Supreme Court of the United States

Merchants Exchange of St. Louis v. Missouri Ex Rel. Barker

1919 U.S. LEXIS 2322 · 248 U.S. 365 · 39 S. Ct. 114 · 63 L. Ed. 300

January 13, 1919 · Docket 116

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
Missouri’s § 63 prohibits anyone other than a duly authorized state weigher from issuing weight certificates or charging for weighing grain at public warehouses. The Court held that this limitation serves to prevent fraud and to promote uniform commercial transactions, and therefore is a permissible exercise of police power.
Headnote 2
18.8.10 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Rational Basis Review Law
The Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal‑protection clause, finding that the statute’s distinction between state‑appointed weighers and others is rationally related to the goal of preventing deceptive weighing practices, satisfying rational‑basis review.
Headnote 3
18.11.3 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations Law > Dormant Commerce Clause Law
The Court held that requiring grain received or discharged from public warehouses to be weighed only by state‑appointed weighers does not place an undue burden on interstate commerce and therefore does not violate the Commerce Clause.
Headnote 4
18.11.6 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations Law > Federal Preemption Law
The opinion noted that the Grain Standards Act addresses only quality standards and contains no provisions on weighing, and that congressional intent was cooperation with state officials, so Missouri’s weighing law remains effective.
Headnote 5
The Missouri Supreme Court convicted Merchants Exchange for violating § 63, ordered it to stop its weighing operations and to pay costs, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that judgment as proper given the statute’s constitutionality.
Headnote 6
18.8.1 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Class-of-One Equal Protection Law
The Missouri statute aims to prevent fraud and promote uniform commercial transactions by requiring only state‑appointed weighers to certify weight, a valid exercise of police power when the rule is reasonable.
Headnote 7
18.8.1 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Class-of-One Equal Protection Law
The statute’s limitation is not a denial of liberty or property; it serves the legitimate purpose of fraud prevention and therefore passes rational‑basis review.
Headnote 8
18.8.1 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Class-of-One Equal Protection Law
The Missouri law imposes only a local procedural requirement and does not impede the flow of grain across state lines, satisfying the balancing test for permissible state regulation.
Headnote 9
18.8.1 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Class-of-One Equal Protection Law
Federal legislation limited to grain quality leaves the field of inspection and weighing to the states; therefore, the Missouri statute remains effective and is not in conflict with the Grain Standards Act.
Headnote 10
2.9.8 Agriculture Law > Agricultural Markets, Commodities, and Dealers Law > Grain Warehousing, Elevators, and Warehouse Receipts Law
Missouri’s Grain Inspection and Weighing Act requires grain received into or discharged from public warehouses to be weighed only by state‑appointed weighers to protect commercial transactions from deception.
Headnote 11
2.9.8 Agriculture Law > Agricultural Markets, Commodities, and Dealers Law > Grain Warehousing, Elevators, and Warehouse Receipts Law
Section 63 of the Missouri act, which bars private weighers, is upheld because it is aimed at preventing fraud in weights and measures, a legitimate police‑power objective.
Headnote 12
2.9.8 Agriculture Law > Agricultural Markets, Commodities, and Dealers Law > Grain Warehousing, Elevators, and Warehouse Receipts Law
The Missouri statute requiring state weighers does not unduly burden the flow of interstate grain and therefore does not violate the Commerce Clause.
Headnote 13
2.9.8 Agriculture Law > Agricultural Markets, Commodities, and Dealers Law > Grain Warehousing, Elevators, and Warehouse Receipts Law
The United States Grain Standards Act deals solely with grain quality and expressly intends to cooperate with, not replace, state inspection and weighing laws, leaving Missouri’s weighing provisions intact.
Headnote 14
2.9.8 Agriculture Law > Agricultural Markets, Commodities, and Dealers Law > Grain Warehousing, Elevators, and Warehouse Receipts Law
The Missouri Supreme Court’s judgment affirming the conviction of Merchants Exchange and ordering it to cease weighing grain and to pay costs was proper because the underlying statute was constitutional.

Opinion

Mr. Justice Brandéis

delivered the opinion of the court.

A statute of Missouri relating to the inspection and weighing of grain, approved March 20, 1913 (Laws, Missouri, 1913, pp. 354-373), and amended March 23, 1915 (Laws, Missouri, 1915, p. 302), declares that in cities of more than 75,000 inhabitants all buildings used for the storage or transferring of grain of different owners, for a compensation, shall be deemed public warehouses; and, by § 63 (p. 372) thereof, prohibits under severe penalties “any person, corporation or association other than a duly authorized and bonded state weigher to issue any weight certificate . ‘ . . [for any] grain weighed at any warehouse or elevator in this state where duly appointed and qualified state weighers are stationed ... , or to make any charge for such weighing, ... or weight certificates. . . .”

In June, 1915, an original proceeding in the nature of quo warranto was brought under this statute at the relation of the Attorney General in the Supreme Court of the State against the Merchants Exchange, a Missouri corporation with the usual powers of a board of trade. See House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270; Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236. The information stated that St. Louis is a city of more than 75,000 inhabitants; that public weighers of grain are maintained there at all public warehouses and elevators in'compliance"’with the act; and that the respondent in violation thereof and in abuse of its corporate franchise maintains a bureau for weighing grain, grants weight certificates, and makes charges therefor. The prayer, is that respondent be adjudged guilty of these practices and that a fine be imposed. The return admitted substantially the facts stated in the information but alleged that the services were rendered only at the request of members; that the weighing by its bureau in addition to that of the public weighers added to the general security, thus benefiting farmer, dealer, and consumer; that similar weighing bureaus were maintained by the boards of trade at competing grain markets; and that the statute, in prohibiting the practice, deprived its members of liberty and property and of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The return also set forth that the grain weighed by its bureau was in large part shipped into or out of the' State; that it is commercially necessary as a part of interstate transit to pass grain through an elevator where it is weighed, and the issue of certificates of weight is essential; and that the provisions of the Missouri act therefore violated the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Upon a demurrer to the return, the full court found the respondent guilty and ordered that it be ousted of the usurped power of weighing grain received into or discharged from public warehouses and elevators and of making charges therefor, and of issuing weight certificates and making charges therefor; and that the respondent pay costs. 269 Missouri, 346. The case comes here on writ of error. .

First. Section 63 of the act does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. As the state court has pointed out, the statute does not prohibit owners of grain from weighing it before it is sent to a public warehouse or after it is removed therefrom. -But the issue of a' private weigher’s certificate in addition to the certificate of the public weigher might lead to embarrassment, or confusion or prove a means of deception. The regulation of weights and measures with a view to preventing fraud and facilitating commercial transactions is'an exercise of the police power. To require that goods received in or discharged from public warehouses shall be weighed by public weighers and that no one else shall issue certificates of or make charges for weighing under those circumstances is not an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the discretion vested in the legislature. Compare House v. Mayes, supra; Brodnax v. Missouri, 219 U. S. 285. Nor can we say that to limit the application of the provision to grain and hay is an arbitrary discrimination against dealers in those articles. The fact that respondent is a corporation does not lessen the scope of the State’s police power. We have no occasion to consider whether it is thereby enlarged.

Second. Section 63 does not violate the commerce clause of the Constitution. The contention that it does was rested below solely on the ground that the prohibition, as applied to grain received from or shipped t& points without the State* burdens interstate commerce. It clearly does not. Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U. S. 590; W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452. But the additional contention is made here that all state regulation of the weighing of grain was superseded by the United States Grain Standards Act, approved August 11, 1916 (39 Stat. 482). That act (which is Part B of chapter 313) relates exclusively to the establishment by the Secretary of Agriculture of standards of quality and condition. It does not in any way refer to the weighing of grain. And Part B of chapter 313, by § 7 (p. 484), like Part C, the United States Warehouse Act (which does contain some reference to weighing), by § 29 (p. 490), makes manifest the purpose of Congress not to supersede state laws for the inspection and weighing of grain, but to cooperate with state officials charged with the enforcement of such state laws. The Missouri act is not superseded by or in conflict with the federal legislation.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is therefore

Affirmed.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 21, 2026

Summary

The State of Missouri, through its Attorney General, brought a quo warranto action against the Merchants Exchange, a Missouri corporation that operated a grain‐weighing bureau in St. Louis public warehouses, alleging that the Exchange violated § 63 of the Missouri Grain Inspection and Weighing Act, which reserves the issuance of weight certificates and charging for weighing to duly authorized, bonded state weighers. The Exchange admitted it weighed grain but contended that its services were requested by members, served a public‐interest purpose, and that the statute infringed the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty, property and equal‐protection guarantees, unduly burdened interstate commerce, and was pre‐empted by the federal Grain Standards Act. The trial court found the Exchange guilty, ordered it to cease the unauthorized weighing, required surrender of the usurped authority, and assessed costs; the State did not appeal, and the Exchange sought review on a writ of error. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that the statute is a valid exercise of the state’s police power because it is reasonably related to the legitimate objective of preventing fraud in weights and measures and therefore does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court further concluded that the law imposes only an incidental, nondiscriminatory burden on interstate commerce and is not pre‐empted by the federal Grain Standards Act, which addresses quality standards and expressly allows cooperation with state weighing regulations. Consequently, the trial‐court judgment and remedial order were proper and were left in effect. No separate concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.

Updated July 21, 2026

Statement of Facts

The State of Missouri, represented by the Attorney General, instituted a quo warranto proceeding in the Supreme Court of Missouri against the Merchants Exchange, a Missouri corporation organized with the powers of a board of trade. The Missouri Grain Inspection and Weighing Act of 1913, as amended in 1915, declared that in cities of more than 75,000 inhabitants—such as St. Louis—any building used for the storage or transfer of grain of different owners for compensation was a “public warehouse.” Section 63 of that act prohibited any person, corporation, or association other than a duly authorized and bonded state weigher from issuing weight certificates or charging for the weighing of grain at any warehouse or elevator where state weighers were stationed. The Merchants Exchange operated a bureau that weighed grain, issued weight certificates, and collected fees for those services at public warehouses and elevators in St. Louis, thereby allegedly contravening the statutory prohibition. The return filed by the Exchange admitted the factual allegations concerning the existence of its weighing bureau but contended that the services were rendered solely at the request of its members, that the additional weighing enhanced security and benefited farmers, dealers, and consumers, that comparable bureaus were maintained by other boards of trade, and that the statute’s application infringed the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of liberty, property, and equal protection and unduly burdened interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. The State’s cause of action was a quo warranto claim that the Merchants Exchange had violated Section 63 of the grain act by unlawfully weighing grain and issuing certificates in a public‐warehouse context. The State’s prayer sought a judgment finding the Exchange guilty of the prohibited practices and the imposition of a fine; the trial court also ordered the Exchange to cease the unauthorized weighing, to surrender the usurped authority, and to pay costs. In its answer, the Exchange raised several defenses: it asserted that its weighing was requested by members and served a public‐interest purpose, that the statute’s restriction was not an arbitrary discrimination, that the corporation’s status did not limit the State’s police power, and that the provision did not violate either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause, arguing that the federal Grain Standards Act did not preempt the state law. The Supreme Court of Missouri found the Exchange guilty, ordered the ouster of its weighing operations, assessed costs, and the judgment was subsequently reviewed on a writ of error. (No specific monetary amount of the fine or the precise statutory penalty was stated in the opinion.)

Updated July 21, 2026

Procedural History

Trial Court (Original Quo Warranto proceeding in the Supreme Court of Missouri).
- The Attorney General filed a quo warranto information against the Merchants Exchange alleging violation of § 63 of the Missouri Grain Inspection and Weighing Act.
- The full court found the Exchange guilty, ordered that it be ousted of the usurped authority to weigh grain, issue weight certificates, and charge for such services, and assessed costs against the Exchange. No specific monetary fine was identified in the opinion.

Appeal (Writ of Error to the Supreme Court of Missouri).
- The Merchants Exchange sought review of the trial‐court judgment, arguing that § 63 violated the Fourteenth Amendment (liberty, property, and equal‐protection guarantees), unduly burdened interstate commerce, and was pre‐empted by the federal Grain Standards Act.
- The State, as the prevailing party, did not appeal.

Appellate Decision (Supreme Court of Missouri, writ of error).
- The Court affirmed the trial‐court judgment, holding that § 63 was a valid exercise of the state’s police power, did not infringe the Fourteenth Amendment, and was not pre‐empted by federal law.
- The original order—ouster of the Exchange’s weighing operations and payment of costs—remained in effect; no additional monetary award was entered.

The opinion provides no information on any intermediate appellate court or the exact amount of any fine, so the procedural record is limited to the trial‐court judgment and its affirmation on writ of error.

Updated July 21, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issues

Fourteenth‐Amendment Question
Does § 63 of the Missouri Grain Inspection and Weighing Act, which forbids any corporation other than a duly authorized state weigher from issuing weight certificates or charging for weighing grain at public warehouses, violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of liberty, property, and equal protection?

Commerce‐Clause Question
Does § 63 of the Missouri Grain Inspection and Weighing Act place an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution?

Procedural Issue

Trial‐Court Error Question
Did the trial court err in affirming the quo warranto conviction and ordering the Merchants Exchange to cease its weighing operations by misapplying the constitutional standards (Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause) and by failing to recognize any pre‐emptive effect of the federal Grain Standards Act?

Updated July 21, 2026

Judgment

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial‐court judgment, leaving in effect the order that the Merchants Exchange be ousted of its weighing operations, prohibited from issuing weight certificates or charging for such services, and required to pay costs.

Updated July 21, 2026

Holding

Fourteenth‐Amendment Claim – A state provision that bars any person, corporation, or association other than a duly authorized and bonded state weigher from issuing weight certificates or charging for the weighing of grain at public warehouses is a valid exercise of the state’s police power and does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of liberty, property, or equal protection; the restriction is not an arbitrary or discriminatory denial of rights.

Commerce‐Clause Claim – A state law requiring that grain received into or discharged from public warehouses be weighed only by state‐appointed weighers does not place an impermissible burden on interstate commerce and is not pre‐empted by the federal Grain Standards Act; consequently, the statute does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Trial‐Court Error Claim – When a statute is a constitutionally valid exercise of the state’s police power, a trial court’s judgment convicting a corporation for violating that statute, ordering the cessation of the prohibited activity, and assessing costs is proper; the trial court did not err in affirming the conviction and imposing the remedial order.

Updated July 21, 2026

Rule of Law

State police‐power authority to regulate weights and measures – A state may, under its police power, enact statutes that regulate the weighing of grain and the issuance of weight certificates in order to prevent fraud and promote uniform commercial transactions. Such regulation is a valid exercise of police power so long as it is not “unreasonable or arbitrary.” Missouri Grain Inspection and Weighing Act §§ 63 (1913, amended 1915) (Mo. Stat.); see House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 274‐75 (1911) (upholding state regulation of weights and measures as a legitimate police‐power measure); Brodnax v. Missouri, 219 U.S. 285, 287 (1911) (same).

Fourteenth‐Amendment equal‐protection/ liberty‐property analysis – rational‐basis test – When a statute classifies persons (e.g., “any person, corporation, or association other than a duly authorized state weigher”), the constitutional inquiry is whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. A law that is rationally related to the legitimate objective of preventing fraud in weights and measures satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal‐protection and due‐process guarantees. House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. at 274‐75 (rational‐basis review for non‐suspect classifications).

Commerce‐Clause limitation – balancing/state‐interest test – A state regulation that does not discriminate against interstate commerce and does not impose an undue burden on the flow of commerce is permissible. The court balances the state’s legitimate police‐power interest against the extent of the burden on interstate commerce; if the burden is incidental and the statute serves a legitimate local purpose, the law is upheld. Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U.S. 590, 595‐96 (1895) (state police power may be exercised so long as it does not unduly burden interstate commerce); W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.S. 452, 456‐57 (1901) (same).

Preemption analysis – field‐occupation and conflict test – Federal legislation does not preempt state law unless (a) the federal statute occupies the field, (b) there is a direct conflict, or (c) Congress intended to “supersede” state regulation. Where the federal statute is limited to establishing quality standards and contains no provision concerning weighing, and its purpose is to cooperate with state officials, the state law remains effective. United States Grain Standards Act, 39 Stat. at 482‐84 (1916) (Sec. 7, § 7, indicating Congress did not intend to preempt state inspection and weighing laws); W. W. Cargill Co., 180 U.S. at 456 (conflict‐preemption test).

Updated July 21, 2026

Reasoning

The court began by stating the governing rule that a state may regulate weights and measures as a legitimate exercise of its police power so long as the regulation is not “unreasonable or arbitrary,” applying the rational‐basis standard for Fourteenth‐Amendment challenges to classifications that do not target suspect classes. Using House v. Mayes and Brodnax v. Missouri as authority, the court held that Section 63 merely requires grain received into or discharged from public warehouses to be weighed by state‐appointed weighers, a limitation designed to prevent fraud and confusion; because the statute does not forbid owners from weighing grain before it enters or after it leaves a public warehouse, the classification is rationally related to the legitimate state interest and therefore does not violate liberty, property, or equal‐protection guarantees.

The court then addressed whether the corporation’s status altered the analysis, noting that the Constitution does not restrict the scope of the state’s police power simply because the regulated entity is a corporation. Consequently, the fact that the Merchants Exchange is a corporate board of trade does not diminish the legislature’s authority to impose the weighing restriction, and no additional constitutional infirmity arises from the corporate character of the defendant.

Turning to the Commerce Clause, the court applied the traditional balancing test that a state regulation is permissible when it does not discriminate against interstate commerce and does not impose an undue burden on the flow of commerce. Citing Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v. Louisiana and W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, the court observed that Section 63 applies equally to all grain handled in public warehouses within the state and does not favor in‐state over out‐of‐state interests; the regulation’s impact on interstate trade is merely incidental, so the statute does not violate the Commerce Clause.

The court next considered the argument of federal pre‐emption by the United States Grain Standards Act. Under the field‐occupation and conflict tests, a federal statute pre‐empts state law only when Congress has expressly occupied the field or when the two regimes are irreconcilably inconsistent. The Grain Standards Act, as the court explained, is limited to establishing quality standards and expressly provides that it is intended to cooperate with, not supplant, state inspection and weighing laws; it contains no provision governing the weighing of grain. Therefore, there is no direct conflict or field‐occupation, and the Missouri statute remains operative.

Having resolved the constitutional and pre‐emption questions, the court inferred that the trial court’s judgment—finding the Merchants Exchange guilty of violating Section 63, ordering the cessation of its unauthorized weighing operations, and assessing costs—was a proper application of a valid statute. Because the statute was upheld as a constitutional exercise of police power, the trial court did not err in enforcing it through a quo warranto conviction.

The court concluded that the appellate court’s role was limited to reviewing the trial court’s legal conclusions, and since those conclusions rested on a statute that survived Fourteenth‐Amendment, Commerce‐Clause, and pre‐emption scrutiny, the judgment was affirmed in its entirety.

Updated July 21, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: None – no concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.
Type of Opinion: None – the Court issued a single majority opinion.
Summary of Reasoning: The opinion text contains only the majority opinion authored by Justice Brandéis; there is no separate concurring or dissenting opinion referenced or appended to the decision.

Updated July 21, 2026

Case Relevance

Merchants’ Exchange v. State stands for the proposition that a state may, under its police power, enact and enforce non‐discriminatory weight‐and‐measure regulations—even against corporations—without violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty, property, or equal‐protection guarantees so long as the classification is rationally related to the legitimate objective of preventing fraud, and that such statutes are likewise permissible under the Commerce Clause when they impose only an incidental burden and do not discriminate against interstate commerce; the Court’s holding that § 63 of the Missouri Grain Inspection and Weighing Act survives both constitutional challenges and a pre‐emption analysis therefore establishes a clear, generally applicable rule that state‐level weighing requirements are valid unless Congress expressly occupies the field or creates a direct conflict, limiting the rule only to statutes that are facially neutral, apply equally to in‐state and out‐of‐state grain, and address a traditional police‐power concern, and it is useful authority for any jurisdiction confronting challenges to state‐regulated weights‐and‐measures schemes on Fourteenth‐Amendment, Commerce‐Clause, or pre‐emption grounds, while leaving unresolved any claim that a similar regulation might be invalid where the state law is discriminatory, overly burdensome, or where federal legislation expressly pre‐empts the field.

Updated July 21, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "Section 63 of the act does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 269 Mo. 346, 367 (1917)
Explanation: Directly states the Court’s holding that the Missouri weighing statute survives a Fourteenth‐Amendment challenge, providing the core rule for the case brief.

Quoted text: "The regulation of weights and measures with a view to preventing fraud and facilitating commercial transactions is'an exercise of the police power."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 269 Mo. 346, 367 (1917)
Explanation: Articulates the constitutional basis—state police power—for upholding the weighing requirement, tying the rule to the legitimate state interest of fraud prevention.

Quoted text: "The fact that respondent is a corporation does not lessen the scope of the State’s police power."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 269 Mo. 346, 368 (1917)
Explanation: Clarifies that corporate status does not limit the state's authority, reinforcing that the statute applies equally to private entities.

Quoted text: "Section 63 does not violate the commerce clause of the Constitution."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 269 Mo. 346, 368 (1917)
Explanation: Summarizes the Court’s Commerce‐Clause analysis, establishing that the statute’s incidental burden on interstate trade is permissible.

Quoted text: "The United States Grain Standards Act ... does not in any way refer to the weighing of grain. ... makes manifest the purpose of Congress not to supersede state laws for the inspection and weighing of grain, but to cooperate with state officials charged with the enforcement of such state laws."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 269 Mo. 346, 369 (1917)
Explanation: Provides the pre‐emption analysis, showing that the federal Grain Standards Act does not displace the state weighing law, thereby preserving the statute’s validity.

Updated July 21, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Merchants’ Exchange v. State · 269 Mo. 346 (1917)

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

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Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

January 13, 1919

Docket

116

Precedential status

Published

Merchants Exchange of St. Louis v. Missouri Ex Rel. Barker

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion