstitutional.' The other is, that the judgment confirming the assessment made by a jury of seven over the objection of the appellant is void, and conferred no authority to enforce by sale the assessment so made.
This appeal was taken prior to the warning contained in the Columbia Heights Realty Company Case. For this reason, we shall avail ourselves of the provision in the 21st rule of this court, by which we reserve the right to “notice a plain error,” not because we assume the errors assigned in the brief to be “plain,” but that questions of such gravity may not be passed without notice, in view of the practice heretofore prevailing in the courts of the District of Columbia.
The objection to the constitutionality of the act of February 10, 1899, 30 Stat. 834, c. 150, as stated in appellant’s brief, is, “that it authorizes an assessment of appellant’s property to meet the cost of public improvements, in substantial excess of the special benefits conferred by the improvements, and to the extent of such excess confiscates appellant’s property to public use without compensation.”
If by this it is meant to say that the act upon its face authorizes an assessment for benefits in excess of actual benefits conferred, the objection is not tenable. There is nothing upon the face of the act to indicate that one-half of the damage awarded to those owners whose property is taken for the extension of the street is an amount in substantial excess of the special benefits realized by owners of property in the special improvement district created by the act. If, on the other hand, it is meant that, as matter of fact, the assessment against owners assumed to be benefited is so excessive as compared to actual benefits as to amount to a taking of such excess for public purpose without compensation, then there is no evidence in the ■ record bearing upon the subject. The question of the excessiveness of a special assessment for benefits resulting from a public street improvement is one of fact. English v. Arizona, 214 U. S. 359.
That Congress under its wide legislative power over the District of Columbia, may create a special improvement district and charge a part or all of the cost upon the property in that improvement district, can hardly be doubted. It would be but an exercise of the power of taxation for a public purpose in an area carved out for the purpose. In Webster v. Fargo, 181 U. S. 394, it was held that a State might create such special taxing districts and charge the whole or part of the cost of a local improvement upon the property in the district, either according to valuation, superficial airea or frontage. That it is within, the power of Congress to create such a special improvement district and charge the cost of an improvement therein according to the benefits received by property, within such district, has been more than once affirmed. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548; Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371; Martin v. District of Columbia, 205 U. S. 135; Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 217 U. S. 547.
When, as under the act for the extension of Rhode Island avenue, only one-half of the cost is to be charged upon lot-owners within the improvement district, and that upon each lot-owner in proportion to the benefit his property has received, the question of whether one such owner has been assessed beyond his proportion is one of fact, and does not touch the validity of the improvement act. This appellant was an owner within the special improvement district. That he was benefited to the extent of one thousand dollars has been determined by the confirme^ verdict of the jury which was charged with the. duty of proportionately distributing that part of the damages which Congress required to be paid by owners within the improvement district.
The other matter to be noticed is the contention that the sale to enforce the lien of the assessment is under an absolutely void judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The claim is that when the appellant appeared under a citation to show cause why the verdict of the jury of seven should not be confirmed, and filed objections to the verdict, that it was the duty of the court to have ordered a jury of twelve for a reexamination of the matter. The section under which this contention is made prescribes the method to be pursued for the assessment of damages to land-owners when land is taken or damaged for public roads. If an owner object to the laying out or extension of the road or street and the damages are not agreed upon, a jury of seven is to be empanelled, who are to go upon the premise's and assess the damages, and this assessment is to be reduced to writing and signed by the jury, attested by the marshal, returned into court and “recorded.”
. . Section 263 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia, provides, that “if the authorities or any owner of the land are dissatisfied with the verdict,” etc., the marshal shall be ordered to summon a second jury of twelve, who are to give the parties notice and meet on the premises “and-proeeed as before directed in regard to the first jury.”
The exceptions filed by the appellant, and others included in same verdict, have elsewhere been stated. These were overruled and the assessment • confirmed as made, and certified for collection. An appeal was prayed and granted, but not prosecuted, because of a stipulation that it should “abide by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the pending case of Wight v. David son,” since decided and reported in 181 U. S. 371. That decision was adverse upon every question common to the two cases. After the decision and after the time had elapsed for any error proceeding the Commissioners of the District proceeded to advertise a sale of the lots so specially assessed for the collection of the amount. Thereupon this bill was filed and the sale has ever since stood enjoined.
Wight v. Davidson did not present one question which is presented here, namely, that it was the duty of the nisi prim court, upon the presentation of the objection which challenged the assessment upon this owner’s property by the first jury as excessive, to have at once directed the calling of a second jury, under § 263, Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia. It is not necessary to consider the effect of the stipulation to abide by the result of the appeal in that case, as foreclosing the question stated, inasmuch as we are clearly of opinion that the failure of the Supreme Court of the District to. order a second jury was at most an error which can only be available in appropriate error proceedings. It is, however, in this connection just to say that the record in the case fails to show that the court was asked for such second jury. . The duty, if it existed without such motion, arose from the fact that the exceptions challenging the amount of the assessments, constituted a statement.that the owner, within the meaning of § 263, “was dissatisfied with the verdict thus rendered,” and therefore entitled without more to another jury. But the court was possessed of jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject-matter. If the owner assessed did not in some way take steps to set aside the first verdict, its confirmation would necessarily be final. If he was denied a second jury, when entitled to it, the court would fall into error; but the order confirming the assessment would not be void. There is no possible ground for upholding the present collateral attack if the order was voidable only.
, The court was in the exercise of a special statutory jurisdiction, but all the facts necessary to the exercise of that jurisdiction appear to have existed, and such a judgment is no more subject to collateral impeachment than if the court had been exercising its general jurisdiction. Secombe v. Railroad Co., 23 Wall. 108; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 234; United States, for use, etc. v. Morse, 218 U. S. 493.
We find no error in the decree dismissing the bill for which we should reverse, and the decree is therefore
Affirmed.