Supreme Court of the United States

Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. Town of Graham

1920 U.S. LEXIS 1461 · 253 U.S. 193 · 40 S. Ct. 453 · 64 L. Ed. 855

June 1, 1920 · Docket 684, 685

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Headnotes

Generated summaries
  1. Headnote 1

    The Graham franchise ordinance did not expressly confer exclusivity, and the court held that because the grant lacked clear language, no exclusive right arose for Piedmont Power.

  2. Headnote 2

    The Graham ordinance’s statement that the town will provide “full and free use” of its streets was found insufficient to establish an exclusive right for the franchisee.

  3. Headnote 3

    Because the Graham franchise was non‑exclusive, the court held that the alleged deprivation could not constitute a taking of Piedmont Power’s property without due process.

  4. Headnote 4

    The court concluded that Piedmont Power’s agreement did not guarantee exclusivity, so granting a comparable franchise to Mutual Power did not violate the contract.

  5. Headnote 5

    The district court’s dismissals were affirmed because the pleadings did not allege an exclusive contractual right or a takings injury, making the actions legally insufficient.

Opinion

Memorandum opinion by direction of the court, by

Mr. Justice Clarke.

These are appeals direct from decrees of the District Court sustaining motions to dismiss complaints for the reason that they did not state facts sufficient to constitute a valid cause of action in equity. The cases involve the same facts differently stated by different complainants. The asserted warrant for the appeals is that action taken by the officials of the Town of Graham, North Carolina, if allowed to become effective, would result in violation of appellants’ contract with that town and in depriving them of their property without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution of the United States.

Since the bill in No. 684 contains all of the elements of strength which the bill in No. 685 contains and lacks some of its elements of weakness, the disposition of the former will rule the latter.

In No. 684 the appellant, a corporation, averring that it is the owner of a franchise to use the streets of the Town of Gxaham for the distribution 'of electric current, prays that the officials of the town be restrained from certifying as lawfully passed an ordinance granting a like franchise to the defendant, the Mutual Power & Light Company, and that the company be enjoined from using the streets for such purpose.

The grant to the appellant is set out in full in the bill and plainly it is not one of exclusive rights in the streets. The attempt to derive an exclusive grant from the declaration, in the paragraph of the ordinance relating to the trimming of trees, that “said Town of Graham hereby warrants that it will, by its proper authorities, provide for the full and free use of its streets, lanes,” etc., is fatuous and futile. Grants of rights and privileges by a State or municipality are strictly construed and whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld, — nothing passes by implication. Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22, 34; Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 471; Mitchell v. Dakota Central Telephone Co., 246 U. S. 396, 412. The grant to appellant not being an exclusive one, the contention that competition in business, likely to result from a similar grant to another company, would be a violation of appellant’s contract, or a taking of its property in violation of the Constitution of the United States is so plainly frivolous that the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, filed inr each case, must be sustained. David Kaufman Sons Co. v. Smith, 216 U. S. 610; Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U. S. 580; Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182.

Dismissed.