Supreme Court of the United States

Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Stringham

1915 U.S. LEXIS 1522 · 239 U.S. 44 · 36 S. Ct. 5 · 60 L. Ed. 136

November 1, 1915 · Docket Nos. 4 and 5

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
67.18.2 Real Property Law > Real Property Ownership and Estates Law > Defeasible Fee Estates Law
The dispute concerned land claimed by a railroad as a statutory right of way and also covered by defendants' placer mining patent. The court determined the nature of the estate created by the 1875 statute when a railroad complied with its requirements and acquired the land as public land.
Headnote 2
67.18.12 Real Property Law > Real Property Ownership and Estates Law > Possibility of Reverter Law
In determining the estate conveyed by the Right-of-Way Act, the court explained that the railroad's interest is not unlimited. If the company stops using or retaining the land for the statutory railroad purpose, the land passes back to the former owner or the government by reversion.
Headnote 3
67.18.14 Real Property Law > Real Property Ownership and Estates Law > Real Property Ownership Law
Although the estate is not a fee simple absolute, the court held that the statutory right of way is more than an easement. It has the ordinary incidents of a fee, including the right to use the land and the remedies available to protect that property interest.
Headnote 4
67.18 Real Property Law > Real Property Ownership and Estates Law
The lower judgment awarded the railroad ownership of a right of way one hundred feet on each side of the track, without calling it a limited fee. The court held that because the judgment used the terms of the Right-of-Way Act, those terms carried their statutory meaning and the judgment gave the railroad the full statutory estate.
Headnote 5
The first Utah Supreme Court decision reversed the trial judgment and directed entry of a specific judgment awarding the railroad a right of way over the disputed land. The court held that judgment was final because it fully decided the case and left the trial court only to enter the directed judgment.
Headnote 6
After the first appellate judgment directed entry of a specific judgment, the trial court entered that judgment and the second appellate court affirmed it because the prior decision was the law of the case. The court held that the later judgment could not be reviewed separately because the real question arose from the first final judgment.

Opinion

Mr. Justice Van Devanter

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a suit to quiet the title to a strip of land claimed and used by the plaintiff as a railroad right of way under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 152, 18 Stat. 482, and to which the defendants asserted title under a patent for a placer mining claim. At the trial the facts were specially found and judgment for the defendants was entered upon the findings. In reviewing that judgment the Supreme Court of the State, accepting the findings below, held that the plaintiff in virtue of proceedings had in the Land Department under the Right-of-Way Act while the land was yet public acquired a right of way two hundred feet wide through the lands afterwards embraced in the mining claim and that the defendants’ title under the placer patent was subject to this right of way, and thereupon reversed the judgment and remanded the case with a direction to “enter a judgment awarding to the plaintiff title to a right of way over the lands in .question one hundred feet wide on each side of the center of the track.” 38 Utah, 113. Acting upon this direction the trial court vacated its prior judgment and entered another adjudging the plaintiff to be “the owner of a right of way” through the mining claim one hundred feet wide on each side of the centér line of the railroad, declaring the plaintiff’s title to such right of way good and valid, and enjoining the defendants from asserting any claim whatever to the premises, or any part'thereof, adverse to the plaintiff’s “said right of way.” The plaintiff again appealed insisting that it was only adjudged to be the owner of a right of way when according to the true effect of the Right-of-Way Act' it had a title in fee simple, as was asserted in its complaint. But the judgment was affirmed, the court saying (39 Utah, 236):

“If counsel for appellant thought that this court, in the prior opinion, did not correctly define and determine the extent of appellant’s rights to the land in dispute, or did not fully safeguard its rights as defined and adjudged, they should have filed a petition for a rehearing. This they did not do. The conclusions of law and judgment having been drawn and entered in conformity with the decision of this court, we are precluded from further considering the. case. The former decision became, and is the law of the case, and this court, as well as the litigants, are bound thereby.”

Being in doubt which of the judgments of the appellate coürt should be brought here for review to present properly the question respecting the nature of its title, the plaintiff concluded to bring up both, each by a separate writ of error.

Manifestly the first judgment was final within the meaning of Jud. Code, § 237. It disposed of the whole case on the merits, directed what judgment should be entered and left nothing, to the judicial discretion of the trial court. Board of Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108; Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3; Mower v. Fletcher, 114 U. S. 127; Chesapeake & Pot. Tel. Co. Tel. v. Manning, 186 U. S. 238. And as the question sought to be presented arises upon the first judgment — it being final in the sense of § 237 — it is apparent that the writ of error addressed to the second judgment presents nothing reviewable here. See Northern Pacific R. R. v. Ellis, 144 U. S. 458; Great West. Tel. Co. v. Burnham, 162 U. S. 339; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207, 214.

What the act relied upon grants to a railroad company complying with its requirements is spoken of throughout the act as a “right of way,” and by way of qualifying future disposals of lands to which such a right has attached, the act declares that “all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way.”.

The right of way granted by this and similar acts is neither a mere easement, nor a fee simple absolute, but a limited fee, made on an implied condition of reverter in the event that the company ceases to use or retain the land for the purposes for which it is granted, and carries with it the incidents and remedies usually attending the fee. New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U. S. 171, 183; Northern Pacific Ry. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 271; United States v. Michigan, 190 U. S. 379, 398; West. Un. Tel. Co. Un. Tel.v. Pennsylvania R. R., 195 U. S. 540, 570. The judgment under review does not in words so characterize the plaintiff’s right nor was it essential that it should do so. It describes the right in the exact terms of the Right-of-Way Act and evidently uses those terms with the same meaning they have in the act. So interpreting the judgment, as plainly must be done, we think it accords to the plaintiff all to which it is entitled under the act.

In No. 4 Judgment affirmed.

In No. 5 Writ of error dismissed.

Case brief

Citation data as of August 31, 2026

Summary

Denver & Rio Grande Railroad sought quiet title to a strip it used as a railroad right of way under the Right-of-Way Act of 1875, while the United States asserted title under a placer mining patent. After the trial court found the facts and ruled for the defendants, the Utah Supreme Court held that the railroad had acquired a 200-foot statutory right of way while the land was public and that the placer patent was subject to it. It reversed and directed a judgment giving the railroad a right of way 100 feet on each side of the track. The trial court then entered declaratory and injunctive relief, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed on the railroad’s later appeal, treating its earlier decision as the law of the case. The United States Supreme Court reviewed the first state appellate judgment as a final judgment under Judicial Code § 237 because it disposed of the case and directed the specific judgment to be entered below. It held that a statutory railroad right of way is a limited fee, not a mere easement or fee simple absolute, and is subject to an implied condition of reverter if the land ceases to be used for the statutory purpose. Because the state judgment described the interest in the exact terms of the 1875 Act, it conferred the full statutory estate even though it did not use the technical label “limited fee.” The Court therefore affirmed the first state appellate judgment and dismissed the separate writ directed to the second, which presented no independent reviewable question; the opinion does not expressly identify which docket number corresponded to which state judgment, though the sequence indicates No. 4 was the affirmed first judgment and No. 5 the dismissed second. The opinion was delivered by Justice Van Devanter and contains no separate concurring or dissenting opinions.

Updated August 31, 2026

Statement of Facts

The plaintiff, Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company, brought a suit to quiet title to a strip of land that it claimed and used as a railroad right of way under the Right-of-Way Act of March 3, 1875. The defendants, identified in the caption as the United States, asserted title to the same land under a patent for a placer mining claim. The dispute therefore arose between a railroad company claiming a statutory right of way over public lands and adverse claimants asserting title under a placer mining patent. At trial, the facts were specially found and judgment was entered for the defendants. The state supreme court accepted those findings and held that the plaintiff, through proceedings in the Land Department under the Right-of-Way Act while the land was still public, had acquired a right of way two hundred feet wide through the lands later included in the mining claim, and that the defendants’ title under the placer patent was subject to that right of way. The state supreme court reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment awarding the plaintiff title to a right of way one hundred feet wide on each side of the center of the track. The trial court then entered judgment declaring the plaintiff the owner of such a right of way, declaring its title good and valid, and enjoining the defendants from asserting any adverse claim. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the judgment gave it only a right of way, whereas its complaint had asserted a fee simple title under the Right-of-Way Act. The state court affirmed, holding that its prior decision was the law of the case. The plaintiff then brought both state-court judgments to the United States Supreme Court by separate writs of error.

Updated August 31, 2026

Procedural History

Trial court (initial judgment): The trial court specially found the facts and entered judgment for the defendants. No monetary damages are stated; the relief was a judgment against the plaintiff on the title dispute.

Utah Supreme Court (first appeal): The state supreme court accepted the trial court’s findings, held that the plaintiff had acquired a 200-foot-wide right of way under the Right-of-Way Act while the land was still public, and held that the defendants’ placer patent title was subject to that right of way. It reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded with directions to enter judgment awarding the plaintiff title to a right of way 100 feet wide on each side of the center of the track.

Trial court (post-remand judgment): Acting on the remand direction, the trial court vacated its prior judgment and entered judgment declaring the plaintiff the owner of a right of way through the mining claim, 100 feet wide on each side of the railroad’s center line. It declared the plaintiff’s title to that right of way good and valid and enjoined the defendants from asserting any adverse claim to the premises or any part thereof. No monetary damages are stated; the relief was declaratory and injunctive.

Utah Supreme Court (second appeal): The plaintiff appealed again, arguing that the judgment gave it only a right of way rather than the fee simple title it had asserted in its complaint. The state supreme court affirmed, holding that its prior decision was the law of the case and that the plaintiff should have sought a rehearing if it believed the prior opinion did not fully define or safeguard its rights.

United States Supreme Court: The plaintiff brought both state supreme court judgments to the Supreme Court by separate writs of error. The Court held that the first state appellate judgment was final and reviewable, while the writ directed to the second state appellate judgment presented nothing reviewable. It affirmed the judgment it treated as the first/final state appellate judgment and dismissed the other writ. The opinion does not expressly identify which docket number—No. 4 or No. 5—corresponded to which state appellate judgment, though the sequence indicates that No. 4 was the affirmed first judgment and No. 5 was the dismissed second-judgment writ.

Updated August 31, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issue
Does a state-court judgment that declares a railroad company the owner of a “right of way” under the Right-of-Way Act of March 3, 1875—describing the interest in the exact terms of the statute and awarding a strip one hundred feet wide on each side of the track—fail to give the railroad the full interest it is entitled to when the Act grants a limited fee, rather than a mere easement or a fee simple absolute?

Procedural Issue
Did the first Utah Supreme Court judgment, which reversed the trial court and directed entry of a specific judgment, constitute a final judgment reviewable under Judicial Code § 237, such that the separate writ of error directed to the second Utah Supreme Court judgment presented nothing reviewable?

Updated August 31, 2026

Judgment

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in No. 4 and dismissed the writ of error in No. 5. No further proceedings were directed.

Updated August 31, 2026

Holding

A statutory railroad “right of way” is a limited fee, not a mere easement or a fee simple absolute, and is subject to an implied condition of reverter if the land ceases to be used or retained for the purpose for which the right was granted; a judgment that declares a railroad company the owner of such a right of way and describes the interest in the exact terms of the statute confers the full estate created by the statute, even if it does not expressly label that estate a limited fee.

An appellate judgment that reverses a lower judgment and directs entry of a specific judgment disposing of the entire case on the merits is a final judgment reviewable under Judicial Code § 237; a subsequent judgment entered on remand in conformity with that decision, and affirmed on the ground that the prior decision is the law of the case, presents no separate question reviewable by a distinct writ of error.

Updated August 31, 2026

Rule of Law

Under the Right-of-Way Act of March 3, 1875, a railroad company that complies with the Act’s requirements is granted a “right of way,” and lands over which that right of way passes are to be disposed of subject to that right of way. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, c. 152, § 1, 18 Stat. 482.

A railroad “right of way” granted by the 1875 Act or a similar statute is not a mere easement and not a fee simple absolute; it is a limited fee, subject to an implied condition of reverter if the railroad ceases to use or retain the land for the purpose for which the right of way was granted, and it carries the incidents and remedies ordinarily attending a fee. New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 183 (1898); Northern Pacific Ry. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 271 (1903); United States v. Michigan, 190 U.S. 379, 398 (1903); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540, 570 (1905).

A judgment that describes a party’s interest using the exact terms of the governing statute must be construed as using those terms with the same meaning they have in the statute, even if the judgment does not expressly label the estate by its technical common-law name.

An appellate judgment is a final judgment reviewable under Judicial Code § 237 when it disposes of the entire case on the merits, directs what judgment should be entered below, and leaves nothing to the judicial discretion of the trial court. Board of Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108 (1876); Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U.S. 3 (1882); Mower v. Fletcher, 114 U.S. 127 (1884); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Manning, 186 U.S. 238 (1902).

When the question sought to be reviewed arises from the first final appellate judgment, a separate writ of error directed to a later judgment entered on remand in conformity with that first judgment, and affirmed on the ground that the first judgment is the law of the case, presents nothing reviewable. Northern Pacific R.R. v. Ellis, 144 U.S. 458 (1892); Great Western Tel. Co. v. Burnham, 162 U.S. 339 (1896); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U.S. 207, 214 (1909).

Updated August 31, 2026

Reasoning

The Court first resolved the procedural question by applying Judicial Code § 237’s final-judgment principle: an appellate decision is reviewable when it disposes of the entire case on the merits and directs what judgment should be entered below, leaving nothing further to the trial court’s discretion. The first Utah Supreme Court judgment met that standard because it reversed the trial court and specifically directed entry of a judgment awarding the railroad a right of way one hundred feet wide on each side of the track, so it was a final judgment properly brought to the Supreme Court.

Because the plaintiff’s challenge to the character of its title arose from that first final judgment, the later state-court judgment entered on remand did not present a separate reviewable issue. The second judgment merely implemented the first decision and was affirmed on the ground that the first decision was the law of the case, so a separate writ of error directed to the second judgment presented nothing for the Supreme Court to review.

On the merits, the Court began with the text of the Right-of-Way Act of March 3, 1875, which grants a complying railroad a “right of way” and provides that lands over which that right passes are to be disposed of subject to that right of way. The Court inferred that the statute’s repeated use of the term “right of way” defined the nature of the interest granted, so the state-court judgment had to be understood in light of the estate created by the Act rather than by any common-law label the judgment might omit.

The Court then characterized the statutory “right of way” by distinguishing it from both a mere easement and a fee simple absolute, holding instead that it is a limited fee. This classification was supported by a line of prior decisions involving railroad and similar statutory rights of way, which treated the interest as carrying the incidents and remedies of a fee while remaining subject to an implied condition of reverter if the land ceases to be used or retained for the purpose for which the right was granted.

Applying that rule to the state-court judgment, the Court reasoned that the judgment need not expressly call the plaintiff’s interest a “limited fee” because it described the interest in the exact terms of the Right-of-Way Act. Because those statutory terms carried the same meaning in the judgment as in the Act, the judgment necessarily conferred the full statutory estate, including the limited-fee character and its implied reverter condition.

From those steps, the Court concluded that the state-court judgment gave the plaintiff all the title to which it was entitled under the 1875 Act, even though it did not use the technical common-law label “limited fee.” Accordingly, the first state appellate judgment was affirmed, and the separate writ directed to the second state appellate judgment was dismissed as presenting no independent reviewable question.

Updated August 31, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

The provided opinion text identifies only one opinion: “Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court.” It does not name any other justice as authoring a concurrence or dissent, nor does it indicate that any justice joined or dissented from the Court’s opinion. The text also contains no language such as “concurred in the judgment,” “concurred in part and dissented in part,” or “dissented,” and no separate reasoning is attributed to any justice other than Justice Van Devanter. Because the task requires an explicit statement when there are no separate opinions, the appropriate output is a single numbered item stating that no concurring or dissenting opinions appear in the provided text. Approach: State in one numbered item that the provided opinion contains no separate concurring or dissenting opinions, grounding that conclusion in the text’s identification of only Justice Van Devanter’s opinion for the Court.

Updated August 31, 2026

Case Relevance

Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. United States matters as authority because it supplies a definitive construction of the estate created by the Right-of-Way Act of March 3, 1875, together with a clear finality rule for reviewing state appellate judgments. On the substantive issue, the Court held that a statutory railroad right of way is a limited fee—neither a mere easement nor a fee simple absolute—and that a judgment describing the interest in the exact terms of the statute necessarily confers the full statutory estate, including the implied condition of reverter, even if the judgment does not use the technical common-law label. This resolves the identified issue squarely: the state judgment declaring the railroad owner of a right of way one hundred feet on each side of the track was not deficient merely because it did not say “limited fee,” because the statutory terms carried their statutory meaning into the judgment. The rule is broad enough to apply generally to statutory railroad rights of way and to the construction of judgments that incorporate statutory language, but it is bounded by the 1875 Act’s grant and the railroad-right-of-way context; it does not decide the precise scope of the reverter condition, the consequences of nonuse, or whether every non-railroad statutory right of way is identical in character. Procedurally, the case is useful for the principle that an appellate judgment is final and reviewable under Judicial Code § 237 when it disposes of the entire case on the merits and directs the specific judgment to be entered below, leaving nothing to the trial court’s discretion; a later judgment entered on remand in conformity with that decision, and affirmed as the law of the case, presents no separate reviewable question. As authority, the case is strong for citing the limited-fee characterization of railroad statutory rights of way, the rule that statutory terms in a judgment are construed with their statutory meaning, and the final-judgment/law-of-the-case limitation on successive writs of error; it is less useful for questions outside the statutory right-of-way grant or for issues the Court did not reach, such as the practical operation of the implied reverter.

Updated August 31, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "the question sought to be presented arises upon the first judgment — it being final in the sense of § 237 — it is apparent that the writ of error addressed to the second judgment presents nothing reviewable here. See Northern Pacific R. R. v. Ellis, 144 U. S. 458 ; Great West. Tel. Co. v. Burnham, 162 U. S. 339 ; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207, 214 ."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 239 U.S. 44
Explanation: This passage explains why the later state judgment did not present a separate reviewable question, since the issue arose from the first final judgment and the second merely followed it.

Quoted text: "What the act relied upon grants to a railroad company complying with its requirements is spoken of throughout the act as a “right of way,” and by way of qualifying future disposals of lands to which such a right has attached, the act declares that “all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way.”."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 239 U.S. 44
Explanation: This passage identifies the statutory grant and the condition that later land disposals remain subject to the railroad right of way.

Quoted text: "udgment under review does not in words so characterize the plaintiff’s right nor was it essential that it should do so. It describes the right in the exact terms of the Right-of-Way Act and evidently uses those terms with the same meaning they have in the act. So i nterpreting the judgment, as plainly must be done, we think it accords to the plaintiff all to which it is entitled under the act."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 239 U.S. 44
Explanation: This passage applies that rule to the judgment under review, showing that using the statute's own terms was enough to confer the full statutory estate.

Updated August 31, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

The Court’s substantive holding is best read as a rule of judgment construction rather than a broad redefinition of the 1875 Act: because the state judgment used the statute’s own phrase “right of way,” the Court treated the judgment as necessarily carrying the statutory estate, even though it did not use the technical label “limited fee.”

That construction is efficient but potentially underinclusive: the opinion does not explain whether a judgment that uses a different but substantively equivalent description of the statutory interest would fail, leaving a gap between the Court’s insistence on statutory meaning and its refusal to require the common-law label.

The limited-fee characterization also creates a tension between the railroad’s apparent ownership and the implied reverter condition: the judgment may confer the full statutory estate, but the estate remains defeasible if the land ceases to be used or retained for the purpose for which the right of way was granted.

The opinion leaves unresolved the practical consequences of that implied condition, including what degree of nonuse or abandonment would trigger reverter and whether the state judgment’s injunction would survive such a change in use.

The procedural holding is narrower than it might appear: the first state appellate judgment was reviewable because it disposed of the whole case on the merits and directed the specific judgment to be entered below, leaving nothing to the trial court’s discretion.

The dismissal of the second writ follows from the law-of-the-case posture: because the later judgment merely implemented the first final judgment, a separate writ directed to that later judgment presented no independent question for Supreme Court review.

A policy implication is that the decision favors finality and the orderly use of appellate review: it discourages litigants from manufacturing successive reviewable judgments when the dispositive question has already been fixed by an earlier final appellate decision.

At the same time, the plaintiff’s strategy of bringing both judgments reflects a real uncertainty about which state judgment carried the dispositive construction of title, suggesting that the Court’s finality rule may be less protective when lower courts enter judgments under a mandatory remand direction.

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

Related opinions

Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Stringham
110 P. 868 · 1910 Utah LEXIS 4 · 38 Utah 113
Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Stringham
115 P. 967 · 1911 Utah LEXIS 36 · 39 Utah 236
Rothschild v. Rio Grande Western Railway Co.
26 Abb. N. Cas. 312
Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. City and County of Denver
1919 U.S. LEXIS 1740 · 250 U.S. 241 · 39 S. Ct. 450 · 63 L. Ed. 958
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Earnest
1913 U.S. LEXIS 2427 · 229 U.S. 114 · 33 S. Ct. 654 · 57 L. Ed. 1096
Rothschild v. Rio Grande Western Railway Co.
38 N.Y.S. 1148 · 72 N.Y. St. Rep. 873

Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

November 1, 1915

Docket

Nos. 4 and 5

Precedential status

Published

Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Stringham

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion