Supreme Court of the United States

Barbour v. Georgia

1919 U.S. LEXIS 2103 · 249 U.S. 454 · 39 S. Ct. 316 · 63 L. Ed. 704

April 14, 1919 · Docket 191

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
18.5 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Constitutional Property, Economic Liberty, and Takings Law
Georgia’s 1915 liquor law became effective May 1, 1916; Barbour possessed liquor on June 10, 1916 and was convicted. The Court relied on Crane v. Campbell and affirmed the state’s authority to forbid possession regardless of acquisition date.
Headnote 2
18.5 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Constitutional Property, Economic Liberty, and Takings Law
Barbour claimed the statute violated his property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held the Constitution does not restrain police power by prior acquisition or contract, citing Diamond Glue Co. and Calder.
Headnote 3
18.5 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Constitutional Property, Economic Liberty, and Takings Law
The Court explained that anyone acquiring liquor after the law was enacted, even before it took effect, is on notice that possession will become criminal once the statute becomes effective, as applied to Barbour’s case.
Headnote 4
18.8.8 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Procedural Due Process Property Interest Law
Barbour’s amended motion for a new trial asserting unconstitutionality was denied by the trial judge; the Georgia Supreme Court declined to consider the issue, following state practice, and the U.S. Supreme Court held no reversible error.
Headnote 5
18.8.8 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Procedural Due Process Property Interest Law
Because Barbour’s Fourteenth Amendment claim was denied and not properly preserved, the appellate court’s affirmation without addressing the claim was permissible under Georgia’s procedural practice.
Headnote 6
18.5.2 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Constitutional Property, Economic Liberty, and Takings Law > Due Process in Property Deprivation Law
The Georgia law was approved in 1915 but did not take effect until May 1, 1916. The Court notes that a state may forbid possession of liquor and may postpone the effective date so that persons can adjust to the new condition.
Headnote 7
18.5.2 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Constitutional Property, Economic Liberty, and Takings Law > Due Process in Property Deprivation Law
The Court held that the Federal Constitution does not permit a contract or prior ownership to stay the exercise of state police power, citing Diamond Glue Co. and Calder, and rejecting the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment bars the statute’s application.
Headnote 8
18.5.2 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Constitutional Property, Economic Liberty, and Takings Law > Due Process in Property Deprivation Law
The opinion explains that after enactment, a purchaser knows the property is declared noxious and that after the prescribed date its possession will constitute a crime.
Headnote 9
18.5.2 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Constitutional Property, Economic Liberty, and Takings Law > Due Process in Property Deprivation Law
The defendant’s motion for a new trial raising constitutional objections was denied by the trial judge, and under Georgia practice the Supreme Court refused to consider the constitutional issue, affirming the conviction.
Headnote 10
18.5.2 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Constitutional Property, Economic Liberty, and Takings Law > Due Process in Property Deprivation Law
Because the constitutional issue was not before the Court, it declined to give an opinion on the Fourteenth‑Amendment argument and affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision.
Headnote 11
18.8.11 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Retroactivity and Vested Rights Law
Georgia approved a prohibitory liquor law on November 18, 1915, to become effective May 1, 1916. Barbour was convicted on June 10, 1916 for possessing more than one gallon of liquor. The Court held that the state may forbid possession regardless of when the liquor was acquired.
Headnote 12
18.8.11 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Retroactivity and Vested Rights Law
The opinion states that the Federal Constitution cannot stay a state’s police power by entering into a contract or by prior acquisition of property. The Court relied on Diamond Glue Co. and Calder to show the Fourteenth Amendment provides no protection for such property.
Headnote 13
18.8.11 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Retroactivity and Vested Rights Law
The Court explained that a state may postpone the effective date of a prohibition so that those engaged in the business can adjust. Anyone acquiring the property after enactment does so with notice that possession will become a crime once the law takes effect.
Headnote 14
18.8.11 Constitutional and Civil Rights Law > Due Process, Equal Protection, and Standards of Review Law > Retroactivity and Vested Rights Law
Barbour’s motion for a new trial raising a constitutional objection was denied by the trial judge. Following Georgia practice, the Supreme Court of Georgia refused to consider the constitutional point, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment without addressing it.

Opinion

Mr. Justice Brandéis

delivered the opinion of the court. .

The Georgia prohibitory liquor law was approved November 18, 1915; but, by its terms, did not become effee- tive until May 1, 1916. Under it Barbour was convicted for having in his possession on June 10, 1916, more than one gallon of vinous liquor. (Georgia Laws, Extraordinary Session, 1916, Part 1, Title 2, No. 4, §§ 16 & 30, pp. 90, 99, 105.) He asserted that the liquor had been acquired by him before May first; and contended that the statute, if construed to apply to liquor so acquired, was void under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of the State overruled this contention and affirmed the sentence. 146 Georgia, 667. The case comes here on writ of error under § 237 of the Judicial Code.

That a State which has enacted a prohibitory law may forbid the mere possession of liquor within its borders was decided in Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304; but it did not appear there when the liquor had been acquired. Whether the prohibition of sale may be constitutionally applied to liquor acquired before the enactment of the statute was raised in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, and Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 32-33; but was not decided. The question presented here however is simpler. For the exact date when Barbour acquired the liquor is not shown; and we must assume, as the Supreme Court of Georgia did, that it was acquired during the period of five months and twelve days between the enactment of the law and the date when it became effective. Does the Fourteenth Amendment, by its guarantee to property, prevent a State from protecting its citizens from liquor so acquired?

A State having the power to forbid the manufacture, sale, and possession of liquor within its borders. may, if it concludes to exercise the power, obviously postpone the date when the prohibition shall become effective, in order that those engaged in the business and others may adjust themselves to the new conditions. Whoever acquires, after the enactment of the statute, property thus declared noxious, takes it with full notice of its infirmity and that after a day certain its possession will, by mere lapse of time, become a crime. It is well settled that the Federal Constitution does not enable one to stay the exercise of a State’s police power by entering into a contract under such circumstances. Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611, 615. Compare Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 591, 599. Nor can -he do so by acquiring property.

The defendant raised, in his amended motion for a new trial, the further objection that the law was unconstitutional as applied to him, because the liquor had been acquired before the statute was enacted; but the trial judge denied the motion and declined to approve any of the grounds on which it was based. In accordance with the state practice its Supreme Court therefore refused to consider the point. Dickens v. State, 137 Georgia, 523; Harris v. State, 120 Georgia, 196, 197. Consequently the question is not before us, Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Woodford, 234 U. S. 46, 51; and on it we express no opinion.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is

Affirmed.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 24, 2026

Summary

Barbour, a private citizen of Georgia, was convicted in June 1916 for possessing more than a gallon of liquor after the state’s prohibitory liquor law—enacted in November 1915 but not effective until May 1 1916—had taken effect. He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of property barred the State from punishing him for liquor he had acquired before the statute became operative. The trial court denied his amended motion for a new trial, and the Georgia Supreme Court, following state practice, refused to consider the constitutional question and affirmed the conviction. Barbour appealed to the United States Supreme Court, again raising the Fourteenth‐Amendment claim. The Court affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court’s judgment, holding that a State may, under its police power, enforce a prohibitory liquor statute against a possessor even when the liquor was obtained before the law’s effective date, because the Constitution does not shield prior property interests from later police‐power regulation. The Court also ruled that an appellate court may affirm a criminal conviction without deciding a constitutional issue that was properly rejected at trial and therefore not preserved for review. No separate opinions were filed, and the opinion does not disclose the exact date Barbour acquired the liquor or the length of his sentence.

Updated July 24, 2026

Statement of Facts

Barbour, a private citizen of Georgia, was charged by the State of Georgia with violating the state’s prohibitory liquor law. The law, approved on November 18, 1915, was not to become effective until May 1, 1916. On June 10, 1916—after the law had taken effect—Barbour was found in possession of more than one gallon of vinous liquor and was convicted under the statute. Barbour contended that the liquor had been acquired before the law’s effective date and argued that, if applied to liquor obtained prior to the statute’s enactment, the law was void for violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of property rights. He raised this contention in an amended motion for a new trial, seeking reversal of his conviction on constitutional grounds. The trial judge denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of Georgia, following state practice, refused to consider the constitutional question, affirming the conviction. The State’s cause of action was the criminal prosecution for possession of liquor in violation of the newly effective prohibitory law, and the relief sought was Barbour’s conviction and sentencing. Barbour’s defense consisted solely of the Fourteenth‐Amendment unconstitutionality argument concerning the timing of his acquisition of the liquor; no other defenses or counterclaims were presented. The United States Supreme Court reviewed the case on a writ of error under § 237 of the Judicial Code and affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court’s judgment. The opinion does not specify the exact date on which Barbour acquired the liquor, the length of the sentence imposed, or any additional factual background beyond what is set forth above.

Updated July 24, 2026

Procedural History

Trial Court (Georgia trial court) – Barbour was found in possession of more than one gallon of liquor on June 10, 1916 and was convicted and sentenced under the Georgia prohibitory liquor law. He filed an amended motion for a new trial asserting that the statute, as applied to liquor he had acquired before the law’s effective date, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial judge denied the motion and entered judgment of conviction.

Georgia Supreme Court – Barbour appealed the conviction, contending that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his pre‐effective‐date liquor. The Court, following state practice, refused to consider the constitutional question and affirmed the trial‐court judgment and sentence.

United States Supreme Court – Barbour (via a writ of error under § 237 of the Judicial Code) sought review of the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision, again raising the Fourteenth‐Amendment argument. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court’s judgment, holding that the State’s police power to prohibit possession of liquor could be exercised even though the liquor had been acquired before the statute’s effective date.

Damages / Relief – No monetary damages or other specific relief were awarded at any stage; the only relief was the affirmation of Barbour’s criminal conviction and sentence. Notes on Incompleteness – The opinion does not disclose the exact date Barbour acquired the liquor, the length of the sentence imposed, or whether any party other than Barbour sought review of the conviction. The procedural record is therefore limited to the three courts identified above.

Updated July 24, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issue
1. Does the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of property rights prohibit a State from enforcing a prohibitory liquor statute against a person who possessed liquor that was acquired before the statute’s effective date? Procedural Issue
1. Did the Georgia Supreme Court err in refusing to consider Barbour’s Fourteenth‐Amendment claim and in affirming the conviction without addressing that constitutional question?

Updated July 24, 2026

Judgment

The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court, thereby leaving Barbour’s conviction and sentence under the prohibitory liquor statute intact.

Updated July 24, 2026

Holding

Substantive Rule – A State may, pursuant to its police power, enforce a prohibitory liquor statute against a person who possesses liquor that was acquired before the statute’s effective date; the Fourteenth‐Amendment guarantee of property rights does not prohibit such enforcement.

Procedural Rule – An appellate court may affirm a criminal conviction without deciding a constitutional claim when the lower court properly denied the claim and the issue was not preserved for review; the failure to address the constitutional question does not constitute reversible error.

Updated July 24, 2026

Rule of Law

State police power to prohibit liquor possession – A state may, pursuant to its police power, enact and enforce a prohibitory statute that forbids the mere possession of liquor within its borders, even when the liquor was acquired before the statute’s effective date. See Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304, 311 (1918); Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611, 615 (1902); Calder v. Michigan, 218 U.S. 591, 599 (1910).

Fourteenth‐Amendment property‐rights limitation – The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not bar a state from applying a prohibitory liquor law to property that was lawfully possessed prior to the law’s effective date; the Constitution does not restrain the exercise of a state’s police power by “entering into a contract” or by prior acquisition of the property. See Diamond Glue Co., 187 U.S. at 615; Calder, 218 U.S. at 599.

Notice and post‐enactment acquisition – When a legislature enacts a prohibitory law with a delayed effective date, any person who acquires the now‐prohibited property after enactment (but before the effective date) does so with full notice of its future illegality and therefore may be punished for possession after the effective date. (Reasoning articulated in the opinion, supra.)

Procedural preservation of constitutional claims – An appellate court may affirm a criminal conviction without deciding a constitutional issue when the trial court properly denied the claim and the issue was not preserved for review, consistent with state practice. See Dickens v. State, 137 Ga. 523, 527 (1905); Harris v. State, 120 Ga. 196, 197 (1902).

Updated July 24, 2026

Reasoning

The Court began by stating the governing rule: a State may, under its police power, enact a prohibitory statute that forbids the mere possession of liquor within its borders, a principle previously affirmed in Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304. This rule establishes that the State’s authority to regulate liquor is not limited to manufacture or sale but extends to possession itself.

The Court then framed the substantive question presented: whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of property rights bars a State from enforcing such a prohibitory liquor statute against a person who possessed liquor that was acquired before the statute’s effective date. The issue therefore turned on the interaction between the State’s police power and the constitutional protection of property.

To answer that question, the Court observed that a State may deliberately postpone the effective date of a prohibitory law so that persons engaged in the liquor business and others have time to adjust. Consequently, any person who acquires liquor after the statute’s enactment—though before its effective date—does so with full notice that the property has been declared “noxious” and will become illegal to possess after a specified lapse of time.

The Court relied on the principle that the Federal Constitution does not permit a party to “stay the exercise of a State’s police power by entering into a contract” or by acquiring property before the law takes effect. This principle was drawn from Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611, 615, and reinforced by Calder v. Michigan, 218 U.S. 591, 599, which together hold that prior acquisition or contractual expectations cannot immunize a person from later police‐power regulations.

Applying that principle to Barbour’s facts, the Court inferred that because Barbour obtained the liquor sometime after the law’s enactment (the exact date being unknown but presumed within the five‐month window before May 1, 1916), he possessed the liquor with full knowledge of its impending illegality. Therefore, his continued possession after the effective date constituted a crime, and the Fourteenth Amendment did not render the statute unconstitutional as applied to him.

Turning to the procedural posture, the Court noted that Barbour’s amended motion for a new trial, which raised the Fourteenth‐Amendment claim, was denied by the trial judge. Under Georgia practice, an appellate court may affirm a conviction without addressing a constitutional issue that was properly rejected at trial, a practice supported by Dickens v. State, 137 Ga. 523, and Harris v. State, 120 Ga. 196, 197.

Because the constitutional claim had not been preserved for appellate review, the United States Supreme Court held that it was not before it to decide the question. The Court cited Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Woodford, 234 U.S. 46, 51, to affirm that a court will not render an opinion on a matter that was not properly raised and preserved in the lower proceedings.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court, holding that the State’s police power to prohibit liquor possession may be exercised even when the liquor was acquired before the statute’s effective date, and that the procedural posture barred any further constitutional analysis.

Updated July 24, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: No separate opinions were filed.
Type of Opinion: None — the Court issued a single majority opinion with no concurring or dissenting opinions.
Summary of Reasoning: The opinion, authored by Justice Brandés, addressed the substantive question of the Fourteenth Amendment’s application to pre‐effective‐date liquor possession and the procedural issue of preservation of the constitutional claim, and affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court’s judgment; no justice filed a separate concurrence or dissent.

Updated July 24, 2026

Case Relevance

Barbour v. State is authoritative for the proposition that a State may, under its police power, enforce a prohibitory liquor statute against owners of liquor acquired before the law’s effective date, because the Fourteenth‐Amendment Due‐Process Clause does not shield pre‐existing property interests from later police‐power regulation—a rule directly drawn from the Court’s holding that “prior acquisition... does not immunize a person from later police‐power regulations” (citing Diamond Glue Co. and Calder). The decision’s scope is limited to statutes that outright forbid possession of a regulated commodity and to situations where the legislature has provided notice of future illegality (i.e., a delayed‐effective‐date law); it does not extend to statutes that merely regulate use, nor does it create a blanket rule for all property‐rights claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, the case is a useful citation when a jurisdiction seeks to uphold the constitutionality of post‐enactment prohibitions on possession of previously lawful goods, and when arguing that an appellate court may affirm a conviction without addressing an unpreserved constitutional claim; however, it offers no guidance on the validity of similar statutes lacking a clear notice component or on substantive due‐process challenges that are properly preserved for review.

Updated July 24, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "A State having the power to forbid the manufacture, sale, and possession of liquor within its borders may, if it concludes to exercise the power, obviously postpone the date when the prohibition shall become effective, in order that those engaged in the business and others may adjust themselves to the new conditions."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 146 U.S. 667, ___ (1892) (§ pinpoint page not determinable from the supplied text)
Explanation: This sentence articulates the core substantive rule: a state may, under its police power, enact a prohibitory liquor statute and set a delayed effective date, thereby allowing enforcement against possession even of liquor acquired before the law takes effect.

Quoted text: "Whoever acquires, after the enactment of the statute, property thus declared noxious, takes it with full notice of its infirmity and that after a day certain its possession will, by mere lapse of time, become a crime."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 146 U.S. 667, ___ (1892) (§ pinpoint page not determinable)
Explanation: This passage defines the notice principle that underlies the Court’s holding—acquisition after enactment, even before the effective date, gives the possessor constructive notice that the property will become illegal to possess, supporting enforcement of the statute.

Quoted text: "It is well settled that the Federal Constitution does not enable one to stay the exercise of a State’s police power by entering into a contract under such circumstances. Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611, 615. Compare Calder v. Michigan, 218 U.S. 591, 599. Nor can—he do so by acquiring property."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 146 U.S. 667, ___ (1892) (§ pinpoint page not determinable)
Explanation: Here the Court directly links the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to the limitation on property‐rights challenges, citing precedent that prior acquisition or contractual expectations cannot shield a person from later police‐power regulation.

Quoted text: "The defendant raised, in his amended motion for a new trial, the further objection that the law was unconstitutional as applied to him, because the liquor had been acquired before the statute was enacted; but the trial judge denied the motion and declined to approve any of the grounds on which it was based. In accordance with the state practice its Supreme Court therefore refused to consider the point."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 146 U.S. 667, ___ (1892) (§ pinpoint page not determinable)
Explanation: This excerpt sets out the procedural posture, showing that the constitutional claim was rejected at trial and not preserved for appellate review, which underlies the Court’s procedural rule permitting affirmation without deciding the constitutional issue.

Quoted text: "Consequently the question is not before us, Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Woodford, 234 U.S. 46, 51; and on it we express no opinion."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 146 U.S. 667, ___ (1892) (§ pinpoint page not determinable)
Explanation: By invoking Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Woodford, the Court confirms the principle that a higher court will not render an opinion on a constitutional question that was not properly raised and preserved, reinforcing the procedural rule.

Updated July 24, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

Barbour v. State · 146 U.S. 667 (1892)Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co. · 187 U.S. 611 (1902)Calder v. Michigan · 218 U.S. 591 (1910)

Barbour v. State · 146 U.S. 667 (1892)Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Woodford · 234 U.S. 46 (1914)

Barbour v. State · 146 U.S. 667 (1892)Crane v. Campbell · 245 U.S. 304 (1918)

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

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Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

April 14, 1919

Docket

191

Precedential status

Published

Barbour v. Georgia

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion