McCluskey v. Marysville & Northern Railway Co.
1917 U.S. LEXIS 2089 · 243 U.S. 36 · 37 S. Ct. 374 · 61 L. Ed. 578
March 6, 1917 · Docket 166
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
The Court explained that goods merely moved within the State on the owner’s own road are not yet in exportation. Only a contract of carriage, bill of lading, consignor or consignee creates the requisite commitment to a carrier, thereby starting the interstate transit.
- Headnote 2
The district court dismissed the claim on the ground that there was no evidence showing the railroad was engaged in interstate commerce when the employee was injured, and the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment.
- Headnote 3
The Court adopts the Coe v. Errol definition, stating that the start of interstate commerce occurs at the point an article is handed to a carrier for out‑of‑state transport or when it commences its ultimate journey.
- Headnote 4
The opinion notes that there was no contract of carriage, bill of lading, consignor, or consignee, and the goods were moved over the company’s own road, therefore no initial shipment occurred.
- Headnote 5
The Court explains that carrying goods to a local depot or tidewater point is not part of the journey until the goods are actually launched toward another State.
- Headnote 6
The Court held that the movement of poles (logs) from forest to tidewater was merely internal carriage; no contract or third‑party carrier was involved, so the activity fell outside the scope of the Act.
- Headnote 7
The lower court’s directed verdict was affirmed; the Court explained that without proof of an initial shipment, the statutory requirement of interstate commerce is not met, justifying dismissal.
- Headnote 8
The Court relies on Coe v. Errol, holding that exportation commences at the point an article is handed to a carrier for out‑of‑state transport, not when it is merely moved within the State.
- Headnote 9
The Court notes that no contract, bill of lading, consignor, or consignee was present when the mill moved its logs on its own railroad, so no shipment was made.
- Headnote 10
The Court explains that until the logs are launched toward another State, their destination is not fixed, so the movement to tidewater alone is not interstate commerce.
- Headnote 11
The lower court entered a directed verdict for the railway, and this Court affirmed, finding the evidence insufficient to show interstate‑commerce engagement.
- Headnote 12
The Court held that the mill’s own railroad movement of logs to tidewater was merely a local transfer, not a shipment, so the railway was not subject to the federal liability statute.
- Headnote 13
The Court defines the point at which movement becomes interstate commerce, emphasizing that only commitment to a carrier or actual departure marks the start of the shipment.
- Headnote 14
The Court notes that the mill company carried its logs over its own railroad without any of the formalities that signal a shipment to a common carrier.
- Headnote 15
The Court explains that the logs remained interior commerce until purchasers initiated their passage to another State, at which time interstate commerce began.
- Headnote 16
The lower court entered a directed verdict on the ground that there was no evidence the railroad was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident, and the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling.
- Headnote 17
The Court explains that interstate commerce starts at the point an article is placed with a carrier for transport out of the State, not when it is merely gathered or moved within the State.
- Headnote 18
The opinion notes that without a contract of carriage, bill of lading, consignor, or consignee, the transport of goods on the company's own cars does not constitute an “initial shipment.”
- Headnote 19
The Court emphasizes that carrying goods to a local depot or point where the journey will later begin is not part of the interstate journey until the goods are truly launched toward the destination out of the State.
- Headnote 20
The trial court’s directed verdict was upheld because the plaintiff presented no proof that the railroad’s activities placed the logs in interstate commerce at the moment of the employee’s injury.
- Headnote 21
The Court explained that interstate commerce commences at the moment the goods are placed with a carrier bound for another state, not when they are merely gathered or moved within the State.
- Headnote 22
Absent any of these indicia, the movement of goods on the owner’s own road or cars is not a shipment for purposes of interstate‑commerce analysis.
- Headnote 23
In this case the logs were moved from the forest to tidewater on the defendant’s own railway, with no contract or bill of lading, so the railroad was not engaged in interstate commerce when the injury occurred.
- Headnote 24
The Court noted that carrying items to the depot where the journey is to commence is not part of the journey, and the destination is not fixed until the goods are launched toward another State.
- Headnote 25
The lower court entered a directed verdict on the ground that there was no evidence the railroad was engaged in interstate commerce, and the Supreme Court affirmed that the standard for such a verdict was met.
- Headnote 26
The Court defines the moment interstate commerce begins by focusing on the point at which the goods are placed with a carrier for out‑of‑state transport, rather than when they are merely moved within the state.
- Headnote 27
Without any of these indicia, the movement of goods cannot be treated as a shipment for purposes of statutes that apply only to interstate commerce.
- Headnote 28
The Court held that the mill’s own transport of logs to tidewater lacked a carrier relationship and therefore did not constitute an initial shipment.
- Headnote 29
The Court explained that until the goods are actually launched toward another State, their destination remains uncertain, so the movement is not yet interstate commerce.
- Headnote 30
The trial court correctly directed a verdict when the record showed no proof that the railroad’s activity placed the logs in interstate commerce at the moment of the injury.
- Headnote 31
The Court applied the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) in affirming the lower court’s directed verdict because the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.
- Headnote 32
The Court explained that the point at which interstate commerce commences is the moment the goods are handed over to a carrier for out‑of‑state transport, not when they are merely moved within the State.
- Headnote 33
Because the logs were moved on the mill’s own railroad using its own cars, without any of those indicia, the Court found no shipment for interstate‑commerce purposes.
- Headnote 34
The Court noted that until the articles are actually launched toward another State or a carrier is engaged, their destination is not fixed and the movement remains non‑interstate.
- Headnote 35
The district court directed a verdict on that ground, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the lack of evidence on initial shipment precludes a jury issue.
- Headnote 36
Applying the foregoing definitions, the Court held that the mill’s movement of logs to tidewater on its own line was not a shipment that engaged it in interstate commerce for purposes of the Employers’ Liability Act.
- Headnote 37
The Court held that the parties’ stipulation substituting the administrator of the deceased employee was a waived irregularity and did not merit reversal.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit was brought under the Employers’ Liability Act to recover damages resulting from injuries suffered by Nordgard white in the employ of the defendant railway company. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants on the ground that there was no evidence tending to show that the defendants and Nordgard were engaged at the time of the accident in interstate or foreign commerce, and the case is here on writ of error to secure a reversal of the action of the court below affirming the judgment entered by the trial court dismissing the suit. 218 Fed. Rep. 737.
These are the facts: The defendant Stimson Mill Com pany was engaged in the logging and lumber business and carried its logs on its own logging railroad, the Marysville & Northern Railway, from timber land owned by it in Washington to a point near Marysville in that State where they were dumped into the waters of Puget Sound. Part of the logs were thereafter sold to mills located on the sound and the balance were rafted and taken by tugs to the Stimson Company’s mills at Ballard, Washington, where they were manufactured into timber, which was thereafter sold, about twenty per cent, in local markets and the remainder in other States and countries. The logs which were sold after they had been carried to tidewater by the railroad were towed away by the purchasers to their mills or places for storage and part of them were subsequently re-sold for piling or poles to purchasers both within and without the State. Nordgard was a brakeman on the logging railroad and suffered the injuries for which he sued while engaged in unloading logs from the cars at tidewater.
The conclusion of the court below that under these facts the defendants were not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce when the injuries were suffered was based upon the decisions in Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, and The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, from the former of which the following quotations were made:
“When the products of the farm or the forest are collected and brought in from the surrounding country to a town or station serving as an entrepót for that particular region, whether on a river or a line <?f railroad, such products are not yet exports, nor are they in process of exportation, nor is exportation begun until they are committed to the common carrier for transportation out of the State to the State of their destination, or have started on their ultimate passage to that State.” 116 U. S. 517, 525.
“But this movement [that is, ‘interstate commerce movement] does not begin until the articles'have been shipped or started for transportation from one State to the other. The carrying of them in carts or other vehicles, or even floating them, to the depot where the journey is to commence is no part of that journey. . . . Until actually launched on its way to another State, or committed to a common carrier for transportation to such State, its destination is not fixed and certain. It may be sold or otherwise disposed of within the State, and never put in course of transportation out of the State.” 116 U. S. 517, 528.
After pointing out that these rulings had not been modified, but on the contrary had been re-affirmed by the subsequent cases relied upon by the plaintiff in error (Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111; Louisiana Railroad Commission v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 229 U. S. 336; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498; Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101) the court said:
“In the case at bar there was no initial shipment of the goods. The transportation of the poles from the forest in which they were cut to tidewater, where they were sold, was not a shipment. There was no contract of carriage; there was no bill of lading; there was no consignor or consignee. The goods were not committed to a carrier. The defendant Mill Company simply carried over its own road, on its own cars, its own goods to a market where it sold and delivered them. It had no concern with the subsequent disposition of them. It was under no obligation to deliver them to another carrier, and no other carrier was under obligation to receive them or carry them further. The selling of the poles after the first sale by the Mill Company, or whether they were going outside of the State; depended upon chance or the exigencies of trade. The movement of the poles did not become interstate commerce until by the act of the purchasers thereof the poles were started on their way to their destination in another State or country. The beginning of the transit which constitutes interstate commerce ‘is defined in Coe v. Errol, to be the point of time that an article is committed to a carrier for transportation to the State of its destination, or started on its ultimate passage.’ General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 229.”
The conclusion of the court below that the defendants were not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce when the accident occurred is, we think, clearly demonstrated by the reasoning by which it sustained its conclusion and the authorities upon which it relied as above stated, and. its judgment should be affirmed.
Before concluding we observe that in view of the stipulation of the parties in the court below agreeing to the substitution as plaintiff in error of the administrator of Nordgard who died while the cause was there pending, the motion to dismiss on the ground that the writ of error was wrongfully .allowed and that the administrator is not a proper party is based upon a mere irregularity which was waived.
Affirmed.