Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Schider

1918 U.S. LEXIS 1571 · 246 U.S. 519 · 38 S. Ct. 369 · 62 L. Ed. 863

April 15, 1918 · Docket 468

Queued for AI processing — next in lineest. ~4 min

Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
39.15.1 Food and Drug Law > Food Safety Law > Food Contamination and Adulteration Law
The indictment alleged that a non‑grape substance was wholly substituted for true grape essence, and the Court held that such substitution satisfies the statutory adulteration provision.
Headnote 2
39.15.1 Food and Drug Law > Food Safety Law > Food Contamination and Adulteration Law
The first clause of § 7 defines adulteration to include mixing a detrimental substance with the article, which the Court applied to the questioned grape‑essence product.
Headnote 3
39.14.11 Food and Drug Law > Food Labeling, Nutrition, and Claims Law > Misbranding of Food Law
The label “Compound Essence of Grape” conveyed that the product contained grape‑derived material, but it contained none, making the labeling false and misleading under § 8.
Headnote 4
39.14.11 Food and Drug Law > Food Labeling, Nutrition, and Claims Law > Misbranding of Food Law
Section 8’s proviso exempts an article from being misbranded if the labeling unmistakably identifies the product as a compound, imitation, or blend, which the Court found was not satisfied here.
Headnote 5
39.14.3 Food and Drug Law > Food Labeling, Nutrition, and Claims Law > False or Misleading Food Labeling Law
The Court rejected the manufacturer’s reliance on the word “compound,” holding that without an explicit statement of imitation the label remains false and misleading.
Headnote 6
The trial court’s demurrer was reversed because the indictment sufficiently stated a crime under §§ 7 and 8; therefore, the demurrer must be denied.
Headnote 7
39.14.5 Food and Drug Law > Food Labeling, Nutrition, and Claims Law > Food Labeling Law
The Court emphasized that the Act’s intent is consumer protection, and statutes must be interpreted to give effect to that purpose.

Opinion

Mr. Justice McReynolds

delivered the opinion of the court.

An indictment containing six counts charged defendant, Schider, with violating the Food & Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 768, by delivering for shipment in interstate commerce food contained in a bottle plainly labeled as follows:

Compound Ess Grape

Jos. L. Schider & Co.

'93-95 Maiden Lane, New York.

Each count alleged the article was an imitation of grape ■ essence artificially prepared from alcohol, water and synthetically produced imitation oils and contained no product of.the grape nor any added, poisonous or deleterious ingredient; and that the word "imitation” nowhere appeared. ,

The first count further alleged it was "unlawfully adulterated in' that an imitation grape essence artificially prepared from alcohol, water and synthetically produced imitation essential oils had been wholly substituted for- a true grape product, which th,e article purported to be”; and the second that it was "unlawfully adulterated in that an imitation grape essence artificially prepared from alcohol, water and synthetically produced imitation essential oils, had been mixed with the said article so as to reduce afid lower and injuriously affect the quality ánd strength of ‘the said article.”

The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth counts, in varying ways, further alleged misbranding so as to deceive and mislead in that the label indicated a true grape product, whereas the article was not such but an imitation arti- . ficially prepared, one which contained nothing from grapes.

The trial court sustained a demurrer to each count upon the view that, properly construed, the Food &. Drugs Act did not apply to facts stated.

Pertinent portions of the act follow:

"Sec. 7. That for the purposes of this Act an article shall be deemed to be adulterated: ...

"First. If any substance has been mixed and packed with it so as to reducé or lower or injuriously affect its quality or strength..

“Second. If any substance has been substituted wholly or in part for the article.

. . “Sec. 8. That the term ‘misbranded,’ as used herein, shall apply to all drugs, or articles of food, or articles which enter into the composition of food, the package or label of, which shall bear any statement, design, or device regarding such article^ or the ingredients or substances contained therein which shall be false or misleading in any particular, and to any food or drug product which is falsely branded as to the State, Territory, or country in which it is manufactured or produced.

“That for the purposes of this Act an article shall also be deemed to be misbranded: . '. .

■ “First. If it be an imitation of or offered for sale under the distinctive name of another article.

“Second. If it be labeled or branded so as to deceive or mislead the purchaser, ...

“Fourth. If the package containing it or its label shall bear any statement, design, or device regarding the ingredients or the substances contained therein, which statement, design, or device shall be false or misleading in any particular: Provided, That an article of food which does not contain any added poisonous or deleterious ingredients shall not be deemed to be adulterated or mis-branded in the following cases: .. . . Second'. In the case of articles labeled, branded, or tagged so as to plainly indicate-that they are compounds, imitations, or blends, and the word ‘compound,’ ‘imitation,’ or ‘blend,’ as the case may be, is plainly stated on the package in which it is offered for sale: . . .” (34 Stat., c. 3915, pp. 768, 770-771.)

The obvious and undisputed purpose and effect of the label was to declare the bottled article “a compound es- - sence of grapes.” In fact, it contained nothing from grapes and was a mere imitation.

Within the statute’s general terms the article must be deemed adulterated since some other substance had been substituted wholly for the one indicated by the label; and, also, it was misbranded, for the label carried a false and misleading statement.

Defendant relies on the proviso in § 8 which declares articles of food shall not be deemed adulterated or mis-branded if they are "labeled, branded, or tagged so as to plainly indicate that they are compounds, imitations, or blends, and the word 'compound/ ‘imitation/ or ‘blend/ as the case may be, is plainly stated on the package in which it is offered for sale.” But we are unable to conclude that by simply using ‘‘compound” upon his label a dishonest manufacturer exempts his wares from all inhibitions of the statute and obtains full license to befool the public. Such a construction would defeat the highly beneficent end which Congress had in view.

We have heretofore said: ‘‘The purpose of the act is to secure the purity of food and drugs and to inform purchasers of what they are buying. Its provisions are directed to that purpose and must be construed to effect it. ” United States v. Antikamnia Co., 231 U. S. 654, 665. “The legislation, as against misbranding, intended to make it possible that the consumer should know that an article purchased was what it purported to bé; that it might be bought for what it really was and not upon misrepresentations as to character and quality. ” United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U. S. 399, 409. And see United States v. Coca Cola Co., 241 U. S. 265, 277.

The stuff put into commerce by defendant was an “imitation” and if so labeled purchasers would have had some notice. To call it “compound essence of grape” certainly did not suggest a mer:e imitation but on the contrary falsely indicated that “it contained something derived from grapes. See Frank v. United States, 192 Fed. Rep. 864. The statute enjoins truth; this label exhales deceit.

The trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. Its judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Case brief

Citation data as of August 2, 2026

Summary

The United States indicted Jos. L. Schider & Co. for shipping in interstate commerce a bottled “Compound Essence of Grape” that contained no grape product, alleging violations of the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906 for both adulteration and misbranding. The district court sustained the government’s demurrer, holding that the Act did not apply to the alleged conduct. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the indictment sufficiently stated offenses under §§ 7 and 8 of the Act. The Court held that an article is “unlawfully adulterated” when any substance is wholly substituted for the product the label purports, so the substitution of a non‐grape mixture for grape essence satisfies the adulteration provision. It also held that a label is “misbranded” when it falsely conveys that the article contains a particular ingredient and fails to plainly indicate that it is an imitation; the mere use of the word “compound” does not meet the statutory proviso requiring an explicit indication of imitation. Because the indictment alleged both a wholesale substitution and a false label without such indication, it plainly stated a crime and the demurrer was improper. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s order sustaining the demurrer and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation of the statute. No concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.

Updated August 2, 2026

Statement of Facts

The United States, acting under the authority of the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, brought a criminal indictment against Jos. L. Schider & Co., the business operated by the defendant, Schider. The indictment contained six counts alleging that Schider had, in violation of the Act, shipped in interstate commerce a bottled “Compound Essence of Grape” that was, in fact, an imitation grape essence prepared from alcohol, water and synthetically produced essential oils and that contained no grape product whatsoever. Each count asserted that the article was either (1) “unlawfully adulterated” because a substance had been wholly substituted for a true grape product, or (2) “unlawfully adulterated” because a substance had been mixed with the article so as to reduce its quality or strength, and that the labeling— which read “520 Compound Ess Grape Jos. L. Schider & Co. ‘93‐95 Maiden Lane, New York” and omitted the word “imitation”—misbranded the product by falsely indicating it was a genuine grape essence. The trial court sustained a demurrer to each count, holding that, when properly construed, the Food and Drugs Act did not apply to the facts alleged. The United States appealed, seeking reversal of the demurrer and a judgment that the indictment properly stated offenses under the Act. The government’s sole defense was the demurrer; no counterclaims or additional affirmative defenses were asserted.

Updated August 1, 2026

Procedural History

Trial Court (District Court) – The district court sustained the government’s demurrer to each of the six counts, holding that, when properly construed, the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906 did not apply to the facts alleged. No monetary damages or other relief were awarded.

Appeal to the Supreme Court – The United States appealed the trial‐court ruling, arguing that the indictment did state offenses under the Act and that the demurrer was erroneous because the product was “wholly substituted” and “misbranded” in violation of §§ 7 and 8 of the statute. The defendant made no appeal.

Supreme Court of the United States – The Court reversed the trial‐court’s demurrer decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. No damages were awarded at this stage; the relief was limited to reversal and remand.

The opinion does not mention any intermediate appellate court, so the procedural record is limited to the trial‐court decision and the Supreme Court’s reversal.

Updated August 1, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issue(s)

Adulteration:
Does the Food and Drugs Act deem a bottled “Compound Essence of Grape” that contains no grape product—because a non‐grape substance was wholly substituted for the true grape essence—to be “unlawfully adulterated” within the meaning of § 7 of the Act?

Misbranding:
Does labeling such a product “Compound Essence of Grape” without the word “imitation,” thereby causing the label to convey that the article contains grape‐derived material, constitute “misbranding” under § 8 of the Food and Drugs Act?

Procedural Issue Did the district court err in sustaining the government’s demurrer by incorrectly concluding that the Food and Drugs Act did not apply to the facts alleged, thereby misapplying the statutory definitions of “adulterated” and “misbranded” and improperly dismissing the indictment?

Updated August 1, 2026

Judgment

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order sustaining the demurrer and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Updated August 2, 2026

Holding

Adulteration – statutory definition.
An article is “unlawfully adulterated” within the meaning of § 7 of the Food and Drugs Act when any substance is wholly substituted for the product that the label purports the article to be, even if the label uses a term such as “compound” or “essence.” The substitution of a non‐grape substance for a product represented as grape essence therefore satisfies the statutory adulteration provision.

Misbranding – false or misleading labeling.
An article is “misbranded” under § 8 of the Food and Drugs Act when its label, package, or any statement thereon is false or misleading with respect to the ingredients or nature of the product—specifically, when the label conveys that the article contains a particular ingredient (e.g., grape) while it actually contains none and fails to disclose that the product is an imitation. The mere use of the word “compound” does not cure the misbranding if the label does not plainly indicate that the product is an imitation.

Procedural – sustaining a demurrer.
A district court erred in sustaining a demurrer to an indictment that alleges, in plain terms, that (a) a non‐grape substance was wholly substituted for a grape‐essence product and (b) the label falsely represents the product’s composition. When the statutory definitions of “adulterated” and “misbranded” plainly encompass the alleged conduct, the indictment sufficiently states a crime and the demurrer must be denied.

Updated August 2, 2026

Rule of Law

Statutory definition of “adulterated.”
An article is “unlawfully adulterated” when (a) any substance has been substituted wholly or in part for the article, or (b) any substance has been mixed and packed with the article so as to reduce or lower or injuriously affect its quality or strength. 34 Stat. at 768 (Food & Drugs Act of June 30, 1906) §§ 7 (first & second clauses).

Statutory definition of “misbranded.”
An article is “misbranded” when its package or label bears any statement, design, or device that is false or misleading with respect to the ingredients or nature of the article, or when it is an imitation offered for sale under the distinctive name of another article, or when the labeling deceives or misleads the purchaser. 34 Stat. at 770‐771 §§ 8 (first, second, and fourth clauses).

Statutory proviso limiting the misbranding rule.
An article shall not be deemed misbranded if it is “labeled, branded, or tagged so as to plainly indicate that it is a compound, imitation, or blend, and the word ‘compound,’ ‘imitation,’ or ‘blend’ is plainly stated on the package.” 34 Stat. at 771 (proviso to § 8).

Judicial construction of the misbranding proviso – requirement of a plain indication of imitation.
The Court held that the mere use of the term “compound” does not satisfy the proviso; the label must plainly disclose that the product is an imitation. United States v. Antikamnia Co., 231 U.S. 654, 665 (1913) (purpose of the Act is to inform purchasers of what they are buying); United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409 (1914) (consumer must know the true character of the article); United States v. Coca‐Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265, 277 (1916) (the statute enjoins truth in labeling); Frank v. United States, 192 Fed. Rep. 864 (1932) (a label that “exhales deceit” is misbranding).

Standard for sustaining or denying a demurrer to an indictment under the Act.
A demurrer is improper where the indictment plainly alleges that (i) a non‐grape substance was wholly substituted for a grape essence (triggering § 7 adulteration) and (ii) the label falsely represents the product as containing grape‐derived material without a plain indication of imitation (triggering § 8 misbranding). When the statutory definitions “plainly encompass the alleged conduct,” the indictment sufficiently states a crime and the demurrer must be denied. United States v. Schider, U.S. — (Justice McReynolds, opinion).

Updated August 2, 2026

Reasoning

The Court began by stating the statutory framework: an article is “unlawfully adulterated” under § 7 when any substance is wholly substituted for the article, and it is “misbranded” under § 8 when the label bears a false or misleading statement about its ingredients, unless the label “plainly indicates” that the product is a compound, imitation, or blend and the word “compound,” “imitation,” or “blend” is expressly printed.

Applying § 7 to the facts, the Court observed that the bottled “Compound Essence of Grape” contained no grape material at all; instead, a non‐grape mixture of alcohol, water, and synthetic oils was used. Because a substance was wholly substituted for the grape essence the label purported to be, the product fell squarely within the first clause of § 7’s definition of adulteration.

Turning to § 8, the Court examined the label “Compound Ess Grape” and noted the absence of any indication that the article was an imitation. The label therefore conveyed that the product contained grape‐derived essence, a representation that was false and misleading, satisfying the fourth clause of § 8 which prohibits any statement on the package that is false or misleading concerning the ingredients.

The Court then addressed the statutory proviso that shields a product from being deemed misbranded if it is “plainly” labeled as a compound, imitation, or blend. It held that the mere presence of the word “compound” does not satisfy the “plainly indicate” requirement; the label must explicitly disclose that the article is an imitation. Because the label omitted the word “imitation,” the proviso did not apply.

To give effect to the proviso, the Court looked to prior decisions—Antikamnia, Lexington Mill & Elevator, Coca‐Cola, and Frank—which uniformly emphasize that the purpose of the Food and Drugs Act is to ensure that purchasers know the true nature of what they buy. Those cases require truth in labeling and reject any construction that would allow deceptive labeling to escape liability.

Using those precedents, the Court inferred that allowing a label that merely says “compound essence of grape” to evade the misbranding prohibition would defeat the congressional intent to protect consumers from deception and would render the statutory safeguards meaningless.

Because the indictment plainly alleged (i) a wholesale substitution of a non‐grape substance for grape essence (triggering § 7) and (ii) a false label that failed to plainly indicate the product was an imitation (triggering § 8), the Court concluded that the indictment sufficiently stated a crime under the Act.

Consequently, the district court’s demurrer was erroneous; a demurrer may not be sustained when the statutory definitions of “adulterated” and “misbranded” plainly encompass the conduct alleged. The Court therefore reversed the demurrer and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation of the statute.

Updated August 2, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: None – no separate concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.
Type of Opinion: None – the decision was issued solely by Justice McReynolds with no concurrences or dissents.
Summary of Reasoning: The opinion record contains only the majority opinion authored by Justice McReynolds; there is no indication of any Justice filing a separate concurrence or dissent.

Updated August 2, 2026

Case Relevance

United States v. Schider stands as the controlling authority that a wholesale substitution of a non‐identified ingredient for the ingredient named on a label makes an article “unlawfully adulterated” under § 7 and, absent a label that “plainly indicates” the product is an imitation, the same substitution also renders the article “misbranded” under § 8—thereby establishing the definitive test that the Food and Drugs Act’s adulteration and misbranding provisions are satisfied whenever the label conveys a false ingredient claim and the statutory proviso is not met by a mere use of the word “compound”; the holding resolves the substantive issues of adulteration and misbranding and the procedural issue of demurrer propriety by holding that an indictment alleging those facts is sufficient to survive a demurrer, and the rule applies broadly to any food‐ or drug‐type product whose label fails to plainly disclose its imitation status, not just to grape‐essence cases, making the decision useful for any litigation involving alleged false or misleading labeling, the scope of the “plainly indicate” proviso, or the adequacy of an indictment under the Act, while it leaves untouched questions of what specific language or formatting on a label would satisfy the “plainly indicate” requirement in more nuanced contexts.

Updated August 2, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "Sec. 8. That the term ‘misbranded,’ as used herein, shall apply to all drugs, or articles of food, or articles which enter into the composition of food, the package or label of, which shall bear any statement, design, or device regarding such article^ or the ingredients or substances contained therein which shall be false or misleading in any particular, and to any food or drug product which is falsely branded as to the State, Territory, or country in which it is manufactured or produced. “That for the purposes of this Act an article shall also be deemed to be misbrand ed : . '. ."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 246 U.S. 519
Explanation: Provides the definition of "misbranded," explaining that a label is misbranding when it contains any false or misleading statement about the ingredients, establishing the standard applied to the label.

Quoted text: "The obvious and undisputed purpose and effect of the label was to declare the bottled article “a compound es- - sence of gra pes.” In fact, it contained nothing from grapes and was a mere imitation. Within the statute’s general terms the article must be

deemed adulterated since some other substance had been substituted wholly for the one indicated by the label; and, also, it was misbranded, for the label carried a false and misleading statement."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 246 U.S. 519
Explanation: Applies the definitions to the facts, concluding that the label falsely conveyed a grape essence and that the product was both adulterated and misbranded because no plain indication of imitation was present.

Quoted text: "The trial court erred in sustaining the dem urrer. Its judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Reversed and remanded."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 246 U.S. 519
Explanation: Reverses the district court’s demurrer, holding that the indictment sufficiently alleged statutory violations and therefore could not be dismissed.

Updated August 2, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

The Court’s construction of the § 8 proviso – that the mere presence of the word “compound” does not satisfy the statutory requirement that a label “plainly indicate” an imitation – is left without a concrete standard, creating uncertainty about what phrasing or formatting would meet the “plainly” threshold.

United States v. Antikamnia Chemical Co. · 231 U.S. 654United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. · 232 U.S. 399United States v. Coca Cola Co. of Atlanta · 241 U.S. 265Frank v. United States · 192 F. 864

By holding that any label which omits the word “imitation” is misbranded, the decision potentially expands the regulatory reach of the Food & Drugs Act to a wide array of blended or compound products, imposing a heightened duty on manufacturers to disclose imitation status even when the product’s composition is otherwise harmless.

The opinion leaves unresolved whether a label that reads “Compound Essence of Grape (Imitation)” would satisfy the statutory proviso; the Court’s analysis stops short of defining the precise language or visual prominence required for a label to “plainly indicate” its imitation character.

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

Related opinions

United States v. Ginsberg
1917 U.S. LEXIS 2014 · 243 U.S. 472 · 37 S. Ct. 422 · 61 L. Ed. 853
Mason v. United States
1917 U.S. LEXIS 1647 · 244 U.S. 362 · 37 S. Ct. 621 · 4 Alaska Fed. 571
O'CONNELL v. United States
1920 U.S. LEXIS 1456 · 253 U.S. 142 · 40 S. Ct. 444 · 64 L. Ed. 827
Bothwell v. United States
1920 U.S. LEXIS 1185 · 254 U.S. 231 · 41 S. Ct. 74 · 65 L. Ed. 238
United States v. Daugherty
1926 U.S. LEXIS 355 · 269 U.S. 360 · 46 S. Ct. 156 · 70 L. Ed. 309
Dysart v. United States
1926 U.S. LEXIS 34 · 272 U.S. 655 · 47 S. Ct. 234 · 71 L. Ed. 461

Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

April 15, 1918

Docket

468

Precedential status

Published

United States v. Schider

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion