Hartford Life Insurance v. Blincoe
1921 U.S. LEXIS 1804 · 255 U.S. 129 · 41 S. Ct. 276 · 65 L. Ed. 549
February 28, 1921 · Docket 161
Headnotes
Generated summaries- Headnote 1
The Supreme Court affirmed that the Missouri court did not give full faith and credit to the Connecticut court’s judgment, violating the constitutional Full Faith and Credit requirement.
- Headnote 2
The Court explained that omissions are not part of the decision and therefore do not become law of the case, citing Messenger v. Andersen.
- Headnote 3
The Court noted that the assessment in question exceeded the necessary amount and was not approved by the required seven‑director board, rendering it invalid.
- Headnote 4
The Court held that the fifteen‑cent Missouri tax was unlawfully included in the mortuary assessment, making the assessment void and protecting the policyholder’s benefit.
- Headnote 5
The insurer argued that no evidence of a vexatious refusal was presented, but the statute itself limits recovery to cases where such refusal is shown.
- Headnote 6
The Court explained that the statutory construction and its application are for the state courts to determine, and federal review is limited to due‑process concerns.
- Headnote 7
The Court found it would be extreme to treat the application of § 7068 as a violation of due process, so the award was upheld.
- Headnote 8
The Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri judgment without giving full faith and credit to the prior Connecticut judgment, violating the constitutional requirement that states honor each other's final judgments on the same claim.
- Headnote 9
The Court explained that omissions in the earlier Missouri decision, such as the tax question, do not constitute binding law of the case, allowing the Supreme Court to address them now.
- Headnote 10
The Court held that the assessment of Barber exceeded the amount necessary and was not approved by the required board, rendering it invalid under the corporate charter rules.
- Headnote 11
The Supreme Court found that the fifteen‑cent Missouri tax was unlawfully included in the assessment, rendering the assessment void and its non‑payment ineffective to void the policy.
- Headnote 12
The Court noted the statutory language requiring a finding of a vexatious refusal before damages or fees may be awarded, and that the statute itself provides this limitation.
- Headnote 13
The Court held that the determination of the vexatious‑refusal condition is for Missouri courts, and its construction is not subject to federal review except for due‑process concerns.
- Headnote 14
The Court concluded that holding the Missouri award unconstitutional would be an extreme step, as the statute’s construction was not itself a Fourteenth‑Amendment violation.
- Headnote 15
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed a judgment without giving full faith and credit to a Connecticut judgment that had previously decided the charter powers and the assessment, contrary to the full‑faith‑and‑credit requirement.
- Headnote 16
The Court observed that the earlier opinion did not address the tax element of the assessment, so that issue was not law of the case and could be decided anew.
- Headnote 17
The Court found the assessment was for more than necessary and was not approved by the required seven‑director board, rendering the assessment invalid.
- Headnote 18
The Court held that a fifteen‑cent Missouri tax included in the mortuary assessment was unlawful, making the assessment void and preserving the policy’s benefit.
- Headnote 19
The insurer argued the statute was applied without proof of a vexatious refusal; the Court explained that the statutory prerequisite is a factual question for the state courts.
- Headnote 20
The Court stated that the construction and application of the statute are for the state courts, and federal courts should not intervene absent a Fourteenth Amendment violation.
- Headnote 21
The Court rejected the insurer’s claim that the award violated due process, finding no constitutional error in the state court’s determination under § 7068.
- Headnote 22
The Supreme Court found that the assessment contained an unlawful fifteen‑cent Missouri tax, rendering the entire assessment invalid and its non‑payment insufficient to void the policy.
- Headnote 23
The Court noted that the company’s charter required a board of at least seven directors to approve assessments and that the assessment in question was for an amount larger than needed to cover death losses.
- Headnote 24
The opinion held that the Missouri Supreme Court erred by failing to give full faith and credit to a Connecticut judgment that had previously decided the authority of the insurer’s assessment.
- Headnote 25
The Court explained that omissions do not become part of the law of the case, citing that the tax issue had not been addressed in the earlier judgment and therefore could be reconsidered.
- Headnote 26
The Court held that the determination of the vexatious‑refusal predicate is left to Missouri courts and that its construction is not subject to federal appellate review.
- Headnote 27
The opinion concluded that holding the Missouri award unconstitutional would be extreme where the statute’s application was not shown to violate due‑process principles.
- Headnote 28
The Company argued that the statute required a finding of vexatious refusal, and the Court noted that the statute’s language limits recovery to cases where such a finding is supported by evidence.
- Headnote 29
The Supreme Court of Missouri failed to give full faith and credit to a Connecticut judgment on the charter powers of Hartford Life, prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse the state court’s decision.
- Headnote 30
The Court observed that the tax issue was omitted from the earlier Missouri decision, so the prior judgment did not preclude re‑examining the tax’s inclusion in the assessment.
- Headnote 31
The Court found the assessment exceeded the company’s charter‑prescribed authority and amount, rendering it invalid under Missouri corporate‑charter principles.
- Headnote 32
The Court concluded that the fifteen‑cent Missouri tax was unlawfully inserted into the assessment, thereby voiding the assessment and preventing forfeiture of Barber’s insurance benefit.
- Headnote 33
Hartford Life argued no vexatious refusal was shown; the Court noted the statute’s prerequisite and that the state court must determine whether the condition is met.
- Headnote 34
The Court held that the construction and application of § 7068 are questions for Missouri courts, not subject to federal appellate scrutiny.
- Headnote 35
The Court said it would be extreme to declare the Missouri statute or its construction a violation of Due Process, reinforcing deference to state courts in applying their statutes.
- Headnote 36
The Supreme Court held that the fifteen‑cent Missouri tax included in the assessment was unlawfully added, rendering the whole assessment void.
- Headnote 37
Because the tax‑containing assessment was void, the court affirmed that Barber’s failure to pay it did not void the policy.
- Headnote 38
The Court noted that the assessment exceeded the necessary funds and was not approved by the charter‑required board, making it invalid.
- Headnote 39
The Court cited the statutory language that makes the vexatious‑refusal finding a prerequisite to any award under the statute.
- Headnote 40
The Court explained that the statutory condition is for the state courts to determine and is not subject to federal review except for due‑process challenges.
- Headnote 41
The Court stated that holding the statute or its construction to violate the Fourteenth Amendment would be “extreme.”
- Headnote 42
The opinion noted that the Missouri Supreme Court failed to give full faith and credit to the Connecticut judgment, violating the constitutional rule.
- Headnote 43
The Court explained that omissions are not part of the decision and therefore do not become binding law of the case.
- Headnote 44
The Court held that the Missouri Supreme Court failed to give full faith and credit to a Connecticut judgment, because the prior decision did not resolve the issue of the tax inclusion in the assessment.
- Headnote 45
The opinion explained that omissions from the earlier judgment are not part of the law of the case, so the question of the tax’s inclusion remained open for later determination.
- Headnote 46
The Court referenced the charter requirement of a minimum seven‑member board and held that the assessment in question exceeded the amount necessary to cover expected losses, rendering it invalid.
- Headnote 47
The Court found that the fifteen‑cent Missouri tax incorporated into the assessment was not permissible under Missouri law, and therefore the entire assessment was void.
- Headnote 48
Because the tax‑inclusive assessment was declared void, the Court held that Barber’s non‑payment could not defeat the policy’s benefit.
- Headnote 49
The Court explained that § 7068 is conditional; without proof of a vexatious refusal, the award of statutory damages and fees is not permitted.
- Headnote 50
The Court held that the determination of the vexatious‑refusal condition is reserved to Missouri courts and is not subject to federal appellate review except for due‑process issues.
- Headnote 51
The Court concluded that imposing the statutory award did not violate due process because the state court acted within its authority under § 7068.
- Headnote 52
The Court affirmed that the Missouri Supreme Court’s factual finding that Hartford had vexatiously refused payment justified the award of statutory damages and fees.
- Headnote 53
The Supreme Court affirmed that the Missouri court did not give full faith and credit to the Connecticut judgment, violating the constitutional full‑faith‑and‑credit rule.
- Headnote 54
The Court explained that omissions are not part of the law of the case, so the tax question, which was not decided earlier, could be revisited.
- Headnote 55
The Court noted that the assessment was for a larger amount than necessary and was not approved by the required board, rendering it invalid.
- Headnote 56
The Court held that the fifteen‑cent Missouri tax was unlawfully included, making the assessment void and its non‑payment insufficient to forfeit the benefit.
- Headnote 57
The Company argued the statute required proof of a vexatious refusal; the Court reiterated that the statutory prerequisite is an essential element for award.
- Headnote 58
The Court declined to re‑examine the state court’s construction of § 7068, noting that such factual inquiries are beyond federal review.
- Headnote 59
The Court held that, even if the award were harsh, it does not constitute a due‑process violation because the statute’s application was within the state’s authority.
- Headnote 60
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed a judgment without respecting the Connecticut judgment, leading the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse because the full‑faith‑and‑credit rule was violated.
- Headnote 61
The Court observed that the tax issue was never decided in the earlier Missouri ruling, so it was not binding in the later proceeding.
- Headnote 62
The Court held that the fifteen‑cent Missouri tax embedded in the assessment was unlawful, rendering the assessment void and its non‑payment ineffective to void the policy.
- Headnote 63
The Court reaffirmed earlier Missouri cases that the assessment was excessive and not approved by the requisite board, making it invalid under the corporate charter.
- Headnote 64
The Company argued that no evidence of a vexatious refusal existed; the Court noted that §7068 itself limits recovery to cases where such a refusal is proven.
- Headnote 65
The Court held that Missouri courts’ construction of §7068 was a state‑law factual inquiry beyond the scope of federal appellate review.
- Headnote 66
The Court concluded that the award under §7068 did not violate due‑process because the statutory prerequisite was properly applied by the Missouri courts.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is the second writ of error in this case. The opinion upon the first writ is reported in 245 U. S. 146. The suit here is, as it was there, upon a certificate of qualified life insurance, issued to Frank Barber and payable at his, death to his wife, the plaintiff, who has since died and her administratrix has been substituted as defendant in error.
The defense here is, as it was there, that Barber failed to pay the mortuary assessment levied January 29, 1910, known as quarterly call No. 126 and that the failure voided the policy by . its terms.
In that case Mrs. Barber recovered judgment, which we reversed on the ground that in rendering it the state court disregarded a judgment of a Connecticut court which had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, including Barber.
Upon the return of the case to the state court a new trial was had that resulted again in a verdict and judgment for Mrs. Barber. . They were affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. 279 Missouri, 316.
To- that affirmance this writ .of error is directed, and the question presented is, Did the Supreme Court proceed hi- consonance with-, our decision? The extent of our decision is, therefore, necessary to consider and what it directed.- The determination is in thé issue that was presented and passed upon.
By reference to the report of -the case (245 U. S. 146) it.willbe'seen that the Supreme Court rested the judgment .reviewed on the invalidity of the assessment and that the non-payrnent of the latter did not, upon two grounds, work a forfeiture of the'insurance: (1) Under the condition of the funds,of the company the assessment was for a larger amount than was necessary , to pay death losses; (2) The charter of the company required all its affairs to be managed and controlled by a board of not less' than seven directors, and that - the assessment was. notTevied by the board. These rulings we held to be “in the teeth' of. the. Connecticut adjudication which held that it was proper-and reasonable for the company to hold a fund collected 'in advance in order to enable it to pay losses promptly.” It was hence decided that the trial court in rendering judgment against .the Hartford Company, and the Supreme .Court in affirming the judgment, did not give “full faith and credit to the Connecticut record.” The reasons for the conclusion we need not repeat.
With this ruling the Supreme Court was confronted upon its reconsideration of-the case with the freedom of decision that remained; to it, and resolved that we had left untouched any consideration of the elements constituting the assessment;.aiid .that it was at liberty to. decide, and deeidéd, that a tax, asserted by the company to have been imposed by the laws Of Missouri, had been unlawfully included in the assessment and that, therefore; the assessment was void and its non-payment did not work a forfeiture of Barber’s insurance. To. the contention of the company that such holding was precluded by our opinion, it was replied that the matter presented purely a question arising under the laws of the State and that this court “did not intend by its judgment to adjudicate to the contrary.”
The decision of the court that the Hartford Company was not subject to the tax that it had included in its assessment was not new. -It was a repetition of the ruling made in Northwestern Masonic Aid Association v. Waddill, 138 Missouri, 628, in 1897, and should have been known to the Hartford Life Insurance Company at the time it made the assessment and mortuary call. The ruling has been again repeated in Young v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., 277 Missouri, 694, and upon the authority of those cases the court decided that the tax was not applicable to companies doing business on the assessment plan and that on that plan the Hartford Company was doing business.
The Hartford Company contests the latter ruling and, as dependent upon it, the other ruling, that is, that the company was not subject to the tax, and asserts besides that the effect of the inclusion of the tax in the assessment was presented to this court on the former writ of error, and whether it was authorized by the Connecticut decree, and that the answers were in the affirmative, — -in other words, passed upon the .power to make and the elements that made the assessment. Counsel say “this court could not have held that this assessment was authorized by the Connecticut decree and at the same time hold that it was void because it included the fifteen cents tax.” To sustain this view óf the case the opinion is quoted as follows: “It is obvious on the evidence that this assessment was levied in the usual way adopted by the company and tacitly sanctioned by the Connecticut judgment.”
Counsel, however, admit that the question of the inclusion of the tax was not discussed,-but insist that “the question was in the record, was necessarily involved, and was presented,” and invoké the presumption tjiat whatever was within the issue was decided.. In other words, that the case was conclusive not only of . all that was decided, but of all that might have been decided.
From our statement of the issues it is manifest that thé quotation from the opinion has other explanation than counsel’s, and we need not dwell upon the presumption invoked or the extent of its application in a proper case. The question of the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand, or its effect upon a particular issue or question in some other case, is not here involved. The most that can be said of any question that was decided is, that it became the law of the case and as such' binding on the "Supreme Court of the State, and to what extent binding is explained in Messenger v. Andersen, 225 U. S. 436. Certainly, omissions do not constitute a part of a decision and become the law of the case, nor does a contention of counsel not responded to. The element of taxes in the assessment was not considered by the Supreme Court, and in this court the Connecticut judgment and its effect were the prominent and determining factors. The question of the inclusion of tHe tax was not discussed or even referred to. The. only question considered was the powers given to the directors of the company by the Connecticut charter and the effect that was to-be assigned to the. Connecticut judgment as that of a court having jurisdiction to decide what powers the charter conferred or required. It is hardly necessary to say that the tax law of Missoúri was no part of the charter. It was a condition the company encountered and became subject to in Missouri.
It was urged, it is t ue, in the brief of counsel that the assessment “was vqt ?d because it included money'.for taxes erroneously claimed to be exacted under the laws of Missouri.” No notice, however, was taken of the contention and no influence given to it or to the effect it asserted. If it made any impression at all it was obviously as a state question dependent upon the state statutes upon which we would naturally not anticipate the state courts, the case necessarily going back to them.
Nor may we judge of the action of the Supreme Court of the State upon the tax because of its size, nor yield to the contention of the company that it had not accepted the assessment plan of insurance but was-doing business on the premium plan, and, therefore, subject to the tax which it had included in the assessment. These axe state questions and are not within our power to review.
It is further contended by rhe Hartford Company that the Supreme Court permitted the recovery of damages and attorney’s fees under the provisions of a statute of the State, although there was nó evidence in support thereof except the delay in payment of the claim for insurance, notwithstanding, it is further said; the company “had prevailed on every issue that had theretofore been presented,” and that by this action the company was deprived of- its property without flue process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
In support of its contention the Company cites § 7068 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri which, it is said, authorizes such recovery only “if it appear from the evidence that such company [insurance company] has vexatiously refused to pay” loss under a policy¡ and no evidence was offered on either trial to show the existence of the condition prescribed by the statute. The immediate answer to the contention is that what the statute prescribed was for the courts of the State to determine and their construction is not open to our review though we might consider its application to the circumstances of of the case to be rather hard. And it would, we think, be..extreme to hold that the statute or its construction is a violation, of the Fourteenth Amendment'.
Judgment affirmed.