In Re Merchants'stock and Grain Co.
1912 U.S. LEXIS 2262 · 223 U.S. 639 · 32 S. Ct. 339 · 56 L. Ed. 584
March 4, 1912 · Docket 10, Original
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
The Court explained that the character of a contempt fine depends on its purpose, citing Gompers, and that punitive fines serve to uphold the court’s power, whereas remedial fines serve to indemnify the complainant.
- Headnote 2
The Court held that the portion of the fine payable to the United States (a punitive element) dominated the order, fixing its character as punitive for review purposes.
- Headnote 3
The Court contrasted the two classifications, stating that a punitive order permits prompt appellate review, whereas a remedial order must wait for the equity suit’s final decree.
- Headnote 4
The lower circuit dismissed the writ, treating the order as remedial, but the Supreme Court reversed, directing the court to take jurisdiction because the order was punitive.
- Headnote 5
In the case, the contempt order required payment of $1,000, $2,000, and $500 with one‑quarter to the United States; the Court held that the United States portion was punitive and dominated the order’s character.
- Headnote 6
The Court noted that although the punitive portion here was only one‑fourth of each fine, it still dominated the proceeding, following the principle set in Christensen.
- Headnote 7
The Court explained that the character of a contempt fine depends on whether the fine is intended to vindicate the court’s authority (punitive) or to reimburse the complainant or secure obedience (remedial).
- Headnote 8
The opinion noted that the fine payable to the United States was punitive and dominated the proceeding, fixing the order’s character for review purposes.
- Headnote 9
The Court held that if the order is punitive, it is a final judgment and reviewable upon a writ of error, making the petition for mandamus proper.
- Headnote 10
The Court contrasted remedial contempt with punitive, stating that remedial orders are reviewable only on appeal from the final decree.
- Headnote 11
The decision found that the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the writ because the contempt order was punitive and thus a final judgment.
- Headnote 12
The Court ordered that petitioners were entitled to mandamus, reinstating the writ of error because the punitive feature of the order dominated.
- Headnote 13
The Court explains that the character of a contempt order depends on its purpose—punitive for vindicating authority, remedial for compensation or coercion.
- Headnote 14
The Court applied the dominant‑feature analysis, holding that the fine payable to the United States dominates the proceeding and fixes the order’s character as punitive.
- Headnote 15
The Court states that if the order is punitive, it is a final judgment and may be reviewed on a writ of error right away.
- Headnote 16
The Court explains that a remedial contempt order is merely interlocutory and its review is permissible only after the final judgment in the equity suit.
- Headnote 17
Because the fine to the United States is punitive and dominates, the writ of error should be reinstated and the appellate court must hear the appeal.
- Headnote 18
The Court notes that although only one‑fourth of the fine goes to the United States, the punitive element still dominates, making the order punishable and reviewable immediately.
- Headnote 19
The Court granted mandamus, ordering the Circuit Court of Appeals to take jurisdiction of the writ of error because the contempt order was punitive.
- Headnote 20
The Court explained that the character of a contempt fine depends on its purpose, citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. to distinguish punitive from remedial contempt.
- Headnote 21
The Court held that the fine payable to the United States dominates the proceeding, making the order punitive despite the presence of a compensatory portion.
- Headnote 22
Because the fine to the United States serves a punitive purpose, the Court treated the contempt order as a final judgment and allowed immediate appellate review.
- Headnote 23
The Court described remedial contempt as an order intended merely to compensate the complainant, rendering it interlocutory and reviewable only after the case’s final judgment.
- Headnote 24
The Court reinstated the writ of error, directing the Circuit Court of Appeals to take jurisdiction because the contempt order was classified as punitive and therefore a final judgment.
- Headnote 25
The Court noted that although the fine to the United States comprised only one‑fourth of the total, its punitive nature dominated the proceeding and determined the order’s classification.
- Headnote 26
The Court granted mandamus, ordering the lower court to reinstate the writ of error and to take jurisdiction over the appeal.
- Headnote 27
The Court explains that the character of a contempt fine depends on its purpose, citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., which distinguishes punitive versus remedial contempt based on the nature and purpose of the punishment.
- Headnote 28
The opinion notes that even though only a quarter of the fine went to the United States, that punitive element dominates the proceeding and fixes the order’s character for review purposes.
- Headnote 29
The Court states that if the order is punitive, it is reviewable upon a writ of error without awaiting the final decree, and therefore the appellate court must accept jurisdiction.
- Headnote 30
The Court explains that when the order’s purpose is to compensate the injured party, it is merely interlocutory and cannot be reviewed until the case concludes.
- Headnote 31
The opinion holds that the Circuit Court of Appeals should have taken jurisdiction because the punitive feature dominates, making dismissal improper.
- Headnote 32
The Court explains that the character of a contempt fine depends on whether the fine seeks to vindicate the court’s authority (punitive) or merely to reimburse or coerce the injured party (remedial).
- Headnote 33
The Court notes that the fine payable to the United States is punitive and, because it dominates the proceeding, fixes the order’s character as punitive for review purposes.
- Headnote 34
The Court holds that if the contempt fine is punitive, the order constitutes a final judgment that may be appealed at once, rather than after the underlying suit concludes.
- Headnote 35
The Court states that when a contempt fine is merely compensatory or coercive, it is considered interlocutory and cannot be appealed until the main suit reaches a final judgment.
- Headnote 36
Because the contempt fine’s punitive component dominates, the Court orders the Circuit Court of Appeals to take jurisdiction and consider the writ of error rather than dismiss it as interlocutory.
- Headnote 37
The petitioners filed a mandamus writ directing the Eighth Circuit to take the error appeal; the Supreme Court granted mandamus, ordering the lower court to proceed with the appeal.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus commanding the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to reinstate and take jurisdiction of a writ of error dismissed by ’it. The facts are these ¡ During the pendency, in a Circuit Court of the United States, of a suit in equity to which the petitioners were parties defendant, they were charged by the complainant with having wilfully violated an interlocutory injunction theretofore granted in the suit at the instance and for the benefit of the complainant, and at the hearing upon that complaint were by the court adjudged guilty of contempt of its authority and ordered unconditionally to pay into its registry, within five days, fines of $1,000, $2,000 and $500, respectively, each fine, when paid, to go three-fourths to the complainant, "as compensation in part for the expenses incurred in prosecuting these contempt proceedings,” and one-fourth to the United States. With the purpose of securing a review of the order the petitiQners sued out a writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals, and when the writ came on for hearing that court dismissed it, upon the ground that the order, rightly considered, was remedial, not punitive, and was merely interlocutory and reviewable only upon an appeal from the final decree. 187 Fed. Rep. 398.
We are not now concerned with whether the proceedings resulting in the order were such as to admit of the imposition of punitive, as distinguished from compensatory, -fines, or whether, if the proceedings were not of that character, the order was erroneous in its. entirety or only as to so much of the fines as was to go to the United States; and therefore we pass what is said in that connection in the briefs and come at once to the only question presented for decision, which is, whether the order was open to review upon a writ of error. The answer turns upon the character of the order. If it was remedial, it was merely interlocutory and reviewable only upon an appeal from the final decree; but, if it was punitive, it was a final judgment, criminal in its nature, and reviewable upon a writ of error, without awaiting the final decree. Such an order against an offending suitor is deemed remedial when its purpose is to indemnify the injured suitor or coercively to secure obedience to a mandate in his behalf, and is deemed punitive when its purpose is to vindicate the authority of the court by punishing the act of disobedience as a public wrong. As was said in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 441: “It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases.” And again, p. 448: “The classification then depends upon the question, as to whether the punishment is punitive, in vindication of the court’s authority, or whether it is remedial by way of a coercive imprisonment, or a compensatory fine payable to the complainant.”
Applications of this test are shown in several adjudged cases in this court, among them being Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14; Doyle v. London Guarantee Co., 204 U. S. 599; Ex parte Heller, 214 U. S. 501; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, and Matter of Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U. S. 458. In the last case the defendant in a suit in equity in a Circuit Court was found guilty of contempt in disobeying an interlocutory injunction and ordered to pay a fine of $1,000, one-half to go to the complainant and the other half to the United States; A writ of error, whereby it was sought to have the order reviewed in.the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, was dismissed by that court for the same reason -that was assigned for the dismissal in the present case. A petition for a writ of mandamus,- commanding the reinstatement of the writ of error, was then presented to this court and, upon full consideration of the prior cases, was held to be well grounded. In that connection it was said (p. 460): 460):
“These authorities show that when an order imposing a fine for violation of an injunction is substantially one to reimburse the party injured by the disobedience, although called one in a contempt proceeding, it is to be regarded as merely an interlocutory order, and to be reviewed only on appeal from the final decree. In the present case, however, the fine payable to the United States was clearly punitive and in vindication of the authority of the court, and, we think, as such it dominates the proceeding and fixes its character. Considered in that aspect, the writ of error was justified, and the Circuit Court of Appeals should have taken jurisdiction.”
That case differs from this only in that the portion of the fine made punitive was there one-half, while here it is one-fourth; but this, in our opinion, does not take this case out of the principle applied in that, which is, that the punitive feature of the order is dominant and fixes its character for purposes of review.
We accordingly hold that the writ of error should be reinstated, and, as it is evident from the return that this will be done on the expression of our opinion, our order will be,
Petitioners entitled to mandamus.