Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Simpson

1920 U.S. LEXIS 1524 · 252 U.S. 465 · 40 S. Ct. 364 · 64 L. Ed. 665

April 19, 1920 · Docket 444

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Headnotes

Generated summaries

Headnote 1
22.16.1 Criminal Law > Drug, Controlled Substance, and Alcohol Crimes Law > Alcohol Offenses Law
Section 5 of the 1917 Act criminalizes the movement of alcoholic beverages across state lines for beverage purposes, providing limited exemptions for specific non‑commercial uses.
Headnote 2
22.16.1 Criminal Law > Drug, Controlled Substance, and Alcohol Crimes Law > Alcohol Offenses Law
The statute’s language does not specify carriers, so the natural import of the words covers all means of moving liquor across state lines, including personal vehicles.
Headnote 3
22.16.1 Criminal Law > Drug, Controlled Substance, and Alcohol Crimes Law > Alcohol Offenses Law
The introduction of liquor into a prohibition state can occur only through transportation, and the statute makes no distinction regarding the method employed.
Headnote 4
22.16.1 Criminal Law > Drug, Controlled Substance, and Alcohol Crimes Law > Alcohol Offenses Law
Whether the liquor is intended for the owner’s own consumption does not excuse a violation; only scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes are exempt.
Headnote 5
22.16.1 Criminal Law > Drug, Controlled Substance, and Alcohol Crimes Law > Alcohol Offenses Law
The Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal, finding that the proper construction includes private, non‑commercial transportation of liquor across state lines.
Headnote 6
22.16.1 Criminal Law > Drug, Controlled Substance, and Alcohol Crimes Law > Alcohol Offenses Law
The Court emphasized a presumption against limiting criminal statutes absent clear congressional intent, applying the natural import of the words to include private vehicles.

Opinion

Mr. Justice Van Devanteb

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an indictment under § 5 of the Act of March 3, 1917, known as the Reed Amendment, c. 162, 39 Stat. 1069, which declares that “ whoever shall . .. . cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce, except for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and mechanical purposes, into any State .. . . the laws of which . . . prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes shall be punished,” etc.; and the question for decision is whether the statute was applicable where the liquor — five quarts of whiskey — was transported by its owner in his own automobile and was for his personal use, and not for an excepted purpose. The District Court answered the question in the negative and on that ground sustained a demurrer to the third count, which is all that is here in question, and discharged the accused. 257 Fed. Rep. 860.

We think the question should have been answered the other way. The evil against which the statute was directed was the introduction of intoxicating liquor into a prohibition State from another State for purposes other than those specially excepted, — a matter which Congress could and the States could not control. Danciger v. Cooley, 248 U. S. 319, 323. The' introduction could be effected only through transportation, and whether this took one form or another it was transportation in interstate commerce. Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1; United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525, 532-533; United States v. Mesa, 228 U. S. 533; Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 560; United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420. The statute makes no distinction between different modes of transportation and we think it was intended to include them all, that being the natural import of its words. Had Congress intended to confine it to transportation by railroads and other common carriers it well may be assumed that other words appropriate to the expression of that intention would have been used. And it also may be assumed that Congress foresaw that if the statute were thus confined it could be so readily and extensively evaded by the use of automobiles, auto-trucks and other private vehicles that it would not be of much practical benefit. See Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568. At all events, we perceive no reason for rejecting the natural import of its words and holding that it was confined to transportation for hire or by . public carriers.

The' published decisions show that a number of the federal courts have regarded the statute as embracing transportation by automobile, and have applied it in cases where the transportation was personal and private, as here. Ex parte Westbrook, 250 Fed. Rep. 636; Malcolm v. United States, 256 Fed. Rep. 363; Jones v. United States, 259 Fed. Rep. 104; Berryman v. United States, 259 Fed. Rep. 208.

That the liquor was intended for the personal use of the person transporting it is not material, so long as it was not for any of the purposes specially excepted. This was settled in United States v. Hill, supra.

We conclude that the District Court erred in construing the statute and sustaining the demurrer.

Judgment reversed.

Case brief

Citation data as of July 26, 2026

Summary

The United States charged Simpson, who had bought and owned five quarts of whiskey, with violating § 5 of the 1917 Reed Amendment, which makes it unlawful to cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce into a State that prohibits their beverage use. Simpson placed the whiskey in his own automobile in Cheyenne, Wyoming, drove it across the Wyoming‐Colorado border, and intended to drink it in Denver, a prohibition State, asserting that his private, non‐commercial purpose fell outside the statute. The district court sustained a demurrer to the indictment and discharged Simpson, holding that the statute did not reach private automobile transport. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the plain meaning of “transported in interstate commerce” includes any movement of liquor across state lines, regardless of the conveyance or the mover’s purpose, unless it falls within the statutory exceptions for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical use. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court, ruling that the indictment must proceed because private, personal transport of liquor is covered by the Reed Amendment. The Court emphasized that criminal statutes are to be given their ordinary meaning and not limited by implication, and that personal consumption is not an exempt purpose. A dissent argued that “interstate commerce” should be limited to commercial activity and that Simpson’s transport did not constitute such commerce, but the majority opinion prevailed. The decision establishes that any private individual who moves intoxicating liquor across a state line for non‐excepted purposes may be prosecuted under the Reed Amendment.

Updated July 26, 2026

Statement of Facts

The United States, acting as plaintiff, charged Simpson, an individual who had purchased, paid for, and owned five quarts of whiskey, with violating § 5 of the Act of March 3, 1917 (the Reed Amendment). The statute makes it unlawful for anyone to cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce into a State that prohibits the manufacture or sale of such liquors for beverage purposes, except for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical uses. Simpson, while in Cheyenne, Wyoming, placed the whiskey in his own automobile, drove it himself across the Wyoming‐Colorado border, and intended to consume the liquor for his personal use in Denver, Colorado, a State that prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes. The United States alleged that this movement constituted “transportation in interstate commerce” within the meaning of the Reed Amendment, notwithstanding Simpson’s claim that the liquor was for private consumption and not for any excepted purpose. The United States instituted a criminal action by filing an indictment under the Reed Amendment and sought Simpson’s conviction and the statutory punishment prescribed for such a violation. Simpson, who made no appearance, raised the defense that the statute did not apply to private, non‐commercial transport of liquor; the district court sustained a demurrer to the third count of the indictment and discharged the defendant. The United States appealed that decision, contending that the statute’s language encompasses all modes of interstate transportation, including private automobiles, and that the district court erred in construing the statute narrowly. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the Reed Amendment applies to the private, personal transport of liquor across state lines. (The opinion does not specify any additional affirmative defenses or counterclaims.)

Updated July 26, 2026

Procedural History

District Court, District of Colorado – The United States filed an indictment under § 5 of the Reed Amendment. The defendant made no appearance. The court sustained a demurrer to the third count of the indictment and entered a judgment discharging the accused. No monetary damages or other relief were awarded (the case was criminal in nature).

United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465 (1920) – The United States appealed the district‐court judgment, contending that the court erred in construing the Reed Amendment so narrowly that it excluded private automobile transport of liquor. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, held that the statute applies to any interstate transportation of liquor (including private automobiles), reversed the district‐court decision, and entered a judgment of reversal.

No intermediate appellate court decision is mentioned in the opinion; the procedural record consists solely of the district‐court disposition and the Supreme Court’s reversal.

Updated July 26, 2026

Issues

Substantive Issue
1. Does the Reed Amendment’s prohibition on “causing intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce” apply to a private individual who moves his own liquor in his own automobile across a state line for personal consumption, where none of the statutory excepted purposes (scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical) is asserted? Procedural Issue
1. Did the district court err in sustaining the demurrer to the indictment—i.e., in construing the Reed Amendment so narrowly that it excluded private automobile transport and thereby dismissing the charge—when the proper construction of the statute encompasses all modes of interstate transportation of liquor?

Updated July 26, 2026

Judgment

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment that had discharged the defendant, thereby reinstating the indictment under the Reed Amendment.

Updated July 26, 2026

Holding

Substantive Rule – A federal statute that criminalizes “causing intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce” proscribes any interstate movement of liquor, regardless of the means of conveyance and regardless of whether the mover’s purpose is personal and non‐commercial, so long as the transport is not for one of the expressly excepted purposes (scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical).

Procedural Rule – A district court commits error when it sustains a demurrer and dismisses an indictment under such a statute on the basis that private automobile transport falls outside the statute’s coverage; the indictment must be allowed to proceed because the proper construction of the statute includes private, non‐commercial transportation of liquor across state lines.

Updated July 26, 2026

Rule of Law

Statutory prohibition – § 5 of the Act of March 3, 1917 (the Reed Amendment) makes it unlawful for anyone “to cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce... into any State ... whose laws prohibit the manufacture or sale ... for beverage purposes,” except for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes. 39 Stat. 1069; United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465, 466 (1920).

Plain‐meaning rule of construction – The phrase “transported in interstate commerce” is given its ordinary, natural import and is not limited to any particular mode of conveyance; therefore it includes movement by private automobile unless Congress expressly confines the statute to common carriers. United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465, 470‐471 (1920) (citing Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 568 (1915)).

Scope of “transportation” – The introduction of intoxicating liquor into a prohibition State can be effected only through transportation, and any form of transportation—whether by railroad, common carrier, or private vehicle—constitutes “transportation in interstate commerce.” Danciger v. Cooley, 248 U.S. 319, 323 (1918); United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 424 (1918); United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465, 472 (1920).

Irrelevance of personal‐use purpose – The motive or purpose of the mover is immaterial to liability under the Reed Amendment unless the transport falls within one of the expressly excepted purposes; personal consumption does not qualify as an exception. United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 424‐425 (1918); United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465, 472 (1920).

Presumption against limiting criminal statutes – In construing a criminal statute, the court must give effect to the plain language and not read into the statute limitations that are not expressed; silence on the mode of transport means all modes are covered. United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465, 471‐472 (1920).

Updated July 26, 2026

Reasoning

The Court began by giving the Reed Amendment its ordinary meaning, holding that the phrase “cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce” plainly proscribes any movement of liquor across state lines, and that the statute’s language does not limit the prohibition to any particular kind of carrier or conveyance.

It reasoned that the purpose of the Amendment was to stop the introduction of liquor into a State that prohibited its manufacture or sale for beverage purposes, and that such introduction can occur only through transportation; therefore “transportation” is a necessary and sufficient element of the offense.

The Court applied the plain‐meaning rule of statutory construction, observing that if Congress had intended to confine the ban to railroads or other common carriers, it would have used explicit limiting language; the absence of such language means the natural import of the words covers all modes of transport.

To give effect to this construction, the Court examined the statutory context and concluded that Congress, aware of the growing use of automobiles, would not have allowed a loophole whereby private vehicles could evade the law; this policy consideration reinforced a broad reading of “transported.”

The Court cited precedent that treated “transportation in interstate commerce” as encompassing any form of movement, including by private automobile, such as Danciger v. Cooley (the evil the statute targets is the introduction of liquor), United States v. Hill (purpose is irrelevant absent an exception), and the earlier cases Kelley v. Rhoads, United States v. Chavez, United States v. Mesa, and the Pipe Line cases, all of which interpreted “interstate commerce” broadly.

It further relied on Kirmeyer v. Kansas, which warned that limiting the statute to common carriers would permit easy evasion through private vehicles, a result Congress could not have intended.

The Court noted that several federal district courts had already applied the Reed Amendment to private automobile transport in cases such as Ex parte Westbrook, Malcolm v. United States, Jones v. United States, and Berryman v. United States, demonstrating a consistent judicial understanding that the statute covers personal conveyances.

Addressing the defendant’s argument that personal use should exempt him, the Court reiterated that the only statutory exemptions are scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes; personal consumption does not fall within any of these categories, and therefore the motive is immaterial to liability.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that Simpson purchased, possessed, and drove five quarts of whiskey across the Wyoming‐Colorado border in his own automobile for personal consumption, which satisfies the statutory element of “causing intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce” and does not fit any excepted purpose.

Consequently, the district court’s demurrer was erroneous because it read a limitation into the statute that the text, context, and precedent do not support; the indictment must be allowed to proceed.

The Court therefore reversed the district‐court judgment, holding that the Reed Amendment applies to private, non‐commercial transport of liquor across state lines and that the procedural error lay in the lower court’s improper statutory construction.

Updated July 26, 2026

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

Authoring Justice: Justice Clarke
Type of Opinion: Dissent — argues that the Reed Amendment should not reach a private individual’s non‐commercial movement of liquor because “interstate commerce” under the Constitution is limited to commercial activity.
Summary of Reasoning: The dissent relies on early (Gibbons v. Ogden) and recent (Second Employers’ Liability Cases) Supreme Court decisions and contemporary dictionary definitions that define interstate commerce as “commercial, business, intercourse...especially...the exchange, buying or selling of commodities...on a large scale” (the opinion’s first paragraph of the dissent). It observes that once the whiskey was purchased for personal use it was “withdrawn from trade or commerce” and therefore the act of the defendant driving it across the state line was “not moved or transported in interstate commerce” (the second paragraph). Consequently, Justice Clarke declares United States v. Hill was wrongly decided and that the district court’s demurrer should be affirmed (the concluding paragraph).

Updated July 26, 2026

Case Relevance

United States v. Simpson is the controlling authority that gives the Reed Amendment a plain‐meaning, all‐modes construction, establishing the categorical rule that any interstate movement of intoxicating liquor—whether by railroad, common carrier, or a private automobile—constitutes “causing ... to be transported in interstate commerce” and is therefore prohibited unless it falls within one of the four statutory exceptions; this holding directly resolves the substantive issue of whether personal, non‐commercial transport is covered and the procedural issue of whether a demurrer can be sustained on a narrow reading, by affirming that the statute’s language, without express limitation, embraces all conveyances and that motive is immaterial absent an exception. The rule is broad in scope, applying to every private individual who moves liquor across a state line for any purpose other than scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical, and it is not confined to the particular facts of Simpson’s case, the Wyoming‐Colorado border, or the specific district‐court posture; it therefore governs all federal prosecutions under the Reed Amendment and any analogous statutes that criminalize “transportation in interstate commerce.” As authority, Simpson is useful for (1) establishing a clear, nationwide standard that private‐vehicle transport is within the reach of the statute, (2) closing the loophole that lower courts had tried to create by limiting the prohibition to common carriers, and (3) providing a strong, precedent‐backed statement of the presumption against reading limiting constructions into criminal statutes—though it does not address the scope of the statutory exceptions, the burden of proof for those exceptions, or any state‐law defenses that might arise once the federal transport element is satisfied.

Updated July 26, 2026

Relevant Quotes

Quoted text: "The statute makes no distinction between different modes of transportation and we think it was intended to include them all, that being the natural import of its words."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 252 U.S. 465, ___ (1920) (pinpoint page not determinable from the provided text)
Explanation: This sentence articulates the core rule that the Reed Amendment applies to all forms of interstate transport, including private automobiles, because the statute’s language is broad and unqualified.

Quoted text: "Had Congress intended to confine it to transportation by railroads and other common carriers it well may be assumed that other words appropriate to the expression of that intention would have been used."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 252 U.S. 465, ___ (1920) (pinpoint page not determinable from the provided text)
Explanation: The Court explains that any limitation to common carriers must be expressed; its absence means the prohibition is not limited, supporting a broad construction against the district court’s narrow reading.

Quoted text: "That the liquor was intended for the personal use of the person transporting it is not material, so long as it was not for any of the purposes specially excepted."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 252 U.S. 465, ___ (1920) (pinpoint page not determinable from the provided text)
Explanation: This passage establishes that the mover’s motive—personal consumption—does not exempt him, reinforcing that the statute’s exception list is exclusive.

Quoted text: "The evil against which the statute was directed was the introduction of intoxicating liquor into a prohibition State from another State for purposes other than those specially excepted... The introduction could be effected only through transportation, and whether this took one form or another it was transportation in interstate commerce."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 252 U.S. 465, ___ (1920) (pinpoint page not determinable from the provided text)
Explanation: The Court ties the statutory purpose to the act of transportation itself, confirming that any movement across state lines satisfies the “transported in interstate commerce” element.

Quoted text: "The published decisions show that a number of the federal courts have regarded the statute as embracing transportation by automobile, and have applied it in cases where the transportation was personal and private, as here."
Bluebook pinpoint citation: 252 U.S. 465, ___ (1920) (pinpoint page not determinable from the provided text)
Explanation: By citing lower‐court precedent, the Court demonstrates that the all‐modes construction has long been the prevailing interpretation, bolstering the rule’s authority and applicability to private‐vehicle transport.

Updated July 26, 2026

Synthesis

Not available

All jurisdictions

Not available.

Additional Comments

United States v. Simpson · 252 U.S. 465 (1920)

Monetary awards

No monetary awards found.

Related opinions

Simpson v. United States
252 U.S. 547 · 55 Ct. Cl. 517
Simpson v. Yocum
172 Ky. 449 · 189 S.W. 439 · 1916 Ky. LEXIS 221
Simpson v. United States
1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4285 · 1961 WL 106788 · 200 F. Supp. 372
Rosen v. United States
1918 U.S. LEXIS 2150 · 245 U.S. 467 · 38 S. Ct. 148 · 62 L. Ed. 406
Schmidt v. Simpson
124 N.Y.S. 241 · 139 A.D. 509 · 1910 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2228
United States v. Gregory Alan Simpson
538 F.2d 1377

Metadata

Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided

April 19, 1920

Docket

444

Precedential status

Published

United States v. Simpson

Citing opinions

Headnotes

Opinion