Supreme Court of the United States

Hurley v. Commission of Fisheries of Va.

1921 U.S. LEXIS 1333 · 257 U.S. 223 · 42 S. Ct. 83 · 66 L. Ed. 206

December 5, 1921 · Docket 33

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Headnotes

Generated summaries
  1. Headnote 1

    The appellant marked oyster grounds and claimed a right to occupy them, but the Court held that any property rights he asserted were necessarily based on the Virginia fisheries statute and not derived from his mere occupation.

  2. Headnote 2

    The Court affirmed that the appellant could not both assail the fisheries statute and depend on it for a protected property interest, citing the principle that a party cannot both attack a law and rely upon it in the same proceeding.

  3. Headnote 3

    The appellant planted stakes to mark oyster grounds and claimed a property interest, but the Court held that his claimed right was derived entirely from the Virginia fisheries statute, not from the mere act of marking the beds.

  4. Headnote 4

    The district court refused a temporary injunction because the appellant could not both challenge the Virginia fisheries statute and depend on that same statute for a protected property interest in the oyster grounds.

  5. Headnote 5

    The appellant claimed a right to occupy oyster grounds he had marked with stakes, but the Court held that no independent property right existed because the alleged rights were derived solely from the Virginia fisheries statute.

  6. Headnote 6

    The district court refused a temporary injunction because the appellant could not both assert a statutory‑derived property right in the oyster beds and challenge the validity of the same Virginia fisheries statute that created that right.

  7. Headnote 7

    The appellant had placed stakes and marks on oyster grounds in the Rappahannock River and argued that those markings gave him a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, independent of Virginia’s fisheries statute.

  8. Headnote 8

    The district court refused a temporary injunction because the appellant’s claimed property interest in the oyster beds depended on the Virginia fisheries statute he was also alleging to be unconstitutional, invoking the principle that a party cannot both attack a law and depend upon it.

  9. Headnote 9

    The appellant claimed a right to occupy oyster grounds he had staked, but the Court held that such claimed rights were necessarily based on the Virginia fisheries statute and that no independent property interest existed beyond the statutory scheme.

  10. Headnote 10

    The district court refused a temporary injunction because the appellant’s claimed property right arose from the Virginia fisheries statute he was contesting, and the Court affirmed that a party cannot both assail a statute and depend on it for a protected interest.

Opinion

Mr. Justice McReynolds

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellant sought a temporary injunction restraining the Virginia Commission of Fisheries from removing the stakes and marks which designated the boundaries of certain oyster grounds in the Rappahannock River, planted by him and which he claimed the right to occupy, and thereby opening the same for public use and enjoyment.

He maintained that the Commission was proceeding under a state statute invalid because it. failed to provide for proper notice and hearing and that the proposed action would deprive him of property without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.

A majority of the three judges composing the court below concluded—264 Fed. 116—that the Commission had acted in substantial compliance with the challenged statute, that whatever rights of property appellant claimed in respect of the specified lands, or the oysters thereon, were necessarily based upon the statute itself and that he could not both assail it and rely upon it in the same proceeding. Kansas City, Memphis & Birmingham R. R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. 111, 117. And further that the evidence showed conclusively that the threatened action would not deprive him of any property which he could rightfully claim. It accordingly refused to grant a temporary injunction but did not dismiss complainant’s bill. We find no reason to interfere with this decree and it is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Clarke concurs in the result.